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iSummary
Over the past forty years the transnational women’s movement has worked 
to conceptualise and institutionalise the understanding of violence against 
women as a gendered human rights violation. Their efforts have led the 
response at the international level, and have shaped the (markedly feminist) 
international human rights law approach to violence against women. 
Despite successes in conceptualising and institutionalising norms concerning 
the elimination of violence against women, there remain problems in 
implementing these norms and holding states accountable. As such, violence 
against women is still pandemic, affecting at least one in three women. An 
area worthy of additional research and attention is state responsibility for 
prevention – particularly primary prevention, aimed at the ‘upstream’ or ‘root’ 
causes of violence against women – and the use of the due diligence standard 
as a tool for actualising this obligation. The due diligence standard is a 
significant development of state responsibility, which, within the context of 
human rights protection, broadens notions of state responsibility to include
instances where there is a failure to exercise due care to prevent or respond 
to violative acts or omissions of private or non-state actors. In the context of 
violence against women, this provides a ‘juridical bridge’ for addressing private 
violence, particularly domestic violence, as a human rights violation, for which 
the state can – and should – be held accountable. The evolution of ‘systemic 
due diligence’ – aimed at the broader level of human rights protection – has 
furthered this feminist theory of state responsibility.
The aim of this thesis is to deepen the understanding of violence against 
women as a gendered human rights violation and to discover how the due 
diligence standard can be better used as a tool to bring about its elimination; 
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1Introduction
The transnational women’s anti-violence movement is now at a mature stage of 
development. It is nearly 40 years since the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979) was signed into law, and 
over 25 years since the CEDAW Committee made General Recommendation no. 19
(1992) on violence against women and the world community united behind the 
Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW, 1993). The 
transnational women’s movement has worked across this time to conceptualise the
understanding of ‘violence against women’1 as a specifically gendered human rights 
violation, and this has led efforts to institutionalise a response at the international level, 
particularly within the field of international human rights law. 
1 Throughout my thesis I rely on the definition given in Article 1 of the Declaration for the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women and Beijing Platform for Action, as framed by the efforts of the transnational 
women’s movement during the international conferences. This definition is used by women’s 
organisations around the world. Violence against women is ‘any act of gender-based violence that 
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including 
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private 
life.’ (United Nations, Report Of The Fourth World Conference On Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action, paragraph 113 and General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women, A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Article 1). In Chapter 2 I will explain 
more fully the history and development of the term ‘violence against women’ within the international 
human rights law discourse, as well as detailing the significance of its feminist conceptualisation and 
focusing on the importance of its framing as ‘gender-based violence’ (meaning violence that is gendered 
and discriminatory). For now it is enough to note the framing and jurisprudential roots of the term 
within the two primary international legal sources focused on violence against women: the DEVAW and 
General Recommendations nos. 19 and 35, clarifying the inclusion of violence against women under the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The DEVAW Preamble states that: 
‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and 
women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the 
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial 
social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men.’ 
(General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Preamble, available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/48/104) The 
CEDAW Committee supports this definition by describing violence against women as: ‘[v]iolence that is 
directed against a woman because she is a woman, or that affects women disproportionately.’ 
(Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 19, 11th
session, A/47/38, (1992), paragraph 6, available from http://undocs.org/A/47/38) The CEDAW 
Committee further clarifies the definitions given by the DEVAW and General Recommendation no 19, 
and outlines the evolved understanding of this framing by offering further definitional clarity of the term: 
‘The concept of ‘violence against women’ in general recommendation No. 19 and other international 
instruments and documents has emphasised that this violence is gender-based. Accordingly, this 
document uses the expression ‘gender-based violence against women’, as a more precise term that 
makes explicit the gendered causes and impacts of the violence. This expression further strengthens the 
understanding of this violence as a social – rather than an individual – problem, requiring comprehensive 
responses, beyond specific events, individual perpetrators and victims/survivors.’ (Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35 on gender-based 
violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), 
paragraph 9.)
2Despite successes in conceptualising and institutionalising norms concerning the 
prevention and elimination of violence against women, there remain problems in 
implementing these norms and holding states accountable to their duties to prevent 
and eliminate violence against women. As such, violence against women is still 
pandemic, posing one of the greatest threats to the lives and wellbeing of women 
globally. Affecting at least one in three women, violence against women continues to 
have devastating impacts on women across all racial, religious and socioeconomic 
groups, and is worthy of further and greater efforts, involving innovative research and 
action, to bring about its elimination. An area worthy of additional research is state 
responsibility for prevention – particularly primary prevention, aimed at the ‘upstream’ 
or ‘root’ causes of violence against women – and the use of the due diligence standard 
as a tool for actualising this obligation. The due diligence standard is a significant 
development of state responsibility, which, within the context of human rights 
protection and fulfilment, expands state responsibility to include instances where there 
is a failure to exercise due care to prevent or respond to violative acts or omissions of 
private or non-state actors. In the context of violence against women, this provides a 
‘juridical bridge’2 for addressing private violence, particularly domestic violence, as a 
human rights violation, for which the state can – and should – be held accountable.
The aim of my thesis is to further the understanding of violence against women as a 
gendered human rights violation and to discover how the due diligence standard can 
be better used as a tool to bring about its elimination; if, indeed, it is fit for this 
purpose. My primary concern throughout is related to the conceptualisation, framing 
and understanding of violence against women, as good practice relies on sure 
methodological and theoretical foundations, and the institutionalisation of this framing. 
As such I will be examining: both the epistemological and methodological 
underpinnings of the feminist response to violence against women (Chapter 1); the 
framing and institutionalisation of violence against women as a human rights violation 
within the international setting (Chapter 2); the normative and legal development of 
primary prevention (Chapter 3); and, the effectiveness of the due diligence standard as 
2 Elizabeth A. H. Abi-Mershed, “Due Diligence and the Fight Against Gender-Based Violence in the 
Inter- American System,” In Due Diligence and its Application to Protect Women From Violence, edited by 
Carin Benninger-Budel, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 128.
3a legal and sociopolitical tool for actualising a feminist account of state responsibility 
and accountability (Chapter 4). 
My approach to these questions is framed by my own experience of the co-
constitutive nature of feminist theory and practice, and what I argue to be the 
significance of theorised practice of, and in, the law. Attention is paid both to the 
institutional and discursive space – and the relationship between the two – crafted by 
feminist engagement with international human rights law; and, throughout, effort is 
made to draw out the richness and importance of the feminist underpinnings of both 
the international institutional and discursive response to violence against women. In 
part, this is in opposition to engagement with the international human rights law 
approach to violence against women that is untheorised, depoliticised and gender-
neutral. In itself, maintaining the institutional gains and discursive space created by the 
transnational women’s movement is a worthy and necessary task that runs throughout 
my thesis. Beyond this, I hope to build on this ground and push towards greater 
institutional and discursive space for women, and in particular women’s experience of
violence against women. 
I plan to bring together sociopolitical and legal analysis of the international human 
rights law approach, with particular engagement with, and review of, the case law of 
the CEDAW Committee under the Optional Protocol, and the Inter-American Court 
and Commission of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights. This will 
be underpinned by analysis of the theoretical and legal framing provided by feminist 
theorists, activists, lawyers, and practitioners, in the field of violence against women. 
Whilst reference to the case law of the regional bodies shapes my analysis of the due 
diligence standard, I have tried to focus, where possible, on the norms of the 
international community at the broadest level, as expressed through the many auspices 
of the United Nations – posed as they are, as representing a significant global 
consensus and universality. The varied workings and trappings of the UN fora make 
comparative analysis challenging, and I have chosen to highlight and focus on the work 
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, 
and the CEDAW Committee, in particular. 
4The scope of my thesis considers violence against women broadly, but there is 
undoubtedly a higher level of attention paid to the particular problem of domestic 
abuse. Whilst domestic abuse is only one form or manifestation of violence against 
women, it is by far the most common and most pervasive. It has also been heavily 
privatised until recent decades, and has, over the past five to ten years, become a 
contested issue again, as the inclusion of men’s experience of domestic abuse raises 
fresh questions about the gendered conceptualisation of domestic abuse. Whilst 
domestic abuse is heavily focused on, it is not the sole focus of my research, and my 
intention is not to separate domestic abuse from other forms or manifestations of 
violence against women, other than to highlight it due to its pervasiveness. The 
gendered analysis of domestic violence provided in my thesis extends to violence 
against women more broadly.
Given that I’m taking a radical feminist approach to preventing violence against women, 
it is worth at the offset addressing the question of ‘why international law?’ Engagement 
with the law is not unproblematic or without challenges, and throughout the thesis 
these challenges are highlighted and negotiated (particularly in Chapter 1). Nor is 
engagement with the law presented as the sole response required, or indeed, 
necessarily, the most important response. This said, engagement as an activist and 
practitioner – with over a decade’s experience working with disenfranchised and at-
risk young people – has only served to bolster my belief in engagement with 
international law; so often characterised as distant and distinct from our daily, material 
experience. The state as a hegemonic cultural actor is the source of much of the 
framing, creation, and perpetuation, of the patriarchal norms that structure our society 
at the broadest level, but also that permeate levels more intimate to the individual. 
State responsibility for primary prevention engages the state at this level and seeks to 
challenge the state’s role as a creator and curator of culture. Accountability at this level 
is required for accountability at the intimate level of the individual. International human 
rights law can (and does) serve as part of this challenge and reframing at the broadest 
level; and whilst beset with challenges – particularly the ongoing dominance of men in 
international law – remains one of the best ways of renegotiating the power of 
women’s citizenship, and the power of the state. Engagement with the law throughout 
my thesis is premised on the hope of strengthening the transnational women’s 
movement’s leadership of the international response to violence against women, and 
5creating and claiming further space for women to renegotiate the shape of the social, 
political and legal society that shapes their lives. 
6Chapter 1 – Feminism as Method: Consciousness Raising, Positionality and
Questioning
To explore the international human rights law approach to violence against women, 
and to clarify and expand on the understanding and application of the due diligence 
obligation to prevent violence against women, I will be relying on theory and 
methodology rooted in radical feminism. The choice to use a radical feminist lens was 
not taken prior to engagement with the international human rights law approach to 
violence against women, but was determined by exposure to the theory and method 
of feminism, and specifically radical feminism, through interaction with the international 
human rights law approach to violence against women itself. As this approach has 
been established and shaped by feminism, likewise my chosen method has been 
established and shaped by engagement with the approach. The second chapter of my 
thesis elucidates on this experiential grounding in radical feminism, through exposure 
to the law, including exposition of the main tenets of the international human rights 
law approach to violence against women and their basis in this strand of feminism. 
Whilst it may seem obvious to those with awareness of the politics and 
methodologies of feminism, that the international human rights law approach to 
violence against women is feminist, this is not obvious to all, and indeed not obvious to 
all who participate in the discourse. Furthermore, the distinctive character of the 
international human rights law approach to violence against women as rooted in 
radical feminism, seems even less obvious. As I will explore in later chapters, the more 
recent use of non-feminist methodologies within the expounding of the approach can 
be contradictory to the purposes of the law when untheorised and lacking the correct 
understanding of its feminist character. Whilst the evolution of the women’s 
movement continues to progress the understanding and methodologies of feminism, 
and to a lesser degree the jurisprudence surrounding the international human rights 
law approach to violence against women, the law itself has specific historicity and 
jurisprudential roots. Whilst one might expect these roots to be liberal in character, 
due to the law being liberal in nature, they are in fact not liberal. They are distinctly 
radical. 
In Chapter 2 I will look at these roots, considering: substantive law, jurisprudence of 
the relevant international courts and treaty monitoring bodies, and the work of expert 
7bodies. However, the character of the international human rights law approach as 
feminist, and my own methodology, is not composed of substantive positions only. 
The theoretical and methodological character of feminism, as expounded by radical 
feminism, runs throughout, and lies beneath and beyond, these substantive positions, 
and creates its own discursive space within the international human rights law 
approach to violence against women. As such, I will clarify my use of radical feminism 
as a theoretical and methodological framework before considering the substantive 
positions within the international human rights law approach, which stem from this. 
Again, as will be shown in later chapters, methodologies or approaches that are 
sympathetic to, or incorporate, these substantive positions, but do not have beyond 
them a feminist methodology, underpinned by feminist epistemology, are ineffective in 
utilising the international human rights law approach to its proper purposes and ends. 
As will be shown in Chapter 2, principal tenets of feminist thinking have led the 
international human rights law approach to violence against women – namely the 
problem of patriarchy and the understanding of violence against women as gendered 
and discriminatory. There is a clear theoretical and political framework for 
understanding violence against women. In this chapter I am interested in whether this 
theoretical framework works as a methodology for (legal) change or whether it is
limited to critique or a list of substantive issue-based positions. Does feminism have a 
(legal) methodology? Or, is it a (legal) methodology? I believe it is a method and I will 
establish in this chapter how I intend to use it to analyse, interpret and expand upon 
the international human rights law approach to violence against women, and 
specifically the issues of prevention, due diligence and state responsibility. 
My use of feminism as a methodology is heavily influenced by the work of Catherine 
MacKinnon and Katherine Bartlett, in particular, MacKinnon’s work in Feminism 
Unmodified and Toward a Feminist Theory of State. More broadly I am influenced by 
other second wave thinkers, such as Sandra Harding, Andrea Dworkin, Gloria 
Steinman, Shelia Rowbotham, Nancy Hartsock, Kate Millet, and Susan Brownmiller. 
These voices are predominantly radical feminists, with the exception of Shelia 
Rowbotham and Nancy Hartsock. Whilst I reference Rowbotham and Hartsock’s work 
on consciousness, as will be shown, I further extend their thinking to a radical feminist 
view of consciousness. My thinking on the methodologies of standpoint and 
8consciousness-raising is heavily shaped by the work of postcolonial feminists such as 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Lourdes Torres, and Black feminists such as Patricia 
Collins and Audre Lorde. My epistemological concerns with positionality and 
consciousness are perhaps best taken up by postcolonial queer feminist theorist, Gloria 
Anzaldúa, and I rely heavily on her work, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza in 
drawing together my own thoughts.  Whilst I will lean more on feminist international 
legal scholars during my review of international human rights treaty and customary law 
(Chapters 2 and 3) – predominantly Christine Chinkin and Hillary Charlesworth, but 
with reference also to Rashida Manjoo, Rebecca Cook, Charlotte Bunch, Sally 
Goldfarb, Rhonda Copelan, and Renée Römkens – I want to look first at the 
foundations of feminist legal thinking more broadly to establish my methodology. 
Whilst my exposure to radical feminism was through international human rights law 
scholars, the methodology predates the work of Chinkin, Charlesworth and others, 
and I wish to deepen my own understanding of how the second wave established and 
shaped the international human rights law approach to violence against women. Whilst 
Bartlett, MacKinnon and Hartsock don’t focus specifically on international human rights 
law and violence against women, I believe review of their work is necessary to 
understand the theoretical and methodological character of the substantive positions 
outlined in international human rights law and developed by the international human 
rights law scholars who followed, such as Chinkin and Charlesworth. In engaging with 
the theoretical, methodological, and epistemological roots of the feminist approach, I 
expect to come up against a key question: can radical feminism, as a legal 
methodology, lend itself to constructive/reconstructive – as well as 
critical/deconstructive – jurisprudence? If it can, I intend to explore how. If I conclude 
that it can’t lend itself to constructive/reconstructive jurisprudence I will have to 
consider how this might affect any substantive positions I was expecting to take in 
clarifying prevention and establishing a feminist framework for systemic due diligence. 
Before problematizing the application of (radical) feminist method to the 
deconstruction and reconstruction within the law, it is worth noting the relationship 
between the more broadly denoted ‘feminist approaches to intentional law’3 and 
(radical) feminist methodology. Whilst it was through Chinkin and Charlesworth’s 
3 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International 
Law,” American Journal of International Law, 85(4), (1991): 613 – 645.
9work that I became familiar with feminist approaches to international law – part of the 
broader critical international scholarship known as the ‘new approaches to 
international law’ (NAIL)4 – it was evident in their appeal to deeply politicised 
understandings of gender and gendered issues of the law, that a more radical and 
wide-reaching methodology belied the international legal approach. Similarly, whilst 
‘feminist jurisprudence’5, more broadly, speaks to ideas introduced (largely) by North 
American scholars such as Ann Scales, Catherine MacKinnon, Martha Fineman, 
Christina Brookes Whitman, Christine Littleton, Carol Smart, and Mary Mossman,6 the 
scholarship finds deeper and wider roots in feminist political theory. Deeper in the 
sense that it builds on a critical approach already well established which looks beyond 
the law to fundamental issues of gender and power, and wider in the sense that it 
draws from a far broader critical spectrum of feminist input (from philosophy, history, 
and psychology) than the often liberal framing of legal theory, methodology and the 
study of jurisprudence. The predominantly legal theorists originating the work on 
feminist jurisprudence in the 1980s, and the feminist approaches to international law in 
the 1990s, regularly appealed to a deeper well of critical and radical methodology
(rooted in second wave feminism) when grounding their own legal theorising and 
contributions on methodology, and drew broadly from critical race theory alongside 
feminist political theory.7 For instance in her landmark essay, ‘The emergence of 
4 José María Beneyto and David Kennedy, eds., New Approaches to International Law: The European and 
the American Experiences, (The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 2012); Thomas Skouteris, “Fin de NAIL: New 
Approaches to International Law and its Impact on Contemporary International Legal Scholarship,” 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 10, (1997): 415 – 420.
5 First coined by Ann C. Scales in the 1970s.
6 Ann C. Scales, “Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,” University of New Mexico School of Law, 56(3), 
(Spring 1981): 375 – 444; Ann C. Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” Yale 
Law Journal, 95, (1986): 1373 – 1403; Ann Scales, “Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary,” UCLA 
Women’s Law Journal, 2, (1992): 1 – 34; Catherine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” Signs, 8(4), (1983): 638 – 639; Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism 
Unmodified: Discourses On Life And Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Catherine 
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1989); Catherine 
MacKinnon, “Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” In Feminist Jurisprudence, Patricia Smith, ed,. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993); Martha Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, At the Boundaries of 
Law: Feminism and Legal Theory, (New York: Routledge, 1991); Martha Fineman, “Feminist Theory in 
Law: The Difference It Makes,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, 2, (1992): 1 – 24; Christina Brooks 
Whitman, “Feminist Jurisprudence,” Feminist Studies, 17, (Fall 1991): 493 – 507; Christine Littleton, “In 
search of a Feminist Jurisprudence,” Harvard Women’s Law Journal, 10, (Spring 1987): 1 – 7; Carol Smart, 
Feminism and the Power of Law, (New York: Routledge, 1989); Mary Jane Mossman, “Feminism and Legal 
Method: The Difference it Makes,” Wisconsin Women's Law Journal, 3 (1987): 147 – 168; Mary Jane 
Mossman, “Feminism and the Law: Challenges and Choices,” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 
10, (1998): 1 – 16. 
7 Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” 1374; Angela P. Harris, “Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,” Stanford Law Review, 42(3), (Feb 1990): 581 – 616; Elizabeth M. 
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feminist jurisprudence’, legal scholar Ann C. Scales describes how radical political 
theorists challenged her formation in liberal legal theory and methodology, without 
which she says: ‘I would probably have been trapped by legal education into believing 
the paeans to objectivity which are the target of my criticism.’8 She goes on to say: 
‘[f]ocusing primarily upon the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Carol Gilligan, Dorothy 
Dinnerstein, and Adrienne Rich, I arrive at an endorsement of Catharine MacKinnon's
radical feminist legal theory.’9
The relationship between legal theory and jurisprudence and (radical) feminist theory 
sparked contention – both for lawyers and theorists: ‘could such a feminist agenda be 
accommodated within the legal system?’10 And ‘[i]n what sense can legal methods be 
‘feminist?’11 A body of scholarship grew in the 1980s focused on these questions –
particularly where the more radical ideas of feminist theory were integrated into 
critical legal analysis and methodologies.12 Indeed debate continues as to whether 
radical feminism is concerned with issues too fundamental – and too closely entwined 
with the kind of power that the law upholds – to attempt to navigate or utilise the law 
as a tool for systemic change. More will be said on this later.
Beyond bringing a challenge to how legal systems address the lives of women – as 
liberal (feminist) legal methodologies might – radical feminism was concerned more 
fundamentally with the root causes of women’s oppression, and how the law has been 
used to maintain this oppression. This marked a significant shift in approaches to the 
law as it questioned the objectivity of the law and presented a foundational ‘challenge 
to the status quo.’13 This shift symbolised a discontent with the legal methodologies 
available for interrogating the law as it concerned the lives of women – seen as they 
were as ‘offer[ing] little opportunity for fundamental questioning’14. Legal scholars
called for recourse to radical feminist political theory – and the work of ‘non-legal’15
Schneider, “The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s movement,” New York 
University Law Review, 61, (1986): 589 – 652.
8 Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” 1374.
9 Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” 1374.
10 Mossman, “Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes,” 149.
11 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 830.
12 Scales, “Law and Feminism: Together in Struggle,” 291 – 296; Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 830.
13 E. Langland and W. Gove, eds., A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The Difference It Makes,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 3.
14 Mossman, “Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes,” 149.
15 Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” 1373.
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theorists – as a necessary challenge to the ‘vocabulary, as well as the epistemology and 
political theory, of the law as it is.’16 In particular, legal scholars utilised and applied the 
epistemology of feminist methods as it relates to consciousness-raising – a ‘way of 
knowing’17 most commonly called on by radical feminists. This built on, but was distinct 
from, critical legal theory and its methodologies. More will be said on consciousness-
raising and its importance to my approach later, but for now it is enough to note the 
role of radical feminist method as bringing not only a critical and political challenge to 
the law, but also to legal theory – questioning, as it did, conceptualisations of
knowledge and power and how they inform the law and critical engagement with the 
law.
Returning now to my own approach and experience – which has been formed 
through mutually constitutive engagement within academic and activist fields – it is 
helpful to first clarify how feminism as a method differs from the common perception 
of feminism as an agenda (as found within campaigns for substantive legal provisions), 
and why it is imperative that the two be understood as distinct, as well as mutual.
Without an account of method feminism becomes limited as a legal tool for reform, as 
method ‘organises the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence 
and defines what is taken as verification.’ 18 Catherine MacKinnon describes the 
significance of method aptly: ‘[t]heory appropriates reality in a certain way – its way is 
method – to make the world accessible to understanding and change.’19 Katherine 
Bartlett makes a clear case for the need to understand feminism as a method:
Method matters […] because without an understanding of feminist methods, 
feminist claims in the law will not be perceived as legitimate or ‘correct’. I 
suspect that many who dismiss feminism as trivial or inconsequential 
misunderstand it. Feminists have tended to focus on defending their various 
substantive positions or political agendas, even among themselves. Greater 
16 Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” 1376.
17 Mossman, “Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes,” 148l; Katherine T. Bartlett, 
“Feminist Legal Matters,” Harvard Law Review, 103(4), (1990): 830; Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist 
Jurisprudence: An Essay,” 1401; Ann Scales, “Law and Feminism: Together in Struggle,” University of 
Kansas Law Review, 51, (2003): 293.
18 MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory,” 527. 
19 Catherine MacKinnon, Are women human?, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2007), 43.
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attention to issues of method may help to anchor these defenses, to explain 
why feminist agendas often appear so radical (or not radical enough), and even 
to establish some common ground among feminists.20
In her influential piece, Feminist Legal Methods, Bartlett goes on to clarify that method 
is not valid because it holds no substantive positions – as no methodology is 
completely non-substantive – rather she argues that the validity of a method rests on 
its relationship to substantive law being ‘defensible.’21
Therefore, key to understanding feminist method is problematising and negotiating its 
relationship with substance. Attention is frequently given to substantive positions at the 
expense of understanding method. The common perception of feminism as a 
campaign of demands or ‘women’s issues’ limits feminist theory and overlooks the 
structural nature of feminism as method. Consequently it will also limit substantive 
change, as method is essential to achieving change. The outworking of feminism 
changes the lives of women in substantive ways that can be articulated in a clear and 
determined fashion: suffrage, reproductive rights, eliminating violence against women, 
equal pay, maternity leave, to name a few. However, the ghettoising of women’s rights 
as an issue-based agenda undermines feminism. These substantive rights are the fruit of 
feminism. Whilst the fruit is eagerly desired, attention focussed solely, or narrowly, on 
substantive positions can confuse the understanding of feminism as a method. Various 
groups further the misunderstanding of feminism as method in differing ways. Within 
the women’s movement feminists can foster this confusion by their understandable 
eagerness for substantive change. As Bartlett suggests, this can become divisive. 
Women are not connected by our ‘wants’ or ‘needs’, though we might connect 
around these, but rather we connect in our want – in the shared experience of both 
the deficit, oppression, or marginalisation, and in the resilience, opportunity, and 
community formed in response. We’re connected by who we are – our historically, 
materially, socially located identities. Defining us by what we want or need, or are 
perceived as wanting, is limiting. We may want different things. We may already have 
different things. The meeting point for feminists must remain method. When it 
20 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 831.
21 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 832.
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becomes substantive positions we lose commonality and validity. We unite through 
method. 
The blurring of method and substance is also furthered by voices outside the women’s 
movement. A campaign of issue-based change is much more easily understood than a 
method for systemic change and transformation; especially from an audience who can’t 
understand, or don’t want to see happen, systemic change. Men may identify with a 
campaign based on a substantive list of demands, or ‘wants’, as this is how they 
regularly engage in community, society, law and the state. The system is established to 
hear and amplify their voice such that they need only express their desires. As the 
system is made in their image and set in their favour they need only articulate the 
change they wish to see. They need no method or theory; they have, instead, ‘reality’. 
The unpicking of the system isn’t on the agenda. In light of this, even men who may 
sympathise with feminism can most easily do so through substantive issue-based 
change. As a man, to join feminism as an issue-based campaign is to add your voice to 
a simple cry for ‘more’. For men to add their voice to feminism as a methodology for 
systemic change becomes problematic if not altogether impossible. How can men, 
through their voice, object to the system that amplifies their voice without furthering 
the noise and feeding the system? This raises the question of who can be involved and 
how. If men can add their voice to a campaign for substantive change, they may well. 
Those who sympathise may see it as a way of supporting women. Those who fear 
more systemic change may do so to limit feminism to the issue at hand hoping to 
avoid greater change. Considering feminism as a methodology raises the old question: 
can men be feminist? (Or how can men be feminist?) In fact, if it is about substantive 
change only, does it matter if this is achieved through sympathetic men using their 
voice within the system? Feminism reduced to substantive demands may give room for 
men as feminists. Feminism as a methodology may not. 
Whilst ruling men out as allies is not the aim here it is imperative to note the 
significance of voice and positionality when considering method and, more specifically, 
the application of feminist method. I would suggest that positionality, as lived in 
‘consciousness raising’ and ‘questioning’, is the epistemological grounding of feminist 
methodology. When speaking of positionality, I purposely speak more loosely than 
feminist standpoint theory. One might question if there is a difference. Positionality and 
14
consciousness-raising are arguably the foundations of standpoint theory, and so I will 
walk a close, if not interlacing path, with the theory. However, standpoint theory, has 
two major problems, which I wish to avoid; one of methodological importance and the 
other of symbolic understanding and application. Standpoint theory is linked most 
closely with Marxist feminist theory, and relies heavily on Marxist ideas of 
consciousness, running a parallel discourse about gender as it does about class struggle. 
Whilst, I would agree that there should be focus on intersections between gender and 
class, I do not agree that Marxism, and Marxist theory, should simply be applied to 
women, as feminism. Whilst Marxist feminism and radical feminism may 
(predominantly) take similar critical realist approaches to gender, I would understand 
them as differing in their epistemological apprehension of consciousness, in particular, 
the privileging of knowledge. This is borne out in understandings of standpoint and 
positionality.
My methodological approach will be based on positionality, consciousness-raising and 
what Bartlett terms ‘asking the woman question’22. Whilst this reflects and forms part 
of standpoint theory, my understanding and application of these methods lacks 
adherence to the Marxian ideas of positionality and consciousness that are usually 
identified with standpoint theories, and in particular the implication of privileged
knowledge. In Signs, Winter 1997, Susan Heckman questioned the underlying Marxist 
epistemology of Nancy Hartsock’s Standpoint Theory. ‘Truth and Method: Feminist 
Standpoint Theory Revisited’ is a key piece in the wider debate surrounding Marxian 
epistemology and standpoint theory, prominent in the 1990s. Hekman questions the 
ability of standpoint theory to articulate and privilege truth given the theory operates 
within a ‘social constructivist theory of the subject.’23 In the same edition, Hartsock 
gives comment on Hekman’s piece, arguing Hekman views standpoint theories 
through ‘a kind of American pluralism that prefers to speak not about power or justice 
but, rather, about knowledge and epistemology.’24 Instead, Hartsock restates the
importance of standpoint theory in deconstructing and challenging the power relations 
22 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 837.
23 Nancy Hartsock, “Comment on Hekman’s “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory 
Revisited”: Truth or Justice?,” Signs, 22(2), (Winter, 1997): 367.
24 Hartsock, “Comment on Hekman’s “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”: Truth 
or Justice?,” 367.
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which structure knowledge and understanding arising from social locations.25 Whilst I 
find Hartsock compelling, I am left with epistemological questions about standpoint 
theory. However, it is not my aim, and it is beyond my current apprehension, to 
resolve these here. Furthermore, whilst epistemological questions remain, there is 
consensus between Marxian, radical, and postcolonial feminists that feminist 
consciousness – whether closer to ‘reality’ or ‘truth’ (or not) – is closer to ‘a definition 
of less repressive society.’26 In this way standpoint theories are to be understood as 
‘counterhegemonic discourse’27. Further to this, I would align to Patricia Collins’
understanding of standpoint as offering ‘specific’ and ‘multiple’ knowledge rather than 
‘privileged’ truth.28 Collins challenges the implication that ‘the more subordinated the 
group the more power the vision available to them.’29 She suggests this reflects the 
‘binary thinking’30 of standpoint’s Western, Marxian origins, and is an ‘additive 
analyses’31 of standpoint theories. This consensus and adherence to positionality and 
consciousness-raising as the chosen methodology of feminism is cross-wave and cross-
theory, and so epistemological questions surrounding standpoint theory are not 
detrimental to my methodological approach. 
Whilst my initial concern with the characterisation of my methodology as standpoint 
theory is based upon ongoing epistemological debate, my secondary concern, linked to 
the first, regards the status and symbolism of standpoint theory within the feminist 
movement. This is more troubling to me than the epistemological questions – if 
standpoint theory, an attempt to foreground the lived experience of women, is seen 
as exclusive or essentialist by the voices it seeks to advance, then it really lacks merit. 
Again, I will not seek to give any kind of full answers to this debate, other than to find 
again, what is still seen as relevant and representative by the wide cross-section of the 
women’s movement. Whilst standpoint theory was increasingly criticised as universalist 
and essentialist, third wave feminism (influenced heavily by Black feminism, Black post-
25 Hartsock, “Comment on Hekman’s “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”: Truth 
or Justice?,” 367.
26 Susan Heckman, “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”, Signs, 22(2), (Winter, 
1997): 345.
27 Hartsock, “Comment on Hekman’s “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”: Truth 
or Justice?,” 367.
28 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009): 289.
29 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 289.
30 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 289.
31 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 289.
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structural feminism, post-colonial feminism, and transnational feminism)32, still 
forefronts the lived experience of women and advocates consciousness-raising as 
method.33 In so doing, third-wave feminists also maintain the significance of group 
consciousness. Whilst some post-structuralists, like Hekman, appear to argue that 
groups are merely ‘aggregates of individuals’34, the appreciation of the group as a 
collective voice – as constituted through construction and reconstruction by way of 
consciousness-raising – is still common in third wave theory and practice. 
Although third wave feminists tend not to utilize the small group format for 
consciousness-raising, personal stories continue to play an important role in 
helping people recognize that their experiences of oppression or discrimination 
are not isolated. In the third wave, these stories are still very much a part of 
consciousness-raising, except that these personal stories tend to appear in 
public venues like anthologies, books, and feminist magazines such as Bitch and 
Bust. Furthermore, these stories function as a major rhetorical component of 
consciousness-raising due to the diversity of texts available. Women may 
engage in consciousness-raising with their female friends and colleagues, but 
these books allow their readers to engage with a number of ideas they may 
not encounter in their personal or professional lives.35
Third wave feminism has broadened the understanding of positionality and standpoint 
theory, and brought further questions regarding epistemology and truth, but I would 
argue that the ongoing advancement of positionality and consciousness-raising 
legitimises the overarching methodological character of standpoint theory. I believe the 
issues of essentialism and exclusion, as taken up by the third wave, lie in Marxian over-
32 bell hooks, “Postmodern Blackness,” Postmodern Culture, 1(1), (1990); bell hooks, Yearning: Race, 
Gender, and Cultural Politics, (Toronto: Between-the-Lines, 1990); Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy 
Richards, Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2000); Rebbeca Walker, To Be Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism (New York: 
Anchor, 1995); Rebbeca Walker, "Becoming the Third Wave". Ms. Magazine,11(2), (2000) p. 39–4; 
Collins, Black Feminist Thought; Chandre Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, Third World 
Women and the Politics of Feminism, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991); Chandre 
Talpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2003).
33 Stacey. K. Sowards and Valerie. R. Renegar, “The Rhetorical Function of Consciousness-Raising in the 
Third Wave,” Communications Studies, 55(4), (Winter, 2004): 535 – 552.
34 Hartsock, “Comment on Hekman’s “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”: Truth 
or Justice?”, 372.
35 Sowards and Renegar, “The Rhetorical Function of Consciousness-Raising in the Third Wave,” 541 –
542.
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emphasis on the ‘macroprocesses of power’36, commonly found in standpoint theories. 
Inclusion of intersections with race, sexuality, class, and disability is to be welcomed 
and is not, as some fear, the widening of feminist collective consciousness to the point 
of subjectivity.37 The voices widening the understanding of consciousness, positionality 
and experience within feminism, have commonly been misunderstood to be more 
epistemologically divergent than is the case. Intersectionality has broadened the 
methodologies of radical feminism, and has ‘rooted and shifted’38 the locus to 
intersections of race, nation, sexuality, and class, but rather than challenging the 
epistemological character of (radical) feminism, it has, in fact, further established it as 
materialist, post-positivist, and critical realist. Its focus on collective standpoint, 
experience and location is ‘antithetical to that of post-modernist relativism.’39 Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty takes up the issue of intersectionality and subjectivity, in Feminism 
Without Borders, where she revisits her 1986 essay, ‘Under Western Eyes’40, and 
defends it against misappropriation by Western post-modern political thought. Her 
work ‘draws on historical materialism and centralizes racialized gender’41; emphasising 
difference and multiply-mediated intersections of oppression, including: gender, race, 
(hetero)sexuality, class, and nation. She argues her work has been misread by post-
modernists and interpreted ‘as being against all forms of generalization and as arguing 
difference over commonalities.’42 Mohanty argues that while Western post-modernism 
‘privileges multiplicity in the abstract’43, post-colonial feminism recognises that 
differences, rooted in material, social, historical and geographical locations, are never 
‘just “differences.”’44 This is not to underestimate or undermine the contribution of 
post-modernist feminist scholarship to the third wave45, nor to suggest that my own 
36 Hartsock, “Comment on Hekman’s “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”: Truth 
or Justice?,” 371.
37 Hartsock is right to suggest: ‘[t]o claim we can understand the totality of social relations from a single 
perspective is as futile an effort as to claim that we can see everything from nowhere.’ Hartsock, 
“Comment on Hekman’s “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”: Truth or Justice?,” 
371.
38 Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997): 130 –131.
39 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 231.
40 Chandre Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” 
Feminist Review, 30, (1988): 61 – 88.
41 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 231.
42 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 231.
43 Chandre Talpade Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of 
Feminism” In Mohanty, Torres, and Russo, eds., Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, 37.
44 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 226.
45 Walker, To Be Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism; Walker, "Becoming the Third 
Wave". Ms. Magazine; Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing 
Feminism, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press,1997); bell hooks, “Postmodern Blackness,”; 
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understanding and approach, or the approach formed within the international legal 
response to violence against women, is not informed by post-modernist thought and 
its challenge to the radical roots of the second wave. This said, I agree with Mohanty’s 
defence of her work on the key issue of collective consciousness and group identity, 
and – as it relates specifically to the chapter at hand – the use of ‘the collective’ as a 
source of knowledge and wisdom. More will be said on the role of community as it 
relates to constructing new knowledge and progressing change, but at this point it is 
important to reflect on Mohanty’s characterisation of her work as ‘antithetical to post-
modernist relativism’, and to recognise that the same critique applies to my 
appreciation of positionality and the widening of standpoint theory to become more 
fully intersectional. From this critical stance it would be wrong, however, to reason that 
post-modernist approaches to standpoint must be wholly abandoned, or that my 
approach is opposed to post-modernist feminism. Rather, I align with Mohanty’s 
understanding of the conflict between materialist, critical realist appreciations of 
identity, consciousness-raising and the collective, and the Western third wave emphasis 
on the individual as separate from the other and from the collective. Again, this is not 
to negate the reality or the role of difference, or the move towards anti-essentialism,
the politics of difference, or claims to the ‘decentred’46 or ‘reconstituted’ subject47 – all 
notable post-modernist contributions of the third wave48. Rather, the critique offered 
by Mohanty, which I uphold in my own emphasis on collectivity, is simply to argue that 
‘differences constitute rather than undermine collectivity’.49 In this sense, the calls for 
intersectionality to be integrated into feminist theory and praxis during the later half of 
the second wave50 are further reinforced by third wave post-modernist emphasis on 
Heckman, “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”; Linda Nicholson, 
Feminism/Postmodernism, (New York: Routledge, 1990); Stacy Gillis and Rebecca Munford, “Genealogies 
and generations: the politics and praxis of third wave feminism,” Women’s History Review, 13(2), (2004), 
165 – 182.
46 See the Thinking Gender series edited by Linda Nicholson – in particular  Judith Butler’s work on 
identity: Judith P. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, (New York: Routledge, 
1990).
47 Heckman, “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited”, 345.
48 Nicholson, Feminism/Postmodernism.
49 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 86. Whilst feminists speak to the particular tension 
with regard the individual and the group caused by post-modernism, this sits in a far-wider project to 
redeem constructivist and progressive politics from ‘modernism’s dusk’, with Hutchinson arguing that 
‘there is no contradiction between continuing loyalty to postmodern strategy and the practical 
realization of a radical political agenda.’ Allan C. Hutchinson, “Review: Inessentially Speaking (Is There 
Politics after Postmodernism?)” Michigan Law Review, 89(6), (1991), 1549 – 1573, 1550.
50 Kimberle Crenshaw was first to use the term intersectionality, which provided a critical political 
framework for feminism to more fully appreciate the overlapping connections, oppressions, and 
identities defined by race, sexuality, nation, and disability. This term became a framework for the efforts 
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multiplicity51, but this multiplicity does not necessarily elevate individuation and 
separateness over collectivity. This will be looked at later in this chapter when I 
consider the role of community and difference in forming knowledge and 
reconstructive politics.
Returning now to the issue of standpoint, we see in the broadening of the 
understanding of consciousness and positionality – brought about by the third wave –
the expansion of ‘standpoints’. Whilst the label and trappings of Marxian standpoint 
theory have been questioned and consequently disregarded by many groups, the 
significance of positionality – as both constructed and counterhegemonic – remains, 
and the methods of consciousness-raising and questioning persist. 
Whilst it might seem strange then to ‘revert’ to second wave thought, I believe the 
essentials of standpoint theory, as agreed upon by the third wave, are well (although 
not fully) articulated by radical feminists, such as MacKinnon, who have always 
advanced the positionality of women as both (at least partly) constructed (and 
reconstructed) and at the same time counterhegemonic. In this way I believe 
MacKinnon articulates a view of consciousness and positionality that resonates with the 
third wave critique of her Marxian contemporaries. MacKinnon gives the following 
characterisation of the positionality of feminist consciousness:
of a number of key critical race theorists who had challenged the whiteness of second wave feminism 
during the 1980s. Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review, 43(6), (July 1991): 1241 – 1299; Kimberle 
Crenshaw, “Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti Discrimination 
Law,” Harvard Law Review, 101, (1988): 1331 – 1387; Kimberle Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory 
and Antiracist Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum, (1989): 139 – 167; bell hooks, Yearning: Race, 
Gender, and Cultural Politics; Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith, But Some of Us are 
Brave, (New York: Feminist Press, 1982); Gloria E. Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga, eds., This Bridge Called 
My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, (Watertown, MA: Persephone Press, 1981); Patricia Collins 
and Simra Bilge, Intersectionality, (Malden: Polity Press, 2016);
51 In her analysis of third wave anthologies from 1995 – 2006, Meredith Evans highlighted four key 
themes: ‘inclusion, multiplicity, contradiction, and everyday feminism.’ Meredith A. Evans and Chris 
Bobel, “I am a Contradiction: Feminism and Feminist Identity in the Third Wave,” New England Journal of 
Public Policy, 22(1), (2007): 207. These same themes are highlighted in similar anthologies and analysis of 
Third Wave themes: Mary P. Sheridan-Rabideau, Girls, Feminism, and Grassroots Literacies: Activism in the 
GirlZone, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008); Hokulani Aikau, Karla Erickson, Wendy 
Leo Moore, “Three Women Writing/Riding Feminism’s Third Wave”, Qualitative Sociology, 26(3), 
(September 2003): 397 – 425; R. Claire Snyder, “What is Third-Wave Feminism? A New Directions 
Essay,” Signs, 34(1), (Autumn 2008):175 – 196; Stacy Gillis, Gillian Howie, and Rebecca Munford, eds., 
Third Wave Feminism: a critical exploration, 2nd Ed., (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
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The practice of a politics of all women in the face of its theoretical impossibility 
is creating a new process of theorising and a new form of theory. Although 
feminism emerges from women's particular experience, it is not subjective or 
partial, for no interior ground and few if any aspects of life are free of male 
power. […] Feminism does not begin with the premise that it is unpremised. It 
does not aspire to persuade an unpremised audience because there is no such 
audience. Its project is to uncover and claim as valid the experience of women, 
the major content of which is the devalidation of women's experience.52
She further explains the context of male dominance: 
Its point of view is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the 
meaning of universality. Its force is exercised as consent, its authority as 
participation, its supremacy as the paradigm of order, its control as the 
definition of legitimacy. Feminism claims the voice of women's silence, the 
sexuality of our eroticized desexualization, the fullness of “lack”, the centrality 
of our marginality and exclusion, the public nature of privacy, the presence of 
our absence.53
Unlike standpoint theories, rooted in Marxian ideas of consciousness and truth, 
MacKinnon doesn’t base the validity of feminist consciousness on its proximity to 
‘truth’ or ‘reality’. The marginalisation and subordination of this positionality are part of 
its significance, but are not privileged, commoditised, or objectified. Its project is not to 
articulate substantive change from an unpremised position but from that position to 
question the premise. It is distinct from any other substantive agenda – liberal, cultural, 
Marxist – and is simply feminist, or ‘feminism unmodified.’54 In claiming as valid the lived 
experience of women it challenges the dominance of men and the subordination of 
women. In this way critique, question and deconstruction operate as method. 
Likewise, feminism as a method has been talked about by Bartlett as ‘“asking the 
woman question,” which is designed to identify the gender implications of rules and 
52 MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” 638.
53 MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” 638 – 639.
54 Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified.
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practice which might otherwise appear neutral or objective.’55 As she explains, ‘a 
question becomes a method when it is regularly asked.’56 In the case of ‘the woman 
question’, feminists ask this regularly across many disciplines. In fact the ‘woman 
question’ is many questions, for instance: ‘have women been left out of consideration? 
If so, in what way; how might that omission be corrected? What difference would it 
make to do so?’57 Identifying how standards, practices and the law are framed in a 
specific male sense to the disadvantage and disempowerment of women, feminism 
works as a method for developing substantive norms. In this way feminism asked the 
‘woman question’ of violence against women and identified it as gendered and 
discriminatory – not arbitrary in any sense, but oppressive, and a cause and 
consequence of disadvantage and discrimination (see Chapter 2). The continuing of 
feminist method within the human rights discourse, asking further questions, has 
developed substantive norms around the prevention and elimination of violence 
against women, in particular: addressing root causes, gender specificity, and 
empowerment. These substantive norms are not subjectively chosen but they are the 
outworking of legal method. Without method we would choose substance 
indefensibly, whereas method works to ‘provide an appropriate constraint upon the 
application of substantive rules.’58
The deconstruction of the partial and the construction of substantive feminist positions 
is rooted in the lived experience of women. The ability to ask the ‘woman question’ in 
an authentic way is the primacy of positionality and consciousness-raising. Through 
consciousness-raising women are able to engage with their own lives, and as they live 
them, to question their own situation, and to determine collectively where that 
question lies in the world and how it might be answered. 
The technique explores the social world each woman inhabits through her 
speaking of it, through comparison with other women’s experience, and 
through women’s experience of each other in the group itself.59
55 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 837.
56 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 837.
57 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 837.
58 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 832.
59 Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 86.
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Consciousness-raising is perhaps the most unifying methodological approach of 
feminist theory. It runs throughout Marxist, liberal and radical feminism, and has 
spanned the first, second and third waves. Whilst questioning by third wave feminists
of the second wave’s approach to ‘asking the woman question’, has shone light on the 
need to expand the collective voice, it has maintained the method of consciousness-
raising: ‘Consciousness among women is what caused this, and consciousness, one's 
ability to open their mind to the fact that male domination does affect the women of 
our generation, is what we need…’60 albeit a ‘[c]onciousness that acknowledges the 
complexities of crosscutting relations of race, gender, class, and sexuality.’61
Consciousness-raising works as an ‘interactive and collaborative process’62 to reveal 
which of a woman’s individual experiences share meaning and resonate with the wider 
experience of women. Elizabeth Schneider explains that the methodological character 
of consciousness-raising functions to reveal ‘the social dimension of individual 
experience and the individual dimension of social experience’63. In this way 
consciousness-raising understands the personal as political and raises broad and public 
awareness of the oppression(s) of women.64 Consciousness-raising as a methodological 
tool serves to keep the relationship between feminist epistemology, theory and 
substance defensible. MacKinnon asserts: ‘The key to feminist theory consists in its way
of knowing. Consciousness-raising is that way.’65 Consciousness-raising works as 
verification66 and ‘meta-method’67, where it ‘provides a substructure for other feminist 
methods […] by enabling feminists to draw insights and perceptions from their own 
experiences and those of other women and to use these insights to challenge 
dominant versions of social reality.’68 As a meta-method, consciousness-raising 
challenges the dominant ‘truth’, but more fundamentally, it ‘challenges the concept of 
knowledge’69. Positionality as revealing counterhegemonic wisdom is grounded in the 
meta-method of consciousness-raising. 
60 Baumgardner and Richards, Manifesta, 11. 
61 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 122 – 132.
62 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 863.
63 Schneider, “The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement,” 603.
64 Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose, 1966 – 1978 (New York: Norton, 1979), 
44; Pamela Allen, Free Space: A Perspective on the Small Group in Women’s Liberation (New York: Time 
Changes Press, 1970), 27; MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 95.
65 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 84.
66 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 87.
67 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 866.
68 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 866.
69 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 867
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Positionality is undoubtedly key to deconstruction as method. Women are uniquely 
placed to ask the deconstructive questions of ‘(how) have women been left out?’ 
Deconstruction is the bedrock of feminist method. However, women are also uniquely 
placed to ask: ‘how might that omission be corrected?’ This is a more complex 
question as it comes with the weight of constructing something different, and without 
thorough recourse to method, it carries the potential to ‘recreate the illegitimate 
power structure [they suggest they are] trying to identify and undermine.’70
This method of asking the woman question can be seen in Chapter 2. The theoretical 
framework for the human rights approach to violence against women and primary 
prevention has been reached by feminist method – exposing those social practices, 
rules and laws that disadvantage women. To assess the due diligence standard and 
systemic prevention I will continue to ask the woman question as a method to see 
what it exposes and to consider how it can be incorporated as a methodological tool
into the conceptualisation of state responsibility itself.
Further to this though, Bartlett suggests part of this method is to ‘suggest how they 
[oppressive social practices, rules or laws] might be corrected.’71 It is at this point that 
feminism as a methodology goes from questioning, critique and deconstruction to 
suggesting substantive change and construction. I wish to explore this further as I 
believe it raises questions about the relationship between methodology and substance. 
As I develop my thesis I expect my methodology to have a relationship to substantive 
law – namely prevention, State responsibility and systemic due diligence – but I must 
retain a defensible relationship between my methodology and any evaluation and 
clarified outline of due diligence. However, I keep in mind the goal of change and also 
the arguably male evaluation of method and theory. Moira McConnell questions the 
use of ‘theory’ and ‘method’ as litmus tests to challenging the status quo. She suggests 
that critics of the establishment are often accused of having weak theory or the 
opposite, having ‘just theory’, by those defending the established position. Mohanty 
suggests that ‘epistemological questions arise through the politicisation of 
consciousness’72– spurred on by the need to negotiate the connections between 
70 Joseph Singer, “Should lawyers care about philosophy?” Duke Law Journal, 38(6), (1989), 1753.
71 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 837. 
72 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 39.
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‘collective consciousness [and] historical and institutional questions.’73 McConnell 
contends that the ‘designation ‘theory’ [is] a political statement as to the existence of 
some non-theory position […] imagined by the men who have dominated the world’s 
power structures.’ 74 I will seek to remain epistemologically and methodologically 
consistent and defensible of my relationship between theory, method and substance 
whilst also keenly pursuing a substantive change to the ‘non-theory position’ or ‘reality’ 
defined and dominated by men; recognising questions of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ are 
also questions of ethics and power.
Part 2: Constructing Knowledge
Again, to understand the nature of feminist constructive method is to understand the 
primacy of consciousness-raising and positionality to feminist epistemology. The 
second part to Bartlett’s ‘woman question’, to ask how the exclusion and oppression 
of women ‘might be corrected’75, is rooted in positionality, and more specifically in the 
epistemological difference between knowledge and wisdom.76 As Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty explains, it is the ‘lived relations’ that are the ‘basis of knowledge’77 for 
women and the crucible of change. It is from that place that women understand their 
creation and construction as women, and reconstruct and recreate themselves, and in 
the process define alternative futures; offering instead: ‘what might be’. Mohanty offers 
a similar arrangement to Bartlett’s two-part ‘questioning’, when she describes the 
discursive space created by testimonials and group consciousness. Mohanty calls out
the centrality of ‘remembering and rewriting’ to feminist analysis.78 Remembering acts 
with deconstructive purpose: ‘correcting the gaps, erasures and misunderstandings’79. 
Rewriting works with constitutive and constructive effect, leading to the ‘formation of a 
politicised consciousness and self-identity’80. It is worth stressing again that it is the 
‘politicisation of consciousness’ that provokes such scrutiny and examination of the 
73 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 39.
74 Moira McConnell, “Feminist theory as the Embodiment of Marginalisation,” In Reconceiving Reality: 
Women in International Law, edited by Dorinda. D. Dallmeyer, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 
25. (Washington, DC: The American Society of International Law, 1993), 63.
75 Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” 837.
76 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 275 – 6.
77 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 35.
78 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
79 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
80 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
25
epistemological grounds of feminism. Indeed it is because of this that I query with 
much more rigour the potential feminist method has to offer constructive direction, 
over the widely-held acceptance that feminism works with effective deconstructive 
purpose. This politicisation raises sensitivities from activism to academia, and obliges 
feminists to defend their purposes as constructive in and – most importantly – of the 
world. The politicisation of consciousness and consciousness-raising is indeed a 
reflection that feminist method is a ‘struggle and contestation about reality itself.’81 It is 
useful to remember this when seeking to defend feminism’s constructive purposes. 
Returning now to how this is done, I will focus on three key characteristics of 
politicised consciousness; each finding their roots in the feminist ontology of becoming, 
and collectively shaping the contributions of feminist constructivism. These 
characteristics are: empowerment, community, and liberation; and together they shape 
the epistemological character of radical feminist constructivism. These characteristics 
are further clarified by third wave, Black and post-colonial feminism. I will explore these 
further below, beginning with empowerment.
Empowerment
To articulate the significance of empowerment within feminist consciousness and 
constructivism, I will rely on the work of Patricia Collins who writes at length on this in 
Black Feminist Thought, particularly in her chapter ‘Towards a Politics of 
Empowerment’. Specifically, I wish to highlight what she calls the ‘special contribution’ 
of US Black Feminist thought: ‘the importance of knowledge for empowerment.’82 To 
do so, I will begin by quoting at length her introduction to the dual character of 
empowerment within Black feminist constructivism:
In their efforts to rearticulate the standpoint of African American women as a 
group, Black feminist thinkers potentially offer individual African American 
women the conceptual tools to resist oppression. Empowerment in this 
context is twofold: Gaining the critical consciousness to unpack hegemonic 
ideologies is empowering… But while criticising hegemonic ideologies remains 
necessary, such critiques are basically reactive. Thus the second dimension of 
81 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
82 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 291.
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empowerment within the hegemonic domain of power consists of constructing 
new knowledge. In this regard, the core themes, interpretive frameworks, and 
epistemological approaches of Black feminist thought can be highly 
empowering because they provide alternatives to the way things are supposed 
to be.83
The contestation for reality, and the process of self-definition act to empower women. 
Indeed, Collins suggests, that when it comes to empowerment, ‘the act of insisting on 
Black female self-definition validates Black women’s power as human subjects… 
[r]egardless of the actual content of Black women’s self-definition.’84 The act itself is 
empowering. Indeed, as Collins suggests, the content following from the act of self-
definition may well be kept ‘hidden’ from the ‘prying eyes of dominant groups.’85
Whilst the content is known internally or privately, consciousness remains a source of 
empowerment for women and, perhaps, her only, ‘sphere of freedom.’86 As Marita O. 
Bonner suggests the conscious woman may be ‘[m]otionless on the outside. But 
inside?’87
The development of discursive spaces provide sites for the contestation of ‘(self) 
knowledge’88 and for ‘constructing new knowledge’. The creation of new (self) 
knowledge allows women to ‘cope with and transcend intersecting oppressions.’89
Collins highlights the power of this process in her analysis of Black women’s literature, 
music and art. As she suggests, much of the output of discursive creative spaces is self-
knowledge and that self-knowledge often represents a ‘journey from internalised 
oppression to the “free mind”’90. In this sense ‘reclaiming the “power of a free mind” 
constitutes an important act of resistance.’91 Akin to Mohanty’s emphasis on ‘rewriting’, 
Collins talks of self-definition as ‘rearticulation’92, including: ‘the significance of self-
valuation and respect, the necessity of self-reliance and independence and the 
83 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 305. [Emphasis mine.]
84 Collins, Black Feminist Thought,126.
85 Collins, Black Feminist Thought,107.
86 Collins, Black Feminist Thought,122.
87 Marita Bonner, “On Being Young–A Woman–And Colored.” In Double Take: A Revolutionist Harlem 
Renaissance Anthology, edited by Venetria K. Patton and Maureen Honey, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2001), 112.
88 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
89 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 108.
90 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 123.
91 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 304.
92 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 130.
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centrality of a changed self to personal empowerment.’93 As it is rooted in the real and 
historically located lives of women, the crafting of alternative knowledge might be 
better understood as uncovering and exposing, rather than creating ‘new’ knowledge, 
as such. Indeed, it is imperative that we ‘rethink, remember and utilize our lived 
relations as a basis of knowledge’94 and understand that ‘the lived experience of 
women acts as the criterion of meaning’95. This knowledge is, therefore, always 
‘grounded in and informed by the material experience of everyday life.’96 These self-
definitions are not free of historicity or materiality, rather they expose and redefine a 
material life that has been narrated primarily, if not solely (from the outside 
perspective, at least), by the powerful and the oppressor, and thereby partly 
constructed by the oppressor.97 In this sense there remains a ‘creative tension’ 
between the social conditions that influence the lived experience of women, and how 
the empowerment of women through exposing positional truth and clarifying 
standpoints, strengthens women ‘to shape those same social conditions.’98 It is exactly 
the contestation over the creation and authorship of this material life that makes self-
knowledge so political and potentially empowering. Indeed this contestation works to 
empower at a very basic level: survival. As Collins explains, ‘not only does a self-
defined, group-derived Black woman’s standpoint exist, but […] its presence has been 
essential to US Black woman’s survival.’99 By taking the lived experience of women as 
the ‘criterion of meaning’, self-definition acts to empower; challenging ‘who is believed 
and why’100. Womanist consciousness recognises and negotiates the nature of 
knowledge as power, and in so doing empowers women through the (re-)creation 
and (re-)claiming of self-knowledge. 
Key to the empowerment experienced by women through consciousness raising and 
self-definition is its collective character. Radical, Black, Third World, and intersectional 
feminism all emphasise the communal character of consciousness and consciousness-
93 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 131.
94 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34 – 35.
95 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 275.
96 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 53.
97 Understanding the importance and power of language with regard to empowerment, Barbra Harlow 
talks of the use of storytelling in the face of oppression as ‘narratives of resistance, which write … 
selfhood, consciousness and identity back into daily life.’ Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third 
World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 35.
98 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 288.
99 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 109.
100 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 270.
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raising activities. This is true also of self-knowledge and self-definition and its 
consequences in the world. Again, Collins explains: ‘[w]hile individual empowerment is 
key, only collective action can effectively generate the lasting institutional 
transformation required for social justice.’101 Feminist consciousness and the 
constructed knowledge of self – or self-definition – illustrate the collectivist and 
communal nature of feminist positionality (or standpoint). Feminist epistemology 
makes bold claims about the significance of community as both a place of identity and 
discovering (or uncovering) identity. In this way the act of self-definition is deeply 
rooted in community. 
Community
Community as a location for positional truth, functions to provide both clarity and 
contradiction within feminist epistemology; which are, together, welcomed as they 
benefit and strengthen the constructive purposes of feminist theory (and activism). I 
will consider first the clarity, and then the contradictions, brought about by collective 
knowledge.
Finding a way to express a communal positionality, or standpoint, is an essential and 
core theme of feminist theory, and a platform from which to construct alternatives. 
The collective character of feminist ontology, epistemology and methodology is 
fundamental. (Or if we are to consider instead standpoint(s) as numerous ontologies, 
epistemologies, and methodologies, then collectivity, or community, is perhaps the 
unifying premise.) As has been touched on at numerous points in this chapter, 
positionality does not just value the lived experience of women, but the materiality of 
that experience, which is ‘of course inextricably both natural and social’102. But further 
to this, and as Collins suggests of Black feminist epistemology (and I would extend to 
intersectional radical feminist epistemology103), experiential, material wisdom, is based 
101 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 308.
102 As Hartsock makes clear of standpoint theory, the basis of the materiality of women’s experience is 
always ‘socially mediated interaction with nature…’ Nancy Hartsock, ‘The Feminist Standpoint: 
Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism’ In Feminist Perspectives on 
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science edited by Sandra G. Harding and 
Merrill B. Hintikka, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Reidel, 1983), 283 – 284.
103 Collins, without rejecting the ‘value’ white women place on connectedness, suggests that ‘African 
American women may find it easier than others to recognise connectedness as a primary way of 
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on a communal way of knowing and verifying, ‘namely, collective experiences…’104
Belonging as an individual to a group is not in itself ‘sufficient ground to assume a 
politicised oppositional identity.’105 Instead it is the collective nature of feminist
consciousness that counts. This theorisation is aided by the privileging of ‘wisdom’ over 
knowledge, as a criterion of meaning within feminist epistemology.106 Wisdom – lived 
experience – is shared through the medium of dialogue and the ‘genre of 
testimonials’107, which, opposed to autobiographies, are ‘constitutively public and 
collective’108. This distinctly feminist way of knowing makes the ‘epistemological 
assumption […] that connectedness rather than separateness is an essential 
component of the knowledge process’109, and, in doing so, further validates a move 
toward connection rather than individuation. Self-knowledge, and the process of self-
definition, is thereby ‘for and of the people.’110 Rather than identity and self-hood as 
individualised, or ‘defined as the increased autonomy gained by separating oneself from 
others’111, the self is defined in community, in ‘the ability to recognise ones continuity 
with the larger community.’112 Community, in this sense, serves to bring greater clarity 
to, and strengthen, feminism’s way of knowing and constructing knowledge. 
Community also serves to provide contradiction – not just collectivity and 
contradiction across women but collectivity and contradiction within women. This, too, 
strengthens feminism’s way of knowing and constructing knowledge, and comes from 
feminists’ unique way of encountering and problematising difference and 
intersectionality within community.
Difference and intersectionality do not give way to subjectivism, as understood by 
post-modernism, or negate commonality, but rather they inform connection and 
commonality. From ‘knowing differences and particularities we can better see 
connections … because no border or boundary is ever complete or rigidly 
knowing simply because we have more opportunities to do so and must rely on it more heavily than 
others.’ Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 279.
104 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 274.
105 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 33.
106 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 274 – 275.
107 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
108 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
109 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 279.
110 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
111 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 124.
112 Mary Helen Washington, “I Sign My Mother’s Name: Alice Walker, Dorothy West, Paule Marshal,” In
Mothering the Mind: Twelve Studies or Writers and Their Silent Parters, edited by Ruth Perry and Martine 
Watson Broronley (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984): 159.
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determining.’113 As Audre Lorde suggests: ‘[i]t is not our differences that divide us [but] 
our inability to recognize, accept, and celebrate those differences.’114 In her famous 
essay, ‘The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House’, Lorde talks 
about the dialectic spark caused by engaging with our differences, and the importance 
of seeing difference as necessary, not just tolerable, within the constructive purposes of 
womanism.
Within the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences lies that 
security which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return 
with true visions of our future, along with the concomitant power to effect 
those changes which can bring that future into being. Difference is that raw and 
powerful connection from which our personal power is forged. […] As 
women, we have been taught either to ignore our differences, or to view them 
as causes for separation and suspicion rather than as forces for change. 
Without community there is no liberation, only the most vulnerable and 
temporary armistice between an individual and her oppression. But community 
must not mean a shedding of our differences, nor the pathetic pretence that 
these differences do not exist.115
In regard to positionality and consciousness we consider then, that ‘differences 
constitute rather than undermine collectivity’,116 and so the challenge is not difference 
but to ‘see how differences allow us to explain the connections and border crossings 
better and more accurately [and] how specifying difference allows us to theorise
universal concerns more fully.’117 However, as Gloria Anzaldúa explores in her crucial 
work on the new Mestiza (a consciousness of the border(lands))118, the formulation of 
consciousness, is not just conceptualised of differences, but often also of
contradictions. Problematising difference where it leads to contradiction caused 
Anzaldúa to further strengthen the epistemic importance of positionality. Rather than 
undermining the importance of positionality and collective consciousness, Anzaldúa’s 
113 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 226.
114 Audre Lorde, Our Dead Behind Us: Poems. (New York: Norton, 1986).
115 Audre Lorde, “The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,” In Sister Outsider: 
Essays and Speeches, Audre Lorde, ed., (Berkeley, CA: The Crossing Press, 1984), 112.
116 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 86.
117 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 226.
118 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, 4th ed. (Aunt Lute Books, 2012).
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work opened the door for feminist standpoint theories that are ‘both/and’, non-binary, 
and non-dual119 – providing grounds, not to transcend difference, but to transcend 
duality, and in doing so provide a new and broader way of collectivising consciousness:
At some point, on our way to a new consciousness, we will have to leave the 
opposite bank, the split between the two mortal combatants somehow healed 
so that we are on both shores at once […] The work of the Mestiza 
consciousness is to break down the subject-object duality that keeps her a 
prisoner and to show in the flesh and through the images in her work how 
duality is transcended.120
Mestiza consciousness rests on a ‘conceptualisation of agency which is multiple and 
often contradictory but always anchored in the history of specific struggles.’121 It does 
not give in to the ‘splintering of the subject’122, advanced by post-structuralist notions 
of agency, but, as a ‘theorisation of the materiality and politics of the everyday struggles 
of Chicanas’123, restates the importance of collective – non-dual – consciousness.  
Liberation 
If community is the means of seeing alternative futures, then liberation – collective
liberation – is the lens through which that vision is focused. Liberation is the lens then 
that both colours the imagined futures of women, and their collective way of seeing. 
The lens of liberation is not only counter-hegemonic, it is emancipatory. It is of 
foundational – and utmost – importance that the lens of liberation not be mistaken for 
equality. Equality is a measure which can only be understood in terms of subject-object 
materiality; whether this be formal equality or substantive equality. It can only be seen 
in light of what is, rather than what could be, and in this sense equality is not a lens by 
119 The growth of transversal politics brings with it a rejection of ‘the origins of standpoint approaches in 
Marxist social theory [which reflect] the binary thinking of its western origins’. Collins, Black Feminist 
Thought, 288; ‘Viewing the world through a both/and conceptual lens of the simultaneity of race, class, 
and gender oppression and of the need for a humanist vision of community creates new possibilities for 
an empowering Afrocentric feminist knowledge. Many Black feminist intellectuals have long thought 
about the world in this way because this is the way we experience the world.’ Patricia Hill Collins, Black 
Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New York: Routledge, 
1990): 221.
120 Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera, 80.
121 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 34.
122 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 37.
123 Mohanty, “Cartographies of Struggle Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism,” 37.
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which to focus with at all.124 Equality is a reordering of the pieces as they currently lie, 
to try and make them a little less offensive; but liberation allows women to prophesy 
beyond what can be seen and construct with free imagination. It’s throwing off of 
oppression goes beyond reordering to dis-ordering the system. It goes beyond 
remembering, to re-writing. It is distinctly constitutive; calling out ‘what could be’, 
unrestrained by ‘what is’. In this way, consciousness-raising and positionality work such 
as to wake disorder where it is needed. In places this can seem like reordering, and 
can appear as demands for ‘equality’, but we would be better off understanding 
equality as being brought into focus by the lens of liberation, rather than the means by 
which to achieve liberation. Again, this is not simply, liberty, as liberalism would have us 
believe; a reordering, or extending, of the freedoms enjoyed by some, but a 
transformation and dis-formation of the systems that exist to share such ‘freedom’ out 
as if it were merely object-subject matter to be weighted out. Radical feminism, Black 
feminism, post-colonial feminism, intersectional feminism, do not exist as methods to 
bring about the equality of women with men (what other standard exists in this 
scenario?) but to achieve their liberation from oppression; yes from male oppression, 
but from all intersecting oppression(s) that impact upon women.125 There is no way to 
‘weigh out’ equality, which fully addresses or successfully challenges the oppression of 
women. Here post-colonial feminism is quite clear: calls for mere ‘gender equality’ lack
the intersectionality to achieve collective liberation, as ‘gender discrimination is not the 
sole or primary locus of oppression of third world women.’126 Again, this difference can 
be seen in the early – pre-liberal – radical feminist movement, which was inescapably 
linked to political liberation movements. As Cheryl Johnson-Odim explains, ‘the early 
radical feminism of the 1960s was, in fact, broadly defined as being antiracist and 
antiimperialist, but much of that movement has been displaced by the far more 
popular liberal feminism which has not sufficiently defined racism and imperialism as 
major feminist issues.’127 Johnson-Odim explains how the International Conferences 
(Mexico, Wellesley, and Copenhagen) were a site of dissonance between radical and 
liberal feminists, with third world women making feminism ‘fundamentally political’ and 
124 But perhaps equality could be understood to be brought into focus by the lens of liberation.
125 At this point, it is important to make clear that this discussion bears no parallels to the equality 
feminism vs. difference feminism debate. It offers a third non-dual path.
126 Cheryl Johnson-Odim, “Common Themes, Different Contexts; Third World Women and Feminism,” 
In Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, edited by Chandre Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and 
Lourdes Torres, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991): 314.
127 Johnson-Odim, “Common Themes, Different Contexts; Third World Women and Feminism,” 316.
33
committed to the struggle for their liberation’, and (more liberal) delegations from first 
world countries ‘attempting to depoliticise the conferences and implicitly construct a 
women’s movement and a feminism which confines itself to the issue of gender 
discrimination.’128 Again, it is important to understand intersectionality as representing 
social locations of identity, oppression and resilience that are truly intersecting, rather 
than simply multiplied. As such the idea of seeing any kind of intersecting oppression as 
‘double discrimination’ isn’t wholly useful. Rather the fundamentally political basis of 
constitutive consciousness and women’s liberation – considered as liberation of the
whole person – must be taken seriously within the legal framework. Again, when we 
come to the international human rights law approach to violence against women the 
political character of its roots must be understood. Whilst the overthrowing and 
ending of oppression of women, and specifically violence against women, will result in 
substantive positions and norms that look very much like the call for gender equality, 
liberation is not limited to these positions and is not (necessarily) the mere 
combination of these efforts. In fact, it is the limited framework created by liberalist 
emphases on equality, that stop short the efforts to imagine and determine what a 
truly alternative future could look like. It is a much simpler task to define standards of 
‘equal treatment’, be they formal or substantive, than to risk the task of liberation, with 
its many ontological uncertainties and visceral politicisation.129 Yet this is the task of 
feminist method, rather than substantive (or issue-based) feminist campaigning. As its 
work for collective liberation does away with the duality caused by determining ‘equal 
treatment’, and instead opts for a non-dual, both/and alternative, feminist method is 
the place of unity and togetherness between women. Whilst the historicity of groups 
as created and constructed is appreciated as constituting the collective voice, these 
boundaries are, as Mohnaty argues, not seen as wholly fixed.130 Rather than binary 
thinking, coalition building around women’s liberation can be built by bridging from 
materially located identities to self-defined futures, via consciousness-raising. The lens 
of liberation allows this collective action to move forward, whereas efforts solely 
128 Johnson-Odim, “Common Themes, Different Contexts; Third World Women and Feminism,” 317.
129 The lens of liberation and the task of consciousness-raising carries with it the same mystery, wonder, 
and risk, as the task of ‘hope’, as described by Walter Brueggemann in his influential work ‘The 
Prophetic Imagination’: ‘Hope, on one hand, is an absurdity too embarrassing to speak about, for it flies 
in the face of all those claims we have been told are facts. Hope is the refusal to accept the reading of 
reality which is the majority opinion; and one does that only at great political and existential risk. On the 
other hand, hope is subversive, for it limits the grandiose pretension of the present, daring to announce 
that the present to which we have all made commitments is now called into question.’ Walter 
Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 2 ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001): 65.
130 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, 226.
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focused by – or on – gender equality, and challenging gender discrimination, can serve 
to further binary thinking and division between women. 
The lens of liberation – and the task of emancipatory imagination – serve as a 
challenge to the narrow vision of gender equality, and the liberal way of seeing 
discrimination and equality more broadly. Throughout my engagement with, and 
analysis of, the international human rights law approach, the challenge of liberation will 
be evident in the development of substantive norms and the discursive framing 
encompassing the feminist approach to violence against women. At an advocacy and 
praxis level, the liberative lens of feminism acts as a continuing means of resistance, 
challenging the limitations that are common, if not inherent, in the use of international 
law as a tool to end violence against women. Whilst engagement with the law is 
commonly viewed as pragmatic – especially by feminists working within the discourse 
who are fully aware of its limitations131 – the utilisation of international human rights 
law as a means to eliminating violence against women has proven a site of major
conceptual, discursive, and material advancement of the cause of women. This hinges 
on readings of human rights and international human rights law that are framed by the 
lives of women, articulated by women, re-written by women, and told by women.
Without such framing engagement with international law – and the state – risks further 
compounding the oppression(s) of women.
Engagement with the state
Before turning to the international legal approach to violence against women, it is 
worth attending to the issue – fundamental to much feminist theorising132 – of how to 
engage with the state, and whether feminists should seek to engage with the state as a 
proposed agent of gender-transformative change, radical democracy, or liberation. This 
131 ‘Although feminist strategies of inclusion have been necessary as well as symbolically powerful for 
women […] they also carry their own problems and limitations, prevent a more radical transformation 
of the human rights system, and ultimately reinforce the unequal position of women under international 
law.’ Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011): ii.
132 Much has been said on whether a feminist theory of the state exists or is possible: Judith Allen, 
“Does Feminism Need a Theory of ‘the State’?”, In Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions, 
Sophie Watson, ed., (London: Verso, 1990); MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State; John 
Hoffman, “Is there a case for a feminist critique of the state?” Contemporary Politics, 4(2), (1998): 161 –
176; Sandra Lilburn, “Ask Not ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of the State?’ but Rather, Do Theorists 
of the State Need Feminism?”, Australian Feminist Studies, 15, (2000): 107 – 110.
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debate is rich with questions that I touch on throughout my review and analysis of –
what I argue to be – the feminist-led international human rights law approach to 
violence against women. Much has been said on these concerns133, which include: the 
relationship between the law and the state134; the question of whether the state is an 
intrinsically or contingently patriarchal actor135 (and therefore whether there is hope for 
it to be utilised by the women’s movement for deconstructive and reconstructive 
purpose); the challenges and contradictions inherent in enlisting a hegemonic 
(patriarchal!) actor as a ‘protector’136 of women and women’s rights137; and the on-
going negotiation of the divide between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ domains. I will briefly
speak to these concerns and their impact on my engagement with international human 
rights law below, with particular appeal to Wendy Brown’s problematisation of ‘the 
man in the state’138.
133 Wendy Brown, “Finding the Man in the State,” Feminist Studies, 18(1), (Spring 1992): 7 – 34; Wendy 
Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1995); Allen, “Does Feminism Need a Theory of ‘the State’?”; MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of 
the State; Hoffman, “Is there a case for a feminist critique of the state?’; V. Spike Peterson, ed., Gendered 
States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1992); Anne Phillips, ed., Feminism and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
134 Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law; Lisa. D. Brush, “The Curious Courtship of Feminist 
Jurisprudence and Feminist State Theory: Smart on the Power of Law”, Law and Social Inquiry, 19(4), 
(Autumn, 1994), 1059 – 1077; Shirin M. Rai and Georgina Waylen, Global Governance: Feminist 
Perspectives, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
135 Hoffman, “Is there a case for a feminist critique of the state?” 162; Drude Dahlerup, “Confusing 
Concepts – Confusing Reality: A Theoretical Discussion of the Patriarchal State,” In Women and the 
State, Anne Showstack Sassonn, ed., (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1987); Barbara Marshall, 
Engendering Modernity: Feminism Social Theory and Social Change, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 125. 
136 Wendy Brown describes the ‘legal and thereby ontologising … construction of … female 
powerlessness’ through the politics of sexual protection. I discuss this problem when considering the 
role of Men and Boys’ Organisations in the praxis of human rights intervention and gender 
transformative work around violence against women (chapter 3). Brown, “Finding the Man in the State,” 
9.
137 A particular body of work has developed around the challenges of feminist engagement (theoretical 
and political) with the Welfare state, with some feminists arguing the welfare state offers opportunities 
to empower women as clients and agents of the state (sometimes termed state feminism), whilst others 
argue that the state – particularly through regulation – perpetuates and produces the subordination of 
women. Key works include: Barbara Ehrenreich and Frances Fox Piven, “Women and the Welfare 
State,” In Alternatives: Proposals for America from the Democratic Left, Irving Howe, (New York: Pantheon, 
1983); Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating Women, (Boston: South End Press, 1988); Nancy Fraser, “Struggle 
Over needs”, In Women, the State, and Welfare, Linda Gordon, ed., (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1990); Frances Fox Piven, “Ideology and the State: Women, Power, and the Welfare State,” In 
Women, the State, and Welfare, Linda Gordon, ed., (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, “The Contemporary Relief Debate,” In The Mean Season: 
The Attack on the Welfare State, Fred Block, Richard A. Cloward, Barbara Ehrenreich, Frances Fox Piven, 
eds. (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Helga Hernes, Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State 
Feminism, (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987); M. Harrington, “What Exactly is Wrong with the 
Liberal State as an Agent of Change?” In Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations 
Theory, V. Spike Peterson, ed., (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); 
138 Brown, “Finding the Man in the State.”
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With regard the relationship between the law and the state, feminist critique has come 
to bear on a fundamental ontological question: what is the state? Is ‘the law’ separate 
to ‘the state’? And if it is, does it matter? – aren’t they still both widely considered as 
patriarchal actors? As Wendy Brown contends, the state is not a monolithic ‘entity or 
unity’139 (of which the law is just one face of ‘its power’); in fact ‘the state’ is not an 
‘it’140 at all. Rather, as Brown suggests, the state is multiple sites and modalities, 
operating, expressing and engendering quite ‘different kinds of power’141. This impacts 
upon feminist engagement with the state and feminist theorising about engagement 
with the state.142 If the state is many things – Brown outlines four modalities: juridical-
legislative, capitalist, prerogative, and bureaucratic143 – are these multiplicities all 
patriarchal? Is the state just the sum of these separate patriarchal institutions, politics 
and discursive spaces coming to bear on women’s lives (and thereby negating 
ontological claims to a patriarchal state that exists distinctly from its incumbent 
parts)?144 Or are these multiple modalities shaped by a wider patriarchal 
conceptualisation of the state as replacing the original patriarchy of the (pre-civil 
society) father/husband?145 These questions have been investigated extensively and 
particular attention has been paid by feminists to the juridical-legislative modality of the 
state, and ‘the law’, as touched on earlier in this chapter.146 However, it is important to 
recognise at the offset that the law remains tightly bound up in the broad feminist 
problematisation of the state as a patriarchal actor – however one considers the 
ontological relationship between the two. As such, whilst advocating for engagement 
with the law I am aware that the negotiation of the state as patriarchal remains a key 
139 Wendy Brown, “Finding the Man in the State,”; Lilburn, “Ask Not ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of 
the State?’ but Rather, Do Theorists of the State Need Feminism?”, 107.
140 Brown, “Finding the Man in the State,” 12.
141 Brown, “Finding the Man in the State,” 13.
142 Women’s groups continue to gather around this issue. Problematizing their engagement with the 
state remains a key part of the work of grassroots women’s organisations: On 13th April 2019 leading 
UK women’s organisations hosted ‘Feminist Responses to State Violence’, a day for women’s 
organisations focused on austerity, deportation, and the criminalisation of sex work, to ‘think and reflect 
on the methods feminists use to resist the harm caused by state governance’. Feminist Responses to State 
Violence, SOAS University of London, Centre for Gender Studies, accessed January 13th, 2020, 
https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/gender-studies/2019/05/29/feminist-responses-to-state-violence/
143 Brown, “Finding the Man in the State,” 13.
144 Allen, “Does Feminism Need a Theory of ‘the State’?”, 22. 
145 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
146 See earlier comments on Feminist Jurisprudence supra note 5, alongside: Smart, Feminism and the 
Power of Law; Zillah R. Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Press, 1988). This will be further considered when looking specifically at the 
relationship between patriarchy and the law in Chapter 2.
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concern and is ever-present when appraising the ‘political opportunity structures’147
offered by the international legal discourse for women to (re)negotiate the terms of 
their citizenship, democratic participation, and civilly defined social identity (whether 
viewed as private or public, personal or political). I don’t claim to settle, or directly 
address, all of these concerns in full through the course of my thesis. However, a deep 
awareness of these concerns has shaped my approach to international human rights 
law – and I would argue shapes the politics and praxis of the transnational women’s 
movement within the discourse. Feminist engagement with the law is fraught with 
tension, suspicion, and at times hostility, and this is evident at a praxis level in the 
negotiations between the transnational women’s movement, the institutions of the 
international community, and other non-state actors. This said, there is a strategic-
political – and not just a pragmatic – choice behind advocating for engagement with 
international law.
Feminist engagement with, and theorising of, international law, whilst informed by the 
concerns raised above, is also premised on the contention that international law – and 
international human rights law particularly – provides unique opportunities for women 
to redefine their relationship with the state – and indeed, to redefine the state ‘itself.’
This is of particular interest to me precisely because of the concerns outlined above. In 
the specific case of state responsibility for violence against women – as will be seen in 
detail in chapter 4 – international human rights law and the general international legal 
principle of due diligence, has been appropriated by feminist legal theorists and activists 
and utilised to expand the demands that women can make on the state.148 As such, 
Paulina García-Del Moral and Megan Alexandra Dersnah argue that this has 
fundamentally changed the claims to citizenship that women can make.149 A broader 
claim to the ‘gendered development of democracy’150 through international legal 
spaces, has been argued as evident by feminist international legal scholars and 
practitioners. In particular, the transnational women’s movement’s engagement with 
147 Vicky Randall, “Gender and Power: Women Engage the State,” In Gender, Politics and the State, Vicky 
Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds., (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 194.
148 Paulina García-Del Moral and Megan Alexandra Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered 
politics of the public/private divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” Citizenship 
Studies, 18 (6-7), (2014): 661.
149 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 664.
150 Elisabeth J. Friedman, Unfinished Transitions: Women and the Gendered Development of Democracy in 
Venezuela, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).
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international law, and its surrounding discursive spaces, such as the international 
conferences on women have offered opportunities for women’s groups to expand on 
– and in some places subvert – their otherwise restricted roles as citizens and agents 
of the state.151 As Vicky Randall suggests, in reference to feminist theorising of the 
state:
Yet a further modification to a focus simply on ‘the state’ is required … 
political opportunities for women have been created by the interaction of 
numerous states… [T]he momentum originally generated by the UN 
Commission for the Status of Women which led to the holding of a succession 
of international conferences, culminating in the meeting in Beijing in 1995, has 
significantly helped to legitimate women’s demands within the confines of the 
nation state.152
Whilst appeals to the normative importance of the human rights discourse (as the 
‘dominant progressive moral philosophy operating at the global level’153) are made by 
feminist scholars, perhaps of more importance is the discursive and institutional space 
created around the state, from which women’s groups have been able to expand 
political agency and cement international institutionalised feminist presence as a site of 
resistance. This allows for unique engagement with the state in a manner which 
renegotiates the terms of that engagement. As Jackie Jones and former Special 
Rapporteur Rhadhika Coomaraswamy suggest, the inclusion and expansion of 
women’s rights have ‘altered the substance and the procedure of international law’154, 
151 Elisabeth Jay Friedman, “Gendering the Agenda: The Impact of the Transnational Women’s Rights 
Movement at the UN Conferences of the 1990s,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 26 (4), (2003), 
313 – 331; Jude Howell, “Women’s Organizations and Civil Society in China,” International Feminist 
Journal of Politics, 5(2), (2003), 191 – 215; Jude Howell, “Gender, civil society and the state in China,” In 
Gender, Politics and the State, Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds., (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 166 – 184; Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur, eds., Comparative State 
Feminism, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995); Valerie Sperling, “Gender, Politics and the 
State during Russia’s Transition Period,” In Gender, Politics and the State, Vicky Randall and Georgina 
Waylen, eds., (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 143 – 165.
152 Randall, “Gender and Power: Women Engage the State,” 196.
153 Hilary Charlesworth, “The Mid-Life Crises of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 
Washington & Lee Law Review, 55, (1998), 781 – 796, 795; Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of 
International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 212.
154 Jackie Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,” In The Legal Protection From 
Violence: Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law, edited by Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 10.
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including ‘piercing the veil of state sovereignty’155. To this end there is broad – although 
not universal – agreement amongst feminists ‘that international law is needed as a 
weapon against systemic oppression’.156 It is from this perspective that my thesis 
proceeds, albeit cautiously.
155 Rhadika Coomaraswamy, “Women and Children: The Cutting Edge of International Law,” American 
University International Law Review, 30, (2015), 9.
156 Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,”10; Kwong-Leung Tang and Jacqueline 
Tak-York Cheung, “Realizing Women's Human Rights in Asia: The UN Women's Convention and the 
Optional Protocol,” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, 9(4), (2003): 13; Ineke Boerefijin, “A Human Rights 
Based Approach of Violence against Women,” International Studies Journal, 4, (2007): 187 – 189.
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Chapter 2 – Violence Against Women and International Human Rights Law: The 
Development of an International Legal Paradigm rooted in the Radical Feminist 
Theory of Positionality.
In the outline of my methodological position in Chapter 1, I have tried to address 
some of the challenges of utilising feminism – particularly radical feminism – as a 
theoretical framework for my research. In particular, these challenges include: 
negotiating intersecting, and sometimes contradictory, locations of positional 
knowledge and wisdom; constructing counter-hegemonic alternative knowledge and 
wisdom; and, maintaining a defensible relationship between theory positions and 
substantive positions i.e. the importance to feminism of problematising method. I will 
now look to clarify how (radical) feminism has shaped the conceptualisation of violence 
against women and surrounding substantive norms within the international human rights 
law approach, and how it has shaped the normative approach itself. (Again, in this way 
it remains important to investigate feminism’s relationship with the law and 
surrounding discursive space, and to continue problematising liberation as both ‘the 
medium and the message’ of feminist engagement with the law.) Through exploration 
of the conceptualisation of violence against women within the international human 
rights law approach, I intend to further draw out the feminist emphases on: the 
epistemic significance of positionality and collective wisdom; and the ontological 
significance of community, empowerment, and liberation. By exploring the feminist 
problematisation of violence against women, I hope to further the understanding of 
violence against women as a human rights violation and the feminist character of the 
international human rights law response (and theorised practice of the law). This will 
enable me to draw together a framework outlining state responsibility with regard 
violence against women, that is consistent and cohesive with feminist theorising within 
the law, and which contributes further to the uniquely feminist human rights approach 
to preventing violence against women. 
In this chapter I also plan to touch upon questions of application and theorised (and 
untheorised) practice, although more will be said on this as I consider preventative 
strategies and norms within the international human rights law approach to violence 
against women, in later chapters.
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In this chapter I will provide an overview of violence against women and international 
human rights law and consider how the understanding of violence against women has 
developed through the women’s movement’s leading of the international human rights 
discourse.157 In particular, I will delineate and highlight key substantive principles and 
characteristics of an international legal approach that I argue is rooted in the radical 
feminist theory of positionality, outlined in Chapter 1. From this, I will go on to 
consider the international human rights law approach to primary prevention and due 
diligence, specifically; outlining, again, its (radical) feminist character and theoretical 
underpinnings. Through this I will trace the conceptual development of violence against 
women as a human rights violation. It is important to note that, again, these principles 
were not picked to defend a theory position, as such, but engagement with these 
principles – as developed within the international human rights law approach –
introduced me to radical feminist political theory, and specifically the primacy of
positionality, as outlined in Chapter 1. For the sake of advancing my thesis and 
clarifying the due diligence obligation to prevent violence against women, I have 
presented my theory position in advance of my legal review, however, in reality, it was 
engagement with the law that began the process of theorising, and educated me as to 
the significance of (radical) feminist theory to this specific area of law. 
Whilst my exposure to political thought within an academic setting predates my 
engagement with the law, it was only through the study of international law, and the 
research and activism that followed, that I became more fully versed in feminist 
political theory and aware of its impact in the world and in my own life. Introduction 
to the work of Christine Chinkin and Hillary Charlesworth was the first time my own
learning and critical engagement was given a specifically feminist lens. This introduction 
to feminist approaches to international law, and following that Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), was a catalytic moment in understanding 
my own positionality with regard the law as a European, white, cisgendered woman 
from a working class background. These schools of legal politics and praxis crystallised 
157 Elisabeth Jay Friedman, “Gendering the Agenda: The Impact of the Transnational Women’s Rights 
Movement at the UN Conferences of the 1990s,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 26 (4), (2003), 
313 – 331; Charlotte Bunch and Niamh Reilly, Demanding Accountability: The Global Campaign and 
Vienna Tribunal for Women’s Human Rights. (New Brunswick, NJ : Center for Women's Global 
Leadership /United Nations Development Fund for Women, 1994); Farrior, Stephanie. “The Due 
Diligence Standard, Private Actors and Domestic Violence,” In Human Rights: From Practice to Policy 
Proceedings of a Research Workshop Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan October 
2010, edited by Carrie Booth Walling, Susan Waltz, Michigan: University of Michigan, 2011.
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my own thinking with regard the role and significance of critical theory and the role 
law plays as a political and normative actor and institution. Finding myself at home 
within the critical approaches to international law, I soon became engaged with 
research and activism that coupled my interest in the law with my passion for social 
justice. Working on the fringes of the lobbying efforts for a new Welsh Bill addressing 
violence against women, I saw first hand the relationship between international human 
rights law and the women’s movement. During this time (2011 – 2012) I volunteered 
for the Welsh Office of Amnesty International who operated as a key partner in the 
Wales Violence Against Women Action Group158 (a coalition of leading Welsh 
women’s organisations operating under feminist principles, such as Welsh Women’s 
Aid, BAWSO, and Wales Assembly of Women). As part of my role I provided
research briefs and in-depth reports supporting the coalition’s call for the Welsh Bill to 
take the feminist approach to violence against women outlined in the DEVAW, 
namely that ‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power 
relations between men and women’159; and that outlined a holistic and feminist 
understanding of state responsibility. With regard the international legal response to 
violence against women it was clear that the international human rights community
and the women’s movements had a symbiotic relationship, with the transnational 
women’s movement acting as a key voice in pushing for the normative standards that 
shaped the DEVAW and the Beijing Platform for Action, and the existence of those 
standards becoming the orthodox tools of grassroots women’s organisations in 
national contexts, such as in the case of the Welsh Bill.160 The role of the women’s 
movement as a fundamental sociopolitical and demosprudential161 actor making ‘legal 
conclusions not just more likely, but for all intents and purposes, inevitable’162 seemed 
evident in the shape of the international human rights law response to violence against 
women, in the make-up of the international legal landscape163, and in the dynamic 
relationship between non-elite groups and international law. Yet there was also a 
158 http://www.walesvawgroup.co.uk accessed 9th January 2020.
159 General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Preamble, available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/48/104 
160 Hannah Austin, VAW: Priorities for the Violence Against Women (Wales) Bill, (Cardiff: Wales Violence 
Against Women Action Group, 2013), available at http://www.walesvawgroup.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/vaw-priorities-for-vaw-wales-bill.pdf.
161 More will be said on this role in the case law review in chapter 4. 
162 Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, “Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and 
Social Movements,” The Yale Law Journal, 123(8), 2014, 2740 – 2804, 2740.
163 Guinier and Torres, “Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social 
Movements,” 2749 – 2750.
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dissonance between the feminist norms that inhered in the international human rights 
law response, and the ability of women’s groups to fully utilise those norms for political 
progress at the national level. As non-elite groups their engagement was afforded 
international institutional orthodoxy, but this was limited by engagement with state 
actors that weren’t versed in, or informed by, those norms or orthodoxy. Despite 
these challenges – which are touched on in later chapters – my experience as a 
student of international law, a researcher, and activist all compounded an 
understanding of the international human rights response to violence against women 
as a fundamental tool of the women’s movement, and as being deeply rooted and 
shaped by feminist political thought and activism. To this end, I believe the use of 
international law as a sociocultural and political – as well as a legal – tool to develop 
the concept and practice of state responsibility for violence against women cannot be 
underestimated. The orthodoxy and institution of international human rights law have
played an important role in creating discursive space and providing opportunities to 
concretise otherwise fragile gains made by the women’s movement. However, 
institutionalising these gains brings with it its own challenges. This dichotomy will be 
touched on across the following chapters.
The international human rights law response to violence against women164
In order to appraise the successes, and highlight the ongoing challenges, which impact 
upon the implementation of a feminist international human rights law approach to 
violence against women, it is first necessary to situate it in the context of more general 
developments in international human rights law and the jurisprudence governing 
understandings of, and responses to, violence against women. 
Prior to, and during, the United Nations Decade for Women (1975 – 1985), the issue 
of violence against women in general, and more specifically domestic violence, was 
high on the agenda of women’s rights activists. Advocacy at the World Conferences 
164 The overview of international legal developments provided in this section was shaped by a research 
memo I prepared with Dr. Claire Malcolm for UN Women as part of the 20 year review of the Beijing 
Platform for Action (Beijing+20 available at http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en). The research memo was 
developed at the request of then UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Rashida 
Manjoo, and focused on developments within the United Nations, as well as continuing gaps and 
challenges. 
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on Women served as a catalyst for the adoption of General Assembly resolution 
40/36 on domestic violence in 1985. The Third World Conference on Women and 
the Expert Group meeting on violence in the family, held in Vienna in 1986, further 
highlighted the global nature and concern regarding violence against women. In May 
1991, the Economic and Social Council (hereafter, ECOSOC) adopted resolution 
1991/18 on violence against women in all its forms, in which it recommended the 
development of a framework for an international instrument that would explicitly 
address the issue of violence against women. The Council also urged member states 
to adopt, strengthen and enforce legislation prohibiting violence against women and to 
take appropriate administrative, social and educational measures to protect women 
from all forms of physical and mental violence.
The UN explicitly recognised violence against women as a human rights violation at 
the World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993. The Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the Conference, noted that ‘the 
human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible 
part of universal human rights’.165 Emphasising that the elimination of violence against 
women in all areas of life, both public and private, was central to the attainment of 
women’s human rights, the Conference called on governments and the UN to take 
the steps necessary for the realisation of this goal, including by integrating the human 
rights of women ‘into the mainstream of United Nations system-wide activity’,166
through the activities of the treaty bodies and relevant mechanisms, including the 
promotion of how to make effective use of existing procedures, and the adoption of 
new procedures to ‘strengthen implementation of the commitment to women’s 
equality and the human rights of women.’167 Furthermore, in 1993, the General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
(resolution 48/104), as recommended by the ECOSOC, and in 1994, the Commission 
on Human Rights adopted resolution 1994/45, establishing the mandate of the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences 
(hereafter Special Rapporteur).
165 United Nations, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Vienna, 25 June 1993, part 1, paragraph 
18, available from http://undocs.org/A/CONF.157/23
166 United Nations, Vienna Declaration, part II, paragraph 37.
167 United Nations, Vienna Declaration, part II, paragraph 40.
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One of the most significant moments regarding the elimination of violence against 
women at the international level was the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action (PFA). The 
PFA followed General Recommendation no. 19 by the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women (hereafter CEDAW Committee) and the 1993 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW (resolution 
48/104)). The PFA distilled two decades of advocacy and awareness-raising of the 
issue of violence against women at the UN. However, it was arguably the DEVAW 
that marked the establishment of an international human rights law approach to the 
elimination of violence against women. Whilst the Declaration is non-binding, it goes 
towards customary law and marks a significant global consensus. The DEVAW 
remains, perhaps, the primary international legal instrument with reference to 
eliminating violence against women. 
The Fourth World Conference on Women, in Beijing, reiterated the strides taken 
under the auspices of the Vienna Declaration, making violence against women the 
centrepiece of its Platform for Action and cementing the issue within the human rights 
discourse. In so doing, it reinforced the legal and normative foundations, developed 
not only at Vienna but also through General Recommendation No. 12 (1989) and 
General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) of the CEDAW Committee and the 
DEVAW. 
Consolidating the understanding developed through earlier World Conferences, these 
elements of international human rights law emphasise and articulate the scope of 
violence against women and affirm that this definition incorporates physical, sexual and 
psychological violence. The PFA elaborates on various manifestations of violence 
against women, such as murder, systematic rape and forced pregnancy during armed 
conflict, as well as sexual slavery, forced sterilization, forced abortion, female infanticide 
and prenatal sex selection.168 Likewise General Recommendation no. 19 and the 
DEVAW are explicit in their elucidation of the systemic and structural nature of 
violence against women. The DEVAW, in particular, offered a critical development 
with regard to characterising violence against women as a human rights violation and 
was fundamental to the PFA. 
168 United Nations, Report Of The Fourth World Conference On Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, Chap. I, resolution 1, annex II, paras. 114 and 115, available at http://undocs.org/A/CONF.177/20
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The DEVAW also provided a comprehensive framework in terms of definition, scope, 
state responsibility, and the role of the UN. The PFA purposefully used the same 
definition of root causes of violence against women as that provided by the DEVAW; 
specifically:
violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power 
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and 
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full 
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the 
crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate 
position compared with men.169
In so doing, it further elaborates on the gendered and discriminatory nature of 
violence against women. The CEDAW Committee furthers this definition by 
explaining violence against women as: 
[v]iolence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman, or that 
affects women disproportionately.170
The PFA and DEVAW marked milestones on the ‘gender equality agenda’ of the UN 
and represented a transition in the acknowledgment of violence against women from a 
so-called ‘private matter’, to a public human rights concern. Whilst progress was made 
during the UN Decade for Women, particularly at the World Conference in Nairobi, 
the term violence against women was only formally outlined in Article 1 of the DEVAW 
(and the PFA), which defined it as: 
any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, 
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including 
169 General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Preamble, available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/48/104 
170 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 19, 
11th session, A/47/38, (1992), paragraph 6, available from http://undocs.org/A/47/38
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threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or in private life.171
During the decade following the DEVAW, there were two main areas of progress at 
the international level – awareness raising and standard-setting – that took root at the 
national level, through the enactment of legislation. In particular, the increased 
consciousness of the scope of violence against women and its varying manifestations 
was steadily highlighted across the UN. A core component of awareness-raising was 
the establishment of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.172 A key part of the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur is to seek and receive information on violence 
against women, a directive that reflects the second strategic objective of the PFA –
‘Study the causes and consequences of violence against women and the effectiveness 
of preventive measures.’173
Before the establishment of the office of the Special Rapporteur, and the DEVAW and 
PFA, violence against women was widespread and unchallenged. The international 
women’s movement fought to place on the international agenda a range of 
manifestations of violence against women, including: violence which targets women 
during armed conflict and/or which is perpetrated directly by the state; violence in the 
family, such as domestic violence, or violence linked with cultural practices; and 
violence in the community, such as rape, sexual harassment, religious extremism and 
trafficking. All these concerns were incorporated into the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur. During the tenure of the first mandate holder, Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
this broad scope proved invaluable in increasing understanding of forms and 
manifestations of violence against women. The Special Rapporteur recommended that 
states criminalise and prosecute all manifestations of violence against women, including 
violence perpetrated under the guise of cultural practices.174 There was a notable 
171 United Nations, Report Of The Fourth World Conference On Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, paragraph 113 and General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women, A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Article 1.
172 Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45, Question of integrating the rights of women into the
human rights mechanisms of the United Nations and the elimination of violence against women, 
RES/1994/45, available from http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1994/45
173 United Nations, Report Of The Fourth World Conference On Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, Chap. I, resolution 1, annex II, D.2
174 United Nations, Cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy,
E/CN.4/2002/83, (31 January 2002), available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2002/83
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increase in awareness and understanding of violence against women as expressed, in 
particular, within domestic violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation (FGM), 
trafficking, and violence against women in armed conflict.  
In 1993 the crime of domestic violence was hidden behind deference to the so-called 
‘private sphere’; rarely prevented or prosecuted. Laws and criminal justice procedures 
did not recognise domestic violence as a specific crime, and prosecutions had to be 
brought under the general law of assault. Since the DEVAW and PFA, a great deal has 
occurred at the standard-setting level with regard to domestic violence. ‘In terms of 
legislation, domestic violence is undoubtedly the area in which many countries have 
made progress’175 over the past 20 years. The development of national legislation was 
promoted and advanced by the model legislation on domestic violence released in 
1996.  At that time, the Special Rapporteur issued a report, ‘Further Promotion and 
Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, submitted in 
accordance with the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/85.176 The 
addendum to the report included a framework for model legislation on domestic 
violence, ‘to serve as a drafting guide to legislatures and organizations committed to 
lobbying their legislatures for comprehensive legislation on domestic violence.’177 The 
model legislation includes a definition of domestic violence, a declaration of purpose 
and both civil and criminal provisions. It includes requirements for police officers, 
judges and prosecutors. Importantly, the legislation highlights the significance of victim 
safety throughout criminal and civil proceedings. The model law was thorough in 
ensuring protection for victims of domestic violence, covering guidance on responding 
to domestic violence, ensuring safety during criminal procedures, and advising on 
protection orders and restraining orders. In Section VII, the model law directs states to 
provide emergency and long-term services to domestic violence victims and to train 
legal professionals and social service providers in the complicated dynamics of 
175 United Nations, Cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy,
E/CN.4/2002/83, (31 January 2002), paragraph 28.
176 United Nations, Violence in the family and domestic violence: Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, E/CN.4/1996/53, (5 
February 1996), available from http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1996/53
177 United Nations: A framework for model legislation on domestic violence: Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2 (2 February 1996), available from http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2
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domestic violence.178 In 1997, as an annex to General Assembly resolution 52/86, on 
crime prevention and criminal justice measures to eliminate violence against women, 
the General Assembly adopted model strategies and practical measures on the 
elimination of violence against women in the field of crime prevention and criminal 
justice.
The strengthening of legislation has more recently been furthered by the ‘UN 
Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women’179, published in 2009, and the 
Secretary-General’s database on violence against women180. These followed a 2008 
report by UN Women and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Good 
practices in Legislation on Violence Against Women.’181 The Expert Group Meeting 
followed on from the Secretary-General’s 2006 in-depth study on all forms of violence 
against women, and General Assembly resolution 61/143, on the ‘Intensification of 
Efforts to Eliminate all forms of Violence Against Women’182. The UN Handbook 
contains a new framework for legislation on violence against women, which addresses 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation, definitions of violence against women, 
prevention, protection, investigations and legal proceedings, protection orders, 
sentencing, family law cases involving violence against women, civil lawsuits, and 
violence against women and asylum law. Under international law, states must now 
address violence against women, including through the passing of legislation and a 
great many appear to have heeded this. In fact, by 2011, domestic violence had been 
outlawed by 125 states. 
Initiatives to develop model approaches in addressing violence against women have 
also been undertaken by the Caribbean Community Secretariat (CARICOM); the Pan-
178 United Nations: A framework for model legislation on domestic violence: Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2 (2 February 1996), Section VII, available from 
http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2 
179 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Division for the Advancement of 
Women, Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women, (New York: UN, 2010)
180 “Secretary-General’s database on violence against women”, accessed 21 May 2015. 
http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org
181 United Nations, Good practices in legislation on violence against women: Report of the expert group 
meeting organized by United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria, 26 to 28 May 2008, available at 
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2008/Report%20EGMGPLVAW%20(final%
2011.11.08).pdf
182 General Assembly resolution 61/143, Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against 
women, A/RES/61/143 (19 December 2006), available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/61/143
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American Health Organization (PAHO), a regional office of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), in coordination with the Inter-American Commission of 
Women (CIMI/OAS), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the United 
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).
Given the erstwhile ‘invisibility’ of violence against women – and particularly domestic 
violence – in international and national legislation, the development of this model law 
must be considered as a notable success, albeit one which remains somewhat 
constrained by limitations concerning implementation and enforcement. 
During the decade following the DEVAW and PFA, awareness-raising and standard-
setting around the varying forms and manifestations of violence against women also 
informed an expanding international legal framework, including:
- The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children (The Palermo Protocol, 2000);
- The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998);
- The Optional Protocol to the CEDAW (2000); enabling the CEDAW 
committee to consider petitions from individual women or groups of 
women who have exhausted national remedies. It also entitles the 
Committee to conduct enquiries into grave or systematic violations of the 
Convention; and,
- UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which called for special 
measures to protect women and girls from violence against women in 
armed conflict.
At the advent of the DEVAW there was no effective international legal framework for 
addressing either the rights of women, or violence against women during armed 
conflict. The reality of this latter phenomenon, in particular the use of rape within 
warfare, had been highlighted after the war in Bosnia Herzogovinia, the genocide in 
Rwanda, and the conflict in East Timor. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, marked one of the most significant achievements in addressing violence against 
women during armed conflict. The statute specifically defines rape and other forms of 
violence against women as constituent acts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
51
Much of this can be traced back to the landmark case Kadic v Karadi (2000), where 
rape as an act of genocide was first recognised. Catherine Mackinnon, with co-counsel, 
won a damage award of $745 million, representing Bosnian women survivors of 
Serbian genocidal sexual atrocities. Mackinnon went on to further her concept of 
‘gender crime’ as the first special gender adviser to the prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court (The Hague) from 2008 to 2012, influencing the implementation of 
this concept. Explicit language now prohibits all types of sexual violence against 
women during wartime (whether international or internal), including rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or other forms 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity. The statute also recognises the crime of 
enslavement183, including trafficking in women and children. Gender is recognised as an 
independent basis of persecution as it pertains to crimes against humanity184 and the 
definition of torture is broad enough to include acts by private actors185.  
The adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1325 has been invaluable in 
recognising the vital role of women in promoting peace. The resolution calls for an 
increased use of women’s expertise in conflict resolution and through all stages of 
peacemaking and peace-building. This was further supported by the report of the 
Secretary-General on ‘Women, Peace and Security'186, which contains 
recommendations to assist in the implementation of resolution 1325.
Alongside these individuated responses at the international level, there were also 
regional legal developments that sought to address violence against women; most 
significantly the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women (the Convention of Belém do Pará, 1994), 
which marked the first binding treaty at the international level which specifically 
addressed violence against women. This was followed by the African Union Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
183 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 2002, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544, Article (7)(2)(c), available from treaties.un.org. available at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
184 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 2002, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544, Article (7)(1)(h).
185 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 2002, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544, Article (7)(2)(e).
186 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security, 
S/2002/1154 (16 October 2002), available from http://undocs.org/S/2002/1154
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Africa (The Maputo Protocol, 2003), and the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul 
Convention, 2011).  It should be noted that the above-mentioned declarations and 
resolutions serve as consensus statements by member states, and are of persuasive 
value in influencing international norms with regard to the elimination of violence 
against women and in providing normative standards for states to follow at the 
national level. 
Most recently, in 2017, the CEDAW Committee drew together the developments of 
the past two decades and reaffirmed the norms of General Recommendation no. 19 
in ‘General Recommendation no. 35 on gender-based violence against women, 
updating general recommendation No. 19’. Of particular note, is the pronouncement 
of customary law status by the Committee which states: 
For over 25 years, the practice of States parties has endorsed the 
Committee’s interpretation. The opinio juris and State practice suggest that 
the prohibition of gender-based violence against women has evolved into a 
principle of customary international law. General recommendation No. 19 
has been a key catalyst for this process.187
General Recommendation no. 35 also furthered the approach of the DEVAW and 
General Recommendation no. 19, by framing violence against women as gender-based 
and rooted in discrimination and inequality: 
The Committee regards gender-based violence against women to be rooted 
in gender-related factors such as the ideology of men’s entitlement and 
privilege over women, social norms regarding masculinity, the need to assert 
male control or power, enforce gender roles, or prevent, discourage or 
punish what is considered to be unacceptable female behaviour. These 
factors also contribute to the explicit or implicit social acceptance of 
187 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), paragraph 2, available from http://undocs.org/ CEDAW/C/GC/35
53
gender-based violence against women, often still considered as a private 
matter, and to the widespread impunity for it.188
As General Recommendation no. 35 is widely seen as an affirmation of the norms 
contained in General Recommendation no. 19, I will refer primarily to General 
Recommendation no. 19 unless there is reason to specifically refer to General 
Recommendation no. 35 – such as the framing of customary law. As General 
Recommendation no. 35 is a recent addition it has not been part of the discursive 
framing, or development, of violence against women as a human rights violation, but it 
does aptly summarise the dominant framing that has evolved.
The definitions outlined above are found in international human rights law and are the 
basis of a feminist human rights approach to violence against women – vastly different 
to a criminal approach which sees only isolated incidences of violence – that is now at 
the forefront of anti-violence against women efforts, internationally, regionally, and 
nationally. However, this understanding was not always so evident in international 
human rights law and is unquestionably the fruit of feminist efforts not simply to raise 
consciousness of violence against women within the discourse but to develop an 
understanding of violence against women as a human rights violation. This approach 
focuses international human rights law on the root causes of violence against women –
moving from a ‘welfarist’ response to violence against women, to a rights-based, 
empowerment model of preventing and eliminating violence against women.
Mirroring the methodological approach of (radical) feminist theory, consciousness-
raising in and through the law displays the same ability to challenge hegemony and 
offer ‘alternative wisdom’; in this context as international legal norms. It can be seen 
that feminism shapes international human rights law and the wider rights discourse in 
two primary ways. Firstly, it serves as a challenge to the male dominance within local, 
national and global communities, and the discursive spaces therein. Men have 
dominated the political and legal world for centuries and as such the male experience 
of life, and the issues that are of concern to men, have come to be understood as 
188 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), paragraph 19.
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‘general human concerns’189 and have encompassed the focus of international human 
rights law. Feminism functions as a deconstructive tool190 by which to reveal the ‘partial 
and partisan instead of the [seemingly] universal or representative position’191 of 
international human rights law. In short, feminism acts to highlight the patriarchal 
nature of society and the state – extending to, and including, of course, the law – and 
to challenge the male domination of the human rights discourse, specifically.  Secondly, 
feminism serves as a voice for the female life experience. It is a platform from which to 
articulate a more comprehensive view of the female experience and the issues that are 
unique to the lives of women. Serving both of these functions, feminism acts with 
deconstructive and constructive purpose with regard the development of an 
international human rights law approach to violence against women, and international 
human rights law more generally. 
When it comes to delineating this deconstructive and constructive purpose, several 
substantive principles, rooted in (radical) feminist theory, can be identified: 
- the persistence and resilience of patriarchy; its relationship to violence against 
women, and the importance, thereby, of focusing on the ‘root causes’ of 
violence against women;
- the understanding of violence against women as gendered and discriminatory; 
and the problematising of a societal and systemic aetiology of violence against 
women;
- the public/private dichotomy and how it interplays with the dominant 
conceptualisation of violence against women, and consequently, how the state 
and society respond to violence against women; 
- and, finally, the conceptualisation of violence against women as a human rights 
violation, leading to an holistic, rights-based – rather than an essentialist and 
welfarist – conceptualisation of elimination.
189 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International 
Law,” American Journal of International Law, 85(4), (1991), 613 – 645, 613.
190 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 60.
191 Elizabeth Gross, “What is feminist theory?” In Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory, edited by 
Carole Pateman & Elizabeth Gross, (Sydney, London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 197.
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These will now be considered in some depth, with case studies of theorised (or 
untheorised) practice and application highlighted to emphasise the feminist roots of 
the legal paradigm and their importance.
Key principles underpinning the development of a radical feminist international 
human rights law approach to violence against women
Patriarchy
Underlying violence against women is ‘the most pernicious of patriarchal myths’: that 
‘the domination of women is a natural right.’192 Whilst the manifestation of patriarchy 
may display nuanced differences from country to country it is still the measure of the 
Nation State.193 As Carole Pateman suggests in her work on the Social Contract 
theorists, the development of civil society, and the delineation of the public and private 
spheres, marks a move from the paternal to the fraternal – in its literal sense – and 
reflects an augmentation of patriarchy from patria potestas – the rule of fathers – to 
the rule of men, or ‘brothers’, as more widely defined: ‘The transition from the 
traditional to the modern world […] involved a change from a traditional (paternal) 
form of patriarchy to a new specifically modern (or fraternal) form: patriarchal civil 
society.’194 With the gendered underpinnings of neoliberalism and ‘Economic Man’195, 
we also see patriarchal civil society imbricated within and bolstered by a specifically 
modern (to use Pateman’s emphasis) form of patriarchal economic society. With these 
civil and economic foundations, what we find is the ‘extraordinary durability of 
patriarchy’196 across, and throughout, modern society, and the Nation State. In fact, 
192 Ann C. Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay,” Yale Law Journal, 95, (1986): 
1378.
193 Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); Carole Pateman, The 
Sexual Contract, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1989).
194 Pateman, The Disorder of Women, 35.
195 Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993); ‘Virginia Held (1993) coined the term “economic man” to link two problematic 
points: the exclusive modelling of political life on economic life; and the deeply gendered presumptions 
underlying such modelling, the legacy of domesticity.’ Ann Mongoven, Just Love: Transforming Civic Virtue, 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009), 148. 
196 Rhonda Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” In Human Rights 
of Women: National and International Perspectives, edited by Rebecca Cook, ed., (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1994): 121.
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most of the research and evidence on violence against women and patriarchy comes 
from Western societies, ‘where the traditional patriarchal arrangements are thought to 
have been most challenged’197. So ubiquitous is the subordination of women that it has 
come to be considered as ordinary; hidden in plain sight. As MacKinnon describes: ‘[i]n 
male supremacist societies, the male standpoint dominates civil society in the form of 
the objective standard – that standpoint which, because it dominates in the world, 
does not appear to function as a standpoint at all.’198 This ‘objective standpoint’ has 
been the basis of law, and particular to this study, international human rights law. This 
serves to further reinforce the position of men by giving their dominance legal 
legitimacy and establishing in our consciousness that that which is legal must be right: 
‘Through legal mediation, male dominance is made to seem a feature of life, not a one-
sided construct imposed by force for the advantage of a dominant group.’199 In this 
manner, patriarchy is a threat to women in two main ways. Firstly, and most 
importantly, patriarchy is a source of direct harm to women – it has an immediate and 
direct causal relationship with violence against women. I will consider this relationship 
and how it has shaped the human rights approach in some depth across this chapter. 
Secondly, because the law is based on the male standpoint it does not represent 
women or provide adequate attention to issues unique to women, such as violence 
against women. I will therefore explore the relationship between patriarchy and law,
and how this impacts upon violence against women and efforts to combat violence 
against women – in some cases openly sanctioning violence against women and in 
others acquiescing to it. 
Following the below sub-paragraphs on ‘patriarchy and violence against women’ and 
‘patriarchy and the law’, patriarchy will be further problematised as I consider the other 
substantive principles outlined above. Patriarchy is not so much one factor contributing 
to violence against women, as it is a system that structures, underlies, and intersects 
with many factors contributing to violence against women.
197 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 120.
198 Catherine Mackinnon, “Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” In Feminist Jurisprudence, edited by Patricia 
Smith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993): 610.
199 Mackinnon, “Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” 610.
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Patriarchy and violence against women
The history of patriarchy is the politics and logic of the dominance of men, and the 
consequent subordination and subjugation of women: ‘the ordering of society under 
which standards – political, economic, legal, social – are set by, and fixed in the 
interests of, men.’ 200 Take as a simple, but profound example, the label ‘woman’201. 
The label comes from ‘wif’ and ‘man,’ meaning wifeman202: ‘[w]oman's very identity is 
thus indistinct from her status as a wife.’203 As Bullough suggests, ‘the implication seems 
to be that there is no such thing as a woman separate from wifehood.’204 This 
subordination is borne of man’s need to dominate, which is itself the subject of 
extensive study – with arguments ranging from man’s ‘fears and antagonisms over 
sexual and reproductive matters’205 to divine will, reinforced through creation stories 
and more general religious teaching.206 Dominating human history, it becomes difficult 
to define clearly the origins of patriarchy: ‘from the very earliest twilight of human 
society, every woman … was found in a state of bondage to some man.’207 This said, 
we can chart its development and see how it has shaped society and the state, and, 
200 John G. Riddall, Jurisprudence, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 272.
201 In the early 1970s a significant part of creating discursive and normative space around gendered 
power, was the symbolic act of forming new language – particularly, names and descriptors. This has had 
a resurgence, particularly within the Trans Movement and collectivised action following the Women’s 
March 2017. Womxn or womyn are two increasingly used frames for negotiating the gendered roots of 
the descriptor ‘woman’. Wymen Creating Consciousness Collectively, a student organising group of 
Michigan State University, describe this act of redefinition and its significance: “By taking the “men” and 
“man” out of the words “woman” and “women” we are symbolically saying that we do not need men 
to be “complete”. We, as womyn, are not a sub-category of men.  We are not included in many of the 
history books, studies and statistics that are done in male dominated societies, thus they do not apply to 
us, for in these items we do not exist. In these societies men are the “norm” and women the 
“particular,” a mere sub-category of the “norm,” of men. The re-spelling of the word “woman” is a 
statement that we refused to be defined by men. We are womyn and only we have the right to define 
our relationships with ourselves, society, with other womyn and men. These re-spellings work as a 
symbolic act of looking at and defining ourselves as we really are, not how men and society view us, but 
through our own female views of ourselves, as self-defined womyn.” “Woman, Womyn, Wimyn, 
Womin, and Wimmin: Why the alternatives spellings?” Wymen Creating Consciousness Collectively, 
accessed 8 December 2018, https://msu.edu/~womyn/alternative.html
202 T.F Hoad, Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, (Oxford: OUP, 1986), 544.
203 Sophie Cubbon, “The Dismantling of Patriarchy,” UCL Jurisprudence Review, (2000): 255.
204 Vern L. Bullough, The Subordinate Sex: A History of Attitudes Toward Women (New York: Penguin, 
1974).
205 Mildred Daley Pagelow, Family Violence (New York: Springer Publications, 1984), 270; “30% of 
domestic violence starts in pregnancy.” Gwyneth Lewis, ed., The Confidential Enquiry into Maternal and 
Child Health (CEMACH). Saving Mothers’ Lives: reviewing maternal deaths to make motherhood safer -
2003-2005. The Seventh Report on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths in the United Kingdom. 
(London: CEMACH, 2007), 174.
206 Terry Davidson, ‘Wife beating: A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History’, In Battered Women, 
edited by Maria Roy (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1977), 7.
207 John Mill, On liberty; Representative government; The subjection of women; three essays by John Stuart 
Mill, with an introduction by Millicent Garrett Fawcett., (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), 432.
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over the past centuries, national laws and international human rights law. Patriarchy has 
created and reinforced the belief that women are inferior to men and that they can be 
objectified, controlled and chastised; and indeed they must be if men are to retain 
their position. As Eva Figes boldly asserts: ‘in a patriarchal society male dominance 
must be maintained at all costs because the person who dominates cannot conceive of 
any alternative but to be dominated in turn.’208 As such, violence is used as a means of 
social control and is exercised where this control seems threatened.209 Women’s 
capacity or power, be it real or perceived, is a ‘trigger’ for violence against women; 
‘whether it be pregnancy, mothering, beauty or the offer of intimacy; competence at 
wage-earning work; social relations, or household management; or actual “rebellions” 
small and large.’210 These are threats to the gender hierarchy and must be denied and 
destroyed through the use of violence. Acts of violence against women ‘express and 
actualize the distinctive power of men over women in society.’211 This goes some way 
to explaining why women are more likely to suffer violence, sexual assault and death 
at the hands of a partner or family member than a stranger. Indeed intimate-partner 
relationships are ‘the primary sources of women’s exposure to violent crime.’212 The 
CEDAW’s General Recommendation no. 35 (2017) summarises this intrinsic 
relationship between patriarchy and violence against women: 
The Committee regards gender-based violence against women to be rooted in 
gender-related factors such as the ideology of men’s entitlement and privilege 
over women, social norms regarding masculinity, the need to assert male 
control or power, enforce gender roles, or prevent, discourage or punish what 
is considered to be unacceptable female behaviour.213
208 Eva Figes, Patriarchal Attitudes: Women in Society, (London: Persea Books, 1972), 52; Esther Fuchs, 
Sexual Politics in the Biblical Narrative: Reading the Hebrew Bible as a Woman (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 2000); Kate Millet, Sexual Politics, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969); Danna Nolan 
Fewell and David M. Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise: The Subject of the Bible's First Story, (Nashville, 
TN: Abingdon Press, 1993).
209 Sally Goldfarb, “Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 61, 
(2000): 16.
210 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 121.
211 MacKinnon, Towards a feminist theory of the state,127.
212 Goldfarb, “Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,” 14.
213 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), paragraph 19.
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Sally Goldfarb expands on this and explains that violence against women as patriarchal
or gendered violence ‘is particularly harmful to its victims, who suffer not only the 
physical and emotional injury of the crime itself but also the added psychic injury of 
knowing they were victimized because of their group identity.’214 In this way violence 
against women serves a ‘terroristic function’; intimidating not only the victim but also 
the wider population of women.215 Whilst international human rights law came to 
define violence against women as a gender-based and discriminatory violation – stating 
that ‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations 
between men and women’216 – this was only after many years of tireless advocacy by 
feminist scholars such as Christine Chinkin, Hillary Charlesworth, Shelley Wright, 
Catherine MacKinnon, Rhonda Copelon and Charlotte Bunch, and some 20 years after 
radical feminist authors such as Susan Brownmiller217 and Kate Millet218. That violence 
against women is a ‘manifestation of unequal power relations’ is of vital importance to 
feminist framing and jurisprudence interpreting international human rights law, and to 
any efforts to further clarify the human rights approach. From the international to local 
level, understanding of the gendered and patriarchal roots of violence against women 
must inform any response. The international human rights law response to the feminist 
problematisation of patriarchy and violence against women will be considered in some 
depth in this chapter, after looking at the second way patriarchy inheres in women’s 
experience of violence against women: through dominance of the law.
Patriarchy and law
When it comes to patriarchy and the law we see two dynamics manifest: firstly, the 
law is used as a tool to actively maintain male privilege and power; and, secondly, 
through male dominance of the legal arena, the law has come to represent a limited 
male norm of how citizens relate to each other, to society, and to the state, which fails 
to represent women.
214 Goldfarb, “Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,” 16.
215 Goldfarb, “Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,” 16; This also echoes Susan 
Brownmiller’s famous explanation on the use of rape as a weapon, claiming it is ‘nothing more or less 
than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.’ Susan 
Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 13.
216 General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Preamble
217 Brownmiller, Against Our Will: men, women and rape.
218 Millett, Sexual Politics.
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The law has long provided the legitimacy for men to subjugate women. It is ironic that 
the representation and acknowledgement of women by the law is so poor that moves 
to change this often seem so radical and transformative; with often the smallest 
progress receiving harsh backlash. Their ‘long-term domination of all bodies wielding 
political power nationally and internationally’219 has enabled men to use the law to 
preserve their position. We have seen this over centuries in national civil and criminal 
law – notably through laws governing marriage, reproduction, suffrage, and 
employment. Two well-referenced examples in domestic criminal law are: 
criminalisation (or exemption from criminalisation) of marital rape; and, the 
jurisprudence concerning self-defense as a mitigating justification for the unlawful use 
of force (i.e. assault or murder). In the case of marital rape, we see the preservation of 
man’s dominion over, and domination of, ‘his wife’. It is only over recent decades that 
the majority of states have moved to criminalise marital rape. Before then a wealth of 
patriarchal thinking prevailed, revolving around the logical and legal impossibility of 
marital rape – how can a woman be raped by a man she has consented to marry; a 
man she is beholden to? In 1997, four years after the DEVAW established martial rape 
as a human rights violation, UNICEF published that only 17 states had criminalised 
marital rape. As of 2012 only 52 countries have laws criminalising marital rape.220
Whilst a growing number of states have criminal laws on rape some still contain special 
exemptions or immunity for rape within marriage. For example, the Indian Penal Code 
Section 375 (which defines rape) makes an ‘exception’ for marital rape, where: ‘Sexual 
intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 15
years of age, is not rape.’221 In 2017, NGO RIT Foundation, All India Democratic 
Women's Association and a marital rape victim challenged the IPC Section 375(d), 
claiming it was unconstitutional. The Indian government responded to pushes to 
change the law, by saying that criminalising marital rape ‘may destabilise the institution 
of marriage’.222 Even where the law has been changed to criminalise marital rape there 
can still be situations where application and interpretation of the law is subject to 
219 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,” 613.
220 UN Women, Progress of the World’s Women 2011: In Pursuit of Justice, (UN Women, 2011), 17, 
available from http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/progress-of-the-worlds-women
221 In 2013 The Indian Penal Code was amended. The only amendment to the exception for marital 
rape was the age on ‘the wife’. The 2013 amendment raised the age from 13 to 15 years of age. The 
Indian Penal Code, 1860, act no 45, Section 375 (d), available from 
https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2263/3/a1860-45.pdf
222 Benjamin Kentish, ‘Indian government files legal papers to try to stop marital rape being outlawed’, 
The Independent, September 1, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-marital-rape-
ban-fight-legal-papers-file-parliament-law-change-marriage-a7924106.html. 
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patriarchal jurisprudence and reasoning within the judiciary. In a case before the 
London Court of Protection in April 2019, social services requested the Judge, Justice 
Anthony Hayden, enact a court order to prevent a man from having sex with his wife 
because her mental capacity had deteriorated such that they believed she may no 
longer be able to consent. In response the Judge said: ‘I cannot think of any more 
obviously fundamental human right than the right of a man to have sex with his wife –
and the right of the state to monitor that.’223 From this example we can see the use of 
law to maintain patriarchal interests – man's complete right over ‘his wife’, including his 
right to rape his wife. 
In the second example, self-defence, we see male dominance in law has led to a 
standpoint and jurisprudence that excludes the lived experience of women and 
thereby endangers women. 
Case Study: Self-defence
A clear example of the impact of male dominance on the law is the jurisprudence 
around self-defence as a mitigating defence in the case of manslaughter. There is a 
body of literature addressing the phenomenon of ‘battered women who kill’224, which 
seeks to question jurisprudence in cases where victims of violence against women 
have killed their abusers in acts of self-defence, but have been charged with murder. 
There is a clear pattern of sentencing in cases of murder or manslaughter where 
perpetrators claim self-defence: harsher sentences are given for women who kill their 
partners than men who kill their partners.225 Whilst much more could be drawn from 
223 Owen Bowcott, ‘English judge says man having sex with wife is “fundamental human right”,’ 3rd April 
2019, The Guardian, accessed 9 May 2019, at https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/apr/03/english-
judge-says-man-having-sex-with-wife-is-fundamental-human-right
224 Robbin S. Ogle and Susan Jacobs, Self-Defense and Battered Women Who Kill: A New Framework, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Aileen McColgan, “In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill,” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies,13(4), (Winter, 1993); Katherine O'Donovan, “Defences for Battered Women 
Who Kill,” Journal of Law and Society, 18(2), (Summer, 1991); Elizabeth A. Sheehy, Defending Battered 
Women on Trial, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014); Lenore E. Walker, Terrifying love: why battered women kill 
and how society responds, (New York: Harper & Row, 1989); Ann Jones, Women Who Kill, (New York: 
The Feminist Press, 2009); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking, (Yale: Tale 
University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Ann Dermody Leonard, Convicted Survivors: The Imprisonment of 
Battered Women Who Kill, (New York: The State University of New York Press, 2002); Charles Patrick 
Ewing, Battered Women Who Kill: Psychological Self-Defense as Legal Justification, (New York: Lexington 
Books, 1987).
225 Along with judicial bias, ‘the law itself provides stiffer sentences for women.’ In an analysis of State 
Law in the United States, Ann Jones found that ‘[s]everal states provide by statute that women must be 
sentenced to the maximum term for their crimes while men may be given lighter sentences.’ Jones, 
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the example of self-defence, particularly around ideas of femininity and violence, and 
the oft drawn conclusion that women who kill their abusers must be ‘insane’226; there 
are two clear ways that the male norm has shaped the law of self-defence (and led to 
the bias in sentencing):
- the understanding of necessity and immediacy, 
- and the measure of force and proportionality.
Necessity in self-defence is considered from the viewpoint of men, where the threat of 
violence comes largely from other men, usually unknown to the victim. The law frames 
necessity in light of this such that self-defence would only be necessary in an instance 
of immediate threat to life. The reality for women is not the same: women are most at 
threat by men who are known to them, particularly intimate partners, and particularly 
in their home; and necessity is not by reason of immediate threat of death, but often 
as a means of escape from eventual227 death.228 As Aileen McColgan, amongst 
Women Who Kill, 34; The average prison sentence of men who kill their partners is two to six years. 
Women who kill their partners are sentenced on average to 15 years, despite the fact that most 
women who kill do so in self-defense. (First recorded by the National Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence in 1989, “Words From Prison - Did You Know?” ACLU, accessed 1 May, 2019, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/words-prison-did-you-know; Elizabeth C. Wells, “‘But Most of All, They 
Fought Together’: Judicial Attributions for Sentences in Convicting Battered Women Who 
Kill,”Psychology of Women Quarterly, 36: 3, (2012).
226 Donald Downs, “Battered Woman Syndrome: Tool of Justice or False Hope in Defense Cases?” In
Current Controversies on Family Violence, edited by Donileen Loseke, Richard Gelles, and Mary 
Cavanaugh, (Lexington: Sage Publications, 2005); Bess Rothenberg, “‘We Don't have Time for Social 
Change’ Cultural Compromise and the Battered Woman Syndrome.” Gender & Society, 17(5), (2003); 
Marianne Noh, and Celia Lo, “Medicalization of the Battered Woman: A Historical-Social Construction 
of the Battered Woman Syndrome,” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, Aug 16, 2003). 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p107922_index.html 
227 “Rather than being a new form of violence, gender-related killings are the extreme manifestation of 
existing forms of violence against women. Such killings are not isolated incidents that arise suddenly and 
unexpectedly, but are rather the ultimate act of violence which is experienced in a continuum of violence.” 
United Nations, Gender-related Killings: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/20/16, (23 May 2012), 4, available at 
http://undocs.org/A/HRC/20/16
228 On average two women a week are killed by a male partner or former partner in the UK: this 
constitutes around one-third of all female homicide victims. David Povey, ed., Crime in England and 
Wales 2003/2004; Supplementary Volume 1: Homicide and Gun Crime. Home Office Statistical Bulletin No. 
02/05. (London: Home Office; Department of Health, 2005); Partner violence accounts for a high 
proportion of homicides of women internationally: between 40% -70% of female murder victims 
(depending on the country) were killed by their partners/former partners, whereas the comparable 
figure for men is 4% - 8%. Etienne Krug, Linda Dahlberg, James Mercy, Anthony Zwi, and Rafael Lozano, 
eds., World report on violence and health, (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2002), 93.
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others229, suggests, self-defence in cases of violence against women is ‘equivalent to 
[the] justifiability of a hostage to kill captors to avoid a non imminent death’.230 Many
victims of violence against women who kill their partners do so because escape could 
not be achieved by any other means. Likewise, where immediate escape is possible, 
victims of violence against women kill in self-defence where they know their escape is 
not secure and where they are part of a wider trap – economic, social, and cultural –
or know there is insufficient protection available to secure their ongoing freedom from 
their torturer. Many victims of violence against women face revictimisation231 or fear 
retribution232 towards them, and their children if they are mothers, which keeps them 
captive, and they are often right in their belief that the state offers limited protection.
Similarly, proportionality is framed from the same male scenario. Therefore use of a 
weapon would display premeditation and would also be unnecessary in an ‘even-
matched’ fight for life between two men. However, victims of violence against women 
often use weapons, as premeditation and force are almost always necessary to escape. 
As victims of violence against women do not meet the standards of immediacy and 
proportionality set by men, they are often unable to use self-defence as a mitigation to 
put in a plea of manslaughter, and therefore receive harsher sentences. (Even when
women are charged with manslaughter rather than murder they still receive harsher 
229 McColgan, “In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill,”; Jones, Women Who Kill; Leonard, Convicted 
Survivors; Ogle and Jacobs, Self-Defense and Battered Women Who Kill; O'Donovan, “Defences for 
Battered Women Who Kill.”
230 McColgan, “In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill,” 508.
231 Repeat victimisation is common. 44% are victimised more than once, and almost one in five (18%) 
are victimised three or more times. Tricia Dodd, Sian Nicholas, David Povey, Alison Walker, Crime in 
England and Wales 2003-2004, (London: Home Office, 2004), 16. An earlier British Crime Survey found 
even higher rates of repeat victimisation: 57%. Jon Simmons, Crime in England and Wales 2001/2002, 
(London: Home Office, 2002), Appendix 1, Table 3.03.
232 Women are at greatest risk of homicide at the point of separation or after leaving a violent partner. 
Sue Lees, “Marital rape and marital murder,” In Home Truths about Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences
on Policy and Practice: A Reader, edited by Jalna Hanmer and Catherine Itzin, (London: Routledge, 2000). 
In a study commissioned by Women’s Aid, 76% of separated women suffered post-separation violence.  
Of these women: 
- 76% were subjected to continued verbal and emotional abuse; 
- 41% were subjected to serious threats towards themselves or their children; 
- 23% were subjected to physical violence; 
- 6% were subjected to sexual violence; 
- 36% stated that this violence was ongoing. 
In addition to this, more than half of those with post-separation child contact arrangements with an 
abusive ex-partner continued to have serious, ongoing problems with this contact. Cathy Humphreys 
and Ravi Thiara, Routes to Safety: Protection issues facing abused women and children and the role of 
outreach services, (Bristol: Women’s Aid Federation of England, 2002.)
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sentences than men who are tried under the same charge for killing their female 
partners233.)  
 
The male norm in human rights law
In a similar way to the example of self-defence within domestic criminal law settings, 
the male norm, and the standpoint of men, dominates international human rights law –
giving it shape and establishing its parameters. Whilst the development of international 
human rights law was not directly (or, necessarily, deliberately) set in the interest of 
men, it has been shaped by their dominance so that ‘issues traditionally of concern to 
men become seen as general human concerns.’234 (As MacKinnon suggests, this is how 
the male standpoint operates: ‘[i]ts point of view is the standard for point-of-
viewlessness, its particularity the meaning of universality.’235) Thus ‘the legal system is 
[based on] life experiences typical to empowered white males.’236 Not only have men 
established and shaped international law, ‘they have interpreted it and given it meaning 
consistent with their understandings of the world and of people “other” than them. As 
the men of law have defined law in their own image, law has excluded or marginalised 
the voices and meanings of these “others”.’ 237 Since the first wave of decolonisation in 
the 1960s, international human rights law has been challenged to accommodate 
‘othered’ voices from the Global South and socialist nations.238 However, this 
‘broadening’ of the discourse is not complete – for any group outside of the white 
233 Further to the difference in sentencing between women who kill their male partners, and men who 
kill their female partners, men also get lesser sentences for killing women who are their partners 
compared to men who kill women who aren’t their partners. In a 2017 report by Women’s Aid, analysis 
of sentencing in Ireland showed: ‘On average, current or former intimate partners convicted of 
manslaughter are sentenced to 2.8 years less than other men convicted of manslaughter of women.’ 
“Femicide Watch 2017: Republic of Ireland,” Women’s Aid, accessed June 4, 2018, 
https://www.womensaid.ie/download/pdf/womens_aid_femicide_watch_2017.pdf
234 Charlesworth, Chinkin, & Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,” 613.
235 Catherine MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,” 
Signs, 8(4), (1983): 638 – 639.
236 Lucinda M. Finley, “Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of 
Legal Reasoning,” 64 Notre Dame L. Rev.,(1989): 893.
237 Finley, “Breaking Women's Silence in Law,” 893.
238 James Thuo Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative 
Bibliography,” Trade, Law and Development, 3 (1), (2011); B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to 
international Law: Manifesto,” International Community Law Review 8, (2006); Makau Mutua, “What is 
TWAIL?”, Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 5–8 April 
2000, 31-40; Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005)
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male norm – and women (Simone DeBeauvior’s original ‘other’239) remain largely 
excluded from, or marginalised within, the fora and discourse concerning international 
human rights law, and international law more generally. As a result women remain 
un(der)represented (or misrepresented) within international human rights law. Whilst 
international human rights law is ‘not a monolithic force for the oppression of women 
and the advantage of men it offers only a partial, and often contradictory and 
inconsistent, response to women’s oppression.’240 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine 
Chinkin, have described international human rights law, as failing to be ‘truly human in 
composition’, and note that the ‘orthodox face’ of international human rights law 
would be markedly different if the discourse and its institutions were representative of 
men and women.241 An example of this, set at the heart of international human rights 
law, is, of course, the dichotomy between civil and political rights (CPRs) and 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs). Whilst the split between CPRs and 
ESCRs, manifest in the two international conventions, is due largely to cold war 
politics242, how it has since developed displays the ongoing priorities of men and how 
these priorities dominate the legal arena. The hierarchy between CPRs and ESCRs is 
distinctly gendered (as well as being shaped by racial, national and economic power). 
This hierarchy reflects the arena in which men consider themselves to live out their 
lives – and thereby the areas of life that are most important. Men fear threats made to 
their civil and political existence, with little consideration of ESCRs, which impinge 
massively on the lives on women.243 This hierarchy is rooted in the public/private 
divide – with CPRs representing the public sphere (where there is competition and 
threat from other men) and ESCRs representing the private sphere (where there is 
limited competition or threat from other men, and where the notion of privacy itself 
enshrines the dominion of men). It is only recently that ESCRs have started to be 
considered as human rights proper. Although a range of actors still uphold this 
hierarchy, including academics, such as Robert Nozick, holding that the only existing 
239 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated and edited by H. Parshley (London: Pan Books, 
1988).
240 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 60.
241 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,” 622.
242 “Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Fact Sheet 33,” Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 9, accessed September 9, 2018, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ESCR/FAQ%20on%20ESCR-en.pdf.
243 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,” 635.
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rights are civil by nature244. This even exists amongst NGOs focused on human rights, 
with Human Rights Watch only recently widening their work to include ESCRs.245
Without including women, much like third world nation and socialist nation 
representation, international human rights law does not represent, and therefore 
protect, the lives of all individuals across society. Along with their dominance of the 
broader human rights discourse – elevating CPRs over ESCRs – we can see the impact 
of the male norm in relation to violence against women specifically. As men are 
‘generally not victims of sex discrimination, domestic violence and sexual degradation 
and violence these matters can be consigned to a separate sphere and tend to be 
ignored.’246 These issues are ignored altogether, considered outside of the purview of 
the law, or understood and legislated on from the male standpoint. I will consider this 
when I look at the public/private dichotomy; but more generally, where the 
international human rights discourse has broken its silence on the rights of women it 
has been voiced through the male estimation of female life. Therefore, where women 
are accounted for they are viewed in an extremely limited way: ‘chiefly as victims, 
particularly as mothers, or potential mothers, and accordingly in need of protection.’247
Robin West goes further to state: ‘women are not constructed as human […] but we 
are nevertheless constructed as something else: as valueless, as objects, as children or 
as invisible.’248 As Lucinda Finley explains, it is ‘women refracted through the male eye 
– rather than women’s own definitions, that has informed law.’249 Where there has 
been mainstream support for including violence against women within the human 
rights paradigm it has been through a welfarist lens. It has been much harder to 
conceptualise and develop concrete gains addressing violence against women as a 
justice or rights-based issue. Where this has happened – such as the conceptualisation
of violence against women in the DEVAW as a ‘manifestation of historically unequal 
power relations between men and women’ – these gains need to be understood for 
what they are and this understanding protected. Welfarist concerns with violence 
against women are rooted in conceptualisations of women’s inherent or innate 
244 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).
245 Kenneth Roth, “Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization,” H.R.Q. 26(1), (2004).
246 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,” 613.
247 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 48.
248 Robin West, “Jurisprudence and Gender,” University of Chicago Law Review, 55(1), (1988): 67.
249 Finley, “Breaking Women's Silence in Law,”1136.
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vulnerability, victimhood, weakness, purity and chastity: woman as the ‘perpetual 
victim’250. This conceptualisation is particularly dominant in the international 
humanitarian law response to violence against women and women in conflict251, where 
the dignity of female life has been conflated with the social construct of feminine 
honour252. This welfarist concern with violence against women and women in conflict 
(as developed within mainstream humanitarian law) has proven a difficult backdrop 
from which to conceptualise violence against women as a rights-based issue concerned 
with justice and liberation. Conversely to the welfarist approach, a feminist 
understanding of violence against women is rooted in politicised conceptualisations of 
gender and male power, that are not concerned with women’s ‘innate vulnerability’ to 
violence against women, but with women’s social, legal, economic and cultural 
disempowerment – as the cause and consequence of violence against women. (This 
will be considered in more detail when I look at the indivisibility of rights as it relates to 
violence against women.) This feminist understanding is distinctly justice oriented –
seeing violence against women as a human rights violation (legal and broader) framed 
by concerns for justice, liberation, entitlement and empowerment; rather than a 
welfare issue, framed by paternalistic notions of morality, compassion and charity. 
The resistance to truly rights-based (rather than welfarist) conceptualisations of 
violence against women, is perhaps telling in that there is still no binding international 
treaty on violence against women despite many decades of attention within the 
discourse. Whilst CEDAW is binding it does not directly address violence against 
women, and there is contention over the legal nature of its general recommendations 
on violence against women.253 It has been over 20 years since the women’s movement 
brought violence against women into the human rights discourse. Awareness has risen 
250 Ratna Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘Native’ Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, 15, (2002).
251 Judith Gail Gardam and Michelle Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and International Law, (London: 
Springer, 2001).
252 In ‘“All the regard due to their sex”: Women in the Geneva Conventions of 1949’, Anna Crowe 
outlines and interrogates ‘the gendered concepts of women that emerge from the texts of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, especially the concept of “honor and modesty.”’ “‘All the regard due to their sex’: 
Women in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Human Rights Program Research Working Paper Series 
December 2016,” Anna Crowe, accessed 9 May, 2018, http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Anna-Crowe_HRP-16_001.pdf.
253 Rashida Manjoo, “Normative Developments on Violence Against Women in the United Nation 
System,” In The Legal Protection From Violence: Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law, Rashida 
Manjoo and Jackie Jones, eds., (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 74; Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, “Is it time 
for a UN treaty on violence against women?” The International Journal of Human Rights, 22(3), (2018): 
309.
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significantly – the former United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, has asserted 
that violence against women, affecting one in three women, is the largest and most 
prevalent human rights abuse in the world254 – and yet there is still no binding or 
unified international response. In Chapter 4, I will consider in more detail the legal gaps 
and the significance of a binding international instrument focused solely on violence 
against women. Suffice to say however, it illustrates the dominance of the male norm 
within international human rights law, and the subsequent absence of the female life 
experience. 
The Public/Private Dichotomy 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said of privacy that ‘the right to be let alone 
is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men’255. In a 
provocative quip addressing the Justice’s famous words, and addressing the danger of 
the public/private dichotomy, Catherine MacKinnon responded: ‘the right to privacy is 
a right of men “to be let alone” to oppress women one at a time.’256
As touched on above, the patriarchal nature of society and the state creates a legal 
system whereby the supremacist position of men is legitimised and reinforced. A key 
way in which it does this is by marginalising issues that affect women and relegating 
them to the private sphere outside the purview of the law, or, indeed, society. This 
serves to preserve the power of the fraternal state and the patriarchal household: 
‘separation of spheres […] has served for selective penetration of public state 
hegemony while allowing some autonomous space for the hegemony of the male 
head of the household.’257 Hence, dismantling the public/private dichotomy is of key 
importance to establishing violence against women as a human rights violation and 
addressing it within the international legal framework. As Carole Pateman suggests, 
‘[t]he dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two centuries 
254 United Nations, “Statement by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for the International Day for the 
Elimination of Violence against Women 2007,” accessed June 8, 2017, 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sgsm11289.doc.htm
255 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting.)
256 Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism unmodified: discourses on life and law, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), 102.
257 Yakin Ertürk, “The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It Entail for Women’s Rights?” In Due 
Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence, Carin Benninger-Budel, ed. (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 32.
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of feminist writing and struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is 
about.’258 The public/private dichotomy raises many questions that shape our 
understanding of violence against women as a human rights violation. For a start, what 
is ‘public’ and what is ‘private’? Feminists have long maintained the political nature of 
what is considered the private sphere259 and have successfully challenged the ability to 
categorise actions as strictly private or public. As Francis Olsen states, ‘“[p]rivate” is not 
a natural attribute nor descriptive in a factual sense, but rather is a political and 
contestable designation.’260 Many other questions surround the idea of privacy. If we 
accept the notion of ‘the private’, is the private sphere free from state and legal 
intervention? Or should it be? The state is very much involved in our ‘private life’, 
through taxation, health care, education, marriage, welfare and child protection laws, 
and as such it is a ‘myth that law doesn’t control the private sphere.’261 Indeed the 
‘public/private dichotomy in international human rights law which is conventionally 
premised on the liberal, minimalist conception of the state […] clouds the fact that the 
domestic arena is itself created by the political realm, where the state reserves the 
right to choose intervention.’262 It is likewise untrue to suggest that non-intervention in 
the ‘private sphere’ is a neutral approach. The apparent restraint and neutrality of the 
law is rooted in historical context: ‘[t]he laws that facilitate the injury of one person by 
another seem like state action when they seem unjust, but go unnoticed or are treated 
as a neutral background of law to those who support the rules.’263 An example of this 
is Article 16 (3) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which states ‘The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.’264 This seemingly neutral 
258 Pateman, The Disorder of Women, 118.
259 ‘“The personal is political” is the central message of feminist critiques of the public/domestic 
dichotomy.’ Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 124; 
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1970); Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” In Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for 
Socialist Feminism, edited by Zilla R. Eisenstein, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978); Audre Lorde, 
“The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,” In Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches, 
edited by Audre Lorde, (Berkeley, CA: The Crossing Press, 1984). Gloria E. Anzaldúa and Cherríe 
Moraga, eds., This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, (Watertown, MA: 
Persephone Press, 1981).
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Commentary, 10, (1993): 319.
261 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law,” 627.
262 Ertürk, “The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It Entail for Women’s Rights?” 32.
263 Olsen, “Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction,” 324 – 325.
264 United Nations, Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 10 December, 1948, Article 16 paragraph 3, 
available from https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
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approach, reiterated in the international covenants, supports the position of men by 
reinforcing normative ideals of the family that are often unparalleled by the realities of 
life. It has meant that ‘the family has been the focus of very little scrutiny under 
international law.’265 As the former Special Rapporteur, Rhadika Coomaraswamy, has 
described, whilst the family may be the natural unit of society – and can be a rich 
source of nurture, love and provision – for many women it is ‘a social institution where 
labor is exploited, where male sexual power is violently expressed and where a certain 
type of socialization disempowers women.’266
When one looks closely and critically, there is, of course, no clear demarcation 
between the private and public. Furthermore, there is no neutral way to make this 
division. As such, it is the right of the powerful to choose what is public and what is 
private. Olsen asks, ‘[w]hat does the person who wields power gain by successfully 
characterising his power as “private”?’267 And to this end, what role does the law play? 
When the private remains outside of the purview of the law, power operating in this 
sphere remains unscrutinised and abuse occurs with impunity; but when the law 
advances on the private, what advantage is left for the abuser by maintaining the 
characterisation of his actions as private? Michael Freeman argues that the deep-rooted 
patriarchal acceptance of private violence as legitimate, indeed necessary, means that 
‘[i]t is not necessary [for men] to have formal rights such as to chastise their wives. 
That they once had this right and exercised it is sufficient. It helped to form and 
reinforce an ideology of subordination and control of women. The ideology remains 
imbricated in the legal system.’268 Therefore, whilst a man may not be assured a legal 
‘right to privacy’, he is nonetheless ‘able to discourage state action that would inhibit 
his use of power, on the basis that domestic life should remain more free of 
government regulation than other aspects of life.’269 It is this much more nuanced 
notion of privacy that threatens the human rights approach to violence against women. 
Where the law ignores private violence, feminists are able to campaign for legal 
265 United Nations, Violence against women in the family: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, E/CN.4/1999/68 (March 10, 
1999), 4 paragraph 6, available at http://undocs.org/ E/CN.4/1999/68.
266 United Nations, Preliminary Report: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, E/CN.4/195/42, (November 22, 1994), 11 
paragraph 54, available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/195/42.
267 Olsen, “Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction,” 319.
268 Michael D. A. Freeman, The State, the Law, and the Family, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1984), 72.
269 Olsen, “Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction,” 323.
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transformation to protect women. A more complicated question is how to tackle the 
patriarchal acceptance of private violence that is still, as Freeman says, ‘imbricated in 
the legal system.’ This will be an important focus of my law review in Chapter 4 as the 
due diligence standard is the key to understanding the state’s responsibilities with 
relation to ‘private’ acts of violence against women, and ‘private’ actors as perpetrators 
of violence against women. The imbricated notion of the ‘right to privacy’ hinders the 
understanding of due diligence obligations. The discourse should voice opposition to 
those who would characterise failure to act with due diligence as invoking ‘indirect’ 
state responsibility. Actors that use this terminology do so to suggest a lesser degree 
of culpability. There are no ‘shades of culpability’270 and it must be reinforced that 
failing to act with due diligence to the detriment of a woman’s safety is no less a 
violation than directly causing her suffering. It is imperative that the discourse does not 
elevate state violence, which disproportionately affects men, over ‘private’ violence, 
which disproportionately affects women.
The relationship between the public/private dichotomy and violence against women is 
further evidence of the gendered nature of violence against women – it is inherently 
linked to violence against women as a continuum of violence that exists in the context 
of gender discrimination and women’s disempowerment.
Violence against women as gendered and discriminatory
The understanding of patriarchy as harmful to women (as discussed so far in our 
investigation of patriarchy and the law and the public/private dichotomy) is at the heart 
of the international human rights law approach to violence against women and to 
feminist jurisprudence, and as touched on above, informs the corollary 
conceptualisation of violence against women as gendered and discriminatory. 
The understanding of patriarchy as a systemic and material manifestation of hegemonic 
power is of significant ontological meaning to radical feminist theory, and so it is, 
consequently, intrinsic to the feminist problematising of violence against women. It is 
fundamental that violence against woman is addressed in a way that deals directly with 
270 Gordon Christenson, “Attributing Acts of Omission to the State,” Michigan Journal of International 
Law, (12), (1991): 350.
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the systemic and gendered nature of the violence experienced by women. Again, this 
is a case of emphasising feminist politics and theorising within the international human 
rights law approach that has become hidden in plain sight. 
Take for instance the very term ‘violence against women’ or ‘VAW’. Violence against 
women is not simply violence that ‘happens to happen to women’. The term does not 
simply consider the ‘sex’ of the victim, but the ‘gendered’ nature of the violence. The 
early definitions of violence against women within the discourse are clear on this –
describing violence against women as gender-based and rooted in historic and material 
dynamics of patriarchal power. Whilst the terminology has developed with a sense of 
very specific meaning and discursive framing, ‘violence against women’ has been used 
interchangeably with ‘domestic violence’, ‘family violence’, ‘intimate partner violence’ 
and simply ‘violence’. This has further been the case as the categorisation of ‘family 
violence’ or ‘domestic violence’ has broadened to include violence experienced by 
men. The lack of clarity as to how gender – or sex – intersects with violence in the 
domestic setting once men are included in the framing has led to the gendered 
conceptualisation of violence against women being eroded. This will be focused on in 
more detail in the following chapter when I consider the gender-neutral approach to 
domestic violence and prevention, with a focus on the Istanbul Treaty. Given the 
broader issue of definitional contestation, ‘violence’ becomes the primary substantive 
violation – the undisputed abuse at issue – and the simultaneous gender discrimination 
experienced by women is evaded or intentionally sidelined. Responses in this vein 
focus on the ‘violence’ present in ‘VAW’ in such a limited way as to ignore the 
significance of ‘against women’. This has been the historic criminal law approach to 
violence against women, making very little account of the gendered and discriminatory 
abuse encompassed in violence against women. (Again, this reflects the welfarist lens 
rather than the justice lens.) The criminal law approach reacts – if at all – to the 
violence present in violence against women. Yet, it is fundamentally and simultaneously
an act of violence and gender discrimination. It is the intersection of violence and 
discrimination that characterises violence against women.
Responding to the violence women suffer, without responding to gender 
discrimination at an individual or systemic level is not an appropriate response to 
violence against women. (As will be seen in Chapter 3, this also opens the 
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international human rights law approach to practice based on gender-neutrality or de-
politicised notions of gender.) Again, the dominance of the welfarist lens, and its 
construct of women’s innate victimhood, acts to distract from the question of why 
women are experiencing violence, particularly and specifically. If women are just 
innately vulnerable then questions of gender don’t need to go beyond sex, to 
investigate power. The welfarist lens considers the sex of the ‘victim’ in its most limited 
and essentialist sense, but doesn’t consider politicised notions of gender and the 
gendered nature of the ‘victimising’. A feminist rights-based approach conceptualises
violence against women as fundamentally gendered and inherently discriminatory. The 
international human rights law approach to violence against women, state responsibility 
and due diligence must not rely on the welfarist approach or approaches that are 
unconcerned with questioning the aetiology of violence against women. In the context 
of violence against women, and in particular, prevention of violence against women, 
the questions of ‘why?’ must be asked. Furthermore the question of ‘why?’ must be 
asked in fullness. If prevention asks the ‘why?’ question only of ‘violence’ and not of 
‘against women’ it leaves intact patriarchy and gender discrimination. Instead prevention 
must apply to the full framing, manifestation and experience of violence against 
women. 
Responses that ignore the fundamentally gendered and discriminatory nature of 
violence against women, take a gender-neutral approach, focusing simply on violence. 
This constitutes a schismatic approach, which addresses itself separately to violence 
and gender discrimination, or primarily to violence and secondarily to gender 
discrimination. This approach privileges the former over the latter, creating a stark 
hierarchy of rights in which gender discrimination need not be taken seriously. In itself 
this hierarchy is inherently gendered and patriarchal; privileging the abuse men more 
readily face and therefore fear – violence – over the abuse they more rarely face and 
do not fear – gender discrimination. Furthering the public-private dichotomy in this
way, the schismatic approach addresses the violence present in violence against 
women in a public way, acknowledging the role of the state, whilst maintaining and 
strengthening the private nature of gender discrimination; leaving it outside of the law 
and the public sphere.
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Within the international human rights law discourse, it must be remembered that 
violence against women has already been established as a cause, consequence, and 
manifestation of discrimination. In fact the only binding international treaty for 
addressing violence against women is the Convention for the Elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination against Women. This remains the dominant frame for understanding 
and responding to violence against women as a human rights violation. As established 
above, in General Recommendation no. 19, the CEDAW Committee considers 
violence against women as a gender-based and discriminatory practice: ‘violence that 
affects a woman because she is a woman.’ This was reinforced through A.T v 
Hungary271, and subsequent CEDAW-OP cases. A.T. v Hungary also influenced the 
ECHR ruling in Opuz v Turkey272, where the Court held – for the first time – that 
violence against women constituted discrimination under the European Convention. 
Other regional support for this position is found in: the preamble to the Council of 
Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence (Istanbul Convention); Article 2 of the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo 
Protocol); and, Article 6(a) of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belém do 
Pará). Recognising the significance – and fragility – of the understanding of violence 
against women as gendered and discriminatory, the CEDAW Committee sought to 
strengthen this conceptualisation in ‘General Recommendation no. 35 on gender-
based violence against women, updating general recommendation no. 19’. General
Recommendation no. 35, as previously quoted, explicitly restates the framing of 
violence against women as gendered and discriminatory:
The Committee regards gender-based violence against women to be rooted in 
gender-related factors such as the ideology of men’s entitlement and privilege 
over women, social norms regarding masculinity, the need to assert male 
control or power, enforce gender roles, or prevent, discourage or punish what 
is considered to be unacceptable female behaviour. These factors also 
contribute to the explicit or implicit social acceptance of gender-based violence 
271 A.T. v. Hungary, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, (comm. 2/2003), 
(2005).
272 Opuz v. Turkey, ECHR, Application No. 33401/02, (Judgment of 9 June 2009).
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against women, often still considered as a private matter, and to the 
widespread impunity for it.273
The Committee went on to emphasise the norms at play behind the ‘definitional 
issues’274 concerning ‘violence against women’; and problematise the full meaning of 
the term’s framing: 
The concept of ‘violence against women’ in general recommendation No. 19 
and other international instruments and documents has emphasised that this 
violence is gender-based. Accordingly, this document uses the expression 
‘gender-based violence against women’, as a more precise term that makes 
explicit the gendered causes and impacts of the violence. This expression 
further strengthens the understanding of this violence as a social – rather than 
an individual – problem, requiring comprehensive responses, beyond specific 
events, individual perpetrators and victims/survivors.275
As a gendered and discriminatory practice violence against women constitutes a
violation of human rights law, distinct from other experiences of violence. The 
identification of violence against women as a human rights violation, established in the 
CEDAW-OP and subsequent cases, has been further recognised in the regional 
treaties, most notably in the Inter-American system, where the Convention of Belém 
do Pará affirms that ‘violence against women constitutes a violation of their human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’276 and stipulates the substantive right of women to 
live free from violence (Article 3). This categorisation of human rights abuse is 
reserved for violence against women as gendered, discriminatory, and distinct from 
other forms of violence.
273 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), paragraph 19.
274 Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, “What potential does the Council of Europe Convention on Violence against 
Women hold as regards domestic violence?” The International Journal of Human Rights, 16(7), (2012): 
948.
275 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), paragraph 9.
276 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210, Article 3, available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210
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If violence against women is stripped of its gendered meaning it loses its meaning 
within international human rights law. It becomes simply violence, which it is not. 
Jurisprudence around due diligence and state responsibility to prevent violence against 
women becomes near meaningless if it is limited to state responsibility for violence. 
The understanding of violence against women and the clarification of state 
responsibility for violence against women must be made within the context of 
international human rights law – argued here to be truly feminist in approach – and so 
must understand violence against women as fundamentally gendered. As will be see in 
Chapter 3, the loss of a gendered understanding is a threat to this clarification. It is also 
a threat to efforts to combat violence against women. Countries that have taken a 
gender-neutral approach to violence against women have fundamentally 
misunderstood violence against women and are failing to combat violence against 
women. Given the framing of violence against women under the CEDAW, they are 
also failing to fulfil their duties as they are outlined in international human rights law. It 
is impossible to fully respond to violence against women as a human rights abuse 
without it being understood as a gendered and discriminatory abuse. 
It is due to this understanding, and feminist problematising of violence against women, 
that states have an obligation to address the root causes of violence against women. 
This is a principle established in the DEVAW, Article 5 of the CEDAW, and General 
Recommendation no. 19, paragraph 11. The regional treaties have leaned heavily on 
the international understanding with the most recent treaty, the Istanbul Convention, 
reaffirming the DEVAW in its recognition of violence against women as both a ‘cause 
and consequence of discrimination and patriarchal dominance.’ The CEDAW
Committee also made decisions under the CEDAW-OP reaffirming the duties states 
have to tackle root causes, such as sex stereotyping and harmful attitudes, as a matter
of prevention and protection. Through individual cases the Committee makes broader 
recommendations, emphasising the duty of all states to tackle patriarchy and the root 
causes of violence against women. This is reiterated in the regional treaties. Article
3(2) of the Maputo Protocol and Article 8(b) of the Istanbul Convention affirm the 
duty of states to ‘modify social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
including the development of formal and informal educational programmes 
appropriate to every level of the educational process, to counteract prejudices, 
customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
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superiority of either of the sexes or on the stereotyped roles for men and women 
which legitimise or exacerbate violence against women.’277 The need to consider 
gender specificity (over gender-neutrality) will be looked at in more depth in Chapter
3, when I outline prevention as understood within the feminist human rights approach; 
and the role of the state at the sociocultural level will be further considered when I
look at systemic due diligence in Chapter 4.
I will consider the understanding and acceptance of this framing further when I look at 
the normative gap (lack of a binding treaty) and the different jurisprudential 
contributions offered (primarily) by the regional courts and the cases of the CEDAW-
OP, in Chapter 4. I will consider how a future approach needs to outline freedom 
from violence against women as a right in itself, whilst also conceptualising violence 
against women as a cause, consequence, and form of gender discrimination. Whilst the 
discriminatory nature of violence against women is not of lone importance to the legal 
standing of violence against women within the human rights discourse, it frames 
appropriately the fundamentally gendered nature of the violation, and shapes how we 
respond legally and otherwise to prevent violence against women.
As a frame for the terminology of my thesis I rely on the complementary definitions 
given by the DEVAW and the CEDAW, laid out above. I most regularly use the term 
‘violence against women’, but also use the term ‘gender-based violence against 
women’, or simply ‘gender-based violence’ (when directly referencing the experience 
of women), to mean the same thing. This interchangeable use is consistent with the 
definitions and descriptions given above. My preference for the term ‘violence against 
women’, is not to negate the framing of violence against women as fundamentally 
gendered, but to avoid any unintentional overemphasis on the ‘gender-based’ nature 
of violence against women in a manner that curtails an intersectional appreciation of 
violence against women as also being based in racial and socioeconomic oppression.
The emphasis on gender, however, does not preclude intersectional analysis, and is 
not an intended interpretation of the new definition by the CEDAW. As discussed 
above, the use of ‘gender-based violence against women’ by the CEDAW in General 
Recommendation no. 35, and by other actors in the discourse, does not serve to 
277 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210, Article 8(b), available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210
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create new meaning but to reinforce the original framing of the terminology, and to 
emphasise the legal and ontologising significance of the term ‘violence against women’
as signifying gendered discrimination. 
Where I do appeal to the term ‘gender-based violence’ this is largely to emphasise 
meaning in a context where the term ‘violence against women’ has not been 
sufficiently understood or accepted as holding that same meaning, or has been directly 
challenged as holding that same meaning. This is particularly the case when referring to 
the framing of violence against women as gendered and discriminatory. In the following 
chapter, where I negotiate the gender-neutral and depoliticised application of 
international standards to domestic abuse, I make particular recourse to the term
‘violence against women’ or ‘gender-based violence’, when seeking to emphasise the 
meaning that is being eroded by oppositional use of the alternate term. For example, 
where ‘gender-based violence’ is used in an attempt to apply international standards to 
men and women (as if gender simply meant ‘men and women’), I emphasize the 
framing of these standards in terms of ‘violence against women’ as understood as 
‘rooted in gender-related factors such as the ideology of men’s entitlement and 
privilege over women’. At times, however, I simply use the terms interchangeably 
when referencing women’s organisations who use both terms, or younger 
organisations who utilise the fuller definitional framing of General Recommendation 
no. 35 alongside older organisations who might refer more commonly to ‘violence 
against women’. On rare occasions, mostly in relation to the engagement of Men and 
Boys’ groups in violence prevention, I refer to ‘men’s violence against women’. Whilst 
men make up the vast majority of perpetrators of violence against women278, they are 
not the sole perpetrators279, and as such this more restricted term is only used when 
applied to a restricted context. However, its worth noting that whilst gender-based 
violence against women can be perpetrated by women, this is largely within a context 
278 In the UK the most pervasive form of violence against women is domestic abuse. In 2017 – 2018 
92% of defendants in domestic abuse-related prosecutions were men. Office for National Statistics, 
Domestic abuse in England and Wales: year ending March 2018, (ONS, 2018) 33, available at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/domesticabuseinengla
ndandwales/yearendingmarch2018
279 Perhaps most notably the practice of FGM, which is almost solely perpetrated by women on girls. 
Janice Rymer, “Female genital mutilation: everyone’s problem,” British Journal of General Practice, 63, 
(October 2013): 515 – 516.
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of enforced gender roles, still framed by violence against women280, and the use of 
‘men’s violence against women’ can be used to emphasise the importance of 
problematising masculinity particularly as it links to violence against women.
The use of multiple terms opens up discourse and has helped evolving and 
intersectional understandings of what constitutes violence against women. It has also 
created contested discursive sites, particularly around the understanding of gender and 
sex. Whilst this is by no means an unimportant debate, my use of terminology falls 
within the majority approach, and in line with a number of radical feminist scholars 
who understand the term ‘violence against women’ as being inclusive and anti-
essentialist, and refuse to take reductive readings of sex, gender and sexuality281
(particularly those that would seek to exclude the experience of trans women, who 
are one of the most at-risk groups of gender-based violence) 282. At the same time as 
rejecting essentialist readings of ‘violence against women’, I would also argue against 
neutralised readings of ‘gender-based violence’ that strip gender of its deeply political 
and politicised meaning. This will be touched on in more depth in the following 
chapter as I problematise the framing of domestic violence. Whilst ‘gender-based 
violence’ includes violence that goes beyond ‘men’s violence against women’, a 
negotiation of gender operating at a material and political level – as well as a relational 
level – must permeate understanding and application of the term. ‘Gender-based 
violence’ no more means just ‘men’s violence against women’, than ‘violence against 
women’ means ‘any violence against women’. One term does not erode the 
ontologising impact of the other within the human rights discourse, and their use 
should be seen as mutually reinforcing the same frame, as outlined above, rather than 
280 As in the case of FGM perpetrated by women – often mothers or grandmothers – but under the 
wider framing of patriarchal control of female sexuality.
281 Whilst there is a history of fraught relationships and at times outright hostility between some radical 
feminists and the trans community, I would align with radical feminist thought and engagement with the 
law that seeks to combat the exclusion of trans women from the movement. Against increased 
attention on this division, a story is also being told of the ‘trans inclusive history of radical feminism.’ 
Cristan Williams, “Radical Inclusion: Recounting the Trans Inclusive History of Radical Feminism,” 
Transgender Studies Quarterly, 3(1 – 2), (2016): 254 – 258. I would align with Catherine MacKinnon and 
Andrea Dworkin who were trans-affirming in their analysis of gender, sex, and power, particularly as it 
related to violence against women. Cleis Abeni, “New History Project Unearths Radical Feminism's 
Trans-Affirming Roots,” The Advocate, 3 February 2016, https://www.advocate.com/think-
trans/2016/2/03/new-history-project-unearths-radical-feminisms-trans-affirming-roots
282 Gender non-conforming people and trans women (particularly trans women of colour) are at high 
risk of gender-based violence. Human Rights Campaign, Violence Against the Transgender Community 
in 2019, accessed on 14 January, 2020, available at: https://www.hrc.org/resources/violence-against-the-
transgender-community-in-2019
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providing competing meanings. Together they hold together a frame of violence 
against women as gendered, discriminatory and a violation of human rights law.
Violence against women as a systemic abuse operating at a societal level
Whilst patriarchy – and resultant wide-spread gender inequality – have come to be 
understood as root causes of violence against women there is still some debate over 
the degree to which individual cases of violence against women can be attributed to 
systemic factors and societally held beliefs. This debate over the relationship between 
patriarchy and violence against women has limited an effective and consistent human 
rights response to violence against women. Lori Heise, however, has been influential in 
developing a model of the aetiology of violence against women that has empowered 
those acting in the human rights discourse to better understand violence against 
women and work towards its elimination. I will be using Heises’ ‘Social Ecology’283
model as a basis for my thesis’ understanding of violence against women. She explains 
that in our nested ‘social ecology’ there are four environments that influence our 
behavior, and contribute to violence against women. Across the four environments we 
are exposed to elements that can increase women’s risk of – or resilience against –
experiencing gender-based violence. Firstly, the individual environment which accounts 
for our early cognitive and personal development. Secondly, the microsystem, or our 
specific context, for example, a marriage or relationship. Thirdly, the exosystem, made 
up of formal and informal structures, such as economic relations, education and media, 
and our legal systems. Fourthly, our macrosystem, which is the ‘broad set of cultural 
values and beliefs that permeate and inform the other three layers.’284 Heise’s model is 
highly regarded by academics and stakeholders alike, and thoroughly accounts for the 
breadth of contributing risk factors.285 For example, the model includes our adolescent 
experience of violence (individual environment), or whether our legal system 
283 Lori Heise, “Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework,” Violence Against 
Women, (4), (June, 1998); Heise’s ‘nested’ model is rooted in ecological systems theory or human ecology 
theory, developed by eminent psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner. Bronfenbrenner helped in the 
formation of the Head Start programme in the United States in 1965, and pioneered work considering 
the environmental and societal influences on child development, which went on to change markedly the 
perspective of developmental psychology and social action responses to child development. Urie 
Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by Nature and Design, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
284 Heise, “Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework,” 277.
285 Conversely, the nested social ecology also frames the different ways, and social spaces, in and 
through which resilience and protective factors can be built up. 
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criminalises marital rape (exosystem), whilst also maintaining the significance feminists 
have placed on the impact of the wider societal, patriarchal values on all three layers. 
286
Heise’s model brings together two disciplines – feminist political thought and 
psychology – which have jarred with regard the understanding of violence against 
women. Feminists have long questioned psychological factors described as contributing 
to violence against women; wary of their use to justify abuse or to minimise the 
understanding of the scale of violence against women.287 They have criticised 
psychologists for ignoring the gendered nature of violence against women and 
individualizing and pathologising incidents of violence against women so that they 
appear to have no societal character, and so that women’s ‘victimisation’ has no 
systemic nature. In particular they have questioned why men who are abused as 
children would often go on to be disproportionately abusive in adult life whereas 
women who are abused as children often go on to face revictimisation in adult life. 
Conversely, feminists have been criticised for offering no explanation as to why some 
men are violent and others aren’t. If patriarchy fuels, or at least acquiesces to violence 
against women, and violence against women operates at a societal level, then why 
aren’t all men violent?288 Heise’s model takes both approaches into account and offers 
286 Heise, “Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework,” 262 – 290.
287 Patrizia Romito, A Deafening Silence: Hidden violence against women and children, (Bristol: Policy Press, 
2008).
288 As a contemporary example of this dilemma: within the context of online activism, feminist claims of 
systemic male violence are routinely met with retorts of #notallmen as a way of silencing the critique of 
gendered power.
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a complex but comprehensive aetiology for violence against women. For example, a 
man and woman might suffer similar abuse in childhood, contributing to factors in their 
‘individual environment’ that inform violence. They could then have similar 
‘microsystems’ even. Surrounding that is more likely an ‘exosystem’ that would 
reinforce the man’s position of power but not the woman’s – whether this is an 
economic system that devalues women’s labour and leaves many women, particularly 
mothers, financially tied to men, or whether it is penal codes and criminal laws that 
offer no protection from marital rape. Then at the macrosytem, informing all other 
factors, we have the patriarchal gender hierarchies that would reinforce violence 
against women. In this way Heise’s model offers answers to the questions left by 
psychologists and feminists and draws on knowledge from both. 
It is important to note that Heise does not expect the delineation of ecologies within 
the framework to be definitive, and believes that ‘considerable room exists for 
interpretation as to exactly where a particular factor most appropriately fits into the 
framework’; however ‘more important than the location of any single factor is the 
dynamic interplay between factors operating at multiple levels.’289 Heise’s social 
ecology framework is critical to efforts navigating the relationship between the 
psychological, situational and sociocultural factors contributing to violence against 
women, as the ‘nested ecological framework explicitly emphasises the interaction of 
these factors in the etiology of abuse.’290 It also gives room for a multifaceted approach 
to tackling violence against women operating at different levels. Heise’s framework 
recognises the need to work with perpetrators, thereby addressing the individual 
environment, whether through perpetrator courses or drugs and alcohol rehabilitation; 
as well as addressing structural issues around violence against women, improving the 
exosystem, whether through legal aid, special courts for violence against women, or 
providing refuges; whilst maintaining the overarching need to tackle root causes by 
addressing the macrosystem and violence against women at a societal level. Indeed 
Heise recognises the focus feminist theory puts on ‘macrosystem factors such as 
patriarchy’ and ‘acknowledges the centrality and importance of macrolevel factors like 
male domination’291. Whilst the nested ecological approach ‘emphasises the 
interrelationship of patriarchal beliefs and values with other factors elsewhere in the 
289 Heise, “Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework,” 266.
290 Heise, “Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework,” 266.
291 Heise, “Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework,” 277.
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framework’, Heise is keen to point out that much of the ‘evidence from the cross-
cultural literature [used in the development of the model] substantiates many of the 
major tenets of feminist theory on male violence.’292 In this sense I consider Heise’s 
nested ecological model to provide a feminist aetiology of violence against women for 
my thesis. 
Understanding violence against women as aetiologically societal is vital to my thesis as 
‘the ways in which violence is conceptualised acts as a fulcrum for effective policy and 
practice on eliminating violence against women.’293 For the focus of my thesis, effective 
prevention strategies hinge upon effectively understanding violence against women. 
How a state understands violence against women (and how the law frames violence 
against women) impacts upon how it responds to violence against women and how 
fruitful that response is. Understandings of violence against women that have focused 
predominantly, or solely, on factors at an individual level have led to individual-led 
responses, normally utilising domestic criminal law, and have failed to impact upon 
violence against women as a broader phenomenon. This lack of understanding also 
explains why various criminal law developments have made so few inroads into 
eliminating violence against women. If violence against women is a societal problem 
there needs to be discussion about what constitutes an appropriate response to 
societal problems. International human rights law is in a good position to contribute to 
a response as it is primarily concerned with the relationship between the state and the 
individual, and not solely with the individual. (The state is of primary importance as an 
actor contributing to societal aetiologies of violence against women, and as an actor 
well placed to combat societal aetiologies of violence against women, should it wish 
to.) Again, international human rights law (as shaped by feminist theory and activism) 
highlights the root causes of violence against women – the gendered and 
discriminatory nature of violence against women. For this reason governments 
(influenced by lobbying from national women’s groups and NGOs) are increasingly 
turning to international human rights law and considering a human rights approach to 
legislation, seeing how it addresses violence against women more comprehensively 
than criminal law. For instance the Welsh Violence Against Women Action Group, 
formed to consult on the drafting process of the Violence against Women, Domestic 
292 Heise, “Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework,” 277.
293 Yakin Ertürk and Bandana Purkayastha, “Linking research, policy and action: A look at the work of the 
special rapporteur on violence against women,” Current Sociology, 60(2), (2012): 146. 
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Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015, advocated an explicitly feminist human 
rights approach, encouraging the use of the DEVAW as a foundational document. 
Likewise, the Action Group insisted that “[t]he Welsh Government strategy and action 
plan to end Violence against Women must include a clear definition of Violence 
against Women, preferably that adopted by the UN.”294 Whilst the use of a human 
rights approach is to be welcomed, it should be cautioned however, that the human 
rights approach must be accompanied by theorised (feminist) engagement with, and 
practice of, the law. Furthermore, that approach must not be limited to merely 
enacting legislation, as ‘legal instruments do not themselves denote change’295. Rather, 
as Christine Chinkin explains, legal instruments must be accompanied by the 
‘internalisation of a human rights culture.’296 Legislation can build on or compound 
societal change but it is limited where societally held beliefs are still strongly in 
opposition to the change legislation seeks to make. This does not mean that 
substantive law does not play a constitutive role but rather that it cannot act in 
isolation. Laura Hebert further comments that to ‘reduce human rights to legal rights is 
to overstate the ability of legal change to translate into a transformation of the deeply 
held beliefs and values that often underlie gendered human rights violations.’297 A 
holistic response is required and there must therefore be a variety of approaches, legal 
and non-legal. The patriarchal values that are imbricated in society, informing violence 
against women, are not wholly transformed by legislation. On the contrary, much anti-
violence against women legislation is built on very poor cultural and social foundations 
for eliminating violence against women. Therefore, the path to preventing violence 
against women, at a societal level, should not be mere legal change alone, but rather 
discovering methods to internalise a women’s rights culture that rejects violence 
against women. A new due diligence framework needs to be set within an improved 
understanding of violence against women that emphasises the societal and systemic 
nature of violence against women and requires from states an appropriate response.
294 “Steps to Safety”, Wales Violence Against Women Action Group, accessed January 12, 2017, 
http://walesvawgroup.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/steps-to-safety.pdf.
295 Christine Chinkin, “Women’s Rights in the 21st Century,” Interights Bulletin, 14(4), (2004): 141.
296 Chinkin, “Women’s Rights in the 21st Century,”, 141.
297 Laura Hebert, “‘Go Back and Give Him What He Wants’: The Limits of a Legal Rights Approach to 
Gendered Human Rights Violations,” International Journal of Human Rights, 12(4), (2008): 483.
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In her 2013 report the Special Rapporteur outlines the dual obligations of individual 
due diligence and systemic due diligence.298 My research is focused on the latter:
systemic due diligence and prevention. A systemic approach must move away from 
the two common approaches of: normalising certain manifestations of violence against 
women, such as domestic violence and rape; and essentialising other manifestations, 
such as FGM or forced marriage. In the one instance, actors normalise the domestic 
violence suffered by one in four women in the UK – asserting that there is no wider 
culture or systemic patriarchy that at best acquiesces to violence against women and at 
worst promotes it. In the other instance, actors essentialise what is often called 
‘cultural violence’, such as FGM, and target elements of culture or manifestations of 
violence but again leave intact the underlying patriarchal system. In so doing they 
stigmatise cultures and victims and leave women vulnerable to revictimisation through 
new manifestations. 
Case-study: Harmful traditional practices?
Over the past 15 years particular attention has been given to manifestations of 
violence against women that are linked to specific traditions or cultures. Perhaps most 
notably is the attention given to FGM. Efforts to raise awareness have been rightly 
welcomed. This said, the language around particular forms of violence against women
such as FGM, Sati, breast ironing, honour killings, and forced marriages, have created a
dichotomy within the human rights discourse where forms of violence against women
more closely identified with religious, ‘non-Western’, or minority ethnic groups are 
considered ‘cultural’ whereas more general forms – intimate partner violence, rape, 
stalking, and sexual harassment – are not. Whilst increased attention on specific forms 
of violence against women has advanced the general understanding, it has also 
‘reinforced the notion that metropolitan centers of the West contain no “tradition” or 
“culture” harmful to women, and that the violence which does exist is idiosyncratic 
and individualised rather than culturally condoned.’299 A 1995 UN Report on Harmful 
Practices didn’t help understanding as it directly juxtaposed traditional practices with 
298 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 71, available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/23/49.
299 Bronwyn Winter, Denise Thompson and Sheila Jeffreys, “The UN Approach to Harmful Traditional 
Practices,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 4(1), (2002): 72. 
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‘non-traditional practices, such as rape and domestic violence’300. As Special 
Rapporteur Yakin Ertürk noted in her 2007 report, this is not only deceptive, as all 
violence against women exists within a culture, it is also ineffective, as isolating specific 
traditions fails to affect the wider societally held beliefs. For example, in Cameroon, 
campaigns specifically aimed at FGM were successful in reducing that form of violence 
against women, but subsequently, and arguably consequently, breast-ironing increased. 
Whilst the specific tradition was challenged the wider issue of controlling female 
sexuality continued and manifested in a different guise.301
Viewing violence against women as a societal problem does not deny differing forms 
of violence against women present in different cultures but considers them as 
manifestations of the broader culture – patriarchy. Throughout this study ‘culture’ and 
‘societal values’ will refer to a universal patriarchy, operating macrosystemically (as per 
Heise’s model), and where this manifests in particular form, culture or tradition, it will 
be said so. This dichotomy between ‘cultural violence’ and violence against women 
that is not seen as ‘cultural’, or perhaps even seen as diverging from cultural rules, is 
doubtless born from colonial and racial privileging of Western culture, and the 
concurrent stigmatisation and demonisation of ‘other’ cultures. This example of white 
privilege and colonialism highlights the need for a truly intersectional understanding of, 
and approach to, violence against women.  
Understanding violence against women as systemic and operating at a societal level, 
must not be reduced to essentialist versions of Heise’s social ecology. Likewise, a new 
due diligence framework needs to establish the obligation to prevent violence against 
women at a systemic level in a holistic and comprehensive manner. At the root of this 
is the obligation to transform patriarchal gender structures – this needs to be clearly 
outlined in a framework so states know their systemic due diligence obligation to 
prevent, and NGOs, non-state actors and individuals can hold them accountable.
300 “Fact Sheet No.23, Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children,” 
OHCHR, accessed June 8, 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet23en.pdf.
301 United Nations, Intersections between culture and violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Ertürk, A/HRC/4/34 (17 
January, 2007) paragraph 34, available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/4/34.
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The indivisibility of human rights and the holistic approach to violence against women
Attention to the macrosystemic aetiology and root causes of violence against women, 
‘challenges the notion that gender violence is a phenomenon distinct from the wider 
field of gender equality and women’s rights.’302 Taking a rights-based approach to 
violence against women takes seriously the maxim: ‘All human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.’303 Violence against women is a 
manifestation of many intersecting factors that go far beyond the individual (as outlined 
above), and as such a response must be holistic; challenging the root causes of 
violence against women and reacting to the realities of women’s lives. An holistic, 
rights-based response to violence against women requires: 
- negotiating the interrelation and indivisibility of women’s rights; 
- the inclusion of violence against women under existing human rights treaties 
and the mainstreaming of gender perspectives on torture and bodily integrity; 
and, 
- the framing of, and response to, violence against women as an issue of justice 
and empowerment, in contrast to a ‘victimisation-approach’.
Gender inequality, as the primary root cause of violence against women304, manifests in 
multiple and varied ways to impact and shape women’s experience of, and resilience 
against, gender-based violence. This can manifest at different strata of the social 
ecology, whether it be forced economic dependency, discriminatory legislation, or 
patriarchal gender roles. Taking just one of these examples, the feminisation of 
302 Julie Goldscheid and Debra Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and 
its Perils,” Cornell International Law Journal, 48, (2015): 309. p.301 – 345, p. 309
303 United Nations, Vienna Declaration, paragraph 5.
304 This understanding is supported by the expertise of women’s organisations, who when surveyed as 
part of a global assessment of the due diligence standard, ‘cited gender inequality as the risk factor that 
most increased the prevalence of VAW.’ Zarizana Abdul Aziz and Janine Moussa, Due Diligence 
Framework: State Accountability Framework for Eliminating Violence against Women. (International Human 
Rights Initiative, 2016), 17, available at 
www.duediligenceproject.org/ewExternalFiles/Due%20Diligence%20 Framework%20Report%20Z.pdf.; 
‘The strongest factors correlating with higher levels of violence against women and their children have 
therefore been found to lie in socio-structural and relationship-level gender inequalities, as well as 
attitudes and norms supporting violence and rigid gender roles. These factors have been termed 
‘determinants’ of violence, as they are considered significant enough to determine the likelihood of 
violence occurring at population levels.’ “Policy Brief: International Evidence on the Effectiveness of 




poverty305, we can see the need to look at wider inequality and consider human rights 
indivisibly, and international human rights law holistically. The economic 
disempowerment of women, and their increased likelihood of economic dependency, 
should lay rest to the claim that women who suffer gender-based violence in the 
domestic setting have full freedom to escape the situation. Economic dependency will 
factor into a woman’s ability to leave a violent partner, where she, and possibly her 
children, can seek refuge, and if she will be able to seek prosecution, and divorce (if 
she is married).306 A common lack of gender-budgeting alongside tax and benefit cuts 
that disproportionately disadvantage women307, also impact on women’s ability to 
escape gender-based violence, and the availability of refuges and protective services to 
go to. A comprehensive approach to violence against women would require looking at 
the wider issues around gender-based violence and accepting that it is ‘part of a larger 
socioeconomic web that entraps women.’308 As discussed above the hierarchy 
between CPRs and ESCRs is set in favour of men, with women suffering from the low 
regard paid to ESCRs. Violence against women is wrapped up in a causal and 
symptomatic relationship with the protection of women’s human rights more generally. 
Whilst it is hoped that freedom from violence will open the door to other freedoms, it 
is, at the same time, necessary to engage with wider human rights issues to tackle 
violence against women. Given an intersectional reading of violence against women, 
this requires emphasising the protection of rights of marginalised women, and 
interrogating the way multiple forms of discrimination interact with and inform gender 
inequality. International human rights law should display innovative jurisprudence that 
305 ‘The majority of the 1.5 billion people living on 1 dollar a day or less are women. In addition, the gap 
between women and men caught in the cycle of poverty has continued to widen in the past decade, a 
phenomenon commonly referred to as "the feminization of poverty". Worldwide, women earn on 
average slightly more than 50 per cent of what men earn.’ United Nations, Review and Appraisal of the 
Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action: Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.6/2000/PC/2 (15 
December, 2014), available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.6/2000/PC/2.
306 In a study by Shelter, 40% of all homeless women stated that domestic violence was a contributor to 
their homelessness.  Domestic violence was found to be ‘the single most quoted reason for becoming 
homeless.’ Helen Cramer and Mary Carter, Homelessness: what’s gender got to do with it?, (London: 
Shelter, 2002).
307 In the UK context, women are disproportionately baring the burden of austerity ‘with 86% of savings 
from tax and benefit measures coming from women’s pockets.’ Single mothers and the elderly have 
been made increasingly financially vulnerable under the UK government’s policy of austerity: By 2020, 
female lone parents and single female pensioners will, on average, have seen their living standards fall by 
20% compared with what would have happened had these policy measures not been introduced.’ 
Rebecca Omonira-Oyekanmi and Polly Trenow, eds., The impact on women of the 2016 Budget: Women 
paying for the Chancellor’s tax cuts, (UK Women’s Budget Group, 2016), p. 3, accessed May 13, 2017, at 
http://wbg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/WBG_2016Budget_FINAL_Apr16-1.pdf
308 Charlotte Bunch, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Re-Vision of Human Rights,” HRQ, 
12(4), (1990): 488.
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reinforces the interdependency of human rights. Standards of state responsibility and 
due diligence should be developed in an holistic way, with a full view of the issues 
surrounding violence against women. When I look further at prevention and the due 
diligence standard I will consider the relationship between preventing violence against 
women, so called ‘positive rights’, and duties under Article 5 of the CEDAW, which 
deals broadly with anti-discrimination and holistic protection and fulfilment of women’s 
human rights at the sociocultural level. Again, the understanding of violence against 
women as fundamentally and simultaneously an act of violence and gender 
discrimination bears on the issues of protection and fulfilment, and how the 
indivisibility of rights is made manifest in application with regard violence against 
women by states, courts and treaty monitoring bodies.
Underlying an holistic approach to international human rights law and violence against 
women is the fundamental principle that ‘women’s rights are human rights’. This has 
been a campaign of the women’s movement for several decades.309 Initially combating 
the exclusivity of the UDHR and international covenants, feminists argued that human 
rights were formulated from a ‘normative male model’ and ‘applied to women as an 
afterthought, if at all.’310 We can see the existence of the normative male model, when 
considering the understanding and jurisprudence surrounding the prohibition of torture 
as found under Article 5 of the UDHR, Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Convention against 
Torture, and a number of the core international human rights treaties. This norm is 
accepted as rule of customary international law and is widely considered to have ius 
cogens status. It is one of the most established human rights norms, yet its framing and 
application lack true universality. 
309 This traces back to the mid 1800s with authors such as Sarah Moore Grimké writing ‘I know nothing 
of man’s rights, or woman’s rights; human rights are all that I recognize’. Sarah Moore Grimké, Letters on 
the Equality of the Sexes (Boston: Isaac Knapp, 1838. Reprinted by Forgotten Books, 2012). However, 
the phrase ‘women’s rights are human rights’ became prominent throughout the UN Decade on 
Women, and was most notably adopted by then First Lady of the United States, Hillary Clinton, in her 
speech to United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995; Getrude Fester, 
“Women's Rights Are Human Rights,” Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity, 20(10), (1994): 76 
– 79.
310 Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: international feminist perspectives, 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 2.
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Case study: Violence against women as torture
There are two dominant frames that have emerged from the feminist leading of the 
human rights law response to violence against women311, or, as Alice Edwards 
suggests, ‘two main pragmatic strategies to include violence against women within the 
existing human rights framework.’312 The first, as touched on above, is the 
establishment of violence against women as a form of gender discrimination, the 
second is the gendered interpretation and expansion of the norm of the prohibition of 
torture to include violence against women. Whilst my research focuses more attention 
on the first frame, the second should be seen as complementing rather than 
competing with the first. It still demands a gendered reading of the violence 
experienced by women, but rather than seeking to conceptualise and establish 
violence against women as a ‘new’ human rights violation, it ‘creatively reinterpret[s] 
existing human rights provisions so that they apply to the experiences of women.’313
There is pragmatic benefit and symbolic significance in taking this approach, touched 
on below.
Historically, the prohibition of torture has tended to be state centric and focused on 
the male experience of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 
However, the provision has been widely expanded in international law to include state 
responsibility for acts of torture by private actors. Perhaps the definitive moment in 
developing state responsibility for private violence was the 1988 Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights decision in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. The Court held that 
Honduras was responsible for the torture suffered by Angel Manfredo Velásquez 
Rodríguez by private actors because it had failed to prevent his disappearance and 
punish the perpetrators.314 The Court went on to clarify the general application of 
state responsibility for private violence by saying ‘[t]he same is true [that the State has 
failed in its duties] when the state allows private persons to act freely and with 
311 Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), xi; Paulina García-Del Moral, & Alexandra Megan Dersnah, “A 
feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private divide: on due diligence, domestic 
violence, and citizenship,” Citizenship Studies, 18(6 – 7), (2014): 662.; McQuigg, “Is it time for a UN 
treaty on violence against women?” 317– 318; Bunch and Reilly, Demanding Accountability: The Global 
Campaign and Vienna Tribunal for Women’s Human Rights. 
312 Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, xi.
313 Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, xi.
314 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, IACtHR, Series C No. 4, Judgment of 29 July 1988.
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impunity to the detriment of rights recognized in the American Convention on Human 
Rights.’315 Likewise, the Human Rights Committee took the approach in 1982 that 
Article 7 also conferred a duty on ‘public authorities to ensure protection by the law 
against such treatment even when committed by persons acting outside or without 
any official authority.’316 This was further expanded in its 1992 general comment on 
Article 7: ‘It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by 
Article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their 
official capacity or in a private capacity.’317 Furthermore, ‘[t]hose who violate article 7, 
whether by encouraging, ordering, tolerating or perpetrating prohibited acts, must be 
held responsible.’318
Whilst the particular importance of the Velásquez Rodríguez case with regard the 
interpretation of due diligence will be explored in more detail later, the framing of 
torture by private actors as violative opened the door to the conceptualisation of 
violence against women, and in particular domestic violence, as a form of torture. 
Rhonda Copelon, advances a very convincing argument as to why violence against 
women, or as she calls it ‘intimate terror’319, should be understood as torture. The 
Human Rights Committee has made clear that there is no definitive list of what 
constitutes torture or cruel treatment; rather it depends on the ‘nature, purpose and 
severity of the treatment applied.’320 In this vein Copelon argues that the ‘process, 
purposes and consequences [of violence against women] are startlingly similar […] to 
the international legal understanding of torture.’321 She argues that the physical and 
psychological tools of official torture and violence against women are much the same. 
315 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, paragraph 176.
316 CCPR general comment No. 7: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment), Adopted at the Sixteenth Session of the Human Rights Committee, 30 May, 
1982, paragraph 2, available from 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx
317 CCPR general comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment), Adopted at the Fourth Session 1992, paragraph 2, available from 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx
318 CCPR general comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment), Adopted at the Fourth Session 1992, paragraph 13, available from 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx
319 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 116.
320 CCPR general comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment), Adopted at the Fourth Session 1992, paragraph 4, available from 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx
321 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 117.
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Indeed, the ‘most common forms of torture involve no special equipment’322 and 
resemble closely the tools of intimate terror, including ‘beating, burning, scalding, 
strangling, stabbing and drowning.’323 With regard the relationship between the physical 
and psychological elements of torture Copelon highlights that ‘both in the domestic 
and official context, rape and sexual abuse, which may do less physical damage than 
beatings, are often experienced by women as the gravest violation.’324 It is at this point 
that there is a dichotomy between the male and female perspective on torture. Whilst 
the Human Rights Committee upholds the male interpretation of torture, putting 
greater emphasis on brutality and severity, Copelon argues that the most ‘insidious 
forms of torture are those that do not involve overt brutality.’325 Some methods may 
be wholly psychological; ‘threats to kill, isolation, arbitrary and unpredictable 
punishments and intermittent rewards.’326 Brutality is not as effective as psychological 
torture in manipulating dependency and exhausting endurance: ‘[t]orture is a context 
and process of domination and not simply or necessarily a set of brutal acts.’327 As for 
those who argue that victims of violence against women are ‘free to leave’, whereas 
those who suffer torture are detained, it is worth considering the large body of work 
strongly linking the position of victims of violence against women with prisoners of 
war328 and terrorist hostages329; and, of course, the socioeconomic factors as touched
on above. Arguably, then, Article 7 is a very real way that violence against women
could be brought under the purview of the Human Rights Committee and considered 
within the supposedly gender-neutral human rights framework. As Charlesworth and 
Chinkin suggest, the major strategic advantage of international human rights law is its 
universal vocabulary. However, this must ‘extend beyond a limited male view’330 of 
universality.
322 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 122.
323 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 123.
324 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 123.
325 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 123.
326 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 124.
327 Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” 124.
328 Albert Biderman’s Framework of Coercion is a tool developed to explain the methods used to break 
the will or brainwash a prisoner of war.  Domestic violence experts believe that abusers use these same 
techniques, including ‘isolation, monopolization of perception, induced debility and exhaustion, threats, 
occasional indulgences, demonstrating ‘omnipotence’, enforcing trivial demands, and degradation.’ It is 
commonly used by health providers and frontline protective services. “Biderman’s chart of coercion,” 
National Centre on Domestic and Sexual Violence, accessed at 2 March 2015, 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/Chart%20of%20Coercion1.pdf.; See also: Albert Biderman and Herbert 
Zimmer, eds., The Manipulation of Human Behaviour, (Oxford, England: Wiley, 1961).
329 McColgan, “In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill,” 508.
330 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 60.
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There has been some progress in institutionalising this frame. Both the Human Rights 
Committee and Committee against Torture have made moves towards engendering 
the interpretation of the prohibition of torture so as to include violence against 
women and have broadened their approach to torture by private actors to include 
domestic violence, in particular.331 This reflects the ‘UN’s “gender mainstreaming”
agenda’, which has ‘made interpretative inclusion rather than textual amendments the 
preferred practice’ for responding to violence against women.332 However, the framing 
of violence against women as torture is more than a pragmatic strategy; it is also an 
insistence that women’s rights be seen truly as human rights. This frame holds 
considerable symbolic importance and works to engender the discursive space 
surrounding the powerful norms prohibiting torture. By working for universality, and 
mainstreaming a gendered reading of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment, the frame acts to avoid ghettoization of women’s rights, and to 
challenge the interpretation of ‘women’s rights’ as a supplementary or lesser category 
of human rights. Whilst I focus more heavily on the frame of gender discrimination, I 
believe the two act co-constitutively, rather than independently, within the discourse, 
even whilst institutionalising distinct understandings of violence against women.
Whilst the plea for ‘women’s rights as human rights’ was originally for inclusion and 
true universality it has also developed to challenge the ‘ghettoisation’ of women’s rights 
as ‘women’s issues.’ The adoption of separate instruments and specialised machinery, 
such as the CEDAW, have been crucial to furthering the protection of women;
however, it can be argued that these instruments have narrowed the global human 
rights perspective and relegated women’s rights to a separate sphere – again 
reinforcing the public/private dichotomy. There is a frustration that these 
331 ‘To assess compliance with article 7 of the Covenant, as well as with article 24, which mandates 
special protection for children, the Committee needs to be provided information on national laws and 
practice with regard to domestic and other types of violence against women, including rape.’ CCPR 
general comment No. 28 - Article 3 (The equality of rights between men and women) (Replaces 
general comment No. 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, (29 March 2000) paragraph. 11, available from 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx; ‘Since the failure of the State to 
exercise due diligence to intervene to stop, sanction and provide remedies to victims of torture 
facilitates and enables non-State actors to commit acts impermissible under the Convention with 
impunity, the State’s indifference or inaction provides a form of encouragement and/or de 
facto permission. The Committee has applied this principle to States parties’ failure to prevent and 
protect victims from gender-based violence, such as rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, 
and trafficking.’ Committee against Torture general comment No. 2, Implementation of article 2 by 
States parties, CAT/C/GC/2 (24 January 2008), paragraph 18, available from 
http://undocs.org/CAT/C/GC/2
332 Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, xi.
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developments have created a dualism between human rights and women’s rights –
where one is normative and the other merely ideological. To this end, Laura Reanda 
suggests use of the term ‘human rights of women’ rather than ‘women’s rights’ to 
emphasise the ‘globality and indivisibility of human rights, and their full applicability to 
women as human beings.’333
Feminist efforts to conceptualise violence against women as a human rights abuse –
and resist ‘ghettoisation’ – also act to resist the historic and dominant framing of 
violence against women within the ‘welfare/humanitarian paradigm’334. Welfarist 
conceptualisations of violence against women are rooted in what the former Special 
Rapporteur, Yakin Ertürk, and Bandana Purkayastha call: the ‘victimization approach’335. 
The victimisation approach narrowly focuses on ‘harm done’ and redress ‘after the 
fact’; and conceptualises violence against women in a way that furthers gendered 
notions of vulnerability, in particular playing up the female/victim, male/rescuer 
narrative. The glorification and legitimisation of hypermasculinity, and the promotion of 
femininity (read here as weakness, purity, honour, etc.) serves to continue the 
disempowerment of women and the acquiescence towards male power that, in reality, 
leads to violence against women. The welfare/humanitarian paradigm not only fails to 
address violence against women successfully, it lacks the understanding of violence 
against women – ‘the raced/gendered/classed/sexualized nature of violence’336 –
needed to respond holistically and with a focus on elimination/prevention. The 
conceptualisation of violence against women as gendered and discriminatory demands 
violence against women be understood within the international human rights discourse 
through an entitlement/empowerment paradigm that prioritises prevention and 
focuses on empowerment. Feminists have fought for this discursive space and for 
violence against women to be problematised and understood within it.
333 Laura Reanda, “Human rights and women’s rights: The UN approach,” 3 HRQ (Spring, 1981): 11.
334 Ertürk and Purkayastha, “Linking research, policy and action: A look at the work of the special 
rapporteur on violence against women,” 146.
335 Ertürk and Purkayastha, “Linking research, policy and action: A look at the work of the special 
rapporteur on violence against women,” 155.
336 Ertürk and Purkayastha, “Linking research, policy and action: A look at the work of the special 
rapporteur on violence against women,” 145.
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Summary of the radical feminist human rights approach to violence against women 
Feminist groups have worked tirelessly to establish jurisprudence which connects
violence against women with understandings of the political character and ramifications 
of gender, and with the pervasiveness of patriarchy. The emphasis on tackling the root 
causes of violence against women, the acknowledgement that the problem is 
(macro)systemic not individuated or idiosyncratic, and the promotion of gender-
specific measures to tackle violence against women as a gender-specific human rights 
violation, are all hard fought gains which need to be consolidated, rather than 
retreated from. 
Through international treaty law, case law, and under the auspices of treaty monitoring 
bodies, state reporting, and the recommendations of UN agencies, international 
human rights law and the surrounding discourse has established and reinforced a 
foundational approach: violence against women is gender-based and discriminatory 
and consequently violence against women is a human rights violation. These corollary 
positions are the hidden-in-plain-sight feminist foundations of jurisprudence and norms 
that encompass the human rights approach. This has been established in General 
Recommendation no. 19, in which the CEDAW Committee established violence 
against women as a gender-based and discriminatory practice – ‘violence that affects a 
woman because she is a woman’ – and further reinforced through the jurisprudence in 
A.T v. Hungary, and subsequent CEDAW-OP cases and regional cases. Other regional 
support for this position is found in the Istanbul Convention, Maputo Protocol, and in 
the Convention of Belém do Pará. It bears repeating that this categorisation of human 
rights abuse is reserved for violence against women as gendered, discriminatory, and 
distinct from other forms of violence. In response, states have been urged to address 
the root causes of violence against women. This is established in the DEVAW, Article 
5 of the CEDAW, and General Recommendation no. 19, paragraph 11. The regional 
treaties have leaned heavily on the international understanding with the most recent 
treaty, the Istanbul Convention, reaffirming the DEVAW in its recognition of violence 
against women as both a cause and consequence of discrimination and patriarchal 
dominance. 
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In light of the root causes of violence against women, international human rights law 
considers violence against women to be a specific and systemic abuse. This has been 
most recently and effectively outlined in the 2013 annual report by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. In the preamble of the Istanbul Convention 
the framers recognise ‘the structural nature of violence against women as gender-
based violence, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social 
mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with 
men.’ The gendered, discriminatory and systemic nature of violence against women has 
been defined and emphasised within the discourse. 
This understanding, developed through the women’s movement and feminist 
jurisprudence, and coordinated primarily through the auspices of the UN, has led to an
holistic approach to violence against women, shaped by the key principle of gender 
specificity, which I will consider in depth in the following chapter.
However, it must be recognised that success in bringing violence against women into 
the international human rights discourse has been hampered by the lack of a single 
binding international mechanism focused on violence against women. The above 
definitions are sourced from soft law, declarations, and general recommendations. 
Whilst this all contributes to international human rights law and customary law 
(although there is some debate as to the legal nature of general recommendations) 
there is no clear mechanism for states to understand their obligations, or for non-
state actors and NGOs to hold states accountable. There is also no specific instrument 
focused on violence against women apart from the DEVAW. I will consider this more 
fully when looking specifically at the due diligence standard. However, the norms 
collected in this chapter all shape the international human rights law approach to 
violence against women, and are the bedrock for the principles discussed in the 
following chapter: the development of a radical feminist human rights approach to 
preventing violence against women.
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Chapter 3 – A Feminist Theory of State Responsibility, Part 1: The 
Conceptualisation of Primary Prevention within International Human Rights Law, 
and the Problematisation of Theorised Practice therein.
Along with the understanding and conceptualisation of violence against women as a 
human rights abuse and the development of international mechanisms and instruments 
addressing the elimination of violence against women, feminist theory has also, 
specifically, shaped the international human rights law approach to state responsibility 
for preventing violence against women (and related obligations under the due diligence 
principle)337. In particular feminist jurisprudence has expanded upon the understanding 
of state responsibility to include primary prevention (or systemic prevention) and acts 
of violence against women by non-state actors. Over the next two chapters I will 
consider the conceptualisation and development of norms and substantive provisions 
within international human rights law concerning violence against women and primary 
prevention, and the development of law and jurisprudence around the due diligence 
principle as it relates to violence against women and primary prevention. I will argue 
that these developments form part of, and are rooted in, a feminist theory of state 
responsibility. The investigation of these developments will follow on from the 
previous chapter, which frames the conceptualisation of violence against women as a 
human rights abuse, and will further contribute towards an analysis of theorised (and 
untheorised) practice of the international human rights law approach to preventing 
violence against women. 
In this chapter, I will focus on and interrogate the feminist roots of the 
conceptualisation of primary prevention of violence against women, before looking at 
systemic due diligence in the next chapter. As part of this chapter, I will consider the 
competition for discursive space within the ongoing problematisation of primary 
prevention in international human rights law. In particular, I will provide a case study of 
one of the more contentious strategies under the umbrella of primary prevention that 
has gained attention and support over the past five years: the engagement of men and 
337 Including the development of state responsibility to: protect women from violence; prosecute and 
investigate instances of violence against women; punish perpetrators of violence against women; and, 
provide redress to victims/survivors of violence against women. More at “5 P's of Due Diligence to 
Eliminate Violence Against Women,” Due Diligence Project, accessed 29 February 2017, 
www.duediligenceproject.org/5-ps.html 
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boys. Through this case study I hope to illustrate the ways in which practice rooted in 
the feminist theory of primary prevention is essential, and how the competition for, 
and the fragility of, discursive space within international human rights law remains an 
issue for feminists in the field, and a danger for those experiencing violence against 
women (and, therefore, a danger for women generally). Before considering the 
developments around due diligence and systemic prevention, I hope focusing on the 
conceptualisation of primary prevention will flesh out the parameters of state 
responsibility, giving further context to the jurisprudence of how this is measured and 
made actionable through the due diligence principle and systemic due diligence 
particularly. 
The development of a feminist international human rights law approach to primary 
prevention
Whilst prevention is the first of the three objectives focused on violence against 
women that are outlined in the Beijing Platform for Action – ‘take integrated measures 
to prevent and eliminate violence against women’338 – efforts focused on prevention 
have typically been lacking over the past 30 years. Instead, states have put significantly 
more resources into protecting victims of violence against women and prosecuting 
perpetrators. The former Special Rapporteur, Yakin Ertürk, in her 2006 report, placed 
emphasis on expanding the due diligence principle with regard to prevention, noting 
that: ‘States have sought to discharge their due diligence obligations of prevention of 
violence against women through the adoption of specific legislation’.339 This has 
‘concentrated on legislative reform, access to justice and the provision of services
[…whilst] relatively little work [has been] done on the more general obligation of 
prevention, including the duty to transform patriarchal gender structures.’340 This was 
picked up again by the former Special Rapporteur, Rashida Manjoo, in her 2013 report 
on state responsibility. This exclusively legislative approach, concentrated on protective 
338 United Nations, Report Of The Fourth World Conference On Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, Strategic Objective D.1, available at http://undocs.org/A/CONF.177/20.
339 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 38, available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2006/61.
340 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 19.
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and punitive measures, has not been appropriate for overturning the patriarchy and 
gender inequality that fuels violence against women, and has largely omitted or 
neglected the focus on ‘prevention and elimination’ outlined from the origins of the 
international human rights approach. 
This said, over the past five to ten years there have been some notable (but isolated) 
moves toward prevention initiatives at the state level – albeit still at the legislative level. 
In 2009, UN Women described the ‘adoption by a number of States of 
comprehensive laws on violence against women that incorporate measures related to 
the prevention of violence’ as ‘one of the most exciting developments since 2000.’341
This has been further supported by the state-reporting process to the CEDAW
Committee, wherein the Committee has used its concluding remarks to ‘systematically 
and comprehensively’342 monitor actions to prevent violence against women. 
Prevention of violence against women was the focus of a discussion on women’s 
human rights held at the 17th session of the UN Human Rights Council, in 2011.343
During this session the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem 
Pillay, reaffirmed that prevention ‘must be central to any strategy to eliminate violence 
against women.’344 In particular, she emphasised the need for prevention aimed at the 
root causes of violence against women such as gender inequality.345 This decade has 
seen some move towards prevention at the state level, and this has been led by the 
feminist characterisation of prevention, outlined in international human rights law. 
341 United Nations, Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome 
document of the special session of the General Assembly entitled Women 2000: gender equality, 
development and peace for the twenty-first century: Report of the Secretary General, E/CN.6/2005/2, (6 
December 2004), 41, available at http://undocs.org/ E/CN.6/2005/2.
342 United Nations, Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome 
document of the special session of the General Assembly entitled Women 2000: gender equality, 
development and peace for the twenty-first century: Report of the Secretary General, E/CN.6/2005/2, (6 
December 2004), 42.
343 United Nations, Report of the Human Rights Council on its 17th session, A/HRC/17/2, (24 May 
2012), available at http://undocs.org/.A/HRC/17/2.
344 Prevention is key to ending violence against women,” News report on OHCHR 5 July, 2011, 
accessed 29 June 2015, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/PreventionViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx.
345 “Prevention is key to ending violence against women,” News report on OHCHR 5 July, 2011, 
accessed 29 June 2015, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/PreventionViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx.
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In this chapter the focus will be on ‘primary prevention’346, or what the former UN 
Special Rapporteurs, Yakin Ertürk and Rashida Manjoo, called systemic prevention in 
their 2006 and 2013 reports, respectively. Whilst prevention at the individual level is 
obviously needed (and forms part of the due diligence duty to prevent violence against 
women), prevention aimed at individual instances of violence against women, often 
focuses on violence as it occurs and in isolation to the root causes of violence. 
Conversely, ‘[p]rimary prevention aims to stop violence against women before it starts
by addressing the underlying gendered drivers of violence.’347 Where I touch on 
prevention at an individual level in this chapter, it will be in relation to norms and 
strategies concerning primary prevention. All mention of prevention from this point 
will refer to primary prevention unless otherwise stated.
The conceptualisation of primary prevention is framed by the feminist understanding 
of violence against women as being societal and systemic, and the aetiological focus on 
root causes, as outlined in Chapter 2. The development of primary prevention within 
international human rights law again reflects the feminist leading of the approach, and 
gives further clarity to the duty of states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights with 
regard to violence against women. The elimination of violence against women is given 
fuller meaning when primary prevention is included in the understanding of human 
rights fulfilment. The duty to eliminate violence against women does not simply mean 
preventing individual incidents such that women are ‘spared’ violence that would 
otherwise befall them, but, to prevent violence from happening. Rather than looking to 
remove women from the path of violence, primary prevention looks to tear up the 
road. Or as the commonly taught public health illustration describes, rather than just 
346 Some organisations use the term ‘general prevention’. Its use and meaning are interchangeable with 
primary prevention. I prefer the public health term ‘primary prevention’ as it denotes the focus on 
proximity to root causes, and therefore infers not just a broadening of duties – as ‘general’ might – but a 
more strategic approach, and more specified duties vis-à-vis prevention. This said, it is worth noting that 
the term can lend focus to narrow epidemiological and medical models that can, as Pease suggests, lack 
‘theoretical coherence’. Along with use of Heise’s ecological model, the language of primary prevention, 
can lack the focus on gendered power that is inherent in the feminist understanding. As ecological and 
bio-medical models have been ‘given more space than feminist approaches’, it is important to maintain 
the feminist conceptualisation of violence against women, and engage with primary prevention in a way 
that recognises the ‘social and political dimensions of men’s violence’. Bob Pease, “Engaging men in 
men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and possibilities,” Australian domestic & 
family violence clearinghouse, 17, (August 2008): 13 – 14; Loretta Pyles and Judy Postmus, “Addressing 
domestic violence: How far have we come?” Affilia, (19), (2004): 376 – 87; L. Mulder, “Preventing 
violence against women,” paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Women, Tromso, 
Norway, 1999.
347 Jasmin Chen, Intersectionality Matters: A Guide to engaging immigrant and refugee communities in 
Australia, (Melbourne: Multicultural Centre for Women’s Health, 2017), 2.
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pulling people out of the stream to prevent drowning, we need to move ‘upstream’ to 
see why people are being swept away, and take preventative action there: ‘Taking 
action upstream to prevent intimate partner violence and sexual violence involves 
understanding and intervening against those factors that place people at risk for 
becoming victims and perpetrators of such violence.’348 Primary prevention ‘contrasts 
with other prevention efforts that seek to reduce the harmful consequences of an act 
of violence after it has occurred, or to prevent further acts of violence from occurring 
once violence has been identified.’349 Elimination – from a primary prevention 
perspective – is therefore focused on the societal phenomenon of violence against 
women and hones in on the aetiology and root causes of violence against women. 
Speaking at the 17th session of the UN Human Rights Council, focused on the 
prevention of violence against women, Michelle Bachelet, then Executive Director of 
UN Women, and current UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, described 
primary prevention as: ‘a new frontier in the field of violence against women… [and] a 
long-term project that involves transforming gender relations.’350 Bachelet went on to 
further emphasise the significance of primary prevention in relation to how violence 
against women is conceptualised (and vice versa), explaining that primary prevention 
re-enforces the ‘critical, and somewhat revolutionary notion that violence against 
women is not inevitable, [and] can be systematically addressed, reduced and, with 
persistence, eliminated’351. This understanding of primary prevention and elimination 
has implications for how state responsibility applies to violence against women by 
private actors, and the scope of that responsibility. It is of significance to our 
understanding of state responsibility that violence against women is framed as 
preventable in this manner – it affirms the feminist characterisation of root causes as 
outlined in the DEVAW and broader conceptualisation of violence against women as 
gendered. It gives effect to claims that violence against women is gendered and is a 
cause and consequence of inequality and discrimination. Violence against women is not 
348 Alison Harvey, Claudia Garcia-Moreno and Alexander Butchart, Primary prevention of intimate-partner 
violence and sexual violence: Background paper for WHO expert meeting May 2–3, 2007, (Geneva: World 
Health Organisation, 2007), 5.
349 Harvey, Garcia-Moreno and Butchart, Primary prevention of intimate-partner violence and sexual 
violence, 5.
350 “Prevention is key to ending violence against women,” News report on OHCHR 5 July, 2011, 
accessed 29 June 2015, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/PreventionViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx.
351 “Prevention is key to ending violence against women,” News report on OHCHR 5 July, 2011, 
accessed 29 June 2015, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/PreventionViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx.
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arbitrary or idiosyncratic, but systemic and structural, and therefore preventable. 
Elimination is not simply framed as stopping the experience of violence against women 
but stopping the potential to experience violence against women. This is of no small 
import for how state responsibility is framed: elimination – as understood alongside 
primary prevention – draws out significantly the duties and responsibilities of the state. 
Regardless, even, of the specific norms and ideas that frame primary prevention; the 
inclusion of primary prevention within the international human rights law approach to 
violence against women reframes elimination and, therefore, state responsibility. More 
will be said on this when I consider the due diligence principle and systemic 
prevention, but for now it is worth noting the co-constitutive relationship between the 
feminist conceptualisation of violence against women as gendered and the 
development of primary prevention with regard the duty of the state in fulfilling its 
human rights obligations. 
Before looking in more detail at state responsibility to prevent violence against women 
at a systemic level, and the due diligence standard specifically, I will consider, as 
mentioned above, the norms, underlying principles, and surrounding debates, relevant 
in the feminist approach to primary prevention more generally. These will expand 
further on the substantive positions and legal provisions included in the feminist 
conceptualisation of violence against women outlined in Chapter 2, and will include: 
- the instrumental relationship between gender equality and preventing violence 
against women; including:
o mainstreaming gender perspectives; and, 
o pursuing gender specificity – over gender-neutrality – as a legal and 
policy approach to gender-based violence; 
- the conceptualisation and actualisation of intersectionality as it relates to 
understandings of root cause aetiologies of violence against women and 
primary prevention; 
- the engagement of women’s organisations as leaders in primary prevention; 
and,
- the fundamentality of empowerment (rooted in a rights-based rather than 
welfare-based approach) to primary prevention strategies.
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Gender (in)equality and gender norms
The international human rights law approach to primary prevention is underpinned by 
radical feminist theory and consequently relies on a politicised understanding of gender 
and gender discrimination as they relate to violence against women; addressing the 
systemic nature of patriarchy and gender(ed) inequality, as outlined in Chapter 2. The 
delay in bringing violence against women into the international human rights law 
discourse was due to the characterisation of violence against women as a ‘private 
matter, a matter of unwanted behaviour of some men and/or a matter of some 
backward or primitive cultures.’352 The long awaited success of the transnational 
women’s movement within the discourse was to gain mainstream acceptance that 
violence against women was ‘part of the structure of the universal patriarchal 
culture.’353 This structure shapes the economic, social, and cultural relations of intra-
and inter-state society, such that women are discriminated against and disadvantaged, 
and such that this discrimination is seen as legitimate. It is also widely accepted – again, 
thanks to the women’s anti-violence movement – that this structural inequality and its 
manifest socioeconomic and cultural practices ‘reflect culturally dominant gender 
stereotypes.’354 For this reason ‘[b]anashing gender stereotypes … is one of the main, 
general mechanisms to prevent violence against women.’355 This has required a ‘shift 
from focusing on stereotypes as a problem of mentality to stereotypes as a source of 
structural discrimination.’356 As such, the focus on gender equality within primary 
prevention work is intrinsically connected to the feminist conceptualisation of violence 
against women within international human rights law. 
As well as being a consequence of violence against women, gender inequality and 
gender stereotyping are identified as ‘upstream’ causes of, or contributing risk factors 
for, violence against women. Gender norms – as shaped by patriarchy – affect all layers 
352 Rikki Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) 
of the CEDAW Convention,” In Due Dilligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence, edited 
by Carin Benninger-Budel, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 63. 
353 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 63.
354 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 63.
355 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 64.
356 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 78.
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of the social ecology and are a dominant part of our macro-level environment, or 
culture, as outlined in Chapter 2. The development and widely-held acceptance of 
Heise’s ecological model for understanding violence against women marked a 
significant moment of collaboration within the anti-violence movement, and was a 
pivotal moment in framing prevention and anti-violence work. Heise’s social ecology 
brought together research and expertise from feminist, public health, and psychosocial 
fields, and offered a model that synergised the evidence bases of these widely differing 
disciplines and emphasised the significance of theorising and problematising violence 
against women as a societal phenomenon. 
Any effort to prevent partner violence is based on an implicit theory of what 
leads particular men to abuse their partners. Thus research and theory on what 
increases risk of partner violence is highly relevant to the design and evaluation 
of programmes aimed at reducing partner violence.357
Whilst the ecological framework incorporates varying disciplines, it is worth noting that 
the macrosystemic level – which influences the other levels and contributory factors –
focuses on culture and norms, and particularly gender norms: affirming the significance 
of feminist theory to conceptualising primary prevention. Heise’s model ‘noted the role 
of individual experiences and beliefs, but theorised them as coloured, confirmed or 
reinforced by gender inequalities and norms of male dominance at community and 
social levels.’358 Alongside the emphasis on theorisation, it is, arguably, the 
macrosystemic level that has the strongest evidence base for establishing the causal 
relationship of factors contributing to violence against women – or perhaps the 
strongest aetiological basis.359 Heise’s own appraisal of the model in 2011 highlighted 
357 Lori Heise, What works to prevent partner violence: An evidence overview. (London: STRIVE Research 
Consortium, 2011), 5 – 6.
358 “Policy Brief: International Evidence on the Effectiveness of Prevention Initiatives,” Our Watch, 5, 
accessed 4 September 2018, www.ourwatch.org.au/getmedia/50e1f9de-9d7b-4236-a300-
91087d3eb9e6/Accessible_Policy_Brief_3_International_Evidence_Base.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf
359 ‘… countries with greater equality between women and men tend to have lower levels of violence 
against women…’ : “Investing in Gender Equality: Ending Violence against Women,” UN Women, 3, 
accessed 4 July 2016, 
http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/genderequality_vaw_leaflet_en_web.pdf; C. L. 
Yodanis, “Gender Inequality, Violence Against Women, and Fear: A Cross-National Test of the Feminist 
Theory of Violence Against Women,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 19(6), (2004): 655 – 675; Policy 




the differing strengths of the evidence bases for factors across the ecological levels, and 
concluded that ‘ecological studies demonstrate a strong link between the level of 
partner violence and various gender-related norms at the country level.’360 To this end, 
research and literature around the social ecology model and primary prevention 
increasingly presents distinctions between ‘contributory factors’ and ‘determinants’:
The strongest factors correlating with higher levels of violence against women 
and their children have therefore been found to lie in socio-structural and 
relationship-level gender inequalities, as well as attitudes and norms supporting 
violence and rigid gender roles. These factors have been termed ‘determinants’ 
of violence, as they are considered significant enough to determine the 
likelihood of violence occurring at population levels.361
This is not to undermine the significance of contributory factors, but to offer credence 
as to why the macrosystemic level and the role of gender norms have been so heavily 
focused on within primary prevention models and have gained prominence within the 
international human rights approach. This understanding is supported by the expertise 
of women’s organisations, who when surveyed as part of a global assessment of the 
due diligence standard, ‘cited gender inequality as the risk factor that most increased 
the prevalence of VAW.’362 For these reasons, working for gender equality, particularly 
through challenging gender norms and stereotypes, is a significant part of primary 
prevention. The focus on addressing gender norms is established in the DEVAW, 
which explicitly links violence against women to patriarchy and calls on states to 
address root causes; and is given further legal character by the CEDAW, an anti-
discrimination treaty. The need to address gender norms as root causes has been 
persistently called for by the CEDAW Committee within its concluding remarks and 
recommendations through the state reporting system, and within specific and general 
recommendations made to states in cases under the Optional Protocol. In particular 
the CEDAW Committee has given guidance on gender equality and gender norms, as 
360 Heise, What works to prevent partner violence: An evidence overview, Executive Summary, xii.
361 Policy Brief: International Evidence on the Effectiveness of Prevention Initiatives,” Our Watch, 7, 
accessed 4 September 2018, www.ourwatch.org.au/getmedia/50e1f9de-9d7b-4236-a300-
91087d3eb9e6/Accessible_Policy_Brief_3_International_Evidence_Base.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf
362 Abdul Aziz, Zarizana. and Moussa, Janine. Due Diligence Framework: State Accountability Framework for 
Eliminating Violence against Women. International Human Rights Initiative, 2016, 17, available at 
www.duediligenceproject.org/ewExternalFiles/Due%20Diligence%20 Framework%20Report%20Z.pdf.
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they relate to violence against women and primary prevention, under Article 2(e)-(f) 
and 5(a) of the treaty and General Recommendation no. 19(11). Article 5(a) acts as 
the primary frame of this approach and is widely understood as ‘the expression of the 
(acknowledged) need for a transformation of society so that structural barriers which 
stand in the way of ‘real’ equality are overcome.’363
Article 2
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:
[…]
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
by any person, organization or enterprise;
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women
Article 5
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all 
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority 
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women;
General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) Violence against women
11. Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men 
or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving 
violence or coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, 
dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision. Such prejudices and 
practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control 
of women. The effect of such violence on the physical and mental integrity of 
women is to deprive them the equal enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of 
363 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 79.
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human rights and fundamental freedoms. While this comment addresses 
mainly actual or threatened violence the underlying consequences of these 
forms of gender-based violence help to maintain women in subordinate roles 
and contribute to the low level of political participation and to their lower level 
of education, skills and work opportunities.
Norms of primary prevention have been further clarified by the Committee in General 
Recommendation no. 35 (34 – 35):
General Recommendation No. 35 (2017) Violence against women
Prevention
34. Adopt and implement effective legislative and other appropriate preventive 
measures to address the underlying causes of gender-based violence against 
women, including patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes, inequality in the family 
and the neglect or denial of women's civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights, as well as to promote women’s empowerment, agency and 
voice.
35. Develop and implement effective measures, with the active participation of 
all relevant stakeholders, such as women’s organisations and those representing 
marginalised groups of women and girls, to address and eradicate the 
stereotypes, prejudices, customs and practices, laid out in article 5 of the 
Convention, that condone or promote gender-based violence against women 
and underpin structural inequality of women with men. 
In the first case regarding violence against women under the Optional Protocol, A.T. v.
Hungary (2005), the Committee found that the state had breached its obligations 
under Article 5(a) as they related to the prevention of violence against women: ‘…the 
facts of the communication reveal aspects of the relationships between the sexes and 
attitudes towards women that the Committee recognised vis-à-vis the country as a 
whole.’364 This has been reiterated in following cases, and most recently in X and Y v.
364 A.T. v. Hungary, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, (comm. 2/2003), 
(2005), paragraph 9.4.
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Georgia (2015), where the Committee held that the facts of the case showed ‘a failure 
by the State party in its duty to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices that are based on the 
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles 
for men and women.’365 This mirrors its guidance in the state reporting process, where 
the Committee regularly makes recommendations on the state’s obligations under 
Article 5(a) with regard preventing violence against women. In fact, in A.T. v. Hungary, 
the Committee reminds the state of this fact: 
It [the Committee] has stated on many occasions that traditional attitudes by 
which women are regarded as subordinate to men contribute to violence 
against them. The Committee recognized those very attitudes when it 
considered the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Hungary in 2002. 
At that time it was concerned about the “persistence of entrenched traditional 
stereotypes regarding the role and responsibilities of women and men in the 
family...”366
The regional treaties have leaned heavily on this understanding with the most recent 
treaty, the Istanbul Convention, reaffirming the DEVAW in its recognition of violence 
against women as both a cause and consequence of discrimination and patriarchal 
dominance. Article 3(2) of the Maputo Protocol and Article 8(b) of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará both mirror Article 5(a), with the Convention of Belém do Pará, 
leaning on the lex specialis of Article 10(c)367 of the CEDAW, to make clear the role of 
education: 
States Parties agree to … modify social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
men and women, including the development of formal and informal 
365 X and Y v. Georgia, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (comm. 
24/2009), (2015), paragraph 9.7.
366 A.T. v. Hungary, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, (comm. 2/2003), 
(2005), paragraph 9.4.
367 ‘(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all 
forms of education by encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve 
this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of 
teaching methods;’ United Nations, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 18 December 1979, Article 10(c), available at 
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.
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educational programmes appropriate to every level of the educational process, 
to counteract prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on 
the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on the 
stereotyped roles for men and women which legitimise or exacerbate violence 
against women.368
The most recent regional treaty, the Istanbul Convention, further reinforces Article 
5(a), and specifically outlines the obligation to tackle gender norms as a preventative 
measure, including it in ‘Chapter III – Prevention, Article 12 – General Obligations’, 
requiring states parties to ‘take the necessary measures to promote changes in the 
social and cultural patterns of behaviour of women and men with a view to eradicating 
prejudices, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based on the idea of 
the inferiority of women or on stereotyped roles for women and men.’369
The focus on gender equality and challenging gender norms – as they relate to primary 
prevention – has been further shaped by the following principles: gender 
mainstreaming and gender specificity. Exploring these will give further understanding to 
both the conceptualisation of gender equality, and to means of addressing it within 
primary prevention initiatives.
Gender mainstreaming
The focus on violence against women as gendered, and gender as political, led to the 
call for the implications of gender to be understood, interrogated and responded to, 
across all areas of the international community. This has commonly been called gender 
mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming is at the heart of the Beijing Platform for Action 
(one of the foremost responses to violence against women at the intentional level), 
and remains a key strategy in achieving gender equality and eliminating violence against 
women. The Beijing Platform for Action and DEVAW place violence against women 
firmly within the human rights discourse and, by implication, argue that awareness of 
368 Organization of American States (OAS), The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, 
and Eradication of Violence against Women, Belém do Pará, 9 June, 1994, Article 8(b), available at 
https://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/convention.asp.
369 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210, Article 12(1), available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210.
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the impact of gender ought to be foregrounded in all policies and activities within the 
international community. Gender mainstreaming, as originally envisaged, entails the 
imperative for gender, and in particular the institutionalised subordination of women, 
to be treated as a central consideration in all forms of policy-making. In the context of 
violence against women, this reinforces and is reinforced by, an holistic approach, 
which situates understandings of the issue into a broader appreciation of gendered 
power relations and the marginalisation of women. Gender mainstreaming is 
maintained as an essential strategy for eliminating violence against women; addressing 
the root cause aetiology of violence against women, and operating at a systemic level 
to prevent violence against women.
Gender mainstreaming entered the international institutional discourse through the 
development agenda. During the UN Decade for Women and World Conference in 
Mexico, the linguistic shift from ‘women in development’ (WID) to ‘gender and 
development’ (GAD) within the development discourse, marked the move from a 
narrow accommodation of women as a ‘special interest group’ to a much broader and 
politicised understanding of women and gender that sought to change practices and 
institutions, within the development arena, that had failed to account for women or 
had done so inadequately.370 The vision of mainstreaming then transitioned into UN 
policy through the Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, 
adopted at the Third World Conference on Women, in Nairobi in 1985. The growth 
of the term was cemented in the Beijing Platform for Action which makes extensive 
comment on gender mainstreaming, calling on ‘governments and other actors’371
throughout 12 areas of concern, including violence against women, to ‘promote an 
active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and 
programs so that before decisions are taken an analysis may be made of their effects 
on women and men, respectively.’372 The commitment to gender mainstreaming, as 
advocated throughout the Beijing Platform for Action, was quickly advanced by the 
Commission on the Status of Women, the Secretary-General, and ECOSOC. In 1997, 
ECOSOC organised a High-Level Panel discussion on gender mainstreaming where it 
370 Hilary Charlesworth, “Not waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the 
United Nations,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, 18(1), (2005): 1.
371 United Nations, Report Of The Fourth World Conference On Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, Chap. I, resolution 1, annex II, paragraph 123, available at http://undocs.org/A/CONF.177/20.
372 United Nations, Report Of The Fourth World Conference On Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, Chap. I, resolution 1, annex II, paragraph 123.
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encouraged all UN agencies, committees and bodies to ‘mainstream a gender 
perspective into all areas of their work.’373 Most of the subsequent efforts to do so 
within the international human rights discourse have drawn on the definition of gender 
mainstreaming advanced by ECOSOC in 1997. 
In a 2004 review of the ECOSOC report, the Secretary-General endorsed the 
ECOSOC definition and framework and urged more ‘active and visible use of gender 
mainstreaming.’374 The commitment to gender mainstreaming in the Beijing Platform 
for Action has informed numerous bodies and committees in their work to eradicate 
violence against women, and has become a foundational part of the international 
human rights approach – again, emphasising feminist jurisprudence around tackling 
macrosystemic male dominance as an imperative to preventing and eliminating 
violence against women. This understanding has since influenced the Rome Statute 
and UN Security Council Resolution 1325. It has also informed the work of various 
treaty-monitoring committees in their efforts to address and eliminate violence against 
women. In particular, in response to General Comment No. 28, which amended 
reporting guidelines to request information on the position of women375, the Human 
Rights Committee has increasingly taken a gender perspective in its Concluding 
Observations during state-reporting. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur dedicated 
her 2003 report to the ‘Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender 
Perspective.’376 This followed reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights377 and Division for the Advancement of Women378, on efforts to 
integrate gender into human rights’ activities. Gender mainstreaming has been widely 
373 United Nations, Provisional Summary Record of the 20th Meeting, Economic and Social Council, 
Substantive Session of 1997, E/1997/SR.20 (16 September 1997), available at 
http://undocs.org/E/1997/SR.20.
374 United Nations, Review and Appraisal of the System-Wide Implementation of the Economic and Social 
Council’s Agree Conclusions on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective Into All Policies and Programmes in the 
United Nations System: Report of the Secretary General, E/2004/59, (5 May 2004), paragraph 80, available 
at http://undocs.org/E/2004/59.
375 CCPR general comment No. 28 - Article 3 (The equality of rights between men and women) 
(Replaces general comment No. 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, (29 March 2000), available from 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TBGeneralComments.aspx.
376 United Nations, Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective: Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2003/75, (6 January 2003), available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2003/75.
377 United Nations, The question of integrating the human rights of women throughout the United Nations
system: Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.4/1998/49, (25 March 1998), available at 
https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1998/49.
378 United Nations, Expert group meeting on the development of guidelines for the integration of gender 
perspectives into human rights activities and programmes: Note by the Secretariat, E/CN.4/1996/105, (20 
November 1995), available at https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1996/105.
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adopted across UN fora, including the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly, 
ECOSOC, UN Security Council, and Department for Peacekeeping Operations.
Whilst substantial groundwork has been laid at the international level for states, and 
other international non-state actors, to take seriously the mainstreaming of a gendered 
approach to preventing and eliminating violence against women – one of the key 
successes of the women’s transnational movement over the past 20 years – there 
remain issues with truly grasping the politicised nature of the work needed. Gender 
mainstreaming as an approach to gender inequality is at its most effective when 
coupled with a correct understanding of patriarchy and gendered power as a system 
which oppresses women and entrenches masculine privilege, and of violence against 
women as gendered and discriminatory. However, as Hillary Charlesworth argues, 
there are questions over the ‘bland and bureaucratic acceptance of the method of 
gender mainstreaming in the international institutions.’379 This is particularly true where 
gender mainstreaming is essentially reduced to collecting gender disaggregated data 
and gender-specific aspects of human rights. Elizabeth Harrison gave examples of this 
in her study of ‘Translating “Gender” through different Institutions in the Development 
Process’380, where she argues that gender mainstreaming has commonly become a 
simple case of counting the number of women involved.381 Charlesworth further claims 
that the strategy has been deployed in a very limited manner, which ‘has allowed the 
mainstream to tame and deradicalise claims to equality’382. In part this is due to the 
proliferation of mainstreaming, which, whilst being a success of the transnational 
women’s movement, also, by nature of its broad reach, ‘implies collaboration with 
institutions that are not unequivocally wedded to the feminist message, which 
positions domestic violence [and violence against women more broadly] as a form of 
violent discrimination against women.’383 As Renée Römkens goes on to say ‘[t]his 
inevitably means that in the process of mainstreaming, both on the level of state 
379 Charlesworth, “Not waving but Drowning,” 2.
380 Elizabeth Harrison, “Fish, Feminists and the FAO: Translating ‘Gender’ Through Different Institutions 
in the Development Process,” In Getting institutions right for women in development, edited by Anne 
Marie Goetz. (London, England, Zed Books, 1997).
381 Harrison, “Fish, Feminists and the FAO: Translating ‘Gender’ Through Different Institutions in the 
Development Process.”
382 Charlesworth, “Not waving but Drowning,” 2.
383 Renée Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns. Reflections on domestic violence as gender-
based violence in European legal developments,” In Family Ambiguity and Domestic Violence in Asia. 
Concepts, law, and process, edited by Maznah Mohamad and Saskia Wieringa, 
(Brighton/Portland/Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2013), 196.
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policies and in its implementation in the field, the original feminist analysis has become 
diluted.’384 As such, implementation of gender mainstreaming lacks depth, doing very 
little to tackle the ‘root causes’ of violence against women. 
This approach to gender mainstreaming is a clear case of the disjuncture between the 
implementation of technical understanding and normative understanding (or theorised 
understanding) within the international human rights discourse. Gender mainstreaming 
operates at the macrosystemic level; it operates where power – specifically patriarchy 
– is most systematised and ‘public’. But without a full appreciation of the normative 
understanding of mainstreaming, and a cogent appreciation of the politicisation of 
gender, the implementation of gender mainstreaming fails to operate as a strategy for 
primary prevention – the very thing it sets out to do. In some cases, mainstreaming 
appears to have emerged as little more than a bureaucratic exercise, which fails to 
achieve its purpose and leads to institutional fatigue.385 Whilst gender mainstreaming is 
intended to address issues of gendered power, when the feminist analysis is lost the 
application ‘does not capture the relational nature of gender, the role of power 
relations, and the way that structures of subordination are reproduced.’386 Whilst the 
language of gender mainstreaming is prolific, the application lacks bite. As 
Charlesworth concludes, it is necessary to pursue ‘less bureaucratic strategies to 
respond to inequality between men and women.’387
Over the past 20 years the understanding of violence against women, as a gendered 
and discriminatory abuse, steeped in unequal power relations, has steadily developed, 
as has awareness of the fact that tackling it requires addressing discrimination and 
gender inequality. However, misreadings of gender have the potential to undermine 
this progress. UN Women stipulate that gender mainstreaming ‘is not an end in itself 
but a strategy, an approach, a means to achieve the goal of gender equality.’388 Gender 
mainstreaming has become omnipresent within the human rights discourse on 
violence against women. However, its breadth is not accompanied by depth and its 
understanding of gender and gender discrimination is not fully realised in its application. 
384 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 196.
385 Charlesworth, “Not waving but Drowning,” 1.
386 Charlesworth, “Not waving but Drowning,” 15.
387 Charlesworth, “Not waving but Drowning,” 18.
388 “Gender mainstreaming,” UN Women, accessed 3 June 2019, 
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Whilst its impact is currently limited, or null, the potential of gender mainstreaming is 
still great, if the normative and theorised understanding – rooted in a deeply political 
(feminist) problematisation of gender – could be fully implemented. With regard 
violence against women, it remains one of the most important – but un(der)explored 
– strategies for preventing violence against women at a macrosystemic level.
Gender Specificity
The lack of consistency in the interpretation and application of gender and gender 
mainstreaming also leaves scope for the reconceptualisation of some of the most basic 
norms upon which the violence against women discourse is based. A particularly 
pressing challenge which results from this, concerns the shift away from gender 
specificity to a form of ‘gender-neutrality’. Whilst the need for gender specific 
measures to address violence against women as a gendered and discriminatory human 
rights violation has been articulated and reinforced throughout international human 
rights law, interpretations of precisely what the term ‘gender’ denotes or how best to 
effect recognition of it, remain subject to conflicting rationales. As above, gender 
mainstreaming, as a principle, was designed to ensure that gendered power relations 
were identified and problematised wherever they were manifest. However, in recent 
years, a ‘gender-neutral’ reading of mainstreaming has emerged as a challenge to calls 
for gender specificity. At the state level, this has meant a reversion to readings of 
gender equality which are formal, rather than substantive and, worryingly, this has 
impacted upon the ability of organisations to respond to women’s rights and cater 
specifically to their needs. One of the most significant examples of this is the 
reconceptualisation of domestic violence: states have begun to draw a distinction 
between violence against women and domestic violence, arguing that the latter is 
something to which men are also vulnerable and from which they too need to be 
protected, and so it follows that responses to domestic violence should be gender-
neutral. This move to gender-neutral readings of domestic violence or intimate partner 
violence, is mirrored in the Istanbul Convention and is a source of contention389, with 
389 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 192 – 209; Jackie Jones, “The European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Council of Europe Convention on Violence Against Women and 
Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention),” In The Legal Protection From Violence: Normative Gaps in 
International Human Rights Law, edited by Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
2018), 139 – 142; Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, “What potential does the Council of Europe Convention on 
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feminists concerned that the reconceptualisation of domestic violence as gender-
neutral depoliticises gender and fails to appropriately respond to women’s experience 
of domestic violence. As intimate partner violence remains by far the most common 
and wide scale manifestation of violence against women390, this represents a major 
reconceptualisation. (See Appendix 1.)
The issue at hand is not whether men experience domestic violence/intimate partner 
violence, which they do – although much could be said on how the experiences of 
men and women differ at an individual and population level, both in severity and 
nature391 – but how/or if this relates to violence against women, as understood as a 
gendered human rights abuse. Whilst men are victims of intimate partner violence, 
when gender-based violence is reconceptualised to include the male experience within 
the discourse – and within the law – the gains made by the transnational women’s 
movement to conceptualise, address and eliminate violence against women are 
jeopardised. (As the male experience is so commonly (mis)taken as the ‘human 
experience’, this conflation becomes even more damaging, quickly opening the door to 
erosion of well established norms.) As outlined in Chapter 2, violence against women 
Violence against Women hold as regards domestic violence?” The International Journal of Human Rights, 
16(7), (2012): 948.
390 Claudia García-Moreno, Henrica A.F.M. Jansen, Mary Ellsberg, Lori Heise, Charlotte Watts, Multi-
country Study of Domestic Violence and Women’s Health, (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2005); 
Heise, What works to prevent partner violence, 2 – 3.
391 Whilst men experience intimate partner violence, and both men and women use violence in 
relationships, the experience and characterization of violence experienced by men and women differ 
widely. Christine Chinkin, Scientific expert to the Council of Europe Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence argues that, ‘while men also experience 
domestic violence, it is more frequently inflicted upon women and has disparate economic and social 
consequences.’ : Christine Chinkin, “Addressing Violence against Women in the Commonwealth Within 
States’ Obligations under International Law,” Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 40 (2014): 475. As such, 
leading criminologists Dobash and Dobash argue for the prioritisation of policies which address men’s 
violence against women: Russell Dobash, and Rebecca Dobash, “Women’s Violence to Men in Intimate 
Relationships: Working on a Puzzle,” British Journal of Criminology, 44, (2004): 424 349. Beyond the 
gendered nature of domestic violence against women, there are also discrepancies in how domestic 
violence against men is ‘counted’ and included in the data : See also Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, “Is it time for
a UN treaty on violence against women?” The International Journal of Human Rights, 22(3),(2018): 314. 
305 – 324. Often data used fails to differentiate between reports of domestic violence where the 
incident is isolated or repeated. Where data shows a pattern of domestic violence (four or more 
incidents) women account for 89% of the cases. Similarly, women are six times more likely to require 
medical attention. The data fails to distinguish between aggression and self-defence – where 75% of 
violence by women is done in self-defence. Sylvia Walby and Jonathon Allen, Domestic violence, sexual 
assault and stalking: Findings from the British Crime Survey (London: Home Office; Development and 
Statistics Directorate, 2004). When it comes to the ‘continuum of violence’, women are far more likely 
to be killed by their partner: 40% - 70% of female murder victims were killed by their partners/former 
partners, whereas the comparable figure for men is 4% - 8%. Etienne Krug, Linda Dahlberg, James 
Mercy, Anthony Zwi, and Rafael Lozano, eds. World report on violence and health, (Geneva: World 
Health Organisation, 2002.)
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is framed within international law as gender discrimination: violence against women is 
gender-based violence. The male experience of intimate partner violence, however, is 
not a ‘cause and consequence’ of discrimination (‘a manifestation of historically unequal 
power relations between men and women’392), nor is it considered ‘violence that is 
directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately’393. As such, the same conceptualisation of domestic violence as 
gender-based violence – as understood within international law – does not apply to 
men. The gendered nature of violence against women is the foundation of its inclusion 
and conceptualisation within international human rights law. As the transnational 
women’s movement has secured the understanding of violence against women as 
gendered and discriminatory, inclusion of the male experience of domestic violence 
risks eroding the understanding of violence against women as a human rights violation. 
Whilst it may seem extreme to suggest the inclusion of domestic violence experienced 
by men could threaten the position of violence against women within the law, it is 
worth remembering that there is still no binding international treaty on violence against 
women, and the conceptualisation of violence against women as a human rights abuse, 
while broadly held, is incredibly fragile. With regard state responsibility for preventing 
violence against women, a gender-neutral understanding of domestic violence and 
violence against women has concrete impacts upon primary prevention. The focus on 
gender equality as an ‘upstream’ strategy would not have gained prominence, or 
perhaps emerged at all, if the transnational women’s movement hadn’t successfully 
conceptualised and secured the fundamental understanding that violence against 
women is gendered and discriminatory, and therefore requires responses aimed at
gender inequality and discrimination. 
In her 2013 article, Reflections on Domestic Violence as Gender-Based Violence in 
European Legal Developments, Renée Römkens, scientific member to the Committee 
for the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention (2009 – 2011), suggests that the 
gender analysis which forms the bedrock of the feminist perspective on violence 
against women is ‘under siege’394 at the state and international levels. The dilution of 
392 General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Preamble, available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/48/104. 
393 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 19, 
11th session, A/47/38, (1992), paragraph 6, available from http://undocs.org/A/47/38.
394 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 196.
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mainstreaming and the movement towards gender-neutralisation and the 
depoliticisation of domestic violence reflect ‘post- and anti-feminist critique’ which, 
Römkens argues, is ‘currently directed against the feminist analysis of domestic violence 
as a gendered phenomenon.’395 Instead, domestic violence is treated separately to 
violence against women as a human rights concern, and ‘increasingly positioned as a 
criminal, legal, and more generally, a social or moral concern.’396 As Römkens points 
out, the ‘success’ of mainstreaming domestic violence has come at a cost, where the 
shift from a gendered, human rights based understanding to a broadly ‘moral rejection’ 
has ‘paradoxically fostered a renewed privatization’397. This is a disjuncture that lies at 
the heart of the Istanbul Convention, with the ‘hybrid conceptualisation’398 of violence 
against women as gendered and domestic violence as gender-neutral, framing the 
scope of the treaty, titled: ‘The Council of Europe Convention on prevention and 
combatting violence against women and domestic violence’. Significantly, the task force 
established to explore the development of a new binding legal instrument was initially 
called ‘Task Force on Violence again Women, including Domestic Violence’. Domestic 
violence was framed as distinct, largely due to its profound scale, affecting one in four
women in Europe, but still included within the framing of violence against women as a 
gendered phenomenon. By the time the bill came to pass a shift had taken place to 
separate domestic violence from the wider concept of violence against women –
‘replacing the “including” with “and”.’399 This is far more than a semantic shift, it 
represents a journey away from the standards and norms laid down in the Beijing 
Platform for Action, the DEVAW, CEDAW Recommendations no.19 and 35, and the 
Maputo Protocol and Belém do Pará. The ‘and’ of the Istanbul treaty represents a 
major reconceptualisation of domestic violence as gender-neutral and – therefore – not 
gender discriminatory. Given intimate partner violence is by far the most common and 
dominant form of violence against women, the hybridisation of the bill presents a 
dangerous erosion of the understanding key to eliminating violence against women. In 
Article 2 the treaty ‘simultaneously positions domestic violence as a gender-neutral 
phenomenon, while acknowledging that domestic violence affects women 
disproportionately’400:  
395 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 197.
396 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 197.
397 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 195.
398 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 202.
399 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 202.
400 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 202.
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Article 2 – Scope of the Convention
(1) This Convention shall apply to all forms of violence against women, 
including domestic violence, which affects women disproportionately.
(2) Parties are encouraged to apply this Convention to all victims of domestic 
violence. Parties shall pay particular attention to women victims of gender-
based violence in implementing the provisions of this Convention.
This is in direct conflict with international definitions of gender-based violence –
particularly those given by the CEDAW Committee, which reflect the nature of the 
CEDAW as an anti-discrimination treaty. As well as eroding international norms the 
hybridisation presents a number of internal inconsistencies within the treaty, with 
Article 18(3) calling for measures pursuant to the chapter to ‘be based on a gendered 
understanding of violence against women and domestic violence [and to] focus on the 
human rights and safety of the victim.’ This hybrid conceptualisation of domestic 
violence opens up questions as to the normative and legal foundations of the treaty, 
and the dissonance this creates within the text itself further endangers the standing 
and efficacy of the Convention in practice. As Römkens argues:
Since discrimination of women in the context of inequality in power relations 
between men and women is one of the constitutive elements of the 
convention, it is internally contradictory, and from an international human rights 
law perspective illogical and without legal ground, to position domestic 
violence against men within its realm.401
The internal inconsistencies, and the wider erosion of norms, that are borne of this 
hybridisation, is especially troubling given that in the absence of a binding international 
treaty, the Istanbul Convention serves as the most high-level instrument for effecting 
protection against, and prevention and elimination of, violence against women in 
Europe. 
401 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 195.
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Rhonda McQuigg (charitably) describes the above inconsistencies as ‘definitional 
issues’402, and is keen to emphasise that the Istanbul treaty maintains the emphasis on 
violence against women: 
Very importantly, the language of the convention is that states are ‘encouraged’ 
to apply the convention to male victims of domestic violence, however, there 
is no actual obligation on states to do so. The focus of the convention 
therefore remains primarily on the prevention of violence against women in its 
various forms, including violence against women taking place in the home.403
She describes the separation of domestic violence from violence against women as 
serving ‘two purposes’:
First, it emphasises the importance which the convention accords to combating 
the specific problem of domestic violence, an objective which is certainly to be 
applauded given the particular prevalence of this form of violence. Second, it is 
recognised in the convention that men may also be victims of domestic 
violence.404
Whilst these were both factors in the eventual framing of the convention, McQuigg 
doesn’t go on to directly question the incompatibility (or conflict) between these 
purposes. It is problematic – perhaps impossible – to highlight domestic violence as 
particularly important for the scope of the treaty and then to separate it from the 
gendered framing of violence against women. By allowing for a gender-neutral reading 
of domestic violence, the treaty undermines efforts to raise awareness and 
consciousness of violence against women as gendered and systemic, and domestic 
violence as its most prevalent and pervasive manifestation: ‘nullifying the meaning of 
the very term violence against women and the rationale for the treaty in the first 
402 McQuigg, “What potential does the Council of Europe Convention on Violence against Women 
hold as regards domestic violence?” 948.
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place.’405 Jackie Jones further argues that the separation of domestic violence from the 
gendered framing of the treaty ‘demonstrat[es] the climate of compromise prevalent in 
relation to women’s human rights – specifically for the most prevalent form of violence 
against women in the world at present – domestic violence.’406 Jones goes on to 
highlight the conceptual confusion and norm erosion caused by the hybrid approach, 
and the opposition to this within the transnational women’s movement:
Separating out domestic violence from other types of violence against women 
has drawn criticisms, including from the European Women’s Lobby which has 
pointed out that it runs the risk of not placing domestic violence within the 
structural problems of all forms of violence against women and therefore 
“weakening the gender approach to the structural phenomenon of male 
violence against women.”407
Whilst the Istanbul Convention includes – to date – the most comprehensive outline 
on state responsibility for prevention (Chapter 4), the convention erodes the 
normative and theorised underpinning of violence against women as a human rights 
abuse, by neutralising, depoliticising and reconceptualising domestic violence. It has also 
contributed towards gender-neutral framings of anti-violence against women legislation 
at the state level. A stark example of this is the Violence against Women, Domestic 
Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015, which mirrors the approach of the 
Istanbul Convention by separating violence against women from domestic violence. 
Again the Act’s title takes the ‘and’ approach to domestic violence, promoting the 
same hybrid conceptualisation of domestic violence as gender-neutral and violence 
against women as gender-based. In fact, the Welsh Bill goes further than the Istanbul 
Convention in not only separating domestic violence from violence against women, 
but in offering and applying a bizarre account of domestic violence as somehow both
gender-neutral and gender-based. In 2018 the Welsh Government gave guidance for 
local strategies for implementing the Act, which tried to hold in tension both the 
gender-neutral and proposed gender-based nature of the legislation:
405 Jones, “The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Council of Europe Convention 
on Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention),” 139.
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The Act covers all forms of gender based violence in recognition that both 
men and women are victims of violence; threats of violence or harassment 
arising directly or indirectly from values, beliefs or customs relating to gender 
or sexual orientation; and also forced marriage. The guidance reflects that and 
whilst the guidance refers to “violence against women”, this should be read as 
also including male victims of gender-based violence (GBV) unless the context 
suggests otherwise.408
From this explanation it is difficult to understand what is meant by gender-based 
violence in the context of the Welsh Bill. It is hard not to conclude that the Act 
contributes to erosion of the feminist concept of gender-based violence – a 
framework that was advocated for throughout the drafting process.409 The bill was 
initially announced as the ‘Domestic Violence (Wales) Bill 2011’. In 2012 this was 
broadened to include all forms of violence against women and retitled ‘Violence
Against Women (Wales) Bill’, reflecting the Welsh Government’s ‘Right to be Safe’ 
strategy, which looked more widely at the multiple manifestations of violence against 
women. During drafting and consulting the Wales Violence Against Women Action 
Group, consisting of leading Welsh Women’s Groups, including: Welsh Women’s Aid, 
BAWSO, and Rape Crisis England and Wales, published a paper called ‘Priorities for 
the Violence Against Women (Wales) Bill’, which outlined concerns about how 
violence against women should be conceptualised in the bill, echoing the international 
human rights approach:
The structural nature of violence against women as gender-based violence is 
one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a 
subordinate position compared with men. It is vital that a shared understanding 
of the links between all forms of VAW, as well as its causes and consequences, 
informs the legislation. This must include the Bills’ title, which must not 
separate domestic abuse from the broader VAW agenda, given that domestic 
408 “The Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015: Guidance 
for Local Strategies,” Welsh Government, 4, accessed 5 September 2018, 
https://gov.wales/docs/dsjlg/publications/commsafety/180317-guidance-for-local-strategies-en.pdf
409 Hannah Austin, VAW: Priorities for the Violence Against Women (Wales) Bill, (Cardiff: Wales Violence 
Against Women Action Group, 2013), available at http://www.walesvawgroup.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/vaw-priorities-for-vaw-wales-bill.pdf.
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abuse is in fact the most prevalent form of VAW in Wales and is as profoundly 
gendered as other forms of VAW.410
In response to what then became the Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and 
Sexual Violence (Wales) Act, the Wales Violence Against Women Action Group, 
further explained the ramifications of the gender-neutral approach to violence against 
women:
The current name is also disappointing as it is cumbersome, divisive and 
unclear. This lack of clarity has led to a conceptual confusion about what 
exactly it is that we are trying to tackle (and how) when we talk about violence 
against women and girls and its various forms, which has negative ramifications 
for policy and practice.411
Like the Istanbul Convention, the Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and 
Sexual Violence (Wales) Act represents a departure from international jurisprudence, 
as well as deviating from the advice of feminist expertise provided throughout the bill’s
consultation period412; evidencing the fragility of the norms held at the international 
level. Whilst norms inherent in the international human rights law approach appeared 
to be broadly-held, the wave of gender-neutral and depoliticised legislation at the 
European and state levels, show how precariously positioned the feminist 
conceptualisation of violence against women really is. It also represents a broader 
challenge to international human rights law, where norms can be taken for their 
ideological utility over – and, perhaps, against – their legal significance. Römkens is 
again astute in assessing how this competition for discursive space presents a threat to 
410 Hannah Austin, VAW: Priorities for the Violence Against Women (Wales) Bill, (Cardiff: Wales Violence 
Against Women Action Group, 2013), 6, available at http://www.walesvawgroup.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/vaw-priorities-for-vaw-wales-bill.pdf.
411 “Gender-based Violence, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Bill Stage 1 Response from 
Wales Violence Against Women Action Group: Submission to the Communities, Equality and Local 
Government Committee,” Wales Violence Against Women Action Group, 3 – 4, accessed at 2 June 
2019, http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s30394/GBV%2089%20-
%20Wales%20Violence%20Against%20Women%20Action%20Group.pdf.
412 ‘There has been very limited discussion with the sector about the content of the Bill since the 
publication of the White Paper in 2012, and we feel as an Action Group that there has not been any 
opportunity to justify why we called for these specific recommendations, as nearly all of them have not 
been included in the Bill.’ “Gender-based Violence, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Bill 
Stage 1 Response from Wales Violence Against Women Action Group: Submission to the 
Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee,” Wales Violence Against Women Action 
Group, 3.
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the feminist gains made within the international human rights discourse to frame and 
address violence against women:
Human rights are no longer the exclusive domain of international public law. 
The human rights perspective is increasingly embraced worldwide to frame the 
political and legal battles of violence against women. It demonstrates that law is 
a living thing, subject to interpretation and not only of legal experts. This 
politicisation may have fostered a different consequence: the weakening of 
international legal standards. Vigilance is, therefore, required.413
Despite the established UN approach and regional treaty law, many states continue to 
emphasise gender-neutrality in their response to violence against women, particularly 
domestic violence. In some cases states have alternated between approaches; 
developing a gender-specific approach and then moving back to gender-neutrality. 
Through the state-reporting process, the CEDAW Committee has criticised states that 
have returned to the gender-neutral approach, including the Netherlands (2007)414, 
Poland (2007)415, Finland (2008)416 and the United Kingdom (2008)417. In the case of 
Finland, the Committee expressed its concern that ‘the policy on violence against 
women is couched in gender-neutral language, which undermines the notion that such 
violence is a clear manifestation of discrimination against women’418. Likewise the 
Committee restated in its General Recommendation no. 35 on violence against 
women that states should ‘[e]xamine gender-neutral laws and policies to ensure that 
they do not create or perpetuate existing inequalities and repeal or modify them if 
413 Römkens, “Gender revisited: Global concerns,” 205.
414 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Thirty-seventh session (15 January-2 
February 2007), Thirty-eighth session (14 May-1 June 2007), Thirty-ninth session (23 July-10 August 2007),
A/62/38, (2007), 61, available at https://undocs.org/A/62/38.
415 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Thirty-seventh session (15 January-2 
February 2007), Thirty-eighth session (14 May-1 June 2007), Thirty-ninth session (23 July-10 August 2007),
A/62/38, (2007), 68.
416 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 40th session (14 January - 1 February 
2008), 41st session (30 June-18 July 2008), A/63/38(SUPP), (2008), 125, available at https://undocs.org/ 
A/63/38(SUPP).
417 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 40th session (14 January - 1 February 
2008), 41st session (30 June-18 July 2008), A/63/38(SUPP), (2008), 142.
418 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 40th session (14 January - 1 February 
2008), 41st session (30 June-18 July 2008), A/63/38(SUPP), (2008), 128.
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they do so.’419 This would seem to indicate a disjuncture between the shift to gender-
neutrality and the existing legal framework currently governing violence against 
women. In the case of the CEDAW, Rebecca Cook outlines the foundational framing 
of specificity in the Convention, distinguishing between the normative parameters of 
‘eliminating discrimination’ and achieving ‘sex neutrality’:
In agreeing “to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of 
eliminating discrimination against women...,” states parties are obligated to 
address the particular nature of each discrimination. The Women's Convention 
clearly reinforces sexual non-discrimination, but its purpose is not simply to 
achieve gender-neutrality. In contrast to previous human rights treaties, the 
Women's Convention frames the legal norm as the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women, as distinct from opposing sex discrimination per 
se. That is, it develops the legal norm from a sex neutrality norm that requires 
equal treatment of men and women, usually measured by how men are treated, 
to recognize that the distinctive characteristics of women and their vulnerabilities 
to discrimination merit a specific legal response.420
Rikki Holtmaat likewise emphasises the same framing of specificity inherent in the duty 
of eliminating discrimination, explaining that the CEDAW goes beyond legal protection 
against discrimination, to requiring positive action to address the causes of 
discrimination, which ‘not only requires the same or identical rights for women but 
also the development of different law and public policy.’421
At the praxis level, the reconceptualisation of gender has also seen funding diverted 
from organisations which refuse to extend their service provision to men. This poses a 
significant challenge to the substantive norms and jurisprudence surrounding violence 
against women, as it suggests that:
419 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), paragraph 32, available from http://undocs.org/ CEDAW/C/GC/35.
420 Rebecca J. Cook, “Accountability in International Law for Violations of Women's Rights by Non-State 
Actors,” Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, (25), (1993): 105. 93 – 116.
421 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 79.
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[m]ale victims of violence require, and deserve, comparable resources to those 
afforded to female victims, thereby ignoring the reality that violence against 
men does not occur as a result of pervasive inequality and discrimination, and 
also that it is neither systemic nor pandemic in the way that violence against 
women indisputably is.422
In her 2014 report, the Special Rapporteur stated that: 
[a]ttempts to synthesize all forms of violence into a “gender neutral” 
framework, tend to result in a depoliticised or diluted discourse, which 
abandons the transformative agenda. A different set of normative and practical 
measures is required to respond to and prevent violence against women and 
equally importantly to achieve the international law obligation of substantive 
equality, as opposed to formal equality.423
This concern was also expressed by the CEDAW Committee in 2013, when it 
observed, as part of its state-reporting on the United Kingdom that:
[a] law, policy, program or practice [may appear] to be neutral insofar as it 
relates to men and women, but has a discriminatory effect in practice on 
women because pre-existing inequalities are not addressed by the apparently 
neutral measure.424
This is the difference between formal and substantive equality and it is this 
understanding which needs to inform attempts at gender mainstreaming and readings 
of the concept of gender, more generally. 
422 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 61, available at 
http://undocs.org/A/HRC/26/38.
423 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 61.
424 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 28 
on Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, A/47/38 (October 19, 2010), paragraph 5, available from 
http://undocs.org/A/47/38.
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Gender specificity as framed by gender equality: 
From formal equality to substantive equality to transformative equality.
Key to understanding and applying gender specificity is the interpretation of gender 
equality. As outlined in Chapter 1, the tension between liberal characterisations of 
gender equality and radical calls for women’s liberation is at play when understanding 
the framing of gender equality and gender specificity in the international human rights 
law approach to violence against women. The lens of liberation – and the task of 
emancipatory imagination – serve as a challenge to the narrow vision of gender 
equality, and the liberal way of seeing discrimination and equality more broadly. The 
work of the liberationist lens can be seen in the feminist refining of the discourse’s call 
for gender equality; progressing from formal equality, to substantive equality, to 
transformative equality. 
Over the past decade in particular, there has been an emphasis on substantive 
equality. Again, this has helped elucidate and consolidate the provisions of the 
CEDAW, DEVAW and the Beijing Platform for Action as they relate to gender 
equality. Under Article 2 of the CEDAW, states have an obligation to pursue a policy 
of eliminating discrimination against women, and must, in their efforts to achieve this, 
focus on formal, de jure, and substantive, de facto, equality. The Istanbul Convention 
further promotes the significance of substantive equality as it relates to primary
prevention, recognising ‘that the realization of de jure and de facto equality between 
women and men is a key element in the prevention of violence against women.’425
This duty is reiterated in Article 2(1)(d) of the Maputo Protocol and, again, in Article 
1(b) of the Istanbul Convention, which outlines the purpose of the convention as 
being to ‘contribute to the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 
and promote substantive equality between women and men, including by empowering 
women.’426
Substantive equality is distinct from equity and must be achieved through gender 
specificity. Article 4 of the Istanbul Convention affirms that, ‘Fundamental rights, 
425 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210. available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210
426 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210. Article 1(b).
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equality and non-discrimination’,427 require gender specificity pursuant to achieving 
equality, and makes clear the difference between equality, equity and neutrality: 
‘Special measures that are necessary to prevent and protect women from gender-
based violence shall not be considered discrimination under the terms of this 
Convention.’428 (This is obviously in contrast to its gender-neutral approach to 
domestic violence, which seems ghettoised from the Convention’s otherwise 
comprehensive account of substantive equality.) In 2013, after highlighting substantive 
equality in its 2006, 2007 and 2011 annual reports, the CEDAW Committee stated 
that it had ‘consistently concluded that the elimination of discrimination against women 
requires state parties to provide for substantive as well as formal equality.’429
With this in mind, the Special Rapporteur emphasised, in her 2011 report, the need to 
adopt a ‘twin-track approach of both mainstreaming and specificity, which take into 
account women's inter- and intra- gender equality and non-discrimination rights, and 
also the right to be free of all forms of violence, both public and private.’430 Gender 
specificity in anti-violence against women legislation is recommended in the UN 
Handbook on Legislation on Violence Against Women. Gender specific legislation and 
policies are called for in Article 2(1)(c) of the Maputo Protocol431 and Article 6 of the 
Istanbul Convention. Gender specificity is required across the range of state duties 
from prevention to reparations, and is rooted in a reading of gender that requires 
substantive equality. International human rights law and UN bodies place particular 
emphasis on gender specificity and the position of women’s groups to lead this 
approach. In fact, the UN Handbook explicitly encourages this. Whilst maintaining the 
duty of states to fund efforts to address violence against women, the UN Handbook 
advocates: 
427 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210. Article 4(4).
428 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210. Article 4(4).
429 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Report of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women Fifty-second session (9-27 July 2012), Fifty-third session (1-19 
October 2012), Fifty-fourth session(11 February-1 March 2013), (A/68/38), (2013), Annex I, paragraph 8, 
available at https://undocs.org/A/68/38
430 United Nations, Multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and violence against women: Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, 
A/HRC/17/26 (2 May 2011), available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/17/26.
431 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, Maputo,11 July 2003, Article 2(1)(c), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/
128
Where possible, services should be run by independent and experienced 
women’s non-governmental organizations providing gender-specific, 
empowering and comprehensive support to women survivors of violence, 
based on feminist principles.432
The drive for substantive equality has fuelled the promotion and advancement of 
gender specificity. As UN Women suggest, substantive equality requires ‘that, due to 
the existence of entrenched discrimination in society, achieving equality might require 
different or unequal treatment in favour of a disadvantaged group in order to achieve 
equality of outcome.’ 433
The understanding of substantive equality, and the significance it holds in the discourse, 
has been further built upon and strengthened by the concept of ‘transformative 
remedies’434, and what the Special Rapporteur has called the ‘transformative agenda’435. 
This marks further elucidation of gender equality as not only substantive but 
transformative. This is in keeping with the framing of the CEDAW, with Holtmaat 
describing the anti-discrimination treaty as conceptualising ‘equality as transformation’, 
rather than ‘equality as sameness’.436 The treaty goes beyond achieving sex-neutrality 
to ‘demand[ing] that attention be paid to the structural causes of discrimination.’437
This reflects the liberationist aims of the transnational women’s movement and is far 
removed from formal readings of equality; further reinforcing gender specificity as an 
432 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Handbook for Legislation on Violence 
Against Women, (New York: United Nations, 2010), 31, available at 
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/v-handbook.htm
433 United Nations Women, A Transformative Stand-Alone Goal On Achieving Gender Equality, Women’s 
Rights And Women’s Empowerment: Imperatives And Key Components, (New York: United Nations, 2013) 
17, available at http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-
do/~/media/AC04A69BF6AE48C1A23DECAEED24A452.ashx
434 Rashida Manjoo, “Introduction: reflections on the concept and implementation of transformative 
reparations,” The International Journal of Human Rights, 21(9), (2017): 1193 – 1203; United Nations, 
Reparations to women who have been subjected to violence: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/14/22 (23 April 2010), available 
at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/14/22; General Assembly resolution 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147, (16 December 2005), Article 23 
‘Guarantees of non-repetition’, available at http://undocs.org/A/RES/60/147.
435 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014).
436 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 78.
437 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 79.
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approach to primary prevention. As Holtmaat concludes ‘the Convention not only 
expresses the principle of equality, but also the principle of diversity or freedom.’438
Again, this relies on a radically politicised understanding of gender as the frame for 
implementing preventative work. Within this understanding, the response to the 
individual is linked to the systemic, as it considers how remedial and preventative 
measures must work together for the individual and for gender equality more
generally. Transformative remedies and the transformative agenda look holistically at 
the prevention of violence against women, and consider the indivisibility of rights as 
they relate to gender equality and gender discrimination. As the Special Rapporteur 
affirms: 
Transformative remedies require that the problem of violence against women 
is acknowledged as systemic and not individual; and that this requires specific 
measures to address it as a gender-specific human rights violation […] 
Responses in laws, policies and programs require that the historical, current 
and future realities of the lives of women be taken into account through a lens 
of indivisibility and interdependency of rights.439
Similarly, in her 2010 report, the Special Rapporteur explained that 
adequate reparations for women cannot simply be about returning them to 
where they were before the individual instance of violence, but instead should 
strive to have a transformative potential.440
This radically links the protective/remedial duties with the preventive duties of the state, 
and considers the transformative potential of redress and reparation to prevent re-
victimisation of the individual concerned, as well as the systemic – upstream –
preventative agenda. This deeply political, and feminist reading of gender, takes note of 
the collective and communal identity of women, and how that identity relates to their 
438 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) of 
the CEDAW Convention,” 79.
439 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014) paragraph 65.
440 United Nations, Reparations to women who have been subjected to violence: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/14/22 
(23 April 2010), paragraph 31.
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experiences of violence. Transformative remedies embody the personal as political, 
and cut against individualised and privatised readings of violence against women. This 
also takes into account that the lack of transformative remedies breeds impunity for 
perpetrators, which leads to (re)victimisation: when isolating individuals from the wider 
system of violence against women, gender inequality and patriarchy go unchallenged, 
which perpetuates the system, and, in turn, the threat to the individual.441 The Special 
Rapporteur explains the concept of ‘engendering reparations’442, which underlies and 
frames transformative remedies:
[A]cts of violence against women are part of a larger system of gender 
hierarchy that can only be fully grasped when seen in the broader structural 
context. Therefore, adequate reparations should aspire to the extent possible,
to subvert, instead of reinforce, pre-existing structural inequality that may be at 
the root causes of the violence the women experience […]443
The conceptual shift to consider reparations as part of a ‘transformative agenda’ came 
from the expansion of rights of remedy to include ‘guarantees of non-repetition’. The 
guarantee of non-repetition, as outlined in General Assembly resolution 60/147 ‘Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law’, linked the individual to the structural by including 
primary prevention within its scope:
Guarantees of non-repetition offer the greatest potential for transforming 
gender relations. In promising to ensure non-recurrence, [they] trigger a 
441 Ruth Rubio-Marín, ed., The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies while Redressing 
Human Rights Violations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Margaret Urban Walker, 
“Transformative Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current Trend in Thinking about Gender-Just 
Reparations,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 10(1), (2016): 108–125.
442 United Nations, Reparations to women who have been subjected to violence: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/14/22 
(23 April 2010), paragraph 30; Rubio- Marín, The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies 
while Redressing Human Rights Violations; Urban Walker, “Transformative Reparations?”; Andrea 
Durbach, Louise Chappell and Sarah Williams, “Foreword: special issue on ‘transformative reparations 
for sexual violence post-conflict: prospects and problems,” The International Journal of Human Rights, 
21(9), (2017): 1185 – 1192.
443 United Nations, Reparations to women who have been subjected to violence: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/14/22 
(23 April 2010), paragraph 31.
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discussion about the underlying structural causes of the violence and their 
gendered manifestations and . . . about the broader institutional or legal 
reforms that might be called for to ensure non-repetition.444
The framing of reparations as transformative in this manner has been applied – to 
some degree – within the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court, most 
notably in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo445. The ICC became a focus for 
transnational activism after the ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia left 
out rights and duties regarding reparation. The Rome Statute corrected this omission 
and has been seen as a site of jurisprudential consolidation with respect to the right to 
reparation – particularly with the establishment of the victims’ trust fund. During the 
reparations hearing of the Lubanga case the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice and 
the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims ‘urged the court to consider developing principles for 
transformative reparations applicable to all victims in the case, including women and 
girl victims of sexual violence…’446 The call on the court to consider the transformative 
potential of reparations was strengthened by the Guidance Note of the UN Secretary-
General Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (2014), which asserts that 
reparations should ‘not reinforce pre-existing patterns of gender-based discriminations, 
but rather strive to transform them.’447 The Guidance Note goes on to call for 
reparations to be ‘empowering and transformative’ with remedies providing the 
‘potential of unsettling patriarchal and sexual hierarchies and customs…’448 In 
particular, the Guidance Note affirmed the significance of guarantees of non-repetition, 
claiming: ‘Guarantees of non-repetition also have an important potential for being 
transformative, in that they imply the need for structural and institutional reforms.’449
444 United Nations, Reparations to women who have been subjected to violence: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/14/22 
(23 April 2010), paragraph 62.
445 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC Doc. No. ICC-01/04-01/06 [2012] ICC; The Women’s Initiatives for 
Gender Justice, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Observations of the Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice on 
Reparations, ICC Doc. No. ICC-01/04-01/06-286, (10 May 2012), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_05520.PDF
446 Durbach, Chappell, and Williams, “Foreword: special issue on ‘transformative reparations for sexual 
violence post-conflict: prospects and problems,” 1185.
447 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 
(June 2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/GuidanceNoteReparationsJune-
2014.pdf.
448 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 
9.
449 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 
9.
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This Guidance Note references evidence of the transformative approach in the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which called for ‘reparations that were 
comprehensive in nature and have the potential to be transformative in women’s and 
children’s lives.’450 The Commission’s recommendations included an extensive list of 
reparative economic, social and health measures, alongside calls for institutional and 
structural reform to address gender-discrimination and inequality. ‘As a direct result of 
the truth commission’s recommendations, three women’s rights bills were passed by 
Parliament addressing key aspects of gender inequality.’451 The transformative potential 
of reparations relies upon a substantive reading of gender equality, and demonstrates 
the ‘twin-track approach of gender-mainstreaming and gender-specificity’. 
As the Special Rapporteur has said, the transnational women’s movement saw the 
establishment of guarantees of non-repetition ‘as being central to the “transformative”
potential of reparations […] given its focus on preventative measures and addressing 
the more structural impediments to eliminating violence against women.’452 As 
Margarate Urban Walker suggests, reparations should be ‘gender-just’ and should 
‘evade, contest or subvert patriarchal norms that disempower or disadvantage 
women.’ 453 This requires an approach that works for ‘structural changes that 
contribute to dismantling sex oppression and inequality.’454 It takes a transformative 
reading of gender equality – as it frames primary prevention – and relates it to the 
rights of the individual; closing the circle on systemic and individual prevention. State 
responsibility to provide redress will be picked up in the next chapter (as it relates to 
duties to prevent), but in relation to the scope of primary prevention, reparations, and 
specifically, ‘guarantees of non-repetition’, provide transformative potential, and as a 
duty of both redress and prevention link the individual and the systemic. This gives
further meaning to the approaches of gender mainstreaming and gender specificity as 
relying on readings of gender equality that are substantive and politicised – tackling the 
root causes – rather than formal.
450 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 
9.
451 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 
9.
452 Manjoo.“Introduction: reflections on the concept and implementation of transformative reparations,” 
1195.
453 Urban Walker, “Transformative Reparations?” 109.
454 Urban Walker, “Transformative Reparations?” 109.
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The emergence of transformative remedies and guarantees of non-repetition, has 
given further credence to readings of gender equality as substantive and 
transformative. To this end, over the past five years gender equality has increasingly 
been conceptualised as ‘transformative equality’. Transformative equality further 
strengthens the well-bedded concept of substantive equality, suggesting preventative 
work should not just be gender specific, but gender transformative. Approaches that 
are gender transformative ‘address the causes of gender-based inequalities and work 
to transform harmful gender roles, norms and relations.’455 They are rooted in Article 
5(a) of the CEDAW, challenging ‘both normative and structural inequality’456, and build 
on the CEDAW Committee’s jurisprudence concerning substantive equality, 
particularly General Comment No 28:
The position of women will not be improved as long as the underlying causes 
of discrimination against women, and of their inequality, are not effectively 
addressed. The lives of women and men must be considered in a contextual 
way, and measures adopted towards a real transformation of opportunities, 
institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically 
determined male paradigms of power and life patterns.457
Transformative equality was first framed by Sandra Fredman in her four-dimensional 
model addressing gender and international development: 
This multidimensional model pursues four overlapping aims, which are to (1) 
break the cycle of disadvantage, (2) promote respect for dignity and worth, (3) 
accommodate difference by achieving structural change, and (4) promote 
political and social inclusion.458
455 “Putting prevention into practice: How to change the story,” Our Watch, 47, accessed 4 September 
2018, www.ourwatch.org.au/getmedia/a8d9dc3d-2291-48a6-82f8-68f1a955ce24/Putting-prevention-
into-practice-AA-web.pdf.aspx
456 “Putting prevention into practice: How to change the story,” Our Watch, 47.
457 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, general recommendation No. 25, 
on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, on temporary special measures, A/47/38 (2004) paragraph 10, available from 
http://undocs.org/A/47/38; see also paragraphs 7 and 8.
458 Sandra Fredman, Jaako Kuosmanen and Meghan Campbell, “Transformative Equality: Making the 
Sustainable Development Goals Work for Women,” Ethics and International Affairs, (30)(2), (2016): 180. 
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Breaking the cycle of disadvantage acknowledges suffering and recognises that ‘positive 
measures are required to redress this imbalance.’459 The ‘dignity dimension’ recognises 
how this discrimination manifests in ‘harassment, prejudice, stereotypes, stigmas, 
negative cultural attitudes, and humiliation.’460 Structural change requires ‘a 
redistribution of power and resources and a change in the institutional structures that 
perpetuate women’s subordination.’461 The fourth dimension requires women’s 
participation and leadership to frame inclusion in all levels of decision-making: private, 
public, social and political.462 Fredman argues that ‘transformative equality provides a 
helpful framework for comprehending the content of substantive equality.’463
Transformative equality is not just concerned that gender specificity frames primary 
prevention, but that the work is actively gender transformative. Not only should 
primary prevention account for the lived experience of women in its engagement with 
gender discrimination (going beyond formal and de jure readings of equality), it should 
look to eliminate gender discrimination by challenging the way gender shapes norms 
and structures. Transformative equality builds on but differs from transformative 
remedies. Rather than a reparative approach to transforming gender – as posed by 
transformative remedies – transformative equality emphasises the stand-alone, positive
duties of states to achieve equality. This is rooted in a politicised reading of Article 
5(a), which calls on the state to ‘modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
men and women’ with a view to challenging discrimination and realising gender 
equality. The two approaches – right to remedy and positive rights – represent the 
same conceptualisation of gender equality – as substantive, requiring specificity, and 
demanding gender transformation – but differ in how the state relates to its duty to 
prevent violence against women. Whilst the goal is the same, the jurisprudence around 
remedies and positive duties is very different and arguably shapes the relationship 
between moral responsibility and legal responsibility for addressing gender equality and 
459 Fredman, Kuosmanen, and Campbell, “Transformative Equality: Making the Sustainable Development 
Goals Work for Women,” 180.
460 Fredman, Kuosmanen, and Campbell, “Transformative Equality: Making the Sustainable Development 
Goals Work for Women,” 180.
461 Sandra Fredman, “Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New 
Definition of Equal Rights,” In Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating de facto equality of women under 
Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations Against Women, edited by 
Ineke Boerefijn et al., eds., (Belgium: Intersentia, 2003), 115.
462 Fredman, Kuosmanen, and Campbell, “Transformative Equality: Making the Sustainable Development 
Goals Work for Women,” 181.
463 Fredman, Kuosmanen, and Campbell, “Transformative Equality: Making the Sustainable Development 
Goals Work for Women,” 180.
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violence against women. This will be investigated in the following chapter, as it raises 
important questions about how norms are actualised and further shaped by the law. It 
is a question of theorised practice and norm construction, as well as policy, to 
consider: should gender transformation be achieved through remedial duties (which 
are ‘individualized, retrospective, and passive’464 in how they conceptualise state 
responsibility) or positive duties (which are far-reaching, pre-emptive and proactive)? 
This will be considered further, but for now the emergence of transformative equality 
gives further credence to the feminist conceptualisation of gender and gender-based 
violence, and frames primary prevention as needing to be gender-transformative, not 
just gender-specific, to tackle gender inequality as a root cause of violence against 
women. Leading practitioner, Our Watch, outline the significance of gender 
transformation, and problematises the differences between primary prevention work 
that is gender blind (gender-neutral), gender specific and gender transformative, and 
how these approaches exist on a continuum ‘from unhelpful approaches that might 
even be harmful, to approaches that can create positive social change’465. (See 
Appendix 2.) 
 
As Our Watch explain:
Not all positive actions to prevention of violence against women will be gender 
transformative, but they must at least be gender-specific. Initiatives that will 
likely cause harm as they are in the ‘gender exploitative’ or ‘gender blind’ 
categories run counter to efforts to prevent violence against women and those 
that are merely ‘gender sensitive’ might avoid harm, but will not contribute to
prevention of violence against women on their own.466
Gender equality as framed by holism and intersectionality
As outlined in Chapter 2, an intersectional understanding of violence against women, 
and an holistic reading of rights, requires states and non-state actors to consider the 
lived reality of women. In the same way as intersectionality shapes the feminist 
conceptualisation of violence against women, it also informs primary prevention 
464 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 176.
465 “Putting prevention into practice: How to change the story,” Our Watch, 46.
466 “Putting prevention into practice: How to change the story,” Our Watch, 46.
136
strategies aimed at eliminating the root causes of violence against women. As 
discussed above, readings of gender are becoming increasingly narrow, as the feminist 
conceptualisation of gender is eroded by depoliticised, neutral and de jure readings of 
equality. Similarly, readings that fail to account for the identity of women, and their 
experience of violence, as being shaped by multiple, and multiply-mediated, 
oppressions and inequalities, are lacking, and provide an inadequate conceptual 
foundation for primary prevention strategies. As violence against women is ‘[r]ooted in 
multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and inequalities’467, efforts to prevent 
violence against women by tackling the ‘root causes’ must be comprehensive. As 
outlined above, and as runs throughout this thesis, gender inequality is highlighted as 
one of the most pervasive and significant root causes of violence against women. 
However, the focus on gender, should not be read so narrowly as to leave out the 
wider liberationist task of the transnational women’s movement with regard eliminating
violence against women. In its report, Intersectionality Matters, the Multicultural Centre 
for Women’s Health explains how gender equality must be pursued with an 
intersectional understanding:
An intersectional approach doesn’t ask us to stop using a gendered lens. It asks 
us to see gender as always interacting and intersecting with other forms of 
discrimination, institutional policies and political forces in ways that impact on:
- how we experience gender;
- the wider social/political consequences of our work; and
- our understanding and perceptions of ourselves and other people, 
including our perceptions about gender.468
The call for intersectional understandings of gender equality – rooted in an 
understanding of gender that is shaped by difference as well as commonality – requires 
prevention strategies to be shaped by the leadership of women, and the ‘centering [of] 
marginalized experiences, voices and leadership, wherever possible.’469 Efforts aimed at 
gender equality must be framed by women’s own understandings of how gender 
467 United Nations, Continuum of violence against women from the home to the transnational sphere: the 
challenges of effective redress: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/66/215 (1 August 2011), paragraph 12, available at 
http://undocs.org/A/66/215
468 Chen, Intersectionality Matters: A Guide to engaging immigrant and refugee communities in Australia, 6.
469 Chen, Intersectionality Matters: A Guide to engaging immigrant and refugee communities in Australia, 6.
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inequality manifests, and in particular, how it relates to their experience of violence. 
This ‘framing’ must contain space for varying experiences of gender. Again, placing the 
emphasis on women’s experiences and definitions, creates a far more political 
definition of equality, than formal readings, or conceptualisations of gender that merely 
count and compare women to men. Taking into account how gender operates as 
power (or, perhaps more aptly, as power operates as gender), and engaging with how 
gendered power intersects with other manifestations of power, intersectionality 
further consolidates the feminist understanding of gender as constitutively public and 
political in nature. Rather than negating the collective and public nature of gender – by 
reading difference as individualising – intersectionality reinforces the significance of 
group identities; all be they multiple and intersecting, rather than essentialising or 
universalising. In understanding women, and their experience of violence, as political 
and structurally shaped, the intersectional approach to gender equality has further 
‘blurred the distinction between violence in the public and the private spheres’470; 
echoing the call for primary prevention strategies to hold together the co-constitutive 
relationship between the macrosystemic and the individual as they relate to violence 
against women. As the Special Rapporteur expressed in her 2011 report, 
intersectionality has furthered the understanding of violence against women as 
structural and public, requiring a response that tackles root causes:
[T]he United Nations discourse regarding violence against women hinges on 
three principles: first, violence against women and girls is addressed as a matter 
of equality and non-discrimination between women and men; second, multiple 
and intersecting forms of discrimination are recognized as increasing the risk 
that some women will experience targeted, compounded or structural 
discrimination; and third, the interdependence of human rights is reflected in 
efforts such as those that seek to address the causes of violence against 
women related to the civil, cultural, economic, political and social spheres.471
470 United Nations, Continuum of violence against women from the home to the transnational sphere: the 
challenges of effective redress: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/66/215 (1 August 2011), paragraph 13
471 United Nations, Continuum of violence against women from the home to the transnational sphere: the 
challenges of effective redress: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/66/215 (1 August 2011), paragraph 20
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Whilst intersectionality promotes primary prevention strategies aimed at achieving 
gender equality and operating at the sociocultural and normative level, it also works 
against strategies that narrate universalising accounts of violence against women at the 
macrosystemic level. Due to the epidemic scale of violence against women and the 
public and structural nature of violence against women, there is a lure towards 
universalist readings of primary prevention: ‘[m]any prevention programmes aim to be 
as general or ‘universal’ as possible so that they reach the largest group of people… 
[relying on] “a one size fits all” approach.’472 Whilst intersectionality still looks at the 
universal and structural nature of patriarchy, it considers the different ways this 
manifests and interacts with women in differing social locations, affected by a variety of 
marginalising and oppressive forces. ‘This marks a departure from the flat narratives of 
gender-based violence that tend to homogenise the diverse experiences of women, as 
well as from approaches that tend to fragment the experience of each individual 
woman.’473 As Marai Larasi suggests:
If we are to end violence against women and girls, and create a truly equal 
world, we need to start to create seismic shifts across our social norms. This is 
not just about transforming belief systems and behaviours in terms of gender; it 
also means addressing other norms – for example, around ethnicity, class and 
disability – all of which contribute to holding other oppressive systems in 
place.474
Whilst intersectionality has increasingly shaped the CEDAW Committee’s comments 
on gender equality and prevention in state-reporting, and has been the focus of 
multiple thematic reports by the Special Rapporteur475, this understanding is yet to be 
472 Chen, Intersectionality Matters: A Guide to engaging immigrant and refugee communities in Australia, 22.
473 United Nations, 15 Years Of The United Nations Special Rapporteur On Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes And Consequences (1994-2009) - A Critical Review: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, Ms Yaking Erturk, A/HRC/11/6/Add.5 (27 May 2009), 
paragraph 107, available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/11/6/Add.5
474 “In the words of Marai Larasi: “If we are to end violence against women and girls, we need to create 
seismic shifts across our social norms.” UN Women, accessed January 4, 2019, 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/1/in-the-words-of-marai-larasi accessed January 4 2019
475 The Special Rapporteur has considered intersectionality at a conceptual and normative level, as well 
as focusing on specific intersections between gender inequality and other locations of identity and 
manifestations of oppression. Including: United Nations, Intersections between culture and violence against 
women: the challenges of effective redress: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk, A/HRC/4/34
(17 January 2007); United Nations, Political economy of women's human rights: the challenges of effective 
redress: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin 
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fully captured by the law. Again, the lack of a binding instrument means much of the 
jurisprudence and institutional understanding around intersectional readings of gender 
equality is obscured or fragmented and located across varying sites. This is problematic 
for cementing the conceptual and legal gains made in the development of primary 
prevention. 
In the beginning of this chapter, I used the definition of primary prevention given by 
the Multicultural Centre for Women’s Health: ‘Primary Prevention aims to stop 
violence against women before it starts by addressing the underlying gendered drivers 
of violence.’ In its report, Intersectionality Matters, the MCWH go on to describe 
primary prevention of violence against women as ‘working together towards gender 
equality: essentially, it is feminism in action.’476 It is intriguing that in a report on 
intersectionality the outline of root causes and the description of primary prevention is 
still couched narrowly in terms of gender. Of course, the report outlines that tackling 
‘gendered drivers’ relies on an intersectional understanding of gender inequality, but 
the definitions do little to demonstrate this. Whilst the concept of intersectionality is 
essential and has shaped more recent efforts to conceptualise gender equality and 
primary prevention, the discourse seems to have little language for how it is actualised 
in duties and rights, and how it is drafted into domestic legislation and policies. 
Intersectionality should be included in definitions of primary prevention, rather than 
included through secondary contextualisation or commentary. Whilst the Human 
Rights Council confirmed ‘intersectionality as a mandatory prism for human rights 
analysis’477 in its Resolution 7/24, the legal discourse still lacks the language for more 
broadly and cohesively liberationist work. Whilst intersectional understandings of 
gender and violence against women consider women holistically, this remains 
problematic for the human rights law approach which still tends to fragment the 
person into civil, political, social, cultural, and economic identities. This impacts upon 
the discursive space of women’s organisations working in primary prevention, whose 
Erturk, A/HRC/11/6 (2009); United Nations, Multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and violence 
against women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, 
Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/17/26 (2 May 2011); United Nations, Violence against women with 
disabilities: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/67/227 (3 August 2012).
476 Chen, Intersectionality Matters: A Guide to engaging immigrant and refugee communities in Australia, 6.
477 United Nations, 15 Years Of The United Nations Special Rapporteur On Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes And Consequences (1994-2009) - A Critical Review: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, Ms Yaking Erturk, A/HRC/11/6/Add.5 (27 May 2009), 49.
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practice, whilst rooted in intersectionality, lacks appropriate legal language to describe 
it. As such, the efforts of feminist organisations committed to intersectional readings of 
primary prevention and working for the liberation of women, are often conceived of in 
a limited manner, and their work reduced down to narrow (and often liberal) readings 
of gender equality. However, the intersectional approach promotes primary 
prevention strategies that look at the indivisibility of rights and require broad-reaching 
and political solutions to human rights abuses; a task that cannot be neutralised or 
narrowed, but that comprehends of the complexity of women’s oppression(s) and 
holds the fullness of women’s emancipation. Whilst the legal language is limited, 
primary prevention where focused on gender equality, must read women in a non-
binary way, and in a way where men are not the standard to be measured against. It is 
hard to know if the international human rights discourse holds enough space for such 
‘prophetic imagination’478, and for such broad and political readings of women’s 
liberation; or if the discourse leaves space for those with such imagination. Gender as 
reduced to ‘men and women’ constrains wider, intersectional understandings of 
gender equality, and must be worked against. Intersectionality – including its politicised 
understanding of the multiple factors shaping the social location of women, such as 
race, sexuality, class, ability, indigeneity, and religion – further promotes a politicised 
reading of gender, and has the potential to ‘enhance the analytical capacity of gender 
analysis’479; emphasizing the multiple forms of discrimination contributing to violence 
against women and, in doing so, ‘signalling an erosion of the public/private sphere 
dichotomy used for so long to exclude violence against women from public concern 
and scrutiny.’480 This further focuses the call for state responsibility for primary 
prevention of violence against, and shapes the politicised work needed at the 
macrosystemic level.
478 Walter Brueggemann speaks of the prophetic imagination as vision that ‘not only embraces the pain 
of the people but creates an energy and amazement based on the new thing’. Brueggemann speaks of 
radical and liberated consciousness as the place of vision, and warns against coopted consciousness: ‘We 
need to ask not whether it is realistic or practical or viable but whether it is imaginable. We need to ask 
if our consciousness and imagination have been so assaulted and co-opted by the royal consciousness 
[the hegemonic power of the day] that we have been robbed of the courage or power to think an 
alternative thought.’ Walter Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2001), 39.
479 United Nations, Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective: Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Ertürk, 
E/CN.4/2004/66 (26 February 2006), paragraph 73 (f)
480 United Nations, Addendum - Report on Communications sent to States and replies received: Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Etrurk,
A/HRC/4/34/Add.1 (19 March 2007), paragraph 8, available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/4/34/Add.1
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At the state level the relationship between intersectional readings of gender equality 
and the primary prevention of violence against women has often been misunderstood. 
There is a tendency of state actors to underestimate, or misrepresent, the 
interrelationship between violence against women and key issues pertaining to culture 
and socioeconomic deprivation, particularly. (This was touched on briefly in Chapter 2, 
where ‘cultural’ violence was problematised within the wider conceptualisation of 
violence against women as societal and macrosystemic; and essentialist readings of 
culture and violence against women were rejected.) Whilst an intersectional approach 
to primary prevention requires negotiating the different ways gender inequality 
interacts with diverse social locations – in this instance culture – intersectionality is not 
a negation of the focus feminists have put on the universal patriarchal culture. Whilst 
refusing to give in to the universalising of women’s experience of violence, 
intersectionality still maintains the problematisation of patriarchy as universal and 
systemic. As Leti Volpp explains, all cultures are patriarchal ‘– not more or less so, but 
differently patriarchal.’481 Unfortunately, although international human rights law, 
(perhaps most notably, the Beijing Platform for Action) calls on states to ‘study the 
causes and consequences of violence against women’ as part of its efforts to prevent, 
this has often taken the form of isolating particular types of abuse from one another, 
or creating a hierarchy between various manifestations of violence against women, 
rather than acknowledging and analysing the interconnections which they share with 
one another. It is common to consider intersecting oppressions as ‘layers’ of 
discrimination, rather than as ‘interacting and dynamic forms of discrimination that 
collectively impact the lives of women.’482 The Special Rapporteur has noted a 
‘continuing lack of response to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, both 
inter- and intra- gender, and its nexus with violence.’483 An holistic, and less 
individuated approach is required. Primary prevention must take into account the 
structural and individual intersections of gender with other forms of discrimination. The 
holistic approach to women’s rights clearly highlights the need to address intersections 
of violence against women with economic, social and cultural discrimination against 
women. To that end, the transnational women’s movement has reiterated the 
481 Leti Volpp, “Feminism versus Multiculturalism,” Columbia Law Review, 101(5), (2001): 1217. 
482 Chen, Intersectionality Matters: A Guide to engaging immigrant and refugee communities in Australia, 17.
483 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 58.
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economic and social empowerment of women at individual and structural levels as 
imperative in the prevention of violence against women. The focus on gender equality 
as intersectional and transformative, is therefore grounded in the practice of 
empowerment. Whilst gender operates at the cultural and normative level, it is the 
institutions that shape the macrosystemic level that actualise and ‘define beliefs and 
norms about violence and structure women’s options for escaping violence.’484 Primary 
prevention must distinguish between and address the gendered norms and roles that 
create and fuel gender inequality, and the material inequalities that shape institutions 
and formal structures. Primary prevention must focus on the norms that inform 
gendered inequality, as well as the material and structural ways that inequality 
manifests.485 As such, empowerment is fundamental to eliminating violence against 
women. 
Empowerment and primary prevention 
The human rights approach to primary prevention of violence against women, is 
distinct from humanitarian and public health approaches to primary prevention. It is 
rooted in an understanding that violence against women is not just a health or welfare 
issue, or a ‘social or moral concern’, but a violation of women’s human rights. In their 
review of the work of the Special Rapporteur, Yakin Ertürk and Bandana Purkayastha, 
focus on the paradigm shift that the violence against women agenda brought to the 
human rights discourse. Ertürk and Purkayastha highlight the paradigmatic significance 
of the DEVAW with regard prevention:
The Declaration clearly links violence experienced by women to their systemic 
subordination and the historically rooted inequality between women and men, 
thus, qualifying the problem as one of a human rights issue… therefore, the 
‘violence against women agenda’ intrinsically challenges the conventional focus 
on individual perpetrators and victims in private life to a focus on complex 
social, economic and political structures that instigate violence; therefore, it’s 
elimination necessitates a shift of focus from the victimization-oriented 
484 Heise, What works to prevent partner violence: An evidence overview, vi.
485 Chen, Intersectionality Matters: A Guide to engaging immigrant and refugee communities in Australia, 16.
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approach to one of empowerment, i.e. enabling women to resist and escape 
abusive relations.486
The focus on empowerment at the praxis and policy level is grounded at the 
paradigmatic level. This said, it is only over the past decade, since state responsibility 
for primary prevention has been more fully conceptualised, that empowerment as 
praxis has gained ground. Over the past decade there has been progress in articulating 
and promoting the empowerment of women as a key facet of prevention. Alongside 
tackling patriarchy and subordination at social, structural and individual levels, the 
empowerment of women through the promotion of substantive and transformative 
equality serves to unpack gendered power relations and move toward gender equality. 
This approach has been adopted across multiple UN entities and has been 
incorporated into the body of substantive norms and jurisprudence through regional 
treaties – the Istanbul Convention outlines empowerment as one of its substantive 
goals and as a frame for interpreting the treaty. This reflects the framing of the Beijing 
Platform for Action, with former Special Rapporteur Ertürk, describing empowerment
as ‘the basic principle inspiring the Platform’487. Likewise, UN Women identify 
empowerment in their Framework to End Violence against Women and Girls, 10-
Point Checklist. The UNIFEM Strategy, ‘A Life Free of Violence: Unleashing the Power 
of Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality’, calls for empowerment as a guiding 
principle in anti-violence against women efforts. The strategy explains that ‘women 
need equal access to resources and opportunities so that they can control their 
choices and destinies—including avoidance of and escape from abusive relationships 
and situations.’488 In 2011, then Executive Director of UN Women, and current UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet called for empowerment as a 
primary prevention strategy, including:
[e]nsuring that girls complete secondary education, delaying the age of 
marriage, furthering women’s reproductive health and rights, ensuring women’s 
486 Yakin Ertürk and Bandana Purkayastha, “Linking research, policy and action: A look at the work of the 
special rapporteur on violence against women,” Current Sociology, 60(2), (2012): 144.
487 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 78. 




economic autonomy and security, and increasing women’s participation in 
decision-making positions and political power, in order to influence policies and 
institutional practices that perpetuate impunity and tolerance for violence 
against women.489
In this way empowerment has the double impact of improving gender equality at a 
systemic level – addressing the root causes of violence – whilst also enabling individual 
women to evade violence against women. In a statement after the 17th session of the 
UN Human Rights Council, urging governments to promote and support women’s 
empowerment, the former Special Rapporteur explained that when women are 
empowered they ‘understand that they are not destined to subordination and 
violence; they resist oppression; and they develop their capabilities as autonomous 
beings and they increasingly question the terms of their existence in both public and 
private spheres.’490 This understanding was recently displayed by the General Assembly 
in the 2015 agreement of the Sustainable Development Goals (as part of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development), with Goal Five being: ‘Achieve gender equality 
and empower all women and girls’491.
Empowerment is essential to prevention – and its articulation marks a significant 
development and notable progress within the international human rights law approach 
to violence against women. However, it sits most vulnerably within normative 
developments over the past 20 years. Whilst a seemingly intuitive response to gender 
inequality, even identifying empowerment as not only relevant but critical to 
eliminating violence against women has been a hard fought battle. Although it is now 
established in regional treaty law, with the Istanbul Convention calling for state parties 
to ‘take the necessary measures to promote programmes and activities for the 
empowerment of women’ under its articles on prevention492, empowerment 
489 “Prevention is key to ending violence against women,” News report on OHCHR 5 July, 2011, 
accessed 29 June 2015, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/PreventionViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx.
490 “Prevention is key to ending violence against women,” News report on OHCHR 5 July, 2011, 
accessed 29 June 2015, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/PreventionViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx.
491 General Assembly resolution 70/1, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, A/RES/70/1, (21 October 2015), available at http://undocs.org/A/RES/70/1
492 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210. Article12(6). The convention also calls for the 
empowerment of women in Articles Article1(b), 6, and 18(3).
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represents one of the most significant gaps between the normative and legal 
framework at the international level. Further efforts to conceptualise and realise state
responsibility for primary prevention relies on embedding women’s empowerment and 
agency as essential to eliminating violence against women. 
Case study: Problematising theorised practice and the engagement of men and boys 
in primary prevention.493
The conceptualisations of primary prevention, and state responsibility for prevention, 
rely on feminist readings of violence against women. The principles of this reading, as 
outlined above, call for a focus on gender equality, with gender understood as political 
and public in nature, and equality conceptualised as substantive and transformative. A 
rights-based approach rejects victimisation-oriented narratives of violence against 
women and focuses on empowerment and agency. This reading requires the 
foregrounding of the lived experience of women – as differently and commonly 
accounting for gender, gender inequality and experiences of violence; and centres 
marginalised voices in a bid to narrate more wholly the impact of oppression(s). In this 
way, the leadership of women inheres in primary prevention at paradigmatic, policy
and praxis levels. The primacy of women’s leadership – particularly in the delivery of 
protective and preventative services – is well established in the human rights approach 
to violence against women, and is outlined in the UN Handbook for Legislation on 
Violence Against Women494. This understanding of primary prevention, whilst broadly 
articulated, is fragile, and vulnerable to erosion. This is particularly evident in the shift to 
engage men and boys in primary prevention strategies – an agenda that has dominated 
at the international level over the past five to ten years. The message was 
(deceptively) simple, ‘men listen to men’, so the most effective way to counter 
493 This case study is taken from a contributing report delivered to the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women for her 2014 report to the Human Right Council considering the continuing 
and emerging challenges facing efforts at the international level to eliminate violence against women. 
The contributing report was written by Helen Griffiths and Dr. Claire Malcolm, and considered case 
studies of men’s groups in the UK, regional and international context. United Nations, Violence against 
women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against women: Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 
2014), paragraphs 70 – 75.
494 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Handbook for Legislation on Violence 
Against Women, (New York: United Nations, 2010), Section 3.6.1, available at 
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/v-handbook.htm
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violence against women must be to engage those men who do not abuse women, and 
are sympathetic to the feminist cause, to challenge and change the behaviours of those 
whose own negative experiences of masculinity have caused them to resort to 
violence. This argument secured enormous and rapid resonance with donors and 
some international agencies and, within only a few short years, had moved from the 
periphery of discussions concerning violence against women prevention, to the centre 
of debate. Through the ‘UNITE to end Violence Against Women’ programme, the 
influence of the ‘Men and boys agenda’ has now even extended to an advisory role to 
the UN Secretary General. However, an array of limitations impact upon the 
proposition that men can, and should, take a leading role in eliminating violence against 
women; not the least of which is its contradictory relationship with the existing 
international human rights law approach to violence against women.
Whilst the engagement of men and boys in challenging gender norms and gender 
inequality, has long been called for by women’s groups leading anti-violence work, this 
has always been articulated in a manner that stresses women’s leadership, 
collaboration and partnership, and the underpinning of feminist theory. From a 
pragmatic point of view, the argument goes: if men constitute the vast majority of the 
abusers and perpetrators of violence against women, then engaging them in 
discussions about how to overcome patterns of violence is an obvious step towards 
eliminating violence against women. Similarly, if patriarchy presents a barrier to gender 
equality, engaging men in challenging their own attitudes towards, and investment in, 
patriarchy is essential. Whilst this relationship is premised as partnership, in practice, 
the engagement of men and boys in primary prevention has led to a burgeoning of 
standalone male-led initiatives that lack women’s leadership, partnership, and 
accountability, and present prevention strategies that are not (consistently) 
underpinned by feminist theory, or characterised by feminist methods, and, 
consequently, represent an erosion of hard-fought feminist gains at the paradigmatic, 
policy and praxis levels. 
Whilst the network of Men and Boys’ organisations (Men and Boys’ Network, 
henceforth) differs widely from the expressly anti-feminist Men’s Rights Movement, or 
Men’s Rights Activism, in both its understanding of gender and its relationship to the 
transnational women’s movement, this seemingly intuitive approach to primary 
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prevention has still raised pressing questions about how men and boys are to be 
involved, and has simultaneously highlighted the importance of theorised practice and 
the vulnerability of feminist theory within the discourse. Below I will explore the 
development of the Men and Boys’ Network and some of the limitations and 
challenges it presents to the feminist conceptualisation of primary prevention outlined 
above.
Over the past decade (and in particular since the 2009 ‘Global Symposium on 
Engaging Men and Boys on Achieving Gender Equality’) there has been a move away 
from the understanding of ‘gender’, as defined by women’s groups, to one which is 
wholly less politicised in nature. Specifically, and as outlined above, gender-neutrality 
has read domestic violence as affecting men and women in the same way, stripping 
domestic violence against women of its gendered and political nature, and operating as 
a gateway for an expanded (and eroded) conceptualisation of violence against women 
within international human rights law. Alongside a rejection of politicised notions of 
gender, some groups have outright attacked the gendered analysis of domestic 
violence, claiming it to be outdated. Mark Brooks OBE, Chairman of ManKind 
Initiative495, a leading UK charity supporting male victims of domestic abuse, called for 
organisations to ‘reject the gendered analysis that so many in the domestic violence 
establishment still pursue, that the primary focus should be female victims. Each victim 
should be seen as an individual and helped accordingly.’496 As a consequence of this at 
the policy and praxis level, men’s organisations have grown to fill the ‘gap’ left by 
women’s organisations. As Shamim Meer explains: 
Gender, stripped of ideas of male privilege and female subordination, came to 
mean that women and men suffered equally the costs of the existing gender 
order. Women’s organisations were increasingly asked ‘if you are working on 
gender, then where are the men?’ and they were increasingly pressurized 
(particularly by donors) to include men. On the heels of this pressure, a new 
495 ManKind are a leading UK charity supporting male victims of domestic abuse. Whilst they reject 
gender specific approaches to, and gendered analysis of, domestic violence, they are part of the UK Men 
and Boys Coalition which is ‘committed to taking action on the gender-specific issues that affect men 
and boys.’ “About,”, Men and Boys Coalition, accessed February 12, 2019, 
http://www.menandboyscoalition.org.uk/about/ 
496 Denis Campbell, “More than 40% of domestic violence victims are male, report reveals,” The 
Guardian, September 5, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/sep/05/men-victims-domestic-
violence 
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[…] actor came into focus – men’s organisations. The existence of already 
weakened women’s organisations was now further threatened, and feminist 
attempts at movement building faced additional challenges.497
In essence, if the experience of violence is not considered to be gender-specific, a 
gendered response to it is no longer justifiable and there is no obvious reason that 
women should take a leading role in exploring and defining responses to the issue. As 
such men’s organisations have grown in response to the widening of discursive space 
surrounding gender-based violence. Conceptually distinct from ‘domestic violence 
against men’, but practically reinforced by the paradigmatic stretching it has produced, 
the Men and Boys’ Network has also formed and grown around the engagement of 
men and boys in the primary prevention of violence against women. The emergence 
and expansion of the Men and Boys’ Network has, arguably, paradoxically relied on 
both the gender-neutral reading of domestic violence (men are equally impacted by 
gender, and domestic violence is experienced by men as it is by women) and the 
gendered, and gender specific, reading of violence against women (violence against 
women is rooted in unequal power relations between men and women, and so men 
should be involved in renegotiating gendered power and challenging patriarchy). In this 
way, the development of the Men and Boys’ Network mandate has mirrored the 
schism happening at the regional and national levels, and we can see directly the 
consequences at the advocacy and practitioner level of the renegotiation and 
problematisation of gender-based violence offered by the Istanbul convention, and its 
national legislative counterparts. Whilst the Men and Boys’ Network has developed 
around this hybrid or schismatic conceptualisation – with groups regularly outlining 
both purposes in their mission statements498 – little attention over the past decade has 
been given to the conceptual dissonance at the heart of the Men and Boys’ Network, 
or the knock-on effects their contradictory mandate has on the work delivered at the 
497 Shamim Meer, Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,
(South Africa: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa January 2012), 4, available at 
http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/sup_files/open_debate_2_-
_reflections_on_the_place_of_men_and_mens_organisations_in_the_struggle_for_gender_ equality.pdf
498 This dual purpose is outlined in the Rio Declaration, which became the framing document for over 
400 leading organizations within the Men and Boys’ Network, such as Promundo, Sonke, White Ribbon 
Campaign. The Rio declaration came out of the 2009 Global Symposium on Engaging Men and Boys on 
Achieving Gender Equality: “The Rio de Janeiro MenEngage Declaration Global Symposium on Engaging 
Men and Boys on Achieving Gender Equality, Rio de Janeiro March 29 – April 3, 2009,” MenEngage, 
accessed April 9 2018, http://menengage.org/rio-declaration/ 
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policy and praxis level. However, there are a range of reasons that this mandate is 
flawed and, arguably damaging, at the conceptual and praxis level. These include: 
a) The reaffirmation of patriarchal norms of men as ‘protectors’ (and, by 
extension, women as ‘victims’); 
b) The reinstatement of the family as the principal referent for analysis; 
c) The move from inherent responsibility to ‘socially constructed 
reinforcement’499 as a basis for engagement;
d) The depoliticisation of violence against women and the reinforcement of 
the public/private dichotomy; 
e) The impact of conceptual confusion stemming from men and masculinities 
scholarship, and the undermining of discursive space created by feminist 
accounts of violence against women; and,
f) The promotion of male leadership against recommendations of partnership 
with, and accountability to, women’s organisations. 
a) The reaffirmation of patriarchal norms of men as ‘protectors’ (and, by extension, women 
as ‘victims’)
One limitation impacting upon the agenda to engage men and boys in primary 
prevention of violence against women relates to concerns about the consolidation of 
patriarchal norms, which cast women as victims, in need of ‘protection’. Such 
protection can only be provided by male ‘rescuers’. Feminist international relations 
theorist Iris Marion Young has argued extensively that the masculinist logic of 
protection denies the agency and autonomy of women and serves to maintain gender 
inequality: ‘In this patriarchal logic, the role of the masculine protector puts those 
protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of 
dependence and obedience’500. This reinforces notions of women’s inherent or innate 
vulnerability or victimhood. This approach also marks a departure from the 
international human rights approach – which the Men and Boys’ Network argue
underpins their mandate. The international human rights law approach prompted a 
499 Claire V. Crooks, George R. Goodall, Ray Hughes, Peter G. Jaffe, Linda L. Baker, “Engaging Men and 
Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive - Behavioral Model,” Violence 
Against Women, (13), (2007): 232. 
500 Iris Marion Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State,” 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 29(1), (2003): 2.
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moved away from victimisation-oriented readings of violence against women, to an 
empowerment and rights-based understanding. However, the Men and Boys’ Network 
promote strategies that reassert the rescuer narrative and the ‘perpetual victim’501
trope – a narrative that disempowers women and perpetuates norms that fuel 
violence against women. As Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie suggests, primary prevention 
strategies should ‘[t]each them [men and boys] about the full autonomy of women 
[…] and that it is also not their job to protect women because they are women.’502
In the case of violence against women this logic appears to be even more self-
defeating because it empowers the group to which abusers belong, to offer 
‘protection’ from abuse; something which could only be justifiable if the premise that 
‘the vast majority of men are non-violent’ is accepted. Sadly, the statistics do not bear 
out such an assumption.503 As Bob Pease recounts: ‘[w]e are often reminded that most 
men are not physically violent to their partners. However, most men are likely to have 
engaged in psychological or verbal abuse at some stage in their lives.’504 Men’s groups 
have a tendency to argue both that the majority of men are not implicated in abuse, 
and that all men suffer the consequences of being socialised into dominant perceptions 
of hypermasculinity, which account in part for the recourse to violence. It seems 
illogical for such groups to posit that the two thirds of men who are not guilty of 
501 Ratna Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘Native' Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, 15, (2002): 1—38
502 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, We Should All Be Feminists, (New York: Anchor Books, 2015).
503 ‘According to a 2013 global review of available data, 35 per cent of women worldwide have 
experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence. 
However, some national violence studies show that up to 70 per cent of women have experienced 
physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime from an intimate partner’: “UN Facts and Figures: Ending 
Violence against Women,” UN Women, accessed 23 June 2014, http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-
we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures; ‘From 2010 to 2013, over 10,000 men in six 
countries across Asia and the Pacific were interviewed using the UN Multi-country Study on Men and 
Violence household survey on men’s perpetration and experiences of violence, as well as men's other 
life experiences. The countries included were Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and 
Papua New Guinea. The study was a collaborative effort involving partners from academia, research 
institutes, civil society, the United Nations family and governments around the globe.  The regional 
analysis found that overall nearly half of those men interviewed reported using physical and/or sexual 
violence against a female partner, ranging from 26 percent to 80 percent across the sites.  Nearly a
quarter of men interviewed reported perpetrating rape against a woman or girl, ranging from 10 
percent to 62 percent across the sites.’: “The UN Multi-Country Study On Men And Violence In Asia 
And The Pacific,” Partners4Prevention, accessed 9 June 2015, 
http://www.partners4prevention.org/about-prevention/research/men-and-violence-study; See also: E. 
Fulu, X. Warner, S. Miedema, R. Jewkes, T. Roselli, and J. Lang, Why Do Some Men Use Violence 
Against Women and How Can We Prevent It? Quantitative Findings from the United Nations Multi-
country Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific. (Bangkok: UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women and 
UNV, 2013).
504 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 4.
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abuse might educate the one third who are, in how best to ‘protect’ women, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining that societal structures and psychological conditioning 
compromise men’s ability to see beyond patriarchal constraints. Perhaps this accounts 
for the tendency of men’s groups to associate the elimination of violence against 
women with the integrity of the family unit, a move that promotes regressive readings 
of the personhood of women. As feminist international legal scholars have persuasively 
argued, the discourse continually characterises women ‘chiefly as victims, particularly 
mothers, or potential mothers, and accordingly in need of protection’505. The Men and 
Boys’ Network perpetuate this disempowering and dangerous characterisation. As 
former Special Rapporteur Ertürk warns, ‘interventions, whether supported by the 
state, multilateral or bilateral donors, must avoid modalities and conditionality’s that 
would disempower women’506; and where the focus is on engaging men and boys 
‘efforts must not lead to a deviation from the commitment to support women’s 
empowerment and the diversion of resources from women’s programmes.’507
b) The reinstatement of the family as the principal referent for analysis 
This speaks to the more general issue of women, who have been subjected to 
violence, being collapsed into the conceptual category of the family, rather than having 
their needs, rights and experiences assessed on their own terms. One of the strategies 
associated with the engagement of men and boys is to appeal to the idea that women 
deserve respect as mothers, sisters, wives, etc. Emphasising personal relationships is 
said to make it easier for men and boys to understand the consequences of violence 
against women; making them ‘more able to feel the issue in their hearts and not just 
intellectualize it in their heads.’508 This is also seen as an effective strategy in overtly 
patriarchal societies in which calls to consider women as rights-bearing individuals 
(irrespective of their marital status) are considered too radical to attract support, even 
amongst women themselves. The logic and narratives of the Men and Boys’ Network 
informs a wider movement of men, looking to engage with violence against women. 
505 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 48.
506 Yakin Ertürk, “The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It Entail for Women’s Rights?” Due Diligence 
and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence, edited by Carin Benninger-Budel, (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 39.
507 Ertürk, “The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It Entail for Women’s Rights?” 39 – 41.
508 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 4.
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This can be seen in the rhetoric of political leaders who (unsurprisingly) look to and 
listen more attentively to the Men and Boys’ Network than the transnational women’s 
movement – even on issues that affect women. At the launch of Makkal Needhi 
Maiam (People’s Centre for Justice), in February 2018, founder Kamal Haasan, 
exemplifying this rationale, gave the following characterisation of primary prevention 
and violence against women. Priyanka Thirumurthy recounts her exchange with 
Haasan at the launch event:
“I ask you with a lot of concern: What is the solution to the atrocities against 
women?”
Kamal Haasan did not hesitate for a moment before he said, “I am the 
solution.”
By ‘I’, he probably was speaking on behalf of men, who are often the 
perpetrators of gender-based violence. The newbie politician did well to 
recognize that the solution to such violence lies not with the victims but with 
those who assault them. However, he followed this up with a problematic 
statement, 
“It is not enough if you just talk about love and bravery. You have to think 
about your elder sister, your mother. You have to think about the younger 
sister you have to get married. You have to think about your daughter. If you 
think about all this and your heart melts, there will be no crimes against 
women[…]”
With this statement, Kamal Haasan unfortunately showed that his 
understanding of gender-based violence is deeply flawed […] From rightly 
identifying that the problem was with men, Kamal went to elevating himself 
(and other men) to the position of women’s ‘saviours’.509
509 Priyanka Thirumurthy, “‘Think of women as moms and sisters’: Why Kamal's view on gender violence 
is troubling,” The News Minute, 24 February, 2018, https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/think-
women-moms-and-sisters-why-kamals-view-gender-violence-troubling-76964
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At the launch of his ‘Network of Men Leaders’ on the 10th anniversary of the 
International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, the UN Secretary 
General similarly framed the engagement of men and boys on the basis of their 
leadership within families and communities, and unfortunately characterised the 
importance of women’s rights based on his own relationship to women. 
My commitment to this issue stems not just from my position as UN 
Secretary-General, but also as a son, husband, father and grandfather […] Men 
have a crucial role to play in ending such violence – as fathers, friends, decision 
makers, and community and opinion leaders.510
The implicit suggestion that a response to violence against women should take the 
family unit as its primary referent of analysis is one which distorts the issue and renders 
regard for the rights of women contingent on their status as wives or mothers. This 
seemingly neutral approach supports the position of men by reinforcing normative 
ideals of the family that are often unparalleled by the realities of life. As the former 
Special Rapporteur, Rhadika Coomaraswamy, has described, whilst the family may be 
the ‘natural unit of society’, for many women it is ‘a social institution where labor is 
exploited, where male sexual power is violently expressed and where a certain type of 
socialization disempowers women.’511 Calls to end violence against women that rely on
conceptualisations of women refracted through the lens of the nuclear family assert 
heteropatriarchal values that perpetuate gender norms and gender inequality, rather 
than challenge them. This approach also furthers the normative primacy of the family 
unit and notions of privacy that accompany it, strengthening the public/private
dichotomy. In this way, primary prevention strategies that define women as wives, 
mother and sisters, rely on conceptualisation of women that centre the lives and social 
location of men. To address violence against women without problematising its 
relationship to familial and patriarchal power within the heteronuclear family unity, 
marks a step back and a step away from the human rights approach which recognises 
510 “Ban launches new Network of Men Leaders to combat violence against women,” UN News, 
accessed 11 March, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/11/322382
511 United Nations, Preliminary Report: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, E/CN.4/1995/42, (November 22, 1994), 11 
paragraph 54, available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1995/42.
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the rights of woman as inherent to her humanity, rather than dependent on her 
relative value or utility within the family or community. 
c) The move from inherent responsibility to ‘socially constructed reinforcement’ as a basis for 
engagement
As Bob Pease suggests, ‘many of the approaches to working with men on violence 
prevention stress the importance of decreasing men’s defensiveness by focusing on the 
positive benefits for men of their greater involvement in this work.’512 Michael Flood 
has argued that ‘strategies of blame and attack are ineffective’513 in engaging men and 
boys, and instead organisations should motivate men by appealing to what they have to 
offer primary prevention and what they have to gain by being involved. As James Lang 
suggests, ‘men respond much better when you begin with the positive … rather than 
approaching them with deficit models.’514 As such, there is a move away from 
responsibility and accountability as the basis for engaging men and boys, towards 
strategies that promote ‘win-win’ accounts of gender equality515 and engagement as a 
positive experience516: ‘[m]en and boys need to be reinforced for involvement, but 
they also need the expectation that being involved will lead to a desired outcome.’517
But, as Bob Pease asks, ‘[i]f it is not a win-win situation for men, will they play a role in 
violence prevention against women?’518
512 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 12.
513 Michael Flood, “Changing Men: Best practice in sexual violence education,” Violence Against Women, 
18, (2005/2006): 32. 
514 James Lang, Gender is everyone’s business: Programming with men to achieve gender equality, Workshop 
report, 10–12 June, (Oxford: Oxfam, 2002), 17.
515 James Lang, “Men, masculinities and violence,” paper presented at the international Conference on 
eradicating Violence Against Women and Girls – strengthening Human Rights, Berlin, Germany, 2–4 
December, 2002; Anne Coles, “Men, women and organisational culture: Perspectives from donors,” In
Men’s involvement in gender and development policy and practice: Beyond rhetoric, edited by Caroline 
Sweetman, (Oxford: Oxfam, 2001); Sandy Ruxton, ed., Gender equality and men: Learning from practice, 
(Oxford: Oxfam, 2004); Michael Flood, “Harmful traditional and cultural practices related to violence 
against women: successful strategies to eliminate such practices – Working with men” paper presented 
at the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Expert Group Meeting 
– Strategies for Implementing the Recommendations from the Secretary-General’s Study on Violence 
Against Women with Particular Emphasis on the Role of National Machineries, Bangkok, Thailand, 25-27 
April, 2007, available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.581.3370&rep=rep1&type=pdf
516 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 232.
517 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 232.
518 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 7.
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Win-win strategies vary from crude promotions of the economic benefits of reducing 
violence against women, to more complex accounts of masculinities, where leading 
activists, such as Flood, Pease, Connell, and Kaufmann, argue that the ‘source of men’s 
privilege and power is also a source of emotional alienation’519, and so gender equality 
is in men’s ‘emancipatory interests’520. Kaufmann suggests that men’s experience of 
power is contradictory521 and leaves men feeling powerless. He claims men have more 
to gain than to lose by reckoning with patriarchy and their investment in it:
Yes it demands that men let go of their unfair privileges, but this is a small price 
to pray for the promise of more trusting, honest, pleasurable and fair relations 
with women and children.522
Whilst these arguments are pragmatic in their manner of appeal, and are founded on 
robust scholarship concerning the harm to men of masculinities; at a paradigmatic and 
praxis level they also make contingent the rights of women on the basis that men will 
find gender equality beneficial and their lives more ‘pleasurable’. Further to the 
commodification of women’s rights, win-win scenarios can also open the door to 
backlash against women’s rights: 
When we talk about men’s interests in terms of the disadvantages suffered by 
men under patriarchy, we are in danger of lending support to men’s rights 
advocates, who aim to refute feminist claims of men’s privilege.523
Primary prevention strategies that commoditise women’s rights are not centred on the 
experience of women but on the experience of men. 
519 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 7.
520 Bob Pease, “Reconstructing men’s interests,” Men and Masculinities, 5(2), (2002): 165–77.
521 Michael Kaufman, “Men, Feminism, and Men’s Contradictory Experiences of Power,” In Men and 
Power, edited by Joseph A. Kuypers, (Halifax: Fernwood Books, 1999).
522 Michael Flood, “Men’s roles in achieving gender justice,” paper presented at the Inaugural National 
Women’s Conference: Australian Women Speak, Commonwealth Office of the status of Women, 
Canberra, 29 August, 2001, 5, available at http://xyonline.net/content/mens-roles-achieving-gender-
justice.
523 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 10.
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The emotional and normative commoditisation of women is mirrored by the 
economic commoditisation of women, where primary prevention strategies stress the 
negative financial impact of violence against women on society (whether outlining the 
direct cost or the cost due to the loss of workforce524) as an incentive towards 
elimination. In his 2012 article for The Guardian, ‘Violence against women is an issue 
for men too’, Michael Kaufman, founder of the White Ribbon Movement, begins his 
argument for engaging men in primary prevention by appealing to this financial 
motivation:
For too long women have stood alone. When it comes to violence against 
women, too many of us still think it's “just” a women's issue. In particular, it is 
about time MPs took this seriously. Here's why.
Sexual and physical violence at the hands of a man affects a staggering 45% of 
women in England and Wales sometime in their lives. That's one-quarter of 
British voters. Voters. People who give our politicians their jobs.
Men's violence against women hits people's pockets, too: the direct costs to 
taxpayers of medical care, police responding to violence, courts, prisons, social 
workers, and refuges is £5.8bn per year. (The total cost to the economy of 
violence against women and girls including lost work time is estimated at 
£40bn per year.) Taxpayers can probably think of ways they'd rather spend 
that money.525
Primary prevention strategies that commoditise the rights of women as 
relationally/materially improving the lives of men, reassert notions of the patriarchal 
family unit and economic man, that have been problematised and deemed as root 
causes of violence against women. When women are conceptualised as part of a 
524 At the launch of Voices Against Violence, a partnership between the US State Department and 
Promundo, John Sullivan (Deputy Secretary of State) appealed to the economic benefit of eliminating 
violence, describing violence against women as causing ‘a chain reaction, further contributing to the 
cycles of poverty and instability we witness in so many countries, impacting not only individuals, but 
entire societies. Whether it occurs inside or outside of the workplace, violence against women can limit 
women’s ability to fully participate in the economy.’ “Remarks at the Engaging Men and Boys in 
Preventing Violence Against Women and Children Event, 4th December, 2017,” US Department of 
State, accessed on 3 February 2019, https://www.state.gov/s/d/17/276221.htm
525 Michael Kaufman, “Violence against women is an issue for men too,” 26 March 2012, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/26/domestic-violence-against-women
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consequentialist calculation, their right to be free from violence is reframed instead as a 
strategic economic priority or win-win scenario, rather than an inalienable human right. 
This reading may be more reasonable, palatable, or even more attractive to men and 
boys, but it abandons normative arguments for women to be afforded respect by dint 
of their personhood alone. Whilst blame may be ineffective, strategies that do not 
frame men’s engagement in primary prevention as rooted in responsibility and 
accountability, fail to centre the rights of women. As well as failing to recognise 
women’s rights as the primary motivator for engaging men in prevention, the lack of 
responsibility – in favour of ‘socially construct[ing] engagement as a positive 
experience’526 – also serves to aid impunity. Whilst strategies aimed at gender equality 
do not need to ‘attack men’, it must be recognised that ‘holding someone responsible 
for their behaviour, which is the literal definition of blame, is an important part of any 
strategy that affirms moral standards to influence people’s behaviour.’527 Whilst men 
call for ‘ownership of the problem’528, this must be understood as ownership – and 
responsibility – for the causes of the problem, rather than ownership of the strategies 
to prevent. 
The commoditisation of women’s rights in relation to primary prevention, relates to 
the dilemma of how to engage men. Whilst there are important questions about how
to successfully engage men in primary prevention this must not be simplified down to 
pragmatic solutions that erode paradigmatic gains. Strategies that promote win-win, or 
merely male gains, as a reason for eliminating violence against women act to 
dehumanise women, and cut against the individual and collectively-constituted identity 
of women – a political and normative identity that roots and makes possible the 
human rights approach to violence against women. 
d) The depoliticisation of violence against women and the reinforcement of the 
public/private dichotomy
526 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 232.
527 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 7.
528 Michael Kaufman, “Building a Movement of Men Working to end Violence Against Women,” 
Development, 44(3), (2001): 11; Todd H. Minerson, H. Carolo, T. Dinner, C Jones, Issue Brief: Engaging 
Men and Boys to Reduce and Prevent Gender-Based Violence, (Canada: Status of Women, 2011).
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An associated consequence of this denial of female agency and politicised identity is 
the insidious reinforcement of the public/private dichotomy. Where women are 
viewed through the lens of the family, their experience of violence once again 
becomes a matter of private concern and the role of masculine privilege in building 
and sustaining unequal power relations between men and women is overlooked. The 
response becomes a pragmatic one based on what Meer refers to as ‘women’s 
practical gender needs’529 (in this case, the cessation of individual violent acts), rather 
than ‘women’s strategic gender needs’530 which require a transformative approach to 
overturn gendered power relations and challenge the underlying assumption that 
women, in general, are suitable targets for abuse. 
Similarly, the perspective advanced by the Men and Boys’ Network overly 
individualises men’s experience of, and participation in, patriarchy and violence against 
women, by focusing on ‘transforming gender relations and men’s beliefs and attitudes 
as individuals within families’531 as fathers and husbands etc. Primary prevention 
strategies that overly individualise men and individuate instances of violence against 
women, depoliticise gender and take inadequate account of violence against women as 
a systemic and societal issue. Troublingly, this seems to be a strategic reframing, not 
just a by-product of a pragmatic attempt at engaging men. Pease suggests that 
programmes commonly ‘focus on developing boys’ self-esteem and communication 
skills, rather than on feminist understanding of masculinity, power and privileged status 
of boys in gender relations. Thus the cause of men’s violence is located in the 
developmental and psychological aspects of the individual perpetrator.’532 Whilst Pease 
suggests ‘concerns about the tendency of these programs to individualise and 
pathologise men’s violence […] have faded from public debates […] in recent years’, 
he also argues ‘that these concerns have not been fully addressed by many of these 
programs.’533 In particular there is a lack of structural analysis and consideration of the 
systems and institutions that individual men operate within, dominate, and benefit 
from. As Pease concludes:
529 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 13.
530 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 13.
531 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 4.
532 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 3.
533 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 2.
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preventing men’s violence against women has to move beyond changing 
individuals to transforming the system that reproduces and sustains violence… 
challenging patriarchy man by man is neither a practical project nor a necessary 
precondition for gender equality. What we need are strategies for structural 
interventions in unequal gender relations that address the policy and cultural 
context of men’s violence…534
The research on men and masculinities, which grounds the work of the Men and Boys’ 
Network, largely mirrors feminist understanding about the toxic effects of 
hypermasculinity, and the oppressive nature of patriarchy. However, masculinities 
scholarship is notably less political than its feminist counterpart, and more focused on 
the sociopsychological effects on the individual. 
[F]ew pro-feminist men’s organisations over the past decade seem to have 
gone beyond consciousness-raising and a focus on individual men. Larger 
questions about power and men’s relationships were missing from much of the 
work done with men, and little was done to address gender regimes of power 
and oppression. The conservative politics of much of the masculinity discourse 
hid from view the structural and institutional power and injustice behind the 
emphasis on men’s personal gender trouble.535
In a bid to conceptualise men alongside women as ‘victims’ of patriarchy – or toxic 
masculinities, as masculinities scholars prefer to speak of – there seemed to follow a 
need to individualise subjects to include them in the discourse.536 To bypass the 
conversation about ‘women’ as a collective political group, the masculinities literature, 
and the programmes based on it, spoke instead of individuals; not women, not men, 
but individuals. This is evident in the framing of victims of violence, as per Mark Brooks’ 
statement above (abandoning gender-analysis in favour of a gender-neutral and 
individualised approach), and in the framing of preventing violence against women. 
Karin Attia has questioned the lack of gender-analysis and feminist understanding 
within the Men and Boys’ Network in this regard. In particular, Attia raised concerns 
534 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 14.
535 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 21.
536 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 23.
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about the understanding shown and language used around gender and primary 
prevention by the Men and Boys’ Network at the 60th session of the UN Commission 
on the Status of Women, where engaging men and boys was high on the agenda. At 
the MenEngage event, “It takes two to tango”, a discussion about masculinities, gender 
norms and violence prevention, Attia questioned the panel, asking ‘if it is important to 
involve women in these efforts to work with men?’537 Attia recounts: ‘responses were 
noncommittal: “sometimes yes, sometimes no”, or “it’s the individual and what they 
are capable of rather than just the sex.”’538 This narrative was evident in other 
comments at the CSW60, such as the panel on the ‘New Paradigm of Gender Equality 
Post- 2015: Girls and Boys Go Together’. As Attia recounts: ‘a civil society presenter 
stated: “we need to stop saying feminist and start saying humanist. We don’t want to 
be against the world, we are all humans.” Surprisingly, this statement was met with a 
round of applause, suggesting that misperceptions about feminism are widely 
shared.’539
Even where gender is considered beyond the more narrow confines of biological sex, 
it lacks an analysis of power. The HeForShe movement describes gender as ‘the 
socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society 
considers appropriate for men and women.’540 This definition comes from Programme 
HMD, a Promundo Global project ‘engaging young people to achieve gender equality’, 
and operating in 25 countries.541 Whilst engaging, to some degree, a normative 
characterisation of gender, it fails to give a feminist or political account of gender. 
Throughout Promundo’s theoretical framework and glossary of key terms, gender is 
outlined as distinct from sex, but without any account for hierarchies of masculinities 
and femininities, and the outworking of ‘socially constructed roles’ on the position of 
men and women. The approach engages with gender norms as being as limiting and 
damaging for men as they are for women. As Emily Esplen and Alan Greig suggest, as 
the Men and Boys’ Network fails to go ‘beyond the personal’, the problem of 
537 Karin Attia, “UN CSW: engaging men and boys in ending violence against women as allies not 
protectors,” Open Democracy, March 31, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/how-do-we-
engage-men-and-boys-as-allies-in-ending-violence-against-women/
538 Attia, “UN CSW: engaging men and boys in ending violence against women as allies not protectors.”
539 Attia, “UN CSW: engaging men and boys in ending violence against women as allies not protectors.”
540 HeForShe, accessed May 11, 2018, https://www.heforshe.org/en
541 “Program HMD: A Toolkit for Action,” Promundo, accessed February 28, 2017, 
https://promundoglobal.org/resources/program-hmd-a-toolkit-for-action/
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‘masculine privilege remains unproblematised’.542 Worryingly, HeForShe, perhaps UN 
Women’s most well known work over the past decade, relies on the glossary and 
conceptualisation of gender offered by Programme HMD in their toolkit for ‘Mobilizing 
Men and Boys for Gender Equality.’543 As Kari Attia suggests, ‘enthusiasm for recruiting 
men to the women’s rights struggle masks considerable confusion about precisely how 
to engage them as allies and on whose terms are they really being engaged.’544
The erosion of the political identity of women, and the feminist analysis of gender and 
violence against women, and the concurrent resurgence of the public/private 
dichotomy, is underpinned by both a praxis and paradigmatic shift: the development of 
the Men and Boys’ Network, and the centring of masculinities scholarship in the field 
of preventing violence against women. Masculinities scholarship shapes the language, 
understanding, and practice of the Men and Boys’ Network, and presents a seemingly 
subtle, but incredibly significant challenge to the feminist underpinnings of the human 
rights approach, that had previously conceptualised violence against women at the 
international level.
e) The impact of conceptual confusion stemming from men and masculinities scholarship, 
and the undermining of discursive space created by feminist accounts of violence against 
women
The origins of the Men and Boys’ Network can be traced to the emergence of a 
discourse surrounding ‘men and masculinities’; and its leading voice R. W. Connell545. 
Whilst feminism had interrogated the hegemonic and toxic nature of patriarchy, it had 
done so through the centred perspective of women’s lived experience; primarily 
concerning itself with the impact of patriarchy on women’s lives, manifest as 
oppression, marginalisation, and violence. R.W. Connell was one of the first voices to 
propose that masculinities ought also to be interrogated for their effects on men who 
542 Emily Esplen and Alan Greig, Politicising Masculinities: Beyond the Personal, workshop report from 
Politicising Masculinities Symposium, Dakar, 15-18 October, 2007, (Institute of Development Studies, 
2007), available at https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Masculinities.pdf
543 “Barbershop Toolkit, Mobilizing Men and Boys for Gender Equality,” HeForShe, accessed November 
12, 2018, https://www.heforshe.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/toolbox_allinone_v2.pdf
544 Attia, “UN CSW: engaging men and boys in ending violence against women as allies not protectors.”
545 R. W. Connell, “The Big Picture: Masculinities in Recent World History,” Theory and Society, 2(5), 
(1993): 597 – 623.
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are conditioned, through processes of socialisation, to demonstrate and expect certain 
behaviours and to view women in functionalist or misogynist terms. 
Whilst this aligns to feminist understandings of patriarchy in its assessment of the way 
in which hypermasculinity threatens and damages lives, the masculinities perspective 
centres the experience of men, and fails to give attention to the disproportionate 
effect on women; arguing, if anything, that men equally experience and suffer under 
patriarchy. Lamenting the fact that ‘gender issues have been widely regarded as 
women’s business and of little concern to men and boys’546, Connell suggested that the 
time had come to ‘raise issues about men’s and boy’s interests, problems or 
differences’547. Connell also claimed that the gendered advantages experienced by men 
are ‘linked [to] a pattern of disadvantages or toxicity’548, or what Michael Kaufman calls 
men’s ‘contradictory experience of power’. In support of this position are arguments 
such as: ‘men collectively receive the bulk of income in the money economy and 
occupy most of the managerial positions. But men also provide the workforce for the 
most dangerous occupations, suffer most industrial injuries, pay most of the taxation, 
and are under heavier social pressure to remain employed’549. In their crudest forms, 
these ideas uphold the growth of the Men’s Rights Movement. In a far more subtle 
manner the same logic inheres in the Men and Boys’ Network. Whilst the masculinities 
scholarship is by no means an ‘attack’ on feminist theory, they are divergent 
approaches, representing (at times) conflicting priorities, which, when conflated, can 
lead to dissonance within primary prevention strategies. As Michael Messner notes550, 
while masculinities theory has opened new perspectives, there are also problems with 
the way it conflicts with the feminist understanding of gender, including: 
the limitation of depoliticising gender oppression as something faced by men 
and women equally [which masks] men’s privilege [and] women’s oppression. 
Secondly, while men in consciousness-raising groups examined their personal 
546 R. W. Connell, “Change among the Gatekeepers: Men, Masculinities and Gender Equality in the 
Global Arena,” Signs, 30(3), (2005): 1805. 
547 Connell, “Change among the Gatekeepers: Men, Masculinities and Gender Equality in the Global 
Arena,” 1805.
548 Connell, “Change among the Gatekeepers: Men, Masculinities and Gender Equality in the Global 
Arena,” 1808; See also: R. W. Connell, “Men, Gender and the State,” In Among Men: Moulding 
Masculinities, edited by Soren Ervo and Thomas Johansson, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
549 Connell, “Change among the Gatekeepers: Men, Masculinities and Gender Equality in the Global 
Arena,” 1808 – 1809.
550 Michael Messner, Politics of Masculinities: Men in Movements, (New York: AltaMira Press, 2000).
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experiences in the light of the feminist call that the personal is political, they 
lacked an analytical framework, and discussions took the form of guilty personal 
interrogation rather than critical social analysis.551
Led by Connell, the masculinities commentary went on to explore potential 
mechanisms for educating and supporting young men in exploring alternative forms of 
masculinity, which were not premised on misogynist understandings of women and 
girls. It is this proposition which has exercised a profound influence over the formation 
and practices of the Men and Boys Network, and in particular their efforts to engage 
men and boys in the prevention of violence against women. Organisations such as 
MenEngage developed Connell’s arguments into a manifesto of sorts, based on a 
number of key pillars, specifically: the notion of gender as ‘relational’; the vulnerabilities 
of men; men as victims of patriarchy; and men as allies against violence against 
women.552 MenEngage asserted: ‘the Alliance believes that men, along with women, 
should be engaged in achieving gender equality […] the Alliance is dedicated to 
engaging men and boys to end violence against women and in questioning or 
challenging violent versions of manhood’553.
The link between the masculinities scholarship and advocacy is evident in the work of 
leading organisations and figures within the Men and Boys’ Network, most notably 
Michael Kaufman, who argued that men should be encouraged to ‘feel a sense of 
“ownership for the problem”’ of violence against women’554. Likewise, the Men’s 
Resource Center proudly declared: ‘We call on all men to reject the masculine culture 
of violence and to work with us to create a culture of connection, of cooperation and 
of safety for women, for men and for children’555. Parallels were even drawn to the 
role of allies in the LGBTQ community, or to the civil rights movement and the 
suggestion that, to counter racism, its members had had to reach out to, and to 
551 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 16.
552 “Our Core Principles,” MenEngage, accessed January 18, 2014, http://menengage.org/about-us/our-
core-principles 
553 “Our Core Principles,” MenEngage, accessed January 18, 2014, http://menengage.org/about-us/our-
core-principles
554 Kaufman, “Building a Movement of Men Working to end Violence Against Women,” 11.
555 See Michael Flood, “Men’s Collective Anti-Violence Activism and the Struggle for Gender Justice,” 
Development, 44:3 (2001): 42.
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engage with, White elites who (however regrettably) had the power to effect 
substantive change.556
The centring of masculinities scholarship over feminist theory is problematic, leading to 
the issues outlined above. The focus on gender as relational and socially constructed, 
but lacking analysis of power and patriarchy leads to individualistic and depoliticised 
gender analysis. The centring of the male experience – and the decentring of women’s 
experience – leads to erosion of women’s personhood as the grounding of women’s 
rights. The framing of masculinities as equally damaging to men contributes to ‘win-win’ 
narratives of gender equality that inadequately challenge, or leave unchallenged, the 
patriarchal dividend. The lack of feminist theorising leaves ungrounded the appeals 
made to the norms and politics of the international human rights law approach to 
violence against women. As well as the deficient account of violence against women 
and gender equality the centring of masculinities scholarship and the male experience, 
has led to one of the most obviously incongruous approaches of the Men and Boys’ 
Network: the lack of women’s leadership and the undermining of feminist expertise.
f) The promotion of men’s leadership against recommendations of partnership with, and 
accountability to, women’s organisations 
Feminist organisations have long called for the engagement of men and boys in 
primary prevention strategies for eliminating violence against women, and the wider 
work of gender equality.557 This has always been framed as a partnership shaped by 
women’s leadership and grounded in feminist expertise. The recognition of feminist 
theory and the centring of women’s lived experience made it an obvious and non-
negotiable premise that women’s leadership should frame the engagement of men and 
boys. The wider human rights approach – grounded in a feminist understanding of 
violence against women as gendered and discriminatory – reinforces this position, 
recognising primary prevention must be gender transformative and based on women’s 
empowerment and agency. The leadership and expertise of feminist organisations and 
the transnational women’s movement is directly called for within the international 
556 Colin Walker, “I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?” The Guardian, November 18, 
2014, www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/nov/18/im-a-man-
running-a-girls-rights-campaign-so-what
557 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 16.
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human rights approach. Whilst the Men and Boys’ Network also espouse the 
importance of underpinning feminist theory to their programmes, and the necessity of 
accountability to the transnational women’s movement, in practice this is not wholly 
evident and can appear as lip-service, with men increasingly taking leadership roles. In 
this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur has highlighted the shift from men as ‘allies’ to 
men as leaders:
The feminist approach has commonly considered men as allies and targets of 
education in the quest for gender transformation. In recent years, many men’s 
groups have moved from being targets of engagement and allies, to being 
leaders of initiatives on gender equality, especially through the setting up of 
specialized men’s organizations to engage men and boys. The logic of the shift 
in focus appears to be self-defeating because it empowers the group to which 
perpetrators belong — and which overwhelmingly continues to maintain 
economic, political and societal structures of power, privilege and opportunity 
— to offer protection from violence and discrimination.558
At best, the pragmatism of ‘men listen to men’ could be to blame for the growth of 
these male-led, male-centred approaches to primary prevention. At worst, the Men 
and Boys’ Network could be seen as the continuation, and evolution, of men’s 
domination of the international legal discourse, and – in keeping with the DEVAW’s 
characterisation of root causes – the ‘historically unequal power relations between 
men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against 
women by men…’ This development has been supported by UN Women, the UN 
Secretary General, NGOs, and international donors. Notable initiatives include: the 
HeForShe559 initiative, the UN Secretary General’s ‘Network of Men Leaders’560, and 
the Men’s Only ‘Barbershop’ Conferences on Violence Against Women561. 
558 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 72.
559 HeForShe, accessed May 11, 2018, https://www.heforshe.org/en
560 “Ban launches new Network of Men Leaders to combat violence against women,” UN News, 
accessed 11 March, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/11/322382
561 Most notably 2015 Barbershop Conference in Iceland: “Statement by H.E. Mr. Gunnar Bragi 
Sveinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, During the General Debate of the 69th 
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 29 September 2014,” United 
Nations, accessed March 28, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IS_en.pdf
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The development of men’s leadership, following the call to ‘engage men and boys’, 
seemed to move quickly. As one commentator noted: the HeForShe campaign –
founded on 20th September 2014 – had only just begun promoting the inclusion of men 
in the conversation ‘before this was quickly followed by the suggestion that men should
be the only ones in the room’562; with the first International Men’s Only Conference 
announced nine days later on 29th September 2014 and to be held in the following 
January. In one of the most prominent Barbershop Conferences, the Icelandic 
government, along with the Surinamese government, convened a men-only 
conference, explaining it to be a space ‘where men will discuss gender equality with 
other men, with a special focus on addressing violence against women.’563 The 
conference was supported by the UN Secretary General and the HeForShe campaign. 
In its statement announcing the conference, the Icelandic government lauded its own 
record on gender equality:
In Iceland and the other Nordic Countries the revolution in women's 
education and the high level of female participation in the labour market have 
been the basis of welfare and economic prosperity. Without the full and equal 
participation of women in all spheres of society, including in decision-making it 
will be impossible to make real and lasting progress in addressing sustainable 
development challenges.564
Whilst recognising the importance of empowerment and the ‘full and equal 
participation of women in all spheres of society, including in decision-making’, the 
Icelandic government went on to call for a men’s only discussion on violence against 
women:
562 Erica Buist, “A men-only UN conference on gender equality? If only it was a joke,” The Guardian, 
October 6, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/womens-blog/2014/oct/06/men-only-un-
conference-gender-equality-if-only-it-was-a-joke
563 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, 
During the General Debate of the 69th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New 
York, 29 September 2014,” United Nations, accessed March 28, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IS_en.pdf
564 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, 
During the General Debate of the 69th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New 
York, 29 September 2014,” United Nations, accessed March 28, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IS_en.pdf
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This will be a unique conference as it will be the first time at the United 
Nations that we bring together only men leaders to discuss gender equality. It 
will be an exceptional contribution to the Beijing+20 and #HeforShe 
campaigns.565
The Icelandic government explained this decision by saying: ‘we want to bring men and 
boys to the table on gender equality in a positive way.’566 This seemed a familiar nod to 
the win-win narrative of the Men and Boys’ Network that seeks to encourage men to 
use their male privilege and power for gender equality, rather than seeking to 
challenge it as an obstacle to gender equality; obscuring the need to disrupt patriarchy, 
power and the profits inherent in them. As Meer explains, this barefaced rejection of 
the principle of women’s leadership, empowerment, and agency, represents a seismic 
shift in how men have traditionally been engaged in primary prevention:
donor attention to men’s organizations seems to signify a shift of support away 
from women’s empowerment and women’s leadership, and a handing over of 
the reins in the struggle for gender equality to men. Men are once more in 
charge – only this time, they are in charge of women’s liberation struggles.567
Again, masculinities scholarship, plays a role in the growth of the Men and Boys’ 
Network, and the emphasis on male leadership. There is a tendency within the Men 
and Boys’ Network to lean on masculinities and feminist scholarship and advocacy 
interchangeably, conflating the two theories’ differing approaches to gender. Whilst 
both feminist theory and masculinities scholarship give accounts of gender, as outlined 
above, there are important differences. A significant factor in the divergence between 
feminist- and masculinities- based primary prevention strategies is the lack of a 
commonly defined goal. Claire Crooks et al. have raised questions about the lack of a 
565 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, 
During the General Debate of the 69th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New 
York, 29 September 2014,” United Nations, accessed March 28, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IS_en.pdf
566 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, 
During the General Debate of the 69th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New 
York, 29 September 2014,” United Nations, accessed March 28, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/IS_en.pdf
567 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 3.
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clear framework for addressing ‘incentives or resistance to join this movement.’568 In 
‘addressing the issue of involving nonviolent men to be an active part of the solution 
against violence’569, Crooks highlights ‘the lack of an identifiable end state of 
intervention and a lack of small steps for making change’570, and the challenges that 
gives rise to. Crooks et al. explain the relationship between pathologising and 
theroising violence against women (or the absence of this theorisation) and the 
framing of men and boys’ engagement in primary prevention: 
The position of most men with respect to violence against women – passivity 
– can hardly be considered a condition. Lack of engagement in violence 
prevention is not a pathology – it cannot be diagnosed, it is not illegal, nor is it 
even socially frowned upon in most circles. Unlike an eating disorder or 
depression, the failure to engage in anti-violence discourse or even recognize 
the existence of violence against women is not a clinical manifestation. Indeed, 
this lack of recognition may do more to define normalcy than deviancy from 
societal expectations. Without the discursive tension provided by an identified 
clinical condition, it becomes difficult to define and set goals.
The end goal for violence prevention has typically been defined at the societal 
level: the cessation of all violence against women and girls and the 
establishment of full gender equality. At the individual level, it is much harder to 
identify the end state toward which we hope men and boys will progress. Are 
we simply looking for all men to commit to nonviolence? Are we looking for all 
men to renounce male privilege and commit to gender equality? Are we 
looking for men to organize rallies and marches? Without this clear end goal in 
mind, prevention initiatives are often constrained to the absence of violence 
perpetration. The expanded notion of violence prevention in terms of 
568 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 218.
569 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 217.
570 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 221.
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advocacy and personal commitment to being part of the solution is 
relegated.571
The absence of this clear end goal has resulted in the lauding of programmes and 
initiatives by the Men and Boys’ Network that aren’t much more than a commitment 
to not commit violence against women, or to not commit violence against women 
again. A well known example of this, of course, is the White Ribbon Campaign. 
Despite its growth to become a global leading voice in primary prevention, its purpose 
remains the same since its inception: ‘since 1991 men have worn white ribbons as a 
pledge to never commit, condone or remain silent about violence against women and 
girls.’572 As Michael Flood admits: ‘[t]here are few, if any, evaluations of White Ribbon 
Campaigns’ actual impact on the norms and relations of gender’, and ‘its television and 
print materials […] did little to engage men in violence prevention and attracted 
negative publicity’.573 (Despite this, the Welsh Government chose the White Ribbon 
Campaign as its lead partner for the 2018 United Nations International Day for the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women and Girls, and in fact, used the name ‘White 
Ribbon Day’ – as encouraged by the White Ribbon Campaign – to advertise and raise 
awareness of the day.574) 
Crooks et al. question the level to which we are expecting men and boys to engage: 
One testimonial that caught our attention was from a student who enthused 
about the workshop and concluded by saying, “I will never rape anyone again.” 
Although the author of this quote clearly enjoyed the program and felt that it 
had a big impact on him, and the developers of the program felt that the 
quote was worthy of inclusion in the manual, we would argue that his 
sentiments are hardly indicative of a male who has been truly engaged in 
preventing violence.575
571 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 221.
572 “Homepage”, White Ribbon, accessed March 15, 2019, https://www.whiteribbon.ca 
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575 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 221 – 222.
170
The lack of commonly defined engagement is problematic. Bob Pease – a leading anti-
violence advocate and academic – similarly calls out the lack of ‘mutual understanding 
between men and women about what the goals of this work are.’576 Differing as they 
do, and lacking a common ‘well defined end state’577, it becomes problematic for the 
Men and Boys’ Network to rely on and reference the two theories interchangeably. In 
fact, the espousing of both theories by the Men and Boys’ Network – unlike the Men’s 
Rights Movement which relies solely on the logic of masculinities scholarship, and is 
overtly critical of feminism – works to mask a more subtle erosion or rejection of 
feminist theory. The favouring of male leadership and male ownership is hidden under 
appeal to the primacy of feminist theory – albeit largely recognition of the historic work 
of feminists578, paving the way for the current work (and leadership?) of the Men and 
Boys’ Network.
Whilst maintaining the appeal to women’s leadership, empowerment and agency – the 
feminist approach – the Men and Boys’ Network also promote the ‘men listen to men’ 
strategy of the masculinities approach, arguing in favour of male leadership and 
ownership of responses to violence against women. Leading groups, such as 
Promundo, Sonke, MenEngage, and White Ribbon Campaign, all espouse the 
importance of accountability to, and leadership by, feminist organisations, yet in reality 
these groups operate independently and under the leadership of masculinities scholars 
and advocates. In particular the centring of women’s leadership is undermined, with 
these independent organisations being led by men who adhere to masculinities theory 
rather than feminist theory. 
There appear to be varying degrees of awareness within the Men and Boys’ Network 
of the problem this entails. The majority appear blind to the issues raised by male 
leadership within primary prevention; or where they show awareness of the potential 
576 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 16.
577 Crooks, et al., “Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying a Cognitive 
-Behavioral Model,” 221.
578 Notably, individuals and organizations pay homage to the women’s movement in an historical 
context. Framing the leadership of women as having ‘paved the way’, or providing foundations for the 
Men and Boys’ Network to build on. Women’s leadership is nearly always spoken of in the past 
participle, as an introduction for men’s leadership in the present: ‘We [the Network of Men Leaders] 
must build on the efforts of so many women and women's organizations who have worked tirelessly to 
address this epidemic.’ The implication is often that men need to finish the work that women have 
started. “Ban launches new Network of Men Leaders to combat violence against women,” UN News, 
accessed 11 March, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/11/322382
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problems they quickly brush them off in favour of the ‘benefits’ of male leadership. As 
Colin Walker, manager of Plan UK’s global campaign ‘Because I am a Girl’, wrote in 
The Guardian: ‘I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?’579 In the article 
Walker touches on the challenges of leading an anti-FGM campaign and girls’ rights 
programme, asking: ‘can I really understand the implications of this sort of abuse?’580
Walker moves on from what quickly appears to have been a rhetorical question 
(seemingly just paying lip service to the issue of positionality and women’s leadership), 
to suggest his concerns are probably just self-doubt rather than anything more critical, 
and in fact his position as a male leader could be beneficial: 
Could there even be benefits of being a male in the role? Certainly, 
encouraging men and boys to engage with the issues we are talking about is 
important, and if being asked to sign a petition in support of girls’ rights by a 
man gives more guys cause to reflect, then that’s a good thing.581
Again, the ‘men listen to men’ narrative trumps any critical reflection – personal, 
professional or organisational – about the conflict male leadership raises with women’s 
empowerment and agency. He finishes the article by, paradoxically given the article’s 
title, calling for women’s leadership and men’s support for that leadership:
It’s vital – of course – that women and girls themselves are at the forefront of the 
fight for equality, identifying the problems they face and the solutions needed. 
My belief is that it’s powerful for boys and men to support girls and women in 
this struggle. Just as a heterosexual can fight for gay rights, or someone without 
a disability can campaign for the equality of those with disabilities.582
The conflict between men supporting women’s leadership (who ‘of course’ should be 
‘at the forefront’) and men’s leadership (men displacing women from the forefront) 
seems lost on Walker, who calls for both in his article – although, arguably, practicing 
the latter over the former. He seems to conflate his capacity to engage with the issues, 
with his capacity to lead on the issue: ‘[m]y gender doesn’t prevent me feeling angry 
579 Walker, “I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?”
580 Walker, “I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?”
581 Walker, “I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?”
582 Walker, “I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?”
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that girls around the world continue to face systemic discrimination and widespread 
violence simply because they are girls.’583 Whilst Walker’s gender might not prevent 
him ‘feeling angry’ about discrimination, it does impact upon (and arguably negate) his 
capacity to lead responses to that discrimination – in which he intimately and 
institutionally participates, whether knowingly or not. The lack of critical engagement 
with power by male leaders is a product of the lack of politicised, feminist gender-
analysis within the primary prevention strategies of the Men and Boys’ Network. 
Masculinities theory does not do enough to equip advocates or practitioners to 
critically engage with their own gendered power, and as such men lead girls rights 
programmes and anti-violence programmes, without any serious questioning of the 
conflict this poses with the goals they propose to pursue: the empowerment of 
women. Colin Walker starts his article with an admission of the lack of this 
consciousness: ‘When I took the job as the UK manager of a global campaign for girls’ 
rights, around a year ago, I didn’t think much of my being a bloke.’584 Whilst nodding to 
the issue of female leadership, he goes on to ultimately dismiss it, showing the same 
consciousness as he began the article with: ‘so what?’
Where a small minority do show increasing awareness and critical engagement with 
their roles as male leaders in primary prevention, the degree of consciousness and 
understanding still varies. Bob Pease, has questioned the ethics and efficacy of male 
leadership within primary prevention, and has lamented the troubling lack of 
‘consensus among men about respecting women’s leadership in violence prevention.’585
He emphasises the importance ‘of ensuring that men’s anti-violence work is 
accountable to feminist women.’586 More subtly, there have been moves by actors 
such as Michael Kaufman to characterise their work, and the work of the Men and 
Boys’ Network, as ‘pro-feminist’ rather than feminist: ‘Feminism is also about women’s 
voices and experiences—so in that sense, over the years I’ve often referred to myself 
583 Walker, “I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?”
584 Walker, “I’m a man running a girls’ rights campaign. So what?”
585 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 16.
586 Pease, “Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and 
possibilities,” 16.
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as pro-feminist rather than a feminist.’587 Shamim Meer highlights the significance of 
men and men’s organisations characterising themselves as pro-feminist: 
The very term pro-feminist was coined precisely to make clear that while men 
could support feminism, only women themselves could be feminists. Men who 
support feminist demands need to ensure that their institutional privilege (and 
their taking for granted of this privilege) does not get in the way of a true 
partnership with women in struggles for gender equality. Difficult as it may be 
they need to accept women’s leadership of gender equality struggles. Even the 
best of men need to guard against their institutional privilege acting out in ways 
that unwittingly reproduce unequal gender relations…588
The increasing use of ‘pro-feminism’ to describe the work of men’s groups shows a 
welcome recognition and deeper understanding of how positionality and the lived 
experience of women are essential to feminist theorising, advocacy and expert 
practice. However, the use of this language is still limited in its effect on how men 
organise and lead, or their choice to do so; with men’s leadership continually privileged 
and lauded over women’s, even on primary prevention. As Michael Flood admits, men 
are often rewarded for doing less, or for doing anything, towards eliminating violence 
against women, despite the burden of responsibility for the problem of violence 
against women resting with men: ‘men acting for gender justice receive praise and 
credit […] which is often out of proportion to their efforts’.589 Flood also recognises 
that ‘[when] men involve themselves in anti-violence efforts, the nature of their 
participation and the ways in which they are received are themselves shaped by 
patriarchal privilege’.590 He notes that, Men’s groups ‘receive greater media attention 
and interest than similar groups of women’591 something which is, in part, a ‘function of 
the status and cultural legitimacy granted to men’s voices in general’.592
587 Leah Fessler, “Patriarchy ruins men: Canadian gender activist Michael Kaufman thinks feminism is the 
greatest gift to men,” Quartz, October 30, 2018, https://qz.com/work/1422387/why-canadas-top-
psychologist-thinks-feminism-is-the-greatest-gift-to-men/
588 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 31.
589 Flood, “Men’s Collective Anti-Violence Activism and the Struggle for Gender Justice,” 46.
590 Flood, “Men’s Collective Anti-Violence Activism and the Struggle for Gender Justice,” 46.
591 Flood, “Men’s Collective Anti-Violence Activism and the Struggle for Gender Justice,” 46.
592 Flood, “Men’s Collective Anti-Violence Activism and the Struggle for Gender Justice,” 46.
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Patriarchy and male privilege work directly, as Flood describes above, to amplify and 
‘legitimise’ the voice and discursive power of the Men and Boys’ Network. It is 
precisely because male leadership is privileged that men can lead in the area of gender 
equality – something that seems so conceptually problematic, is, it appears, held in high 
regard in practice; lauded as a ‘silver bullet’ even593. Not only does the privileging of 
male leadership obscure the conceptual difficulties it presents (which knock-on to the 
policy and praxis level), it also hides the limited expertise, and evidence of results594, 
within the Men and Boys’ Network. As one might expect, a degree of masculinist 
posturing within the Men and Boys’ Network, helps in this regard, disguising the reality 
of a small – but vocal – leadership. As the Special Rapporteur suggests, we should be 
concerned:
that the dominant voices on engaging men and boys, whether through 
reporting, United Nations meetings or connection with the wider public 
through the press and popular culture, belong to a very small group of men 
who are linked to the most prominent organisations associated with the men 
and boys agenda. This raises numerous questions, including in respect of 
legitimacy and accountability.595
It appears that a relatively small group of men seem to dominate the Men and Boys’ 
Network. In contrast to the transnational women’s movement, which is know for its 
combination of disseminated, diverse – and famously divergent – voices, the Men and 
Boys’ Network seem to sing as if with one voice; arguably, the alliance group,
593 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 14.
594 Pease, amongst others, questions the efficacy of engagement programmes, noting how little 
evaluation of the Men and Boys’ Network there has been: ‘While there have been some evaluations of 
men’s violence intervention campaigns, to date such evaluations have not addressed the impact that 
men’s involvement has had on reducing violence or challenging patriarchal gender relations.’ Pease, 
“Engaging men in men's violence prevention: exploring the tensions, dilemmas and possibilities,” 16; 
Similarly, Flood says ‘there has been very little evaluation of primary prevention strategies’ (361) used by 
the Men and Boys’ Network. As an example, he cites the White Ribbon Campaign stating ‘[t]here are 
few, if any, evaluations of White Ribbon Campaigns’ actual impact on the norms and relations of 
gender.’ (369) He also suggests: ‘[w]hen evaluations have been undertaken, they show that not all 
educational interventions are effective, the magnitude of change in attitudes often is small, changes often 
decay or “rebound” to preintervention levels one or two months after the intervention and some even 
become worse, and improvements in men’s violence-supportive attitudes do not necessarily lead to 
reductions in their perpetration of violence’. (364)  Flood, “Involving Men in Efforts to End Violence 
Against Women.”
595 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 72.
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MenEngage. MenEngage are an umbrella organisation who describe their purpose as 
below:
Activities of the alliance include information-sharing, joint training activities and 
national, regional and international advocacy. We develop joint statements of 
action on specific areas of engaging men, carry out advocacy campaigns and 
seek to act as a collective voice to promote a global movement of men and 
boys engaged in and working toward gender equality and questioning violence 
and non-equitable versions of manhood.596
The ‘collective front’ of MenEngage works to further strengthen the voice of the Men 
and Boys’ Network – operating as a megaphone of sorts, and working effectively to 
gain widespread attention and support. This is problematic for the transnational 
women’s movement, which has both organically and intentionally articulated itself in a
decentralised, counterhegemonic manner.
The dominant voices promoting the Men and Boys’ Network belong to Gary Barker 
and Dean Peacock, who are leading figures in almost all of the most prominent 
organisations associated with the Men and Boys’ Network. Their voices dominate at a 
policy and popular culture level, with The Guardian’s coverage of the International Day 
for the Elimination of Violence Against Women headlined by Gary Barker: ‘We must 
enlist men and boys in the fight to end violence against women’597. Peacock, in 
partnership with Gary Barker, runs or is affiliated with a vast array of interrelated Men 
and Boys Groups including but not exclusive to:  ‘Men as Partners; ‘Engender Health’; 
‘Promundo’; and the ‘Sonke Gender Justice Network’.598
There is considerable overlap between the MenEngage network and Promundo, 
Sonke, and EngenderHealth, sharing donors and key personnel, as outlined above. 
Likewise, there is similar overlap between EngenderHealth and Sonke. MenEngage, 
596 “What we do,” MenEngage, accessed December 27, 2013, 
http://www.menengage.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Ite mid=9
597 Gary Barker and Michael Kaufman, “We must enlist men and boys in the fight to end violence against 
women,” The Guardian, November 25, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/25/boys-men-end-violence-women-clares-law
598 “Expert Bios,” MenCare, accessed January 20, 2019, https://men-care.org/about-mencare/press-and-
media/
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Promundo and Sonke share primary donors, including the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) and the Oak Foundation.599 There is a similar overlap of 
management, with Gary Barker and Dean Peacock, president and CEO of Promundo 
and Sonke, respectively, also co-founding and co-chairing MenEngage. It is rare for 
these groups to explicitly state in their literature that they belong to the same 
extended network but they regularly cross-pollinate one another’s Executive Boards 
and cite one another’s research. For instance, on a webpage advertising the ‘2nd 
MenEngage Global Symposium 2014’600, Peacock describes himself as the ‘co-founder 
and co-chair of the MenEngage Alliance’601. However, this same source lists Gary 
Barker as ‘International Director of Promundo-DC’602, without acknowledging the 
crucial role which Peacock also plays in the latter organisation. Additional 
interrelationships of interest, in this respect, include: ‘Men Care’, ‘Men + Gender 
Equality Project’, the ‘International Centre for Research on Women’ and, perhaps most 
significantly, the United Nations Secretary General’s Campaign ‘UNITE to end Violence 
against Women’, in which Peacock features amongst the ‘Network of Men Leaders. 603
Whilst it could be expected that expertise would be concentrated and coordinated, 
there is sufficient overlap to call into question the consensus and representation 
documented by these organisations. 
The rationale, evidence base and advocacy for engaging men and boys relies on this 
connectedness. It appears as though MenEnage rely heavily on Promundo for evidence 
base, recycling many of Promundo’s reports and materials, and Promundo frequently 
cite MenEngage to give the appearance of wider consensus. For example, the Global 
Symposium, whilst well attended, was organised by MenEngage and Promundo, both 
chaired by the same personnel, and reflects the agenda articulated by Promundo prior 
to the symposium. The Rio Declaration came from the 2009 Global Symposium on 
Engaging Men and Boys in Gender Equality, and serves to solidify and advance the 
599 According to the Oak Foundation grant database Promundo has received $2,687,245 and Sonke has 
received $1,086,407 in support, “Oak Foundation Grant Database”, Oak Foundation, accessed 30th 
December 2013, http://www.oakfnd.org/node/3m
600 “Executive Committee,” Men and Boys For Gender Justice, accessed June 15, 2014, 
http://menengagedilli2014.net/executive-committee 
601 “Executive Committee,” Men and Boys For Gender Justice, accessed June 15, 2014, 
http://menengagedilli2014.net/executive-committee
602 “Executive Committee,” Men and Boys For Gender Justice, accessed June 15, 2014, 
http://menengagedilli2014.net/executive-committee
603 “UNITE to End Violence Against Women: Network of Men Leaders,” United Nations, accessed 15 
June 2014, http://www.un.org/en/women/endviolence/DeanPeacock.shtml
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emerging focus on engaging men and boys. It is comprehensive in its inclusion of the 
core principles already outlined by MenEngage – gender as relational, men as allies, and 
men as victims of patriarchy – and further emphasises men as jointly suffering from 
gender inequality and gender-based violence:
As we acknowledge the harm done to too many women and girls at the hands 
of men, we also recognize the costs to boys and men from the ways our 
societies have defined men’s power and raised boys to be men.
Too many men suffer because our male-dominated world is not only one of 
power men have over women, but of some groups of men over others.
Too many men carry deep scars of trying to live up to the impossible demands 
of manhood and find solace in risk-taking, violence, self-destruction or alcohol 
and drug use.604
It outlines an obligation on states, UN agencies and donors, to promote the agenda of 
engaging men and boys, and advocates the allocation of resources to further the 
work. Worryingly, the Rio Declaration is increasingly being referred to alongside 
international and UN commitments within the discourse on engaging men and boys, 
yet it does not share comparable status in legal terms and has, in fact, ‘been developed 
and promoted by the very men’s groups it provides for and strengthens.’605 The 
Declaration is being employed to give weight to a distinct way of viewing gender 
equality and engaging men to prevent violence against women. 
Such conflating of United Nations commitments with an NGO declaration has 
resulted in the mushrooming of independent men’s groups and organizations, 
separate from the women’s movement, many of which have redefined 
604 “The Rio de Janeiro MenEngage Declaration Global Symposium on Engaging Men and Boys on 
Achieving Gender Equality, Rio de Janeiro March 29 – April 3, 2009,” MenEngage, accessed April 9 
2018, http://menengage.org/rio-declaration/
605 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 71.
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engagement with men and boys, in male terms.606
This is particularly worrying as much of the rationale and conceptualisation of engaging 
men and boys is done by a far narrower group than is actually active in the work. 
Whilst MenEngage ‘have over 700 members across 70 countries’607 representing ‘some 
of the key organizations working to engage men and boys in women’s rights and 
gender justice’608, the leadership is incredibly narrow, as evidenced in the MenCare 
‘Expert Bio’s’:
Gary Barker is President and CEO of Promundo. He has conducted extensive 
global research and program development around engaging men and boys in 
gender equality and violence prevention, and is a leading voice for the 
worldwide effort to establish positive, healthy dynamics between men and 
women. Gary is the co-founder of MenCare … and co-founder of MenEngage 
… He coordinates IMAGES (the International Men and Gender Equality 
Survey)… He is a member of the UN Secretary General’s Men’s Leaders 
Network …
Dean Peacock is Co-Founder and Executive Director of Sonke Gender Justice, 
MenCare’s co-coordinator. His work and activism over the last 25 years has 
focused on issues related to gender equality, gender-based violence, men and 
constructions of masculinities, HIV and AIDS, human rights, and social justice. 
He is also co-founder and co-chair of MenEngage, a global alliance with 
networks in over thirty countries across the world… Dean is a member of 
many advisory councils, including the United Nations Secretary General’s 
Network of Men Leaders formed to advise UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon on gender based violence prevention and of the Nobel Women’s 
Advisory Committee on ending sexual violence in conflict settings…609
606 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 71.
607 “Homepage,” MenEngage, accessed January 20, 2019, http://menengage.org 
608 “Homepage,” MenEngage, accessed January 20, 2019, http://menengage.org
609 “Expert Bios,” MenCare, accessed January 20, 2019, https://men-care.org/about-mencare/press-and-
media/
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It is unclear how widely the rationale of the Rio Declaration, as outlined by this smaller 
group, is upheld across all of the men’s groups but what is clear is that the ‘consensus’ 
it informs is less well established than a cursory analysis might suggest.
Similarly the Men + Gender Equality Policy Project (MGEPP), a multi-year study to 
build the evidence base on how to engage men and boys, is again coordinated by 
Promundo, in collaboration with International Centre for Research on Women. 
MGEPP and its subsidiary project, the International Men and Gender Equality Survey, 
has been significant in cementing the rationale behind engaging men and boys. Again, 
there is significant overlap in the reports and material delivered through MenEngage, 
Promundo, and MGEPP.610 As such, it is difficult to determine the real breadth and 
depth of the evidence base.
This pattern is replicated in academic commentary611 in which a group of men 
including Michael Flood, Michael Messner, Jeff Hearn, Alan Berkowitz, and Michael 
Kimmel cite themselves, or one another, with noticeable regularity whilst also, in the 
cases of commentators such as Jackson Katz and Michael Kaufmann (founders of the 
‘Mentors in Violence Prevention’ Project612 and the ‘White Ribbon Campaign’, 
respectively), using one another’s evidence to promote their own Men and Boys’ 
Groups. 
Disseminating virtually identical arguments and initiatives under the auspices of 
‘separate’ organisations (consciously) creates the impression that the consensus 
surrounding the engagement of Men and Boys is significantly broader than deeper 
analysis reveals it to be, and this serves to silence objections to the trend and compel 
women’s organisations to ‘follow the funding’. Tactics such as this lead to a vicious 
circle (or virtuous circle from the point of view of MenEngage) and ultimately ensure 
that the Network’s grandiose claims become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, as
more and more (women’s) organisation feel compelled, for strategic reasons, to 
610 “Men and Gender Equality Policy Project,” International Centre for Research on Women, accessed 
January 20, 2019, https://www.icrw.org/research-programs/men-and-gender-equality-policy-project/ 
611 Molly M. King, Carl T. Bergstrom, Shelley J. Correll, Jennifer Jacquet, Jevin D. West, “Men Set Their 
Own Cites High: Gender and Self-citation across Fields and over Time,” Socius, 3, (2017): 1 – 22.
612 Jackson Katz, “Reconstructing Masculinity in the Locker Room: The Mentors in Violence Prevention 
Project,” Harvard Educational Review, 65(2), (1995): 163 – 175.
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reinforce and assimilate the message that primary prevention necessitates not just the 
engagement of men and boys – but the leadership of the Men and Boys’ Network.
Working with men and men’s organisations was now latched onto (in 
particular by UN agencies and bilateral donors) as a way of addressing gender 
equality concerns…
This support for men’s organisations took place at a time when feminists were 
struggling against the effects of the depoliticisation and co-option of their 
demands for gender equality. Feminists were faced not only with the 
withdrawal of support for women’s movement building, but also with the 
emergence of a new constituency seemingly advanced to do the work of 
achieving gender equality.613
Case Study Summary 
The leadership of men and boys within primary prevention undermines the 
epistemological and methodological importance placed on positionality within feminist 
theory. As has already been argued, feminism asked the ‘woman question’614 of 
violence against women and identified it as gendered and discriminatory – not arbitrary 
in any sense, but a cause and consequence of disadvantage and discrimination. The 
continuing of feminist method within the human rights discourse, asking further 
questions, has developed substantive norms around primary prevention, in particular: 
addressing root causes, gender specificity, and empowerment. These substantive 
norms are not arbitrarily chosen but they are the outworking of method. Without 
method we would choose substance indefensibly. As such, positionality – as outlined 
in Chapter 1 – is at the heart of feminist method and underpins the international 
human rights approach to violence against women. This perhaps explains the 
disjuncture between the Men and Boys’ Network (keen to argue that gendered power 
relations equally disadvantage men) and feminist method (which is premised on the 
opposite argument), and this in turn accounts for the conflict between the Men and 
Boys’ Network and the substantive norms within the international human rights 
613 Meer, “Struggles for Gender Equality: Reflections on the place of men and men’s organisations,” 14. 
614 Katherine Bartlett, “Feminist Legal Matters,” Harvard Law Review, 103(4), (1990): 829. 
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approach to violence against women. Without applying feminist method, men’s groups 
are unable to hold a defensible relationship to substance. Moreover, without applying a 
different methodology (consistently) they will, intentionally, or not, ‘recreate the 
illegitimate power structure [they suggest they are] trying to identify and undermine.’615
If this is not verboten the human rights approach to violence against women will 
become decoupled from feminist method. Without understanding and upholding 
feminist method men’s groups can wantonly oscillate on key substantive positions and 
are given license to indefensibly reconceptualise and create new norms. We see this 
most keenly in the reconceptualisation of gender. In so doing men’s groups threaten to 
undermine positionality and method as essential to the conceptualisation and 
construction of norms and substantive law, undoing decades of work and progress at 
the highest levels. 
It is clear, in both conceptual and legal terms (deviating as it does from the feminist 
underpinnings of international human rights law), that the shift to the ‘Men and Boys 
agenda’ is fraught with difficulty and yet it appears to have attracted a great deal of 
funding, recognition and political support. Whilst a closer examination of the network 
of organisations associated with the engagement of men and boys is warranted it is 
not within the scope of this case study to provide that. However, suffice to say it 
presents an interesting case study with regard the importance – and fragility – of 
feminist theorised practice of the law with regard violence against women and primary 
prevention. The growth of the Men and Boys’ Network – despite the limited extent of 
its expertise and evidence base – also supports the position that the feminist character 
of the international human rights law approach is vulnerable and needs further 
delineation and strengthening. 
615 Joseph W. Singer, “Should lawyers care about philosophy?” Duke Law Journal, 38(6), (1989): 1753. 
1752 – 3503.
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Chapter 4 – A Feminist Theory of State Responsibility, Part 2: How Effectively 
Does the Due Diligence Standard Actualise the Feminist Conceptualisation of State 
Responsibility for Primary Prevention? 
The development of norms around primary prevention has been framed by the 
feminist conceptualisation of violence against women, gender equality and gender 
more broadly. As outlined in the previous chapter this has led to particular policy and 
praxis developments that require the state to operate at the macrosystemic level to 
challenge and transform gender norms. This particular framing of primary prevention –
developed within the international human rights discourse – is underpinned by feminist 
method and epistemology. Where this is lacking, as outlined in the ‘Men and Boys’ 
case study, the knock-on effect is divergent strategies at the policy and praxis levels. 
The duty the state has to prevent violence against women at the primary level has 
been further developed within the jurisprudence and ‘demosprudence’616 surrounding
the due diligence standard. The use of the due diligence standard is not specific to 
preventing violence against women, but as the majority of violence experienced by 
women is perpetrated by non-state actors, the standard has been called on and 
developed by groups looking to actualise and define the contents of the state’s
responsibility to prevent violence perpetrated by private individuals; and, as such, has 
become a focus for activists seeking to hold the state accountable to its international 
legal obligations. The due diligence standard has proved pivotal in framing the violence 
of a non-state actor as a human rights abuse, and problematising the state’s role in 
eliminating private acts of violence against women, particularly domestic violence. 
Further to this, the development of systemic prevention and transformative remedies 
under the due diligence standard has also sought to bridge the gap between the social 
locations of the individual and group and make sense of the mutually constitutive 
relationship between violence against women and patriarchy.
In this chapter I will consider the development of the due diligence standard within 
international law, and international human rights law, specifically, as it relates to 
preventing violence against women; and consider the legal and normative gaps it 
616 Lani Guinier, “Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide,” 
Harvard Law Review, 127(1), (2013): 437 – 444; Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, “Changing the Wind: 
Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements,” The Yale Law Journal, 123(8), (2014): 
2740 – 2804. 
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bridges in tackling violence against women. While considering the development of due 
diligence through international and regional case law, I will highlight key norms relating 
to primary prevention that have emerged or have been strengthened through the 
expansion of the legal concept of due diligence. Following this I will look at the utility 
and efficacy of the standard, considering how useful the concept is for actualising 
accountability and responsibility for violence against women, both as a legal concept 
and as a sociopolitical tool and rally point for advocacy and action. Finally I will 
consider the legal and normative gaps that remain, considering the due diligence 
standard in the wider context of the international human rights law response to 
violence against women. In particular, I will question the capacity and legitimacy 
inherent in the due diligence standard to create or enforce state responsibility, as well 
as the normative questions that arise from framing primary prevention as a due 
diligence obligation (implying a secondary form of culpability and responsibility for 
women’s rights), rather than as a positive duty in its own sense, perhaps best 
considered under Article 2 and Article 5 of the CEDAW. To strengthen the 
international human rights law approach to violence against women – be it via 
expansion of the due diligence standard, or not – I will finally consider if there is a 
need for a new binding international instrument focused on violence against women to 
make actionable and accountable the state’s responsibility to prevent.
In the previous chapter I focused on the conceptualisation of primary prevention, in 
this chapter I will consider how feminist theory has also shaped jurisprudence 
regarding due diligence, and specifically due diligence and systemic prevention, and 
how these further (or not) the norms considered in the earlier outline of primary 
prevention. In particular I am interested in the interplay between jurisprudence and 
what Lani Guinier has termed ‘demosprudence’, and the two-way discourse between 
the courts and third party interveners and social movements (in the broadest sense),
as it relates to the norm-creation of the courts, case law, and legislation. The nature of 
demosprudence – the process of the courts ‘courting the people’617 in efforts to 
catalyse legal change – blurs the legal/political divide (or perhaps just highlights the 
blurriness that already exists) and makes the claim that ‘social movements’ can be –
617 Guinier, “Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide,” 439.
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and are – ‘sources of law’618. Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres make this claim in light of 
the role of social movements in the civil rights era and argue that ‘non-elite actors in 
the civil rights and social justice movements … made some legal conclusions not just 
more likely, but for all intents and purposes, inevitable.’619 A thorough investigation of 
the role of demosprudence as it relates to state responsibility for violence against 
women is not my intention here, but the concept neatly highlights the significance that 
this chapter places on the discursive, political and politicised nature of norm creation, 
and the role of the transnational women’s movement in moving forward the legal 
conceptualisation of primary prevention and state responsibility through the courts. As 
will be shown in the evolution of regional and international case law and standards, the 
work of feminist theorising and practice within the movement (supported by third 
party interveners), is called on and ‘courted’ by the courts and relevant mandate 
holders, such as the Special Rapporteur. This political discourse weaves through the 
iterative development of the case law across the regional human rights systems.A 
 
The development of the due diligence standard within international law – key concepts and 
jurisprudence 
The due diligence standard is widely considered one of the most significant 
developments of state responsibility with regard the protection of human rights, 
incorporating, as it does, the acts of private individuals in its purview. It has become a 
rallying point for activists as it is arguably ‘one of the key mechanisms which ensures 
accountability for adherence to human rights standards.’620 It provides a unique account 
of state responsibility, furthering the standards and principles defined in the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereafter, 
‘Draft Articles’) by the International Law Commission in 2001. As outlined in Article 1 
of the Draft Articles: ‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State.’ However, as Article 2 makes clear in its 
definition of wrongful acts: ‘There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when 
conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under 
618 Guinier and Torres, “Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social 
Movements,” 2740.
619 Guinier and Torres, “Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social 
Movements,” 2740.
620 Brooke Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal 
Lens,” Merkourios Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 29 (77), (2013): 8. 
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international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.’ As a general rule, then, state responsibility is based on acts or omissions 
committed either by state actors or by actors whose actions are attributable to the 
state, and results from the general legal personality of the state as the chief bearer of 
obligations under international law. The due diligence standard, therefore, expands 
state responsibility for instances where there is a failure to exercise due diligence 
(sometimes termed ‘due care’, ‘vigilance’, or ‘all appropriate measures’), to prevent or 
respond to certain acts or omissions of private or non-state actors that are not directly 
attributable to the state. This principle significantly widens the scope and reach of state
responsibility. Whilst its application within international human rights law is relatively 
new, due diligence has long been accepted as a standard – or even a general 
principle621 – of international law. The concept of due diligence dates back to 17th
century legal thinkers such as Hugo Grotius, Richard Zouche and Samuel Pufendorf,622
and early Roman ideas of diplomatic protection623; and was first applied within 
international law in the Alabama Arbitration case624. However, as the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) suggested in its Seabed Mining Advisory 
Opinion, the content of the obligation of due diligence remains unclear:
The content of “due diligence” obligations may not easily be described in 
precise terms. Among the factors that make such a description difficult is the 
fact that “due diligence” is a variable concept. It may change over time as 
measures considered sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may become not 
diligent enough…625
621 Katja L. H. Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 1 Central 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, (2018/2019 forthcoming): 15.
622 Joanna Bourke-Martignoni, “The history and development of the due diligence standard in 
international law and its role in the protection of women against violence,” In Due Diligence and Its 
Application to Protect Women from Violence, edited by Carin Benninger-Budel, (Leiden, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 48. p. 47 – 62, p. 48
623 See ILA citing Max Huber in British Property in Spanish Morocco case: ILA, ILA Study Group on Due 
Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, (ILA, 2016), 10 – 11, available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/index.php/study-groups
624 Thomas Bingham, “The Alabama Claims Arbitration,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
50(1), reprinted in Thomas Bingham, Lives of the Law: Selected Essays and Speeches 2000-2010, (Oxford: 
Oxford University, 2011), 13 – 40.
625 Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the 
Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), (2011), ITLOS case no. 17, 
ILM 458, paragraph 117, hereafter ‘Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion’.
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This said, it is rightly held that ‘difficulty in defining the standard does not imply that the 
obligation to act in due diligence has no content.’626 Whilst there still remains a lack of 
clarity about the legal character of due diligence (is it a standard, or an obligation?627), 
as well as the degree to which the principle varies from case-to-case (is it completely 
subjective, or does it entail legal minimums?628), there are some generally accepted 
characteristics that hail from the Alabama Arbitration case and continue to be evident in 
contemporary understanding and application of due diligence. The Alabama Arbitration 
case’s framing of ‘reasonableness’ (as determined by international law rather than 
domestic law) still marks definitions by leading academics such as Ian Brownlie629, as 
well as the judgements of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)630. The ILA explain, 
that:
[a]t its heart, due diligence is concerned with supplying a standard of care 
against which fault can be assessed. It is a standard of reasonableness, of 
reasonable care, that seeks to take account of the consequences of wrongful 
conduct and the extent to which such consequences could feasibly have been 
avoided by the State or international organisation that either commissioned 
the relevant act or which omitted to prevent its occurrence.631
Timo Koivurova suggests that ‘reasonableness’, whilst context-specific, is understood 
by the ‘majority opinion’ to be an ‘international minimum standard’ for due diligence, 
and could be read as ‘what a “reasonable” or “good” government would do in a 
626 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 7.
627 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 15.
628 Lee Hasselbacher, “State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human 
Rights, Due Diligence, And International Legal Minimums of Protection,” Northwestern Journal of 
International Human Rights, 8(2), (Spring, 2010): 190 – 215; Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, (Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 2012),  available at 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/abstract/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1034?rskey=qvtmm1&result=1&prd=EPIL
629 ‘“[r]easonableness” is a golden thread in determining which measures State should take to act in a 
duly diligence manner’, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 
526.
630 ‘Even in the instance of preventing a gross violation of international law from occurring, such as the 
commission of genocide, the standard articulated by the ICJ in order to incur international responsibility 
was that a State “manifestly failed to take all measures” that were “within its power” to take.’ ILA, ILA 
Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, (ILA, 2016), 7; Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 430. (emphasis added), hereafter ‘Genocide 
case’.
631 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 2.
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specific situation’632. Or as the ILA suggest: ‘one might describe a due diligence 
obligation as an obligation for the State to take all measures it could reasonably be
expected to take.’633 As the ILA Study Group report on Due Diligence in International 
Law concludes, when it comes to assessing the content and operationalisation of due 
diligence, ‘reasonableness’ is the ‘overarching standard’634. 
Whilst reasonableness is determined by international law, it is, as has already been 
mentioned, specific to the context of the primary rule or obligation at hand, and 
widely argued to be an ‘obligation of conduct and not result’635: focusing ‘primarily on 
the behaviour of States rather than the outcomes of that behaviour.’636 In this way it 
differs from the standards regarding breaches of state responsibility as commonly 
conceived of in the Draft Articles. Reasonable conduct ‘implies an evaluation of the 
measure taken by reference to what could be expected from a State.’637 The ICJ in the 
Bosnia Genocide case, stated that investigating due diligence ‘calls for an assessment in 
concreto’, which takes into account the ‘[v]arious parameters [that] operate when 
assessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned.’638 Conduct, 
whilst needing to meet internationally recognised minimum standards – rather than 
those determined by the state – is still context specific, and can be influenced by the 
capacity of the state. As outlined in the ILA report639, reasonable conduct is impacted 
by:
- capacity, control of territory, and the ‘power to influence’640 (as legally 
permitted);- the degree of risk: ‘due diligence requirements increase in situations in which 
the risks of harm are known to be particularly significant’641; and;
632 Koivurova, Due Diligence, paragraph 16. 
633 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 8.
634 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 7.
635 Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, “The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International 
Responsibility of States,” 35 German Year Book of International Law, 9, (1992): 22 – 41; Koivurova, Due 
Diligence, paragraph 1; Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 
24.
636 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 2.
637 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 9.
638 Genocide case, Judgment, [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 430.
639 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 11 – 13.
640 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 11;
Genocide case, Judgment, [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 403.
641 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 12; Seabed Mining 
Advisory Opinion, (2011) ITLOS, Case no. 17, ILM 458, paragraph 117.
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- knowledge of an activity or potential risk.642
Whilst due diligence exists as a general principle or an obligation of customary 
international law643, the degree of due diligence expected is most influenced by the 
primary rule or obligation it refers to. Due diligence is ‘context specific and […] 
dependent on the substantive international legal rule at issue.’644 For instance, 
[w]hat is considered to be reasonable in exercising diligence to prevent 
genocide (a violation of a norm of ius cogens) will obviously be more 
demanding than that which is expected for the prevention of harm to property 
or financial interests. In this case, the degree of diligence varies according to the 
importance of the interest requiring protection.645
This will obviously relate to the standards laid out for preventing violence against 
women when we come to consider it, and the way violence against women is 
conceptualised. A further relevant factor in the conceptualisation of due diligence is 
the development of progressive application. For example, a ‘broad due diligence 
obligation may be an initial strategy to promote participation’, but then, as participation 
increases, ‘the strictness of the applicable standard can be enhanced and mature into a 
more demanding system of legal accountability.’646 In the Pulp Mills case, the ICJ 
expanded the expectation to act with due diligence to include more stringent 
environmental impact assessment.647 This reflected the increased understanding and 
appreciation of the environmental risk at hand. Further to this, where the 
understanding of the risk of harm – and the potential for that harm to be irreversible –
increases, so does the expectation to exercise due diligence648. The conceptualisation 
– politically and legally – of the primary rule at hand has massive bearing on the 
content of due diligence obligations, and the conduct, thereby, considered reasonable 
642 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 12.
643 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 15.
644 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 12, available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2006/61.
645 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 20 – 21.
646 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 3.
647 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Case Concerning (Argentina v. Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14. hereafter 
the ‘Pulp Mills Case’; See also Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua) proceedings joined with Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River 
(Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgement [2015] ICJ Rep 65 and the Separate Opinion of Judge Donoghue.
648 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 3.
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by the state in response. Again, this highlights how significant the conceptualisation of 
violence against women is in determining the measure of due diligence expected with 
regard primary prevention. 
The complexities of what constitutes due diligence are somewhat cleared up when the 
obligation is formulated alongside core substantive principles such as the obligation to 
prevent, protect, investigate, punish and ensure redress; often referred to as the PPIPR 
obligations.649 In reference to state responsibility for violence against women, these 
have commonly been called the 5Ps650, which include the obligations of (1) prevention, 
(2) protection, (3) prosecution, (4) punishment, and (5) provision of redress. There 
have been recent calls to expand this to the 7Ps to include the ‘promotion of 
awareness-raising and adherence to non-discrimination and no vaw’ and ‘probing’ 
(read as investigation)651. The existence of PPIPR/5P obligations further strengthens the 
concept of due diligence, due to the ‘inherent relationship’652 between the two. Whilst 
it is particularly unusual to have international treaty language that specifies the term 
‘due diligence’653, the conventions, declarations, and general comments relating to 
violence against women often directly call for ‘due diligence’ and do so alongside the 
PPIPR/5P formulation. This formulation is part of the thickening of international human 
rights law with regard to the state’s role to respect, protect, and fulfil, which ‘means that 
a state has to take measures to prevent and repress violations, irrespective of whether 
they are committed by state or non-state actors, and provide adequate remedies in 
case of breach.’654 In the context of prevention this correlation is well established, as 
649 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 24.
650 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006); “5 P's of Due Diligence to Eliminate Violence Against Women,” 
Due Diligence Project, accessed 29 February 2017, www.duediligenceproject.org/5-ps.html.
651 Jeremy Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” Human Rights 
Quarterly, (40) (1), (2018): 2. 1 – 36.
652 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 39.
653 In fact the International Law Association Study Group on Due Diligence highlight The Council of 
Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women as a ‘notable’ exception to 
the general absence of the term in treaty language: ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International 
Law: Second Report, July 2016, 6; Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations 
or Both?” 23.
654 Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 76.
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prevention is considered both a ‘parallel obligation’655 to due diligence, and the essence 
of due diligence itself. As the ICJ observed in the Pulp Mills case: ‘the principle of 
prevention, as a customary rule, has its origins in the due diligence that is required of a 
state in its territory.’656 I will consider this relationship further in relation to primary 
prevention of violence against women and systemic due diligence. 
As will be shown, due diligence is heavily utilised in the international human rights law 
approach to violence against women, and is interpreted with specific meaning. 
However, it is important to recognise its general standing in international law as a 
standard, rather than an obligation, and as a measure of conduct not result, as outlined 
above. This is important as due diligence, as a legal tool and as a sociopolitical tool, or 
‘rallying point’ for action against violence against women, will be perceived within, and 
appreciated against, this broader context and jurisprudence. As will be seen below, 
due diligence is now well established as a framework for accountability within 
international human rights law, particularly under the CEDAW-OP, European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights 
(IACtHR/IACHR). A closer look will consider how norms of primary prevention have 
emerged through this jurisprudence. 
The development of due diligence within international human rights law and its 
application to violence against women
The obligation to act with due diligence in response to violence against women is 
most clearly laid out at the international level in the DEVAW (1993) in Article 4(c), 
where states are urged to ‘exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in 
accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether 
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.’657 This built on the 
CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation no. 19 on violence against women, 
that stated: ‘under general international law … States may also be responsible for 
655 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 26; James R. 
Crawford, International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 227 – 228.
656 Pulp Mills case, Judgment, paragraph 101.
657 General Assembly resolution 48/104, Declaration for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 
A/RES/48/104 (20 December 1993), Article 4 (c), available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/48/104. 
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private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to 
investigate and punish acts of violence.’658 As referenced in Chapter 2, this principle 
was established in the landmark IACtHR case Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras in 1988, 
which provided the first framework for addressing private violence as a human rights 
abuse. 659 The case dealt with the abduction and forced disappearance of Angel 
Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez by armed men in civilian attire, who the state argued 
were non-state actors. In Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras the IACtHR established the 
principle that states can be held responsible for actions that are not directly 
attributable to them:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a State (e.g., because it is the act of a private person or because 
the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of 
due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the 
Convention.660
In its judgement the Court also made clear that whilst it found that the disappearance 
of Velásquez Rodríguez was ‘carried out by agents who acted under the cover of 
public authority’, had this not been the case, it would still stand that ‘the failure of the 
State apparatus to act, which is clearly proved, is a failure on the part of Honduras to 
fulfil the duties it assumed’661. In this regard the due diligence standard opened up a 
‘juridical bridge between precepts of international law focused on the relationship 
between the state, its agents and its subjects and the role the state may have with 
respect to the conduct of and relations between private subjects.’662 The Court made 
clear that the relationship between the state and perpetrator is not the decisive factor 
in establishing state responsibility:
658 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 19, 
11th session, A/47/38, (1992), paragraph 9, available from http://undocs.org/A/47/38.
659 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, [1988] Series C No. 4, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR).
660 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement [1988] Series C No. 4, IACHR, paragraph 172.
661 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement [1988] Series C No. 4, IACHR, paragraph 182.
662 Elizabeth A. H. Abi-Mershed, “Due Diligence and the Fight Against Gender-Based Violence in the 
Inter- American System,” In Due Diligence and its Application to Protect Women From Violence, edited by 
Carin Benninger-Budel, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 128.
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the violation can be established even if the identity of the individual 
perpetrator is unknown. What is decisive is whether a violation of the rights 
recognized by the Convention has occurred with the support or the 
acquiescence of the government, or whether the State has allowed the act to 
take place without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those 
responsible. Thus, the Court's task is to determine whether the violation is the 
result of a State's failure to fulfill its duty to respect and guarantee those rights 
[…]663
Regardless, therefore of the ‘motivation’ of the perpetrator, and whether the state was 
directly imputable in the violation, the state was still responsible for its lack of due 
diligence. In the same manner the Court pronounced on the thickening of positive 
rights and state responsibility with regards human rights, explaining that beyond 
legislative provisions, the state must ‘conduct itself so as to effectively ensure’664 the 
‘free and full exercise of … rights and freedoms.’665 In keeping with this 
conceptualisation of due diligence, the Court explained: 
The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the 
rights protected by the Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way 
that the violation goes unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of such 
rights is not restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its 
duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within 
its jurisdiction. The same is true when the State allows private persons or 
groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights 
recognized by the Convention.
[The duties of prevention and investigation …] must be undertaken in a 
serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective … 
This is true regardless of what agent is eventually found responsible for the 
violation. Where the acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not 
663 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement [1988] Series C No. 4, IACHR, paragraph 173.
664 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement, paragraph 167.
665 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement, paragraph 182.
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seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by the government, 
thereby making the State responsible on the international plane.666
As was then capitalised on by the CEDAW Committee, the IACtHR extended the 
state’s ‘obligations beyond the public sphere of its own machinery to private actors 
over which it may have no direct control.’667 This paralleled to violence against women 
by non-state actors, with particular significance for the conceptualisation of state
responsibility for domestic violence. Along with the foundations of Article 2(e)-(f) and 
Article 5(a) of the CEDAW, which, unusually, allow for some regulation of the ‘private 
sphere’, the CEDAW Committee used the precedent set in Velásquez Rodríguez v.
Honduras to apply the same notion of due diligence to violence against women by 
private actors, including the IACtHR’s conceptualisation of the four obligations of 
prevention, investigation, punishment and redress/compensation. The ‘feminist 
appropriation of the legal principle of due diligence’668 through the CEDAW 
Committee’s General Recommendation no. 19 allowed for the institutionalisation of 
‘broader notions of state responsibility for violence against women’669. This was quickly 
picked up by the transnational women’s movement who were pushing for a new 
international instrument on violence against women. As Stephanie Farrior describes, 
‘the due diligence standard was very much on their mind’670, and so it is unsurprising 
that the CEDAW Committee’s framing of the due standard was included in Article 
4(c) of the DEVAW. General Recommendation no. 19 is widely considered the most 
important of all the Committee’s recommendations671, and has been followed up by 
General Recommendation no. 35 in 2017, which argues that the norms within General 
Recommendation no. 19, including the due diligence standard, are now considered 
customary international law.672 Evidence of this can be seen in the jurisprudence of the 
666 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement, paragraph 176, 177.
667 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 42.
668 Paulina García-Del Moral and Megan Alexandra Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered 
politics of the public/private divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” Citizenship 
Studies, 18 (6-7), (2014): 661.
669 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 661.
670 Stephanie Farrior, “The Due Diligence Standard, Private Actors and Domestic Violence,” In Human 
Rights: From Practice to Policy - Proceedings of a Research Workshop Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy 
University of Michigan October 2010, edited by Carrie Booth Walling and Susan Waltz, (Michigan: 
University of Michigan, 2011), 3.
671 Dubravka imonovi, “Global and Regional Standards on Violence against Women: The Evolution 
and Synergy of the CEDAW and Istanbul Conventions,” Human Rights Quarterly, 36, (2014): 601. 
672 This is further supported by Special Rappourter Ertürk’s assessment of the due diligence standard in 
2006, where she argued there was evidence that ‘a rule of customary law that obliges States to prevent 
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CEDAW-OP, ECtHR and IACHR/IACtHR cases below. Alongside the cases under 
these bodies, the UN Special Rapporteur has given two thematic reports on due 
diligence that have built on and been used as part of a ‘recursive and iterative’673
process of institutionalising the feminist conceptualisation of the standard. This will 
now be considered in some depth.
CEDAW-OP cases and the due diligence standard
In 1999 the UN General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW, 
allowing the CEDAW Committee to receive individual complaints and to inquire into 
‘grave or systematic violations’. Shortly after it came into force in 2000, the Committee 
made three landmark judgements in response to individual complaints involving 
domestic violence. The first of these, A.T. v. Hungary, was brought in 2005 by the 
survivor, and the second and third, Goekce (deceased) v. Austria, and Yildirim (deceased) 
v. Austria, were brought in 2007 by an NGO that had supported both victims whilst 
they were alive. These cases have been significant in reinforcing domestic violence as a 
human rights violation and developing state responsibility for private violence. In all 
three of the original cases the CEDAW Committee used its judgements to make 
wider recommendations to all states. Through these cases the Committee expanded 
on the understanding of due diligence included in General Recommendation no. 19, 
elaborated on the exhaustion of local remedies, and advised on the conflict between 
the victim’s rights and the abuser’s right to privacy. The recommendations in A.T.,
Goecke and Yildrim built on the jurisprudence of the 2001 IACHR decision in Maria da 
Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, and went on to be highly influential in the ECHR case, 
Opuz v. Turkey (2009), which marked a significant shift in the European Court’s 
approach to due diligence and violence against women as discrimination. These
regional cases, which will be considered in turn, provided ‘discursive opportunity 
structures’674 for what Paulina García-Del Moral and Megan Dersnah describe as the 
‘recursive dialogue between the Inter-American institutions, [the European 
and respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence.’ United Nations, The due diligence 
standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk, E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), 
paragraph 29, available at http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2006/61.
673 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 671.
674 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 668.
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institutions,] the CEDAW Committee, and the SRVAW to strengthen the due 
diligence principle and to challenge the depoliticisation of violence against women.’675
Whilst the regional Courts are able to make decisions binding on member states, the 
non-binding judgements of the CEDAW Committee recommendations still represent 
the clearest international jurisprudence concerning the due diligence standard and state
responsibility to prevent violence against women, and contributed to the binding 
regional decisions.
A. T. v. Hungary676
In October 2003 A.T. submitted a communication to the CEDAW Committee on the 
grounds that she had suffered severe domestic violence since 1998 and the state had 
failed in its obligations to prevent, protect against, and punish domestic violence. A.T. 
stated that she had been subject to violence by her husband, L.F., since 1998 and 
during that time had received ten medical certifications substantiating her claims and 
demonstrating severe physical abuse. This abuse continued even after L.F. had left the 
family residence in 1999. Prior to submitting her communication A.T. had sought 
protection from the authorities and the courts through criminal and civil proceedings. 
Although criminal proceedings were brought against L.F. between 1999 and 2001, L.F. 
was not detained and A.T. was offered no protection. In 2003 the Budapest Regional 
Court granted L.F. access to the family home despite efforts to restrict his access. The 
court found that there was a lack of substantiation of A.T’s claims and the court could 
not deny L.F.’s right to property. Whilst appealing this judgement with the supreme 
court, A.T. submitted her communication to the CEDAW Committee on the grounds 
that Hungary had violated Articles 2(a), (b) and (e), 5(a), and 16. 
In this case the CEDAW Committee used the ‘prohibition of gender discrimination as 
the essential legal basis for a State’s obligation to combat domestic violence.’677 It is the 
675 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 668; This ‘recursive dialogue’ can be further 
see in the IACHR report discussing jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee, IACHR, Access To Justice 
For Women Victims Of Sexual Violence In Mesoamerica, (OAS/IACHR, 2011) available at 
www.oas.org/en/iachr/women/docs/pdf/WOMEN%20MESOAMERICA%20ENG.pdf 
676 A.T. v. Hungary, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, (comm. 2/2003), 
(2005).
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first international human rights decision to equate domestic violence with gender 
discrimination and is a landmark in the CEDAW Committee’s campaign to 
conceptualise domestic violence as a human rights violation. It relied heavily on 
General Recommendation no. 19 – reading domestic violence as ‘private acts’ for the 
conceptualisation of responsibility: ‘…States may also be responsible for private acts if 
they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations…’678 This creative 
interpretation of due diligence was used in this instance to ‘extend the substantive 
scope’ of the CEDAW and ‘its normative parameters’ to include the ‘private sphere’.679
In this sense, the due diligence principle was not only the measure used to determine 
state responsibility, but it was the crux of conceptualising what had happened to A.T. 
as a violation of her human rights, and establishing domestic violence, more broadly, as 
a human rights abuse. As Andrew Byrnes and Eleanor Bath argue, the jurisprudence 
regarding ‘the due diligence standard in relation to violence, particular in the family 
context’, is the ‘major substantive contribution thus far of the Committee under the 
individual complaints procedure’680. A. T. v. Hungary was the first time domestic 
violence was considered a human rights violation at the international level, and marked 
a concretising moment in the feminist conceptualisation of violence against women 
and state responsibility.
In relation to Article 2 the Committee referred to the state’s own admission that the 
remedies pursued by A.T. ‘were not capable of providing immediate protection to her 
against ill-treatment by her former partner.’681 With regard the denied detainment of 
L.F., the Committee emphasised the primacy of a woman’s rights to life and security, 
stating that they ‘cannot be superseded by other rights, including the right to property 
and the right to privacy.’682 Whilst this is certainly true, Jim Murdoch voices concern 
that such a simple assertion ‘seems to suggest a lack of appreciation of the content of 
677 Beate Rudolph and Andrea Eriksson, “Women’s rights under international human rights treaties: 
Issues of rape, domestic slavery, abortion and domestic violence,” International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, 5(3), (2007): 507.
678 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 19, 
11th session, A/47/38, (1992), paragraph 9.
679 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 16.
680 Andrew Byrnes and Eleanor Bath, “Violence Against Women, the Obligation of Due Diligence, and 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women – Recent Developments,” Human Rights Law Review, 8(3), (2008): 533.
681 A.T. v. Hungary, paragraph 5.6.
682 A.T. v. Hungary, paragraph 9.3.
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the obligation to protect against arbitrary deprivation of liberty’683, on behalf of the 
Committee. The concept of ‘competing rights’ is a great obstacle to domestic violence 
prevention and it is disappointing that the Committee didn’t elaborate further on its 
position. With regard Articles 5 and 16 the Committee pointed to the facts of the 
case, that A.T. was abused for four years and failed to be either protected, or offered 
redress, by the state, through criminal and civil proceedings, and the fact that there 
were inadequate means for her to escape this situation revealed ‘aspects of the 
relationships between the sexes and attitudes towards women that the Committee 
recognised vis-à-vis the country as a whole.’684 This significant appeal to the 
macrosystemic aetiology of violence against women in Hungary – calling out the 
widespread gender stereotyping and subordination of women – was one of the first 
international jurisprudential building blocks, for what would later be termed the duty of 
‘systemic due diligence’, by Special Rapporteur Manjoo685. In the same manner, the 
Committee also referenced its past recommendations to Hungary during the state
reporting process, three years prior to the case; further emphasising the duties states
have under Articles 2(e)-(f) and 5(a) and General Recommendations no. 19(11 – 12) 
and no. 35 (34 – 35) to transform attitudes and practices that are prejudicial and 
contribute at the macrosystemic level to violence against women: 
It [the Committee] has stated on many occasions that traditional attitudes by 
which women are regarded as subordinate to men contribute to violence 
against them. The Committee recognized those very attitudes when it 
considered the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Hungary in 2002. 
At that time it was concerned about the “persistence of entrenched traditional 
stereotypes regarding the role and responsibilities of women and men in the 
family ...”686
The Committee found that Hungary had violated articles 2(a), (b) and (e), 5(a), and 16 
and concluded that the state should ‘take immediate and effective measures to 
683 Jim Murdoch, “Unfulfilled expectations: the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” European Human Rights Law Review, 1, (2010): 34.
684 A.T. v. Hungary, paragraph 9.4.
685 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/23/49.
686 A.T. v. Hungary, paragraph 9.4.
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guarantee the physical and mental integrity of A. T. and her family,’687 including 
providing a home for A.T. and her family. It then went on to make general 
recommendations on the state’s responsibility to ‘[a]ssure victims of domestic violence 
the maximum protection of the law by acting with due diligence to prevent and 
respond to such violence against women.’688 Whilst it is disappointing that the 
Committee didn’t make a general recommendation on eliminating harmful stereotypes 
or traditional attitudes that perpetuate, or are tolerant of, domestic violence, A.T. v.
Hungary was a landmark case that had the effect of concretising the due diligence 
obligation to prevent violence against women. Perhaps most significantly, with regard 
the development of norms, it went on to provide the basis of the ECtHR’s decision in 
Opuz v. Turkey.
Goekce (deceased) v. Austria689 and Yildirim (deceased) v. Austria690
Goekce (deceased) v. Austria and Yildirim (deceased) v. Austria are very similar cases. 
Both women were killed by their husbands after a lengthy period of abuse, despite 
efforts by both women to seek assistance through the authorities and the courts. Both 
cases were brought by a non-governmental organisation that the victims had been 
clients of. Only the details of Goekce are considered below, as the Committee’s 
findings in Yildirim were ‘near identical’691. 
The applicants stated that the mental and physical abuse Sahide Goekce suffered 
began in 1999. On 2nd December Mustafa Goekce choked Sahide Goekce and 
threatened to kill her. The next day she reported this to the police who ordered a 
ten-day expulsion order prohibiting Mustafa from returning to the apartment. Mustafa 
was charged with bodily harm but was later acquitted. The violence continued and in 
2000 the police ordered another ten-day expulsion and requested the Public 
Prosecutor permit detaining Mustafa for ‘aggravated coercion’ on the basis of making a 
687 A.T. v. Hungary, paragraph 9.6.I(a).
688 A.T. v. Hungary, paragraph 9.6 (II) General (b).
689 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
(comm. 2/2005) (2007) 
690 Yildirim (deceased) v Austria, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
(comm. 6/2005) (2007)
691 Byrnes and Bath, “Violence Against Women, the Obligation of Due Dilligence, and the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women – Recent 
Developments,” 526.
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death threat to Sahide. This was denied. The police were repeatedly called out to the 
Goekce apartment to answer reports of ‘battering’ over the next two years and on 
the 8th October 2002 the police gave Mustafa a third expulsion order. Sahide pressed 
charges for causing bodily harm and the police again requested the Public Prosecutor 
permit detaining Mustafa but were again denied. On the 22nd October 2002 the 
district court gave an interim injunction prohibiting Mustafa to return to the Goekce 
apartment for three months. Mustafa violated this injunction and both Sahide’s brother 
and father reported his threats to kill Sahide to the police, although no record was 
kept of their statements. On the 5th December 2002 the Public Prosecutor stopped 
prosecutions against Mustafa for causing bodily harm on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence. On the 7th December Mustafa shot and killed Sahide in their family home in 
front of their two daughters. The applicants state that the authorities had been 
informed that Mustafa had a gun even though he was prohibited from having a gun but 
that this was not looked into. The applicants claim that Austria had violated article 1, 2, 
3 and 5 of the covenant and failed to fulfil its obligations under General 
Recommendation no. 19.
Austria claimed the communication was inadmissible. Sahide had withdrawn claims, 
refused to testify, and failed to challenge the Public Prosecutor at the Constitutional 
Court. The CEDAW Committee held the communication as admissible, explaining 
that the purpose of the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule was to provide a state
with the opportunity to remedy an alleged violation. The Committee also considered 
the relationship between the allegations made by the complainant and the need to 
exhaust domestic remedies: 
The Committee considered that the allegations made relating to the obligation 
of the State party to have exercised due diligence to protect Sahide Goekce 
were at the heart of the communication and were of great relevance to the 
heirs. Thus, the question as to whether domestic remedies had been exhausted 
in accordance with article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol must be 
examined in relation to these allegations.692
Austria appealed this decision and gave further grounds for inadmissibility. It argued 
692 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, paragraph 7.4.
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that Sahide ‘as a private individual, would have been free to bring an action, known as 
“associated prosecution” against her husband after the Public Prosecutor decided to 
drop the charges against him’693 and in failing to do so she had not exhausted local 
remedies. Again the Committee denied claims of inadmissibility. Most importantly the 
Committee held that ‘in a situation of protracted domestic violence and threats of 
violence’694 this provision was not a realistic remedy to Sahide. The Committee’s 
position on exhaustion of domestic remedies has been praised; and is in keeping with 
readings of due diligence that require effective and de facto protection of rights. 
Similarly, on the merits of the case the Committee highlighted that whilst Austria had 
fulfilled obligations under Article 2 and General Recommendation no.19 through 
comprehensive legal and political measures, the de facto enjoyment of those rights 
were missing and the fulfilment of those rights comprise an obligation of due diligence 
on the state. The Committee explained that this obligation is incumbent on all state
actors:
[T]o enjoy the practical realization of the principle of equality of men and 
women and of her human rights and fundamental freedoms, the political will that 
is expressed in the aforementioned comprehensive system of Austria must be 
supported by State actors, who adhere to the State party’s due diligence 
obligations.695
This is an encouraging affirmation of the state’s due diligence responsibilities across the 
range of its actors. Despite three expulsion orders and two requests for detainment 
orders, the statements of Sahide, her father, and her brother, the threats made against 
Sahide’s life were not taken seriously and investigated. This all evidences a failure on 
the part of the Austrian authorities to act with due diligence. The position of the 
Committee also reinforces the importance of substantive and transformative equality, 
rather than mere de jure equality, as outlined in the norms of primary prevention in 
Chapter 3. In this way the Goecke decision echoes the IACtHR decision in Velásquez 
Rodríguez v. Honduras where the Court found on the state’s responsibility to ‘ensure 
693 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, paragraph 11.3.
694 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, paragraph 11.3.
695 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, paragraph 12.1.2, this was common to Yildirim (deceased) v Austria, 
paragraph 12.1.2.
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and fulfil’ human rights, as outlined above, and the positive duties this entails on the 
state. Whilst the Committee didn’t feel it necessary to make findings on Article 5 it did 
recognise that there were ‘linkages between traditional attitudes by which women are 
regarded as subordinate and domestic violence.’696 It is disappointing, however, that 
the Committee didn’t expand further on this and make explicit findings on Article 5 as 
it is highly likely that these ‘traditional attitudes’ contributed to the gap between the de 
jure provisions that outlaw domestic violence and the de facto protection that was 
afforded Sahide and contributed to her death. 
As well as clarifying the state’s duty to act with due diligence, the Committee also 
went on to consider the conflict of rights that occurs when advocating detainment. It is 
disappointing, however, that in its explanation it only cited its position in A.T. v. 
Hungary, that ‘the perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede the women’s rights to life and 
to physical and mental integrity’, and didn’t expand on this at all. This said, the 
Committee’s position has been influential in other cases dealing with domestic 
violence and the right to privacy. For example, in Opuz v. Turkey697 the opinion of the 
Committee on the supremacy of women’s rights to physical and mental integrity 
influenced the ECHR’s position on detainment and the perpetrator’s right to privacy.698
The Committee held that whilst Austria punished Mustafa to the full extent of the law 
for the murder of Sahide, the state had violated Article 2 (a) and (c) through (f) and 
Article 3 in conjunction with Article 1 and General Recommendation no. 19. This case 
shows clearly the separate elements of the due diligence obligation. It is not simply the 
duty of state’s to make domestic violence illegal and punishable; it has a separate legal 
human rights obligation to prevent it. In its recommendations the Committee once 
more emphasised the importance of implementation, alongside legislation and national 
action plans, and stressed the state’s responsibility to prevent violence against women, 
calling on the state to:
Strengthen implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the Protection 
696 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, paragraph 12.2.
697 Opuz v. Turkey, Application No. 33401/02, [2009], ECHR.
698 Patricia Londono, “Developing human rights principles in cases of gender-based violence: Opuz v. 
Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Review, 9(4), (2009): 663. 657 –
667.
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against Violence within the Family and related criminal law, by acting with due 
diligence to prevent and respond to such violence against women and 
adequately providing for sanctions for the failure to do so…699
The CEDAW Committee has further affirmed the due diligence obligation to prevent 
in a number of key cases, and has regularly linked its conceptualisation of violence 
against women in General Recommendation no. 19 with duties under Article 5(a) to 
modify and transform culture. In this way the application of due diligence within the 
CEDAW-OP cases help further establish norms concerning primary prevention. This 
jurisprudence went on to shape the recommendations in Karen Tayag Vertido v. the 
Philippines (2010), V.K. v. Bulgaria (2011), V.P.P. v. Bulgaria (2012), CaseIsatou Jallow v. 
Bulgaria (2012), Cecilia Kell v. Canada (2012), Angela González Carreño v. Spain (2014), 
R.P.B. v. The Philippines (2014), and X and Y v. Georgia (2015). In one of the 
Committee’s most recent complaints, X and Y v. Georgia, the authors argued:
that there exists a sociocultural pattern of conduct in the State party that 
accords greater weight to the word of a man and that accepts a level of physical 
violence and sexual touching as being within the realms of acceptable parenting 
for a man. Customs and social patterns also perpetuate discrimination and 
prejudices based on the idea of inferiority or superiority. The authors add that 
the State party did not contest those discriminatory practices, social and cultural 
patterns of conduct and prejudices outlined in the communication, nor provide 
evidence indicating steps to modify or eliminate them.700
In response the Committee concluded that the state had failed in its duty:
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by 
any person, organization or enterprise; and to take all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and 
practices that constitute discrimination against women. It also considers that the 
above-mentioned facts show a failure by the State party in its duty to take all 
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
699 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, CEDAW (comm. 2/2005) (2007) paragraph 12.3(a).
700 X and Y v Georgia, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, (comm. 
24/2009) (2015) paragraph 8.7.
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men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices that are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women.701
The jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee has served to establish the due 
diligence obligation to prevent, and by linking this to the positive obligations of the 
state under Article 5(a), has furthered the feminist appropriation of the due diligence 
standard. The approach of the CEDAW committee has been further bolstered and 
expanded by the 2006 and 2013 thematic reports of the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women. In fact, García-Del Moral and Dersnah argue that ‘the active 
framing efforts of the CEDAW Committee to institutionalise due diligence within the 
UN were concretised chiefly through the work of the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women.’702 In their reports, Special Rapporteurs Ertürk and Manjoo look at the 
broader preventative duties of the state, and establish state responsibility within a 
normative context that understands violence against women as a continuum operating 
across multiple social locations. The thematic reports built on the first Rapporteur’s 
approach to due diligence, who said of state responsibility that ‘a State that does not 
act against crimes of violence against women is as guilty as the perpetrators.’703 In her 
1999 report on domestic violence, Special Rapporteur Coomaraswarmy also 
developed a list of measures that are incumbent upon states in their compliance with 
their due diligence obligation to prevent. As a starting point for her 2006 report, 
Special Rapporteur Ertürk recalls this list: 
ratification of international human rights instruments; constitutional guarantees of 
equality for women; the existence of national legislation and/or administrative 
sanctions providing adequate redress for women victims of violence; policies or 
plans of action that deal with the issue of violence against women; the gender-
sensitivity of the criminal justice system and police; accessibility and availability of 
support services; the existence of measures to raise awareness and modify 
701 X and Y v Georgia, paragraph 8.7.
702 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 666.
703 United Nations, Violence in the family and domestic violence: Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, E/CN.4/1996/53, (5 
February 1996), paragraph 26, available from http://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1996/53
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discriminatory policies in the field of education and the media, and the collection 
of data and statistics concerning violence against women.704
The 2006 and 2013 thematic reports sort to expand on the concept and negotiate its 
legal and sociopolitical framing within international human rights law. Arguably, the 
work of the Special Rapporteur has proven ‘instrumental … in adapting the due 
diligence standard from a feminist intersectional perspective.’705
The expansion of the standard through the work of the Special Rapporteur
In her 2006 report, Special Rapporteur Ertürk characterised the concept of due 
diligence as ‘a yardstick to determine whether a state has met or failed to meet its 
obligations in combating violence against women.’706 The report considered the 
jurisprudence of the regional courts and the development of standards through the 
UN fora, concluding that, on the basis of the opinio juris outlined in the report, ‘there is 
a rule of customary international law that obliges states to prevent and respond to acts 
of violence against women with due diligence.’707 This pronouncement of customary 
international law status went on to affect the case law of the European and Inter-
American Courts708 and was used as a conclusive factor in determining admissibility in 
the landmark domestic violence case, Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States 
(2011). The Special Rapporteur argued that the concept was well established but 
there remained ‘a lack of clarity concerning its scope and content’709. Consequently, 
she argued, ‘[t]he application of [the] due diligence standard, to date, has tended to be 
State-centric and limited to responding to violence when it occurs, largely neglecting 
704 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 32.
705 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 666.
706 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 14.
707 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 29.
708 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 79
709 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 14.
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the obligation to prevent and compensate and the responsibility of non-State actors.’710
With regard to prevention the Special Rapporteur noted that states have 
‘concentrated on legislative reform access to justice and the provision of services... 
[whilst] relatively little work [has been] done on the more general obligation of 
prevention, including the duty to transform patriarchal gender structures.’711 Further to 
understanding the scope of prevention required, the Special Rapporteur also stressed 
that due diligence obligations must be implemented in good faith. This is a general 
principle of international law and means due diligence should be result-based and 
effective. With the intended effect being prevention of violence against women, 
approaches that merely criminalise violence against women, without any wider 
preventative strategy, obviously don’t meet the criteria of a good faith implementation. 
Similarly, due diligence must hold up to the fundamental rules of international human 
rights law, including non-discrimination. It is important to resist actors who would 
characterise failure to act with due diligence as invoking ‘indirect’ state responsibility. 
This terminology is used to suggest a lesser degree of culpability. There are no ‘shades 
of culpability’712 and it must be reinforced that failing to act with due diligence to the 
detriment of a women’s freedom from gender-based violence is no less a violation of 
her rights than causing her suffering. As has previously been stated, it is vital that the 
discourse does not elevate state violence, which disproportionately affects men, over 
private violence, which disproportionately affects women. As such, ‘States are required 
to use the same level of commitment in relation to prevention, investigation, 
punishment and provision of remedies for violence against women as they do with 
regards to the other forms of violence.’713 Whilst the capacity of the State is taken into 
account when determining reasonableness, ‘[i]nadequate resources are not a valid 
excuse for failing to act with diligence because State resources “must be allocated on a 
non-discriminatory basis.”’714 With the application of good faith and non-discrimination, 
710 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 15.
711 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 15.
712 Gordon. Christenson, “Attributing Acts of Omission to the State,” Michigan Journal of International 
Law, (12), (1991): 350.
713 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 35.
714 Julie Goldscheid and Debra Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and 
its Perils,” Cornell International Law Journal, 48, (2015): 311.
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the measures included in the due diligence obligation to prevent stretch to issues of 
gender-budgeting as well as legislation and policy. However, the Special Rapporteur 
noted a far more limited appreciation of the standard by states:
As a general rule, States have sought to discharge their due diligence obligations 
of prevention of violence against women through the adoption of specific 
legislation, the development of awareness-raising campaigns and the provision of 
training for specified professional groups […] These programmes tend to view 
violence against women as a stand-alone issue and there are relatively few 
examples of linkages being made between violence and other systems of 
oppression.715
Whilst some state had preventative programmes in place, the Special Rapporteur 
noted that there was little attention to primary prevention and the positive obligations 
of the state under Article 2(e)-(f) and 5(a) or General Recommendation no. 19, 
paragraphs 11 and 12. The Special Rapporteur concluded that there was a lack of 
‘State engagement in overall societal transformation to demystify prevailing gender 
biases or to provide support to civil society initiatives in this regard.’716 The Special 
Rapporteur characterised this blindness to structural inequality as a consequence of 
the ongoing public/private dichotomy operating in the international human rights law
discourse.717 The dominance of individualist, masculinist portrayals of human rights have 
meant that responsibility for prevention, as understood by the state, has lacked 
appreciation of the ‘complex and intersecting relations of power in the public and 
private spheres of life that lie at the heart of sex discrimination.’718 The Special 
Rapporteur argued that this was down to the ‘narrow interpretation’719 of the law 
715 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 38.
716 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
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E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 46.
717 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 56.
718 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 56.
719 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 57.
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rather than the discourse itself, and that what was needed was to ‘re-imagine the [due 
diligence] standard so that it responds more effectively to violence against women.’720
Special Rapporteur Manjoo continued this work of ‘re-imagining’, and picked up on the 
themes of prevention and gender transformation at the sociocultural level in her 2013 
report on state responsibility for eliminating violence against women.721 The report 
highlighted the importance of the due diligence standard for rights holders in contexts 
where a violation is based on a state’s failure to fulfil rights. The Special Rapporteur 
argued that the standard is ‘especially important where the potential infringement 
comes through a State’s failure to act, as it can be difficult for rights bearers to assess if 
an omission constituted a violation of their rights, in the absence of a normative basis 
for the appraisal.’722 The report highlighted the precedent set in Velásquez Rodríguez, 
and the jurisprudence concerning the state’s positive obligations to ensure rights. The 
report also reiterated the wider norms and principles that must inform the application 
of the standard, including: ‘universality, inalienability, equality, non-discrimination, 
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness; and the principles related to the 
respect, protect and fulfil goals of human rights.’723 In the context of prevention this 
‘entails the use of all means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature to 
promote the protection of human rights’724.
Special Rapporteur Manjoo recalled the 2006 report by Special Rapporteur Ertürk, 
which ‘highlighted the lack of State accountability for social structural deficiencies, such 
as ongoing gender discrimination, that create environments that are conducive to acts 
720 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 74.
721 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013).
722 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 13.
723 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 76.
724 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 15.
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of violence against women.’725 From this perspective, the Special Rapporteur went on 
to consider the relationship between the conceptualisation of violence against women 
as structural and systemic and the framing of due diligence prevention. Mirroring 
Heise’s social ecology model the Special Rapporteur argued that violence against 
women needs to be understood as ‘underpinned by a complex interplay of individual, 
family, community, economic and social factors’726, and as such preventative measures 
must reflect the duties of the state at the individual and systemic levels. This means:
recognizing that State responsibility to act with due diligence is both a systemic-
level responsibility, i.e. the responsibility of States to create good and effective 
systems and structures that address the root causes and consequences of 
violence against women; and also an individual-level responsibility, i.e., the 
responsibility of States to provide each victim with effective measures of 
prevention, protection, punishment and reparation.727
The report goes on to recommend a new framework for due diligence that separates 
the ‘standard into two categories: individual due diligence and systemic due 
diligence.’728 The delineation of this concept allows for greater accountability, 
particularly at the systemic level, where the public/private dichotomy has worked to 
obscure the state’s role and responsibility. It makes clear that the state has a duty to 
the individual, but also emphasises the framing of the DEVAW, Beijing Platform, and 
General Recommendation no. 19, by highlighting the state’s obligations beyond the 
individual level, ‘to create a functioning system to eliminate violence against women.’729
The report introduced the terminology ‘systemic due diligence’, which acted to 
institutionalise the concept of primary prevention within the discourse surrounding 
725 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 20.
726 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 20.
727 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 20
728 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 70.
729 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 70.
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state responsibility. This further concretised the feminist appropriation of the standard 
as applied by the CEDAW Committee and regional Courts. Special Rapporteur 
Manjoo outlined the duty of systemic due diligence as: 
the obligations States must take to ensure a holistic and sustained model of 
prevention, protection, punishment and reparations for acts of violence against 
women. At a systemic level, States can meet their responsibility to protect, 
prevent and punish by, among other things, adopting or modifying legislation; 
developing strategies, action plans and awareness-raising campaigns and 
providing services; reinforcing the capacities and power of police, prosecutors 
and judges; adequately resourcing transformative change initiatives; and holding 
accountable those who fail to protect and prevent, as well as those who 
perpetrate violations of human rights of women. Also, States have to be involved 
more concretely in overall societal transformation to address structural and 
systemic gender inequality and discrimination.730
The focus on societal transformation picked up on the jurisprudence of the regional 
courts both in its decisions on prevention and reparations. As well as being involved in 
‘societal transformation’ as a systemic due diligence obligation of prevention, the 
standard applied to redress and reinforced the evolving norm of transformative 
remedies:
The due diligence obligation in respect of remedies cannot be just about 
returning women to the situation they were in before the individual instance of 
violence, but instead should strive to have a transformative potential. This implies 
that remedies should aspire, to the extent possible, to subvert instead of 
reinforce pre-existing patterns of cross-cutting structural subordination, gender 
hierarchies, systemic marginalization and structural inequalities that may be at the 
root cause of the violence that women experience … [T]he notion of a right to 
reparation is located within the framework of the law of remedies and can serve 
730 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 71.
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both individual and societal goals […]731
Whilst reparations are not a preventative measure, the framing of the standard to 
include the root causes and systemic nature of violence against women, furthers the 
norms and principles of primary prevention, and strengthens the duty of systemic due 
diligence as it applies to prevention. Systemic due diligence challenges the state’s 
‘dominant focus on protection and prosecution’732 by centring the feminist 
conceptualisation of violence against women as gendered and discriminatory, and 
spotlighting the state’s responsibility to eliminate, rather than just respond to, violence 
against women. In calling for ‘the combatting of gender stereotypes, tackling gendered 
economic inequalities, and providing access to political empowerment and decision-
making’733, the standard of systemic due diligence ‘challenges the notion that gender 
violence is a phenomenon distinct from the wider field of gender equality and 
women’s rights.’734 The conceptualisation of the standard of systemic due diligence is 
intimately connected with the norms of primary prevention, as outlined in Chapter 3, 
and the framing of violence against women as gendered, discriminatory, and systemic, 
as outlined in Chapter 2. The expansion of the due diligence obligation to prevent 
violence against women is in keeping with the broader understanding of the standard 
as evolutionary and context-specific by nature: ‘the degree of diligence pivots on the 
primary rules [therefore…] changes to the primary rules will also affect the standard of 
care expected.’735 As outlined above, the understanding of reasonableness and 
appropriate means (the agreed framing of the standard) can evolve as the 
understanding of risk becomes clearer; as the methods of prevention become more 
obvious; and, as the primary rule itself becomes more widely accepted. As violence 
against women has moved from being understood as a ‘private matter’ to a ‘pandemic 
human rights violation’, so has the understanding of reasonableness and responsibility. 
Likewise, as evidence has grown to support the link between the systemic and the 
individual, and between gender inequality and violence, so has the understanding of 
731 United Nations, State responsibility for eliminating violence against women: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013), paragraph 75.
732 Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils,” 
308.
733 Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils,” 
309.
734 Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils,” 
309.
735 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 21.
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what constitutes ‘all appropriate means’. As outlined in the introduction to the due 
diligence standard, the measures deemed appropriate are also subject to scientific and 
technical developments in the field of the primary rule: 
Advances in scientific understanding […] can also increase the degree of care 
required over time. The extent of risk or advances in scientific knowledge that 
allow us to perceive more accurately the extent of risk (either higher or lower) 
will also influence the degree of diligence required.736
In the field of violence against women and primary prevention, the research has 
developed a strong consensus that gender inequality is a causal risk; not just a 
‘contributory factor’ but a ‘determinant’ of violence against women.737 This 
understanding is supported by the expertise of women’s organisations, who when 
surveyed as part of a global assessment of the due diligence standard, ‘cited gender 
inequality as the risk factor that most increased the prevalence of VAW.’738 Our 
perception of risk – of both its nature and extent – as it relates to violence against 
women has evolved and influenced the ‘degree of diligence required’. ‘Systemic due 
diligence’ articulates this increased diligence, and gives the evolution of the standard 
orthodoxy within the discourse. 
This evolution is picked up in the 2016 framework for prevention outlined by the ‘Due 
Diligence Project’.739 It covers ten measure that should shape prevention programmes 
as states look to fulfil their obligations of due diligence. Leading amongst the 
recommendations are measures aimed at the systemic or primary level:
1. Targeting Underlying Causes of VAW
Effective preventive strategies address underlying causes of VAW and seek to 
eliminate tolerance and acceptance of VAW while incorporating a human rights 
736 ILA, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law: Second Report, July 2016, 21.
737 “Policy Brief: International Evidence on the Effectiveness of Prevention Initiatives,” Our Watch, 7, 
accessed November 9, 2018, www.ourwatch.org.au/getmedia/50e1f9de-9d7b-4236-a300-
91087d3eb9e6/Accessible_Policy_Brief_3_International_Evidence_Base.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf
738 Zarizana Abdul Aziz and Janine Moussa, Due Diligence Framework: State Accountability Framework for 
Eliminating Violence against Women, (International Human Rights Initiative, 2016), 17, available at 
www.duediligenceproject.org/ewExternalFiles/Due%20Diligence%20 Framework%20Report%20Z.pdf.
739 Zarizana Abdul Aziz and Janine Moussa, Due Diligence Framework: State Accountability Framework for 
Eliminating Violence against Women, (International Human Rights Initiative, 2016).
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framework, exposing the relationship between gender inequality and VAW.
2. Transforming Society: Changing Mindsets and Modifying Behaviour
Effective preventive measures not only specifically target VAW but also aim to 
transform social perceptions, attitudes and behaviours that cause, support and 
tolerate VAW. They must be aimed at changing mindsets and modifying 
behaviour to reject VAW, its justifications and excuses. These are embedded in 
gender inequality, gender discrimination and negative socio-cultural-religious 
perceptions of women that reinforce hegemonic notions of masculinity and 
femininity and the institutions that propagate them.
3. Eliminating Risk Factors
Preventive programmes must challenge negative socio-cultural norms and those 
that support male authority and control over women and sanction or condone 
VAW. Strengthening women’s economic and legal rights and eliminating gender 
inequalities in access to formal wage employment and secondary education 
would lay concrete foundations in preventing VAW.740
In García-Del Moral and Dersnah’s analysis of the due diligence standard as it applies 
to violence against women, they outlined ‘three key moments’741 that institutionalised 
and anchored the ‘feminist appropriation’ of the standard. These were ‘the explicit 
incorporation of the so-called private sphere into notions of violence by private actors, 
the split between systemic and individual due diligence, and the framing of due 
diligence as customary international law.’742 The work of the Special Rapporteur has 
been pivotal in all three moments. However, the work of the Special Rapporteur, and 
the jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee, has been part of a wider ‘dialogical 
740 Zarizana Abdul Aziz and Janine Moussa, Due Diligence Framework: State Accountability Framework for 
Eliminating Violence against Women, (International Human Rights Initiative, 2016), 79 – 80: Measures 4 –
10 include: Providing Outreach and Ending Isolation; Broadening the Scope of VAW Programmes; 
Formulating Comprehensive Laws and Constitutional Guarantees; Collecting Data and Designing 
Programmes; Incorporating Intersectionality and Providing for At-risk Groups; Maintaining a Sustained 
Strategy; Collaborating with Women’s/Feminist Organizations.
741 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 671.
742 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 671.
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process’743, which includes the case law of the regional human rights bodies. This 
understanding of due diligence and prevention has been further defined and 
strengthened through the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights744 and the European Court of 
Human Rights. The expansion of the standard is also evident in treaties at the regional 
level. An in-depth look at the case law of the European and Inter-American systems 
will highlight this evolution. Whilst the obligations of individual and systemic 
responsibility are not as clearly delineated in the language of the regional bodies’ case 
law, evidence of the norms of primary prevention and systemic due diligence are clear 
in their decisions and recommendations on prevention and reparations.
The European Court of Human Rights and the due diligence obligation to prevent 
The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention, was adopted in 2011 
and came into force in 2014. As discussed in the previous chapters, it marks a 
significant leap forward in terms of conceptualising prevention and state responsibility. 
Whilst problems may arise because of its gender-neutral approach to domestic 
violence745, it is arguably ‘the most comprehensive victim supporting regional treaty 
that currently exists.’746 The Istanbul Convention frames violence against women as 
both a human rights violation and a form of discrimination, and encompasses a 
substantive equality approach to prevention and elimination of violence against 
women: ‘Recognising that the realisation of de jure and de facto equality between 
743 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 667.
744 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe Communication no. 245/02 [2006] ACHPR, 
paragraph 143:
The ACmHPR states that ‘Human rights standards do not contain merely limitations on State’s authority 
or organs of State. They also impose positive obligations on States to prevent and sanction private 
violations of human rights. Indeed, human rights law imposes obligations on States to protect citizens or 
individuals under their jurisdiction from the harmful acts of others. Thus, an act by a private individual 
and therefore not directly imputable to a State can generate responsibility of the State, not because of 
the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or for not taking the 
necessary steps to provide the victims with reparation.’ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. 
Zimbabwe Communication no. 245/02 [2006] ACHPR, paragraph 143
745 See Chapter 3 on gender specificity.
746 Jackie Jones, “The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Council of Europe 
Convention on Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention),” In The Legal 
Protection From Violence: Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law, Rashida Manjoo and Jackie 
Jones, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018): 140.
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women and men is a key element in the prevention of violence against women’747. 
Article 5 outlines the due diligence principle, in line with General Recommendation no. 
19 and the DEVAW Art 4(c):
Article 5 – State obligations and due diligence
Parties shall refrain from engaging in any act of violence against women and 
ensure that State authorities, officials, agents, institutions and other actors 
acting on behalf of the State act in conformity with this obligation.
Parties shall take the necessary legislative and other measures to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and provide reparation for acts of 
violence covered by the scope of this Convention that are perpetrated by 
non-State actors.
Article 12 (General obligations) further outlines what is included in the obligation to 
prevent violence against women, including the transformation of ‘social and cultural 
patterns of behaviour of women and men with a view to eradicating prejudices, 
customs, traditions and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority of women or on stereotyped roles for women and men’ (Article 12 (1)); 
and taking the ‘necessary measures to promote programmes and activities for the 
empowerment of women’ (Article 12 (6)). The Convention also outlines preventative 
measures in Article 13 (Awareness-raising), Article 14 (Education), Article 15 (Training 
professionals), Article 16 (Preventive intervention and treatment programmes), and 
Article 17 (Participation of the private sector and the media). The Convention builds 
on jurisprudence concerning due diligence and prevention established in the European 
system, ‘codifying some of the most important cases from the ECtHR’748. 
In Airey v. Ireland (1979) the European Court of Human Rights first ‘established that in 
certain circumstances the state has a duty to provide resources to individuals to 
747 The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, Istanbul, 11 May 2011, CETS No.210. Preamble, available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210
748 Jones, “The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Council of Europe Convention 
on Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention),” 161.
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prevent violations of their rights.’749 The Court didn’t go so far as to say that the state 
has an obligation to provide victims of domestic violence with specific support, but it 
did recognise that due diligence was not merely a duty to respect human rights but 
implied an obligation of ‘positive action on the part of the State.’750 The Court built on 
this in Osman v. United Kingdom (1998), where the Court applied a similar standard of 
due diligence to the Velásquez Rodríguez ruling, recognising that a state’s international 
responsibility ‘extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in 
place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the 
person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and 
sanctioning of breaches of such provisions.’751 The Court suggested that state
responsibility ‘may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation 
on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual 
whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.’752 The Court went on 
to expand this approach in cases relating to violence against women, in M.C. v. Bulgaria, 
Kontrova v. Slovakia, Bevacqua and S v. Bulgaria, Opuz v. Turkey, E.S. and Others v.
Slovakia, and A v. Croatia. The Court’s approach to violence against women has:
- emphasised the positive obligations of the state (as in Kontrova753); - rejected notions of the public/private dichotomy (as in Bevacqua and S v.
Bulgaria where the Court dismissed the state’s characterisation of domestic 
violence as a ‘private matter’754); and,- challenged the burden of proof in cases of rape and domestic violence (as in 
M.C. v. Bulgaria where the Court eliminated the requirement of force from any 
definition of rape755). 
However, there have been ‘discrepancies’ in the Court’s case law, ‘established in part 
through use of the margin of appreciation.’756 Brooke Stedman argues there has been 
749 Ronagh McQuigg, “What potential does the Council of Europe Convention on Violence against 
Women hold as regards domestic violence?” The International Journal of Human Rights, 16(7), (2012): 
957.
750 Airey v Ireland, Series A, No 32 [1979] ECHR, paragraph 25 – 26.
751 Osman v United Kingdom, Reports 1998-VIII 87/1997/871/1083 [1998] ECHR, paragraph 115.
752 Osman v United Kingdom, paragraph 115.
753 Kontrova v Slovakia, Application no. 7510/04 [2006] ECHR, paragraph 50.
754 Bevacqua and S. v Bulgaria, Application no. 71127/01 [2008] ECHR, paragraph 65.
755 M.C. v. Bulgaria, Application no. 39272/98 [2003] ECHR.
756 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 
12.
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an element of cultural relativism in the Court’s application of universal human rights 
standards to cases of domestic violence, with the result being ‘inconsistent judgments 
and varying perceptions of the norms regarding women’s rights.’757 Similarly, Patricia 
Londono argues that whilst the Court has developed the notions of positive 
obligations in cases dealing with violence against women, the ‘articulation of these
issues as inequality issues’ has been ‘missing’758. The Court has on numerous occasions 
failed to find violations under Article 14 – the prohibition of discrimination – when 
considering cases of violence against women. Londono goes on to say: ‘the absence of 
this discrimination component is conspicuous.’759 Certainly in its early cases, the Court’s 
inconsistent and gender-blind jurisprudence is evident. However, this changed 
markedly with Opuz v. Turkey (2009), where the ECtHR, impacted by the ‘interpretive 
widening and thickening’760 at the international level (A.T v. Hungary, CEDAW 2005) 
and in the Inter-American system (Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, IACHR 
2001), went on to establish domestic violence as a human rights abuse rooted in 
gender discrimination. The impact of the ‘normative environment’761 surrounding the 
ECtHR, and the feminist conceptualisation of the due diligence standard, can clearly be 
seen in this landmark case.
Opuz v. Turkey
The case involved a man, Huseyin Opuz (H.O.), who had repeatedly threatened, and 
subjected his wife and mother-in-law to serious physical violence, including driving a 
car into them. He had beaten Nahide, his wife, for the entirety of their marriage, and 
had stabbed Nahide with a knife seven times, resulting in life-threatening wounds and 
hospitalisation. The authorities decided not to prosecute as they believed there was 
insufficient evidence, and the Prosecutor believed there was ‘no public interest in 
757 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 
12.
758 Londono, “Developing human rights principles in cases of gender-based violence: Opuz v. Turkey in 
the European Court of Human Rights,” 657.
759 Londono, “Developing human rights principles in cases of gender-based violence: Opuz v. Turkey in 
the European Court of Human Rights,” 658.
760 Vibeke Blaker Strand, “Interpreting the ECHR in its normative environment: interaction between the 
ECHR, the UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the UN 
convention on the rights of the child,” The International Journal of Human Rights, (2019): 3. 
761 Blaker Strand, “Interpreting the ECHR in its normative environment: interaction between the ECHR, 
the UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the UN 
convention on the rights of the child,” 4.
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pursuing the case’762. H.O. repeatedly issued death threats to Nahide and her mother. 
After each assault H.O. was only temporarily detained by the police. Nahide and her 
mother filed complaints with the Prosecutor but were later coerced into withdrawing 
them. Following Turkish legislation, when the complaints were withdrawn the 
Prosecutor stopped proceedings. In their dealings with Nahide and her mother, the 
police characterised the violence as a ‘private matter’, despite Nahide’s mother’s 
insistence ‘that her life was in immediate danger’763. In 2002, a month after Nahide had 
contacted the police again, H.O. shot and killed Nahide’s mother. H.O. received a life 
sentence for the murder of Nahide’s mother, but was released from custody pending 
an appeal, claiming he killed Nahide’s mother ‘for the sake of his honour and 
children.’764 The police dropped the protection order that Nahide had taken out 
against H.O. and he continued to threaten Nahide. The authorities only began to act 
once Nahide had put an application into the Court. Nahide argued that the state had 
violated her rights under Article 3 (prohibition of torture) in combination with Article 
14 (prohibition of discrimination), and violated her mother’s rights under Article 2 
(right to life) in combination with Article 14. Interights acted as a third-party 
intervener.
The Court confirmed its approach in Osman, that under Article 2, the state has 
positive duties to take preventative action765. Utilising its decision in E v. United 
Kingdom, and affirming that due diligence is an obligation of means not result, ‘the 
Court held that, whilst it could not be predicted with accuracy that the outcome 
would have been different’766 had the state acted differently, ‘failure to take reasonable 
measures which could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating 
harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State.’767 The Court referenced 
A.T. v. Turkey, Yildrim (deceased) v. Austria, General Recommendation no. 19, and 
Article 4(c) of the DEVAW in support of its decision that the state had failed in its 
duty of due diligence to prevent violence against women768. Of particular significance, is 
the Court’s reference to Special Rapporteur Ertürk’s 2006 report, wherein she argues 
762 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 21.
763 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 51.
764 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 51.
765 Osman v United Kingdom, paragraph 115.
766 Londono, “Developing human rights principles in cases of gender-based violence: Opuz v. Turkey in 
the European Court of Human Rights,” 661.
767 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 136.
768 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 149.
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‘that there is a rule of customary international law that “obliges States to prevent and 
respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence”.’769
In assessing the state’s alleged failure to act with due diligence, the Court considered 
the state’s claim that ‘any attempt by the authorities to separate the applicant and her 
husband would have amounted to a breach of their right to family life [Article 8]’770. 
The Court – referencing the CEDAW Committee’s findings in A.T. v. Hungary and
Yildrim (deceased) v. Austria – found that ‘“the authorities” view that no assistance was 
required as the dispute concerned a “private matter” was incompatible with their 
positive obligations to secure the enjoyment of the applicants’ rights’771, and that ‘in 
domestic violence cases perpetrators’ rights cannot supersede victims’ human rights to 
life and to physical and mental integrity.’772
In reference to the state’s discontinuation of enforcement and prosecution after 
Nahide withdrew her complaints, Interights submitted that ‘the national authorities 
failed to act with due diligence to prevent violence against women.’773 They further 
claimed that ‘the jus cogens nature of the right to freedom from torture and the right 
to life required exemplary diligence on the part of the State […]’774 As in the precedent 
set by Yildrim, Interights further emphasised ‘that the due diligence obligation to 
prevent must go beyond legislation’ to ‘ensure effective implementation.’775 The Court 
agreed with the standard set in Yildrim, stating that, ‘aside’ from the state’s legislative 
framework, the Court’s judgement ‘must also consider whether the local authorities 
displayed due diligence to protect the right to life of the applicant’s mother in other 
respects.’776 It also claimed that the ‘State’s positive obligation to take preventive 
operational measures’ should have been ‘consonant with the gravity of the situation’777. 
Mirroring broader norms around due diligence and the severity of harm in question, 
the Court held that the ‘seriousness of the risk to the applicant’s mother rendered 
769 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 79.
770 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 140.
771 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 144.
772 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 147.
773 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 125.
774 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 125.
775 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 127.
776 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 146.
777 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 146.
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such intervention by the authorities necessary.’778 As such the Court found the state’s 
preventative measures were ‘manifestly inadequate to the gravity of the offences in 
question.’779
Reflecting the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system, the Court also linked 
impunity and the culture of tolerance to the state’s due diligence obligations, 
concluding that the state had failed to act with the ‘required diligence to prevent the 
recurrence of violent attacks against the applicant, since the applicant’s husband 
perpetrated them without hindrance and with impunity to the detriment of the rights 
recognised by the Convention.’780 It went on to speak to the wider context of violence 
against women, and the failings of the state at the structural and sociocultural levels: 
‘the judicial decisions in this case reveal a lack of efficacy and a certain degree of 
tolerance, and had no noticeable preventive or deterrent effect on the conduct of 
H.O.’781 Linking the individual case to the systemic nature of violence against women, 
the Court concluded that the ‘general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey 
created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence.’782
The Court’s appreciation of the wider context of gender-based violence and 
discrimination led to its first finding of violations under Article 14 (equality provision) in 
a domestic violence case. Utilising the Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes case, the Court 
held that domestic violence was a form of gender-discrimination, and that the state’s 
failure to prevent domestic violence was also gender-discrimination: ‘the State’s failure 
to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection 
of the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional.’783 The Court also 
found that the ‘discrimination at issue was not based on the legislation per se but 
rather resulted from the general attitude of the local authorities.’784 The interpretive 
shift and gender-transformative jurisprudence of the Opuz decision is widely 
‘considered a milestone in the Court’s jurisprudence on domestic violence as it 
778 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 144.
779 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 170.
780 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 169.
781 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 170.
782 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 198.
783 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 191.
784 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 198.
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brought the ECHR in line with other international law.’785 Opuz represented a 
significant shift in the way the ECtHR applied the due diligence standard and the way it 
conceptualised violence against women as gender-based violence and discrimination. 
The ECtHR had previously been ‘reluctant to define violence against women as an 
expression of systemic gender inequality’786, so the Opuz decision was welcomed by 
the transnational women’s movement who saw it as the institutionalisation of their 
‘active efforts to frame due diligence in feminist terms’787. The Court went on to 
cement this approach in A v. Croatia (2010), M.G. v. Turkey (2014), and Talpis v. Italy 
(2017).
Talpis v. Italy
The Talpis case concerned the alleged failure of the state to prevent or provide 
protection and support to the applicant who suffered years of domestic violence by 
her husband. Following the escalation of violence, the applicant’s husband murdered 
her son and attempted to murder her. In keeping with the Opuz judgement, the Court 
found in favour of the applicant. Notably, the ECtHR furthered its approach in Opuz to 
systemic gender discrimination and due diligence prevention. Sara De Vito argues the 
Court held the state to a ‘stricter due diligence standard’788 by applying the norms of 
the Istanbul Convention, in line with the interpretive principles of Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The application of a ‘stricter’ standard 
was in keeping with the Court’s development of due diligence, and the broader 
interpretive understanding (as outlined in the Seabed Mining case) that the standard of 
conduct deemed ‘diligent’ may change as the understanding of what preventative 
action is ‘necessary’ evolves. As Judge Ziemele outlined in O’Keeffe v. Ireland, ‘the 
nature of obligations is by definition an evolving concept, precisely in conjunction with 
the evolution of understanding and of means.’789 However, Judges Spano and Eicke 
785 Blaker Strand, “Interpreting the ECHR in its normative environment: interaction between the ECHR, 
the UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the UN 
convention on the rights of the child,” 6.
786 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 669.
787 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 669.
788 Sara De Vido, “States’ Positive Obligations to Eradicate Domestic Violence: The Politics of Relevance 
in the Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights,” ESIL Reflections, 6 (6), (2017): 2.
789 O’ Keeffe v. Ireland, Application No. 35810/09 [2014] ECHR, Concurring Opinion of Judge Ziemele, 
paragraph 10.
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gave partially dissenting opinions based on the Court’s evolving application of the due 
diligence standard; particularly in reference to its finding of systemic gender 
discrimination under Article 14. They argued there was insufficient evidence to 
determine a wider pattern of discrimination from the case. Judge Spano also dissented 
on the findings under Article 2 (right to life), arguing that the Court had not met the 
standards of reasonableness defined in Osman and Opuz with regard the application of 
the due diligence obligation to prevent.790 In particular, the Judge argued that due to 
the ‘lapses of time’ between the attacks the Court – in keeping with Osman – should 
have found that there wasn’t evidence of an ‘immediate risk’. 791 The Judge finally
argued that:
the doctrine of positive obligations cannot remedy all human rights violations 
occurring in the private sphere if due process considerations, also worthy of 
Convention protection, are not to be rendered obsolete. In other words, it is 
true that the States are under a Convention-based positive obligation 
effectively to combat domestic violence. But that fight, like any other campaign 
by Government to safeguard the lives and protect the physical integrity of its 
citizens, must be fought within the boundaries of the law, not outside them. 
[… It] is all too easy to review tragic circumstances with the benefit of 
hindsight and impute responsibility where, on an objective and dispassionate 
analysis, there can be none. There is a limit on how far positive obligations 
under Article 2 can extend to shield victims from unforeseen attacks without 
imposing unrealistic obligations on the police accurately to forecast human 
behaviour and to act on those prognostications by unduly restricting other 
Convention rights. Although it may be tempting to dilute legal concepts such 
as the Osman test when faced with heart-rending facts and give solace to 
individuals in situations such as that of the applicant, there are reasons why the 
threshold under the Convention is set high, and, in my view, why it must 
790 The Judge argued that to determine a failure to act with due diligence to prevent ‘it must be 
established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal 
acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, 
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’ Talpis v. Italy, Application No. 41237/14
[2017] ECHR, Partly Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Spano, paragraph 2
791 Talpis v. Italy, Application No. 41237/14 [2017] ECHR, Partly Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Spano, 
paragraph 5.
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continue to remain so. Even in the field of domestic violence the ends cannot 
justify the means in a democratic society governed by the rule of law.792
Aside from the masculinist and paternalistic language used in his characterisation of the 
law and its application to domestic violence793, the grounds of Judge Spano’s dissent 
show a troubling misunderstanding of violence against women: 
Judge Spano employs a so-called incident-based understanding of domestic 
violence, an understanding that overlooks the continuum of fear, intimidation 
and abuse in which the violence takes place and instead looks at each 
(reported) incident of violence as a separate event.794
Whilst the dissenting opinions of the Judges are out of turn with the direction of the 
Court, and international jurisprudence more generally, the opinion of Judge Spano 
shows the vulnerability of the conceptualisation of violence against women as 
gendered and discriminatory, and the fragility of the institutionalisation of the state’s 
responsibility to prevent violence against women, particularly domestic violence. 
Whilst the development of the due diligence obligation to prevent has evolved 
through the European system, it is arguably the Inter-American system that had led the 
way in progressing gender-transformative interpretations of the standard. 
The Inter-American system and the due diligence obligation to prevent 
The Inter-American human rights system – including the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR), the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), 
the Inter-American Commission of Women, and the Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Women – was the first region to adopt a specific instrument on violence against 
women. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
792 Talpis v. Italy, Partly Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Spano, paragraph 16.
793 The reading of ‘objective and dispassionate analysis’ as gender-neutrality, and the characterisation of 
gender-sensitivity and specificity as appealing to ‘the heart-rending facts of the case’, rather than a 
normative approach, all form a narrative that disregards feminist accounts of the law, and women as 
subjects rather than objects of the law.
794 Fleur van Leeuwen, “The ‘limits of human rights law’: dissenting androcentric voices in Talpis, v. Italy,” 
Strasbourg Observers, May 30, 2017, https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/05/30/the-limits-of-human-
rights-law-dissenting-androcentric-voices-in-talpis-v-italy/ 
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Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará) was adopted in 1994 in Belém 
do Pará, and became the first binding treaty at the international or regional level to 
directly address violence against women. Significantly the Convention is framed by the 
duty to prevent and eradicate violence against women, and not just to respond to 
violence against women. In Article 7 the Convention outlines the state parties’ 
condemnation of violence against women, and their agreement to ‘pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such 
violence.’ In itself the language of ‘all appropriate means’ indicates a due diligence 
framing of prevention, but the Convention goes on to specify the standard in Article 
7(b), making clear the obligations incumbent on states to: ‘apply due diligence to 
prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence against women’. Article 8 
outlines measures in line with CEDAW Article 5(a) and General Recommendation no. 
19, paragraph 11 and 12, making clear the link between prevention and the ‘social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women’. Whilst Article 8 is framed in terms of 
‘progressively specific measures’, Article 6 is explicit in stating women have an 
immediate right to live free of violence and discrimination:
Article 6
The right of every woman to be free from violence includes, among others:
a. The right of women to be free from all forms of discrimination; and
b. The right of women to be valued and educated free of stereotyped 
patterns of behaviour and social and cultural practices based on 
concepts of inferiority or subordination.
The Convention led the way in articulating freedom from violence against women as a 
right in and of itself (Article 3), whilst also maintaining the feminist characterisation of 
violence against women as a form of discrimination (Article 6). In Article 3, the 
Convention mirrors General Recommendation no. 19 in its articulation of due 
diligence for private actors, specifying that: ‘Every woman has the right to be free from 
violence in both the public and private spheres.’ In this way the Convention also 
mirrors the earlier jurisprudence of the IACtHR in Velásquez Rodríguez, through which 
due diligence (especially for private violence) ‘entered the general consciousness of 
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human rights activists.’795 Beginning with the Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil
case, and building on the IACtHR’s decision in Velásquez Rodríguez, the IACHR and 
IACtHR have developed robust norms around due diligence in relation to private 
violence and have developed and strengthened the understanding of state 
responsibility for preventing violence against women at an individual and 
systemic/primary level. 
Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil796
Over a sustained period of years Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes was abused by her 
husband, Marco Antonio Heredia Viveiros. In May 1983, he shot her in the head while 
she slept and attempted to murder her. After undergoing life saving surgery Maria da 
Penha returned home. Two weeks after the shooting he tried to electrocute her while 
she bathed. Whilst she survived the attacks, she was left with paraplegia and severe 
physical and psychological trauma. Maria da Penha sought legal separation after the 
attacks. A year later criminal charges were brought against Viveiros and in 1991 –
seven years later – he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. In 1994 the sentence 
was overruled by an Appeal Court. A second trial then took place in 1996 in which 
Viveiros was condemned to ten years. The Court again agreed to hear a second 
appeal. In 1998 – 15 years later – Maria da Penha filed her submission with the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights. At this point Viveiros was still free. In 2001 –
seventeen years later – Viveiros was sentenced to six years imprisonment but only 
served two. 
Maria da Penha submitted a petition before the IACHR claiming violations of Articles 
3, 4(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g), and 5 and 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, 
as well as provisions under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
She argued the that the state had ‘condoned the situation’797 for more than 15 years 
and had failed to ‘take preventive action, in accordance with its international 
795 Farrior, “The Due Diligence Standard, Private Actors and Domestic Violence”, 2.
796 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, [2001] IACmHR, Report No. 54/01, 
OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev. 
797 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 2.
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commitments’798, and to act with due diligence to prevent, respond to, or provide 
redress for the violence she suffered.
Maria da Penha also claimed that the abuse she suffered was part of a wider culture of 
tolerance for violence against women and impunity: ‘this complaint does not represent 
an isolated situation in Brazil; rather, it is an example of a pattern of impunity in cases 
of domestic violence against women in Brazil.’799 She went on to refer to the 
Commission’s early comments to Brazil in its 1997 Report, which outlined the duty the 
state has to prevent violence against women, whether by a state or non-state actor:
the State has an obligation under Article 1(1) of the American Convention and 
Article 7.b of the Convention of Belém do Pará to exercise due diligence to 
prevent human rights violations. This means that, even where conduct may not 
initially be directly imputable to a state (for example, because the actor is 
unidentified or not a state agent), a violative act may lead to state responsibility 
not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or respond to it as the Convention requires.800
Dealing with the impunity and lack of redress in the case, the Commission cited 
Velásquez Rodríguez in finding that Brazil had not acted with due diligence to respond 
to the abuse Maria da Penha suffered: 
If the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished and 
the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as possible, 
the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise 
of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction.801
Referencing the effectiveness of protective and remedial measures the Commission 
concluded that ‘initiatives have been implemented on a limited basis in relation to the 
798 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 22.
799 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 20.
800 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 20, quoting from Report on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Brazil, 1997, Chapter VIII.
801 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 42, citing Velásquez Rodríguez case, paragraph 176; 
and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Godínez Cruz and ors v Honduras, Series C no 10, [1990] 
IACHR, paragraph 187.
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scope and urgency of the problem […] In this case, which stands as a symbol, these 
initiatives have not had any effect whatsoever.’802
In response to Maria da Penha’s argument that her case represented a wider pattern 
and culture of violence against women, the Commission spoke to the state’s 
responsibility to tackle root causes – including impunity, prejudice and discrimination –
as a duty of primary prevention: 
Furthermore, as has been demonstrated earlier, that tolerance by the State 
organs is not limited to this case; rather, it is a pattern. The condoning of this 
situation by the entire system only serves to perpetuate the psychological, 
social, and historical roots and factors that sustain and encourage violence 
against women.
Given the fact that the violence suffered by Maria da Penha is part of a general 
pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the State in prosecuting 
and convicting aggressors, it is the view of the Commission that this case 
involves not only failure to fulfill the obligation with respect to prosecute and 
convict, but also the obligation to prevent these degrading practices. That 
general and discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that is 
conducive to domestic violence, since society sees no evidence of willingness 
by the State, as the representative of the society, to take effective action to 
sanction such acts.803
In a searing indictment of the state, the Commission found that Brazil had failed to 
exercise its duties to prevent (at the primary level) the abuse Maria da Penha suffered, 
and, arguably, contributed to her suffering by allowing the impunity of her husband, as 
well as a wider culture of impunity that fuelled violence against women in the country. 
The Commission argued that the case ‘represents the tip of the iceberg’ and provided 
‘an example of the lack of commitment to take appropriate action to address 
domestic violence.’804 In summarising the state’s failure to act with due diligence to 
prevent domestic violence, the Commission said: ‘Article 7 of the Convention of 
802 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 50
803 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 55, 56
804 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 57
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Belém do Pará seems to represent a list of commitments that the Brazilian State has 
failed to meet.’805 It went on to find that ‘[t]he State has violated the rights of Mrs. 
Fernandes and failed to carry out its duty assumed under Article 7 of the Convention 
of Belém do Pará […] as a result of its own failure to act and tolerance of the violence 
inflicted.’806 In response it recommended comprehensive legislative and policy reform 
aimed at the wider culture of violence against women, and specific remedial measures 
for Maria da Penha. In particular, the Commission made recommendations aimed at 
the macrosystemic level ‘in an attempt to place greater emphasis on steps the State 
could take to prevent the cycle of violence against women.’807
In response to the findings of the Commission, Brazil adopted the ‘Maria da Penha Law 
on Domestic and Family Violence’ (the ‘Maria da Penha Act’, 2006) which offered new 
mechanisms for prevention, protection, investigation, compensation and redress. In 
accordance with UN guidance for legislation on violence against women808, it provided 
for specialist protective services and outlined prevention strategies. Within the five 
years following the adoption of the act ‘more than 331,000 cases of domestic violence 
were prosecuted, with 110,000 resulting in final judgements, and the national call 
centre received nearly 2,000,000 calls.’809
The ‘first generation of Inter-American cases’810: ‘blindspots and subsequent trailblazing on 
vaw.’811
Despite the jurisprudence of the Commission in the Maria da Penha case, it was some 
time before due diligence for private actors was consistently applied by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in cases dealing with violence against women, and 
805 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 57
806 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 60.4
807 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 9.
808 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Division for the Advancement of 
Women, Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women, (New York: UN, 2010).
809 Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-
American Human Rights System,” In The Legal Protection From Violence: Normative Gaps in International 
Human Rights Law, edited by Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 
177.
810 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 176.
811 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 178.
228
domestic violence particularly.812 Whilst the Inter-American system brought ‘private 
acts’ under the purview of due diligence and state responsibility, this was still largely 
conceptualised as private acts within the public sphere – such as the disappearances in 
the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases. Domestic violence, however, lacked 
that ‘public’ element – being the violative act of a non-state actor within the private 
sphere – and was therefore doubly conceptualised as outside of the scope of 
international law.813 As such Caroline Bettinger-Lopez characterises the IACtHR’s case 
law on violence against women as an ‘anomaly both because it was nearly non-
existent until the twenty-first century, and second because the Court has, in general, 
been a trailblazer amongst international human rights bodies with regard to the State’s 
obligation to protect the rights of vulnerable groups.’814 Bettinger-Lopez calls the years 
following the Velásquez Rodríguez case, but preceding the Maria da Penha case, the 
‘first generation of Inter-American cases’, wherein the Court, in particular, displayed a 
patchy, or non-existent gender-jurisprudence on violence against women. Brooke 
Stedman similarly claims that ‘[d]espite the IACtHR’s recognition of positive State 
obligations in relation to individual human rights, the Court consistently failed to 
uphold these ideals in cases of violence and discrimination against women following 
the Velásquez ruling.’815 Stedman goes on to outline the Court’s gender-blindness with
regard state responsibility for preventing violence against women. In Caballero Delgado 
and Santana v. Colombia (1995), a case dealing with detainment, the Court ‘ignored the 
sexual violence dimension of nudity’816. The Court again failed to recognise the 
gendered elements of human rights abuses in María Elena Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru
(1997), where Loayza-Tamayo claimed she was tortured, raped, threatened and 
mistreated while detained. The Court found violations of Loayza-Tamayo’s rights ‘for 
all of the incidents except the rape.’817 In Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala (2003), a case 
concerning detainment, the Court again ‘failed to recognise… the gendered elements 
of the crime’, in particular ‘threats of rape as a form of sexual violence that could affect 
812 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 8.
813 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 177.
814 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 178.
815 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 8.
816 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 8.
817 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 179.
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women distinctively from men.’818 The ‘gendered stereotypes’819 at play in these cases 
were kept in place by the public/private dichotomy. Whilst the conceptualisation of 
due diligence cuts at the heart of this gendered conceptualisation of human rights, it 
wasn’t until the IACHR’s decision in Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, that the 
IACtHR began to actually apply a consistent gender perspective that allowed due 
diligence to be applied to violence against women. This was evident in the Plan de 
Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala and Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru cases, which 
both involved gendered-violence, and ‘marked a significant turning point in the Court’s 
gender analysis.’820 In particular, the latter case marked the first time the Court 
recognised violence against women as a form of discrimination, adopting the definition 
contained in CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation no. 19. Further to this, 
and again for the first time, the Court found violations of  Article 7(b) of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará, which obliges states to ‘apply due diligence to prevent, 
investigate and impose penalties for violence against women.’821 The integration of 
gendered analysis into Plan de Sánchez and Miguel Castro Castro ‘laid the groundwork 
for a series of landmark decisions by the Inter-American Court and Commission that 
expanded and deepened the due diligence principle in the context of both State-
sponsored and private acts of VAW’822
The Second Generation Cases
Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico
The first of the ‘second generation’823 cases was Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton 
Field”) v. Mexico (2009), which concerned the disappearances and deaths of Claudia 
Ivette González (age 20), and minor children, Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez (age 
818 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 8.
819 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 179.
820 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 179.
821 Organization of American States (OAS), The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, 
and Eradication of Violence against Women, Belém do Pará, 9 June, 1994, Article 7(b), available at 
https://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/convention.asp.
822 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 182.
823 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 182.
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17), and Esmeralda Herrera Monreal (age 15). The women were reported as missing 
on 11th October 2001, 29th October 2001, and 25th September 2001, respectively. 
The three women were living in Ciudad Juárez when they disappeared on their way 
home from work. When the families contacted the police, officers dismissed their 
concerns, saying that the women had probably ‘run away with their boyfriends.’824 On 
6th November 2001, Claudia, Esmeralda and Laura’s bodies, alongside the bodies of 
five other young women, were discovered in the cotton fields of Ciudad Juárez, which 
is why the case is often referred to as the ‘Campo Algodonero’ or ‘Cotton Field’ case. 
All of the women’s bodies displayed evidence of intense violence, including evidence 
of rape and other kinds of sexual abuse, torture and mutilation. The multiple wounds 
and forms of violence made it difficult to establish the exact causes of death. The 
investigations that followed were perfunctory and incomplete. The police failed to 
collect evidence and record what they had found. The families of the women 
conducted a two-day search and found clothing, bones, blood remains, hair and other 
evidence. The police arrested two innocent men who were coerced and tortured to 
confess. The men hired a lawyer who was then (allegedly) shot and killed by the 
police. Autopsies of Claudia, Esmeralda and Laura’s bodies were inconsistent and did 
not document many of the violations they had suffered, including the sexual abuse. 
Despite receiving threats from police and Ciudad Juárez officials, the mothers of 
Claudia, Esmeralda and Laura brought their case to the IACHR, where it was referred 
on to the IACtHR. 
The mothers, alongside civil society organisations, presented evidence and data that 
showed 4,456 women were reported missing between 1993 and 2005, most of them 
aged between 15 and 25.  The application argued that the systemic pattern of violence 
against women was imputable to the state, who failed in its duties to ensure the rights 
of women under Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and to act 
with due diligence to prevent violence against women under Article 7 of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará:
824 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs Judgment) Series C No. 205 [2009] IACHR, paragraph 400.
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The State is considered responsible for “the lack of measures for the 
protection of the victims, two of whom were minor children, the lack of 
prevention of these crimes, in spite of full awareness of the existence of a 
pattern of gender-related violence that had resulted in hundreds of women 
and girls murdered, the lack of response of the authorities to the 
disappearance [...]; the lack of due diligence in the investigation of the 
homicides [...], as well as the denial of justice and the lack of an adequate 
reparation.”825
The petitioners made clear that they believed ‘their family members’ disappearances 
and killings were gender-based, not only because they targeted women and girls 
specifically, but also because they took place in the context of a culture of 
discrimination against women.’826
The Cotton Field decision was a ‘watershed moment in the Inter-American system’827, 
where – for the first time – the Court found that acts of private violence confer an 
obligation on states under Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. The Court 
concluded that the state had failed within its duty to prevent. The Court was clear in 
its appeal to the due diligence obligation to prevent, with Judge Medina Quiroga 
stating in her concurring opinion: ‘I need not repeat what the Court has stated in 
numerous judgments and reiterates in this: that the obligation to guarantee requires 
the duty to prevent.’828 The Court also went on to establish ‘two moments at which the 
State failed to comply fully with this obligation.’829 It outlined the first, more ‘general’ 
obligation to prevent, arose before the women went missing. The Court held that whilst 
it ‘would be disproportionate’830 to expect the state to have prevented the three 
women being abducted, ‘[w]hat could be claimed is that, as soon as the State was 
officially (not to mention unofficially) aware [of] the existence of a pattern of violence 
825 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs Judgment) Series C No. 205 [2009] IACHR, paragraph 2.
826 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 182.
827 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 182.
828 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Concurring Opinion Of Judge Cecilia Medina 
Quiroga, paragraph 19.
829 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Concurring Opinion Of Judge Cecilia Medina 
Quiroga, paragraph 18.
830 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Concurring Opinion Of Judge Cecilia Medina 
Quiroga, paragraph 18.
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against women in Ciudad Juárez, there was an absence of policies designed to try and 
revert the situation.’831 The Court went on to note ‘that the absence of a general 
policy which could have been initiated at least in 1998 – when the CNDH [the 
National Human Rights Commission] warned of the pattern of violence against 
women in Ciudad Juárez – is a failure of the State to comply in general with its 
obligation of prevention.’832 The ‘second moment’833, after the women were reported 
missing but before the discovery of their bodies, gave rise to what the Court called ‘an 
obligation of strict due diligence’834 – an ‘obligation of means that is more rigorous’835 –
as the ‘State was aware that there was a real and imminent risk that the victims would 
be sexually abused, subjected to ill-treatment and killed.’836 (In outlining ‘two moments’ 
of prevention, the Court upheld the standards of systemic and individual due diligence, 
that the Special Rapporteur would later go on to delineate in her 2013 report.) The 
Court also furthered earlier jurisprudence in the Inter-American system, and under the 
CEDAW-OP, that made clear that prevention strategies must be effective, practically 
realised and implemented – their mere existence does not represent a good faith 
application of due diligence:
Although the obligation of prevention is one of means and not of results 
(supra paragraph 251), the State has not demonstrated that the creation of the 
FEIHM and some additions to its legislative framework, although necessary and 
revealing a commitment by the State, were sufficient and effective to prevent 
the serious manifestations of violence against women that occurred in Ciudad 
Juárez at the time of this case.837
In making its decision on the due diligence obligation to prevent, the Court relied on: 
- CEDAW Committee General Recommendation no. 19;- Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará;
831 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Concurring Opinion Of Judge Cecilia Medina 
Quiroga, paragraph 18.
832 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 282.
833 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 283.
834 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 283.
835 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 283.
836 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 283.
837 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 283.
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- Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil (with particular reference to the 
Commission’s finding that the violation was ‘general pattern of negligence and 
lack of effectiveness of the State’838); - the 2006 Report of the Special Rapporteur (with reference to her conclusion 
that a norm exists in ‘customary international law that obliges States to prevent 
and respond with due diligence to acts of violence against women’839); - the ‘Report on Mexico produced by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention’840; and,- Opuz v. Turkey.
The Court’s concluding characterisation of violence against women – focusing on
macrosystemic aetiology alongside the root causes specific to violence occurring in 
Ciudad Juárez – marked a new advancement in the Inter-American system’s efforts ‘to 
address women’s rights in a holistic manner.’841 The Court concluded that:
the obligation of prevention encompasses all those measures of a legal, 
political, administrative and cultural nature that ensure the safeguard of human 
rights, and that any possible violation of these rights is considered and treated 
as an unlawful act, which, as such, may result in the punishment of the person 
who commits it, as well as the obligation to compensate the victims for the 
harmful consequences.842
A further significant element of the Cotton Field case – with regard primary prevention, 
in particular – relates to the Court’s move towards transformative remedies within its 
judgement on reparations. Ruth Rubio Marín and Clara Sandoval argue that the 
Court’s application of a gender perspective to reparations, as well as to the merits of 
the case, ‘marks a significant moment of change in the gender jurisprudence of the 
838 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 56.
839 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 29.
840 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Report on Mexico produced by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention, and reply from the Government of Mexico, CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO, (January 7, 
2005), available at http://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO
841 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 9.
842 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 252.
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights.’843 As highlighted in the previous chapter, 
whilst transformative remedies are, by nature, ‘after the fact’ rather than preventative, 
the expansion of norms concerning guarantees of non-repetition ‘include preventive 
measures that are capable of serving as a transformative tool, particularly in challenging 
the underlying causes of violence and changing mindsets.’844 Linking the individual with 
the systemic, transformative remedies impact on the recursive dialogue concerning 
primary prevention and state responsibility. In line with the UN Special Rapporteur’s 
report on transformative remedies, the Court held that:
the concept of “integral reparation” (restitutio in integrum) entails the re-
establishment of the previous situation and the elimination of the effects 
produced by the violation, as well as the payment of compensation for the 
damage caused. However, bearing in mind the context of structural discrimination
in which the facts of this case occurred, which was acknowledged by the State 
(supra paras. 129 and 152), the reparations must be designed to change this 
situation, so that their effect is not only of restitution, but also of rectification. In 
this regard, re-establishment of the same structural context of violence and 
discrimination is not acceptable.845
This was the first time the Court advised on transformative remedies. Its approach 
further bolstered the conceptualisation of violence against women as structural and 
systemic, as well as strengthening the jurisprudence that state responsibility to respond 
to violence against women includes duties of transformation as well as restitution. 
Whilst this marks a huge leap forward in concretising the feminist conceptualisation of 
state responsibility, the Court, disappointingly, rejected the argument by the petitioners 
and the Inter-American Commission that as a further matter of non-repetition, ‘the 
Court should order the state to adopt “an integral and coordinated policy, backed 
with sufficient resources, to guarantee that cases of violence against women are 
adequately prevented, investigated and punished, and that their victims receive 
843 Ruth Rubio Marín and Clara Sandoval, “Engendering the Reparations of the Jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field Judgement,” Human Rights 
Quarterly, 33 (2011): 1090. p. 1062 – 1091, p. 1090
844 Abdul Aziz and Moussa, Due Diligence Framework: State Accountability Framework for Eliminating 
Violence against Women, 75.
845 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 450.
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reparations.”’846 Although the Court outlined extensive and holistic remedies aimed at 
non-repetition847, Rubio Marín and Sandoval suggest that by rejecting the 
Commission’s request it ‘lost a major opportunity to apply its own concept of 
transformative reparations to the awards it made.’848 They go on to assert that ‘when 
the shortcomings are indeed structural, triggering systemic transformation is both a 
necessary and legitimate task for an international human rights tribunal.’849
The ‘Court’s willingness to embrace a gender-sensitive approach’850 continued in its
proceeding cases on violence against women, including Inés Fernández Ortega et al. v. 
Mexico (2010), Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico (2010), and Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. 
United States (2011). In Ortega and Cantú the Court developed its jurisprudence 
around rape and sexual violence as a gendered abuse, and as form of torture, for 
which the state has a responsibility to prevent. The framing of sexual violence against 
women in the IACtHR cases bears likeness to Rhonda Copelon’s characterisation of 
rape as torture851, and Sally Goldfarb’s conceptualisation of ‘psychic injury’:
[Gender-based violence] is particularly harmful to its victims, who suffer not 
only the physical and emotional injury of the crime itself but also the added 
psychic injury of knowing they were victimized because of their group 
identity.852
846 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 474.
847 Guarantees of non-repetition included: ‘renewed investigations, prosecutions  and punishment for 
perpetrators; investigations of public servants who failed to exercise due diligence in responding to the 
disappearances and murders and, in some cases, threatened or persecuted the victim’s next of kin, and 
a public announcement of the results of such investigations; the standardization of investigative 
protocols concerning cases of sexual violence and parameters to be taken into account when 
implementing rapid investigation responses in the case of disappearances of women and girls; creation 
and updating of a national website and database with information on all missing women and girls;
training of all personnel in Mexico involved , directly or indirectly, in the prevention, investigation, and 
prosecution of violence against women; and the development of an educational programme for the 
people of the State of Chihuahua, to ameliorate the situation of gender-based violence there.’ Bettinger-
Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System,” 184.
848 Rubio Marín and Sandoval, “Engendering the Reparations of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field Judgement,” 1090.
849 Rubio Marín and Sandoval, “Engendering the Reparations of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field Judgement,” 1091..
850 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 185.
851 Rhonda Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture,” In Human Rights 
of Women: National and International Perspectives, edited by Rebecca Cook, ed., (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 121.
852 Sally Goldfarb, “Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal, 61, 
(2000): 161.
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The Court, for the first time, acknowledged the impact of rape as gender-based 
violence, and called for a response that recognises that:
severe suffering of the victim is inherent in rape, even when there is no 
evidence of physical injuries or disease. … Women victims of rape also 
experience complex consequences of a psychological and social nature.853
Notably, in Ortega, the court also ‘highlighted the vulnerability of indigenous women 
and emphasised state obligations to implement protective measures which take into 
consideration the customs, values, as well as economic and social characteristics of 
indigenous communities.’854 As Bettinger-Lopez describes ‘the Court dove into an 
“intersectional” analysis’ in Cantú and Ortega, ‘highlighting the particular vulnerabilities 
of multipally-marginalized women.’855 The Court’s intersectional approach to primary 
prevention and state responsibility was further evidenced in its decision on reparations. 
Once again the Court considered transformative reparations to the individual 
alongside the broader reach of guarantees of non-repetition, and made comprehensive 
orders aimed at structural and sociocultural change and the empowerment of women, 
including:
The State must facilitative the necessary resources so that the indigenous 
Me’paa community may establish a community centre, to be considered a 
Women’s Center, where educational activities regarding human rights and the 
rights of women can be carried out, pursuant to paragraph 267 of the present 
Judgment.
The State must adopt measures so that the girls of the community of Barranca 
Tecoani that carry out their middle school studies in the city of Ayutla de los 
Libres, may provide facilities that offer adequate food and shelter, so as to 
allow the girls to continue their education at the institutions which they attend 
[…]856
853 Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Series C no. 224 [2010] IACHR, paragraph 124
854 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 
11 – 12.
855 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 188.
856 Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, paragraph 308.22, 308.23.
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The uptake of a feminist approach to state responsibility within the Inter-American 
system, was further evident in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) and others v. United States 
(2011).
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) and others v. United States
In June 1999, Jessica Lenahan’s three daughters were abducted by her ex-husband, 
Simon Gonzales. Ms Lenahan had a restraining order against Simon Gonzales following 
prolonged domestic abuse. The ‘police failed to adequately respond to Jessica 
Lenahan’s repeated and urgent calls over several hours reporting that her estranged 
husband had taken their three minor daughters (ages 7, 8 and 10) in violation of the 
restraining order.’857 During calls to the police she was told by dispatchers that: ‘at least 
you know where the kids are right now’858, and ‘I don’t know what else to say, I 
mean…. I wish you guys uh, I wish you would have asked or had made some sort of 
arrangements. I mean that’s a little ridiculous making us freak out and thinking the kids 
are gone…’859 Nearly ten hours after their abduction Simon Gonzales drove to the 
police department and opened fire; he was shot and killed by the police. The police 
then found the bodies of Ms Lenahan’s daughter in the back of Simon Gonzales’ car; 
they had each been shot multiple times. Having heard about the shooting Ms Lenahan 
drove to the police station. Her requests to see her daughters were ignored for 12 
hours, and she was not given any information as to whether they were alive or not. 
The following investigation into their deaths was insufficient. Ms Lenahan claimed in 
her petition that the United States violated her rights under the American Declaration 
by failing to exercise due diligence to protect her and her daughters from domestic 
violence perpetrated by her ex-husband, even though she had a restraining order in 
place against him. 
Ms Lenahan also argued that the state had failed in what could be characterised as its 
systemic due diligence obligations. The petitioners argued that:
857 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, Case 12.626, [2011] (Merits) IACmHR Report no. 80/11, 
paragraph 2
858 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 74.
859 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 75.
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domestic violence is a widespread and tolerated phenomenon in the United 
States that has a disproportionate impact on women [and that the failings in 
this case … ] are representative of a larger failure by the United States to 
exercise due diligence in response to the country’s domestic violence 
epidemic. The petitioners contend that Jessica Lenahan’s claims are 
paradigmatic of those of numerous domestic violence victims in the United 
States [and whilst the …] prevalence, persistence and gravity of the issue are 
recognized at the state and federal levels [the common response remains 
to…] treat it as a family and private matter of low priority, as compared to 
other crimes. According to the petitioners, the present case demonstrates that 
police departments and governments still regularly breach their duties to 
protect domestic violence victims by failing to enforce restraining orders.860
As the United States was not a signatory to the Convention of Belém do Pará, the 
CEDAW, or the American Convention on the Rights of Man, the Inter-American 
Commission could only admit the case based on the state’s duties under the American 
Declaration, and could not issue a legally binding decision. The US argued that the case 
was inadmissible as the American Declaration doesn’t impose on the state any 
‘affirmative duty, such as the exercise of due diligence, to prevent the commission of 
individual crimes by private actors, such as the tragic and criminal murders of Jessica 
Lenahan’s daughters.’861 However, this ‘landmark admissibility case’862 relied instead on 
the customary international law status of the due diligence obligation to prevent 
violence against women (as proposed by former Special Rapporteur Ertürk), and 
emphasised the ‘strong link between discrimination, violence and due diligence’863 held 
at the international and regional level. The Commission found that the US had failed in 
its duty to prevent violence against women (paragraph 160), noting in support of its 
findings that:
the principle of due diligence has a long history in the international legal system 
and its standards on state responsibility. It has been applied in a range of 
860 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 48.
861 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 3.
862 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 661.
863 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 111.
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circumstances to mandate States to prevent, punish, and provide remedies for 
acts of violence, when these are committed by either State or non-State actors 
[…] moreover […] there is a broad international consensus over the use of 
the due diligence principle to interpret the content of State legal obligations 
towards the problem of violence against women; a consensus that extends to 
the problem of domestic violence. This consensus is a reflection of the 
international community’s growing recognition of violence against women as a 
human rights problem requiring State action.864
The Commission affirmed the conceptualisation of domestic violence advanced in A.T. 
v. Hungary and Opuz v. Turkey, arguing that ‘[d]omestic violence […] has been 
recognized at the international level as a human rights violation and one of the most 
pervasive forms of discrimination, affecting women of all ages, ethnicities, races and 
social classes,’865 and that the due diligence obligation of prevention applied to 
‘domestic violence acts perpetrated by private actors’866. The Commission also framed 
violence against women as discrimination and a violation in its own right: ‘international 
human rights bodies have moreover considered State failures in the realm of domestic 
violence not only discriminatory, but also violations to the right to life of women.’867
In relation to the standard of reasonableness inherent within due diligence prevention, 
the Commission applied an intersectional lens to assessing ‘risk of harm’, recognising 
‘that certain groups of women face discrimination on the basis of more than one factor 
during their lifetime, based on their young age, race and ethnic origin, among others, 
which increases their exposure to acts of violence.’868 As such the Commission argued 
that ‘[p]rotection measures are considered particularly critical in the case of girl-
children, for example, since they may be at a greater risk of human rights violations 
based on two factors, their sex and age.’869
The Commission continued its interpretation of due diligence as being an obligation of 
means not result, and again emphasised that this includes effective implementation and 
864 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 122, 123.
865 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 111.
866 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 111.
867 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 112.
868 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 113.
869 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 113.
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de facto protection, alongside legislative and public policy provisions: ‘Even though the 
Commission recognizes the legislation and programmatic efforts of the United States 
to address the problem of domestic violence, these measures had not been sufficiently 
put into practice’;870 ‘[t]he States’ duties to protect and guarantee the rights of 
domestic violence victims must also be implemented in practice.’871 In relation to the 
specific issue of restraining orders, the Commission made clear that ‘[t]hey are only 
effective […] if they are diligently enforced.’872 The failure to implement was viewed by 
the Commission as discriminatory, as ‘women constitute the majority of the victims.’873
Again, referencing its findings in Maria da Penha, the Commission reiterated that ‘State 
inaction towards cases of violence against women fosters an environment of impunity 
and promotes the repetition of violence “since society sees no evidence of willingness 
by the State, as the representative of the society, to take effective action to sanction 
such acts.”’874 Impunity has become an issue of focus for the Inter-American system, 
with the Court and Commission highlighting the cultural significance of state endorsed 
impunity and the link between individual acts of violence against women and the wider 
culture of violence against women. Kenneth Roth, argues that ‘[w]hen the state makes 
little or no effort to stop a certain form of private violence, it tacitly condones that 
violence. This complicity transforms what would otherwise be wholly private conduct 
into a constructive act of the state.’875 As an issue of primary prevention, the Court 
and Commission continue to emphasise the state’s duty to tackle impunity, especially 
given its role as a powerful (and arguably, hegemonic) sociocultural actor.
The Commission furthered the jurisprudence of the Cotton Field case (where the 
Court assessed the individual violative acts of the case in light of the wider context of 
a pervasive and systemic culture of violence against women), and emphasised:
870 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 161.
871 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 163.
872 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 163.
873 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 163.
874 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 163, citing Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, 
paragraph 56.
875 Kenneth Roth, “Domestic Violence as an International Human Rights Issue,” In Human Rights of 
Women: National and International Perspectives, edited by Rebecca Cook, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 330.
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[The] States’ duty to address violence against women also involves measures 
to prevent and respond to the discrimination that perpetuates this problem. 
States must adopt the required measures to modify the social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men and women and to eliminate prejudices, customary 
practices and other practices based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority 
of either of the sexes, and on stereotyped roles for men and women.876
In outlining the primary preventative duties of the state under the due diligence 
standard, echoing the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation no. 19, the 
Commission further concretised the link between discrimination, violence against 
women and due diligence. The Commission argued that there was ‘international 
recognition that the due diligence duty of states to protect and prevent violence has 
special connotations in the case of women, due to the historical discrimination they 
have faced as a group.’877 Quoting its decision in Maria da Penha, the Commission 
again argued that the due diligence principle in response to violence against women, 
entailed an obligation ‘to prevent these degrading practices.’878 In response to 
Lenahan’s argument that the state had failed in its wider duties to respond to violence 
against women, the Commission ‘found the existence of a general pattern of State 
tolerance and judicial inefficiency towards cases of domestic violence, which promoted 
their repetition, and reaffirmed the inextricable link between the problem of violence 
against women and discrimination in the domestic setting.’879 In light of this, the 
Commission made extensive recommendations including at the primary level, calling 
for the adoption of:
public policies and institutional programs aimed at restructuring the stereotypes 
of domestic violence victims, and to promote the eradication of discriminatory
socio-cultural patterns that impede women and children’s full protection from 
domestic violence acts, including programs to train public officials in all 
branches of the administration of justice and police, and comprehensive 
prevention programs.880
876 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 126.
877 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 129.
878 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 131, quoting from Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. 
Brazil, paragraph 56.
879 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 131.
880 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 201.6.
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Whilst the United States was under no compulsion to follow the non-binding 
judgement of the Commission, the case has had an impact at the state and local levels. 
The ‘DOJ hosted a Roundtable on Domestic Violence and Human Rights for 
government workers that considered the value added of a human rights approach to 
domestic violence programmes and advocacy [and …] approximately 30 cities and 
counties across the U.S., inspired by Jessica’s win, passed resolutions declaring freedom 
from domestic violence a human right.’881
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) and others v. United States represents the development of a 
distinctly feminist account of state responsibility within the Inter-American context. 
Having received ‘eight very extensive amicus briefs’ the case also ‘represents activists’ 
heavy investment’882 in the framing of violence against women as discrimination and a 
violation of women’s human rights in its own right. The cases of the CEDAW 
Committee, ECHR, ACHPR, and the IACtHR/IACHR provided opportunities to 
institutionalise significant feminists norms. The due diligence standard was the key to 
these opportunities. Whilst the evolving legal obligations have largely been outlined 
above, further focus is needed on the ways that due diligence has operated as a 
political and normative tool, to further the broader conceptualisation of violence 
against women as a human rights abuse. 
Due diligence as a sociopolitical and normative tool 
In the context of the elimination of violence against women, the due diligence 
standard has operated as far more than a measure of state responsibility, it has acted 
as a ‘framework for action’883. The concept has allowed for substantive change in the 
scope and content of the international human rights law approach to violence against 
women, and has proven pivotal in the framing of violence against women as a human 
rights violation. It has served as a ‘rallying point’884 for activists and academics, and a 
881 Bettinger-Lopez, “Violence Against Women: Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System,” 190.
882 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 670.
883 Yakin Ertürk, “The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It Entail for Women’s Rights?” In Due 
Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence, edited by Carin Benninger-Budel, 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 27.
884 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 4; Bourke-
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‘useful instrument in the tool box of all who advocate for women’s human rights.’885 It 
has fundamentally changed the notion of citizenship within the transnational context, 
by broadening the rights-claims that women can make of the state.886 Perhaps most 
significantly, it has served to erode the public/private dichotomy that, for many years, 
acted as a barrier to conceptualising violence against women as a human rights 
concern. As Yakin Ertürk, suggests:
[the] violence against women agenda has exposed […] inconsistencies in the 
public/private divide and applying the due diligence standard to women’s rights 
has helped to invalidate the liberal state theory thereby bringing violations of 
rights in the private sphere under scrutiny.887
Whilst the legal development of due diligence is obviously important to the 
substantive provisions of a feminist theory of state responsibility, the wider 
sociopolitical impact of the standard is often over-looked. As García-Del Moral and 
Dersnah contend: ‘due diligence is not only a legal principle; it is a political and 
sociological concept, the implications of which require more careful consideration by 
citizenship and human rights scholars.’888 Using frame analysis, the scholars argue that 
due diligence is a political and social construct that represents ‘intense negotiations 
over the meaning of gender, violence, citizenship, and human rights.’889 Arguably, the 
standard is one of the foremost ways that feminists have contested the discursive 
space within international human rights law. The gendered conceptualisation and 
application of the standard – or what García-Del Moral and Dersnah call the ‘feminist 
appropriation’890 of due diligence – has served as a ‘discursive opportunity structure’891
Martignoni, “The history and development of the due diligence standard in international law and its role 
in the protection of women against violence,” 61.
885 Bourke-Martignoni, J., ‘The history and development of the due diligence standard in international law 
and its role in the protection of women against violence’, In Benninger-Budel, C., (Ed.), Due Diligence 
and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers:, 2008), p. 47 – 62, p. 61
886 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 664.
887 Ertürk, “The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It Entail for Women’s Rights?” 33.
888 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 662.
889 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 664.
890 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 661.
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to challenge the public/private dichotomy and expand notions of state responsibility 
for violence against women. In the context of institutional and language orthodoxy 
within the discourse, the status of the due diligence standard as part of the wider 
‘lingua franca of the human rights movement’892, has also helped to centre violence 
against women as human rights concern, not just a ‘women’s issue’. As private violence 
disproportionately affects women, the expansion of state responsibility to include the 
violative actions of non-state actors was a pivotal moment in ‘advancing the cause of 
dealing with preventing and eradicating the practice of VAW and gender-based 
violence.’893 As such the appropriation of the due diligence standard ‘became a central 
cog in many campaign strategies on women’s human rights’894; challenging the 
gendered depoliticisation of the so-called private sphere and reimagining the 
international human rights law discourse to include violence against women. 
As a rallying point for wider reconceptualisation of violence against women, the due 
diligence principle has served to strengthen the sociopolitical standing of women’s 
human rights, as well as to expand the legal means to hold states responsible and 
accountable. However, questions remain as to the gaps and contradictions that exist in 
both the sociopolitical and legal development of the standard.
Assessment of the Legal and Sociopolitical Significance of the Due Diligence 
Standard with regard the Elimination of Violence Against Women.
Issues surrounding due diligence 
As evidenced in the case law of the CEDAW Committee and regional courts and 
bodies, the due diligence standard has ‘institutionalise[d] broader notions of state 
891 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 664.
892 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 5.
893 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 5.
894 Bourke-Martignoni, “The history and development of the due diligence standard in international law 
and its role in the protection of women against violence,” 47.
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responsibility’895 for violence against women. It has worked as a ‘juridical bridge’ to 
bring violations of women’s rights to account. However, there are numerous questions 
that remain as to the persisting ‘normative gap’896 in the protection of women from 
violence. Some of these questions pertain directly to the standard, such as: the 
connotation of lesser culpability; the degree of flexibility the concept allows states in 
fulfilling their duties; and, the use of individuals as a means to achieving broader 
structural change. Other questions speak to the wider context of the standard, such as: 
the lack of a legally binding international instrument on violence against women; the 
fragility of the feminist conceptualisation of violence against women as gendered and
discriminatory; and, the assumption that greater state intervention is desirable. 
Beginning with the questions specific to the standard, I will consider to what degree 
the due diligence standard closes the ‘normative gap’.
Due diligence as a lesser shade of culpability 
Whilst the due diligence standard has served to expand notions of state responsibility, 
it remains distinct in its application as a measure of means, not of result: a violation of 
women’s rights doesn’t necessarily mean a breach of the state. Whilst the principle 
allows for some degree of responsibility it is less clear on culpability and accountability. 
In the context of preventing violence against women, due diligence offers a lesser 
standard of accountability, often described as ‘indirect responsibility’. As Rebecca Cook 
argues, in this context ‘responsibility can be understood as a limited sub-category of 
895 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 661.
896 ‘The Special Rapporteur has highlighted that a normative gap exists at the international level. The lack 
of a legally binding instrument on violence against women precludes the articulation of the issue as a 
human rights violation in and of itself, comprehensively addressing all forms of violence against women 
and clearly stating the obligations of States to act with due diligence to eliminate violence against 
women.’ United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 68, available at 
http://undocs.org/A/HRC/26/38; United Nations, Existing legal standards and practices regarding violence 
against women in three regional human rights systems and activities being undertaken by civil society 
regarding the normative gap in international human rights law: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/29/27 (June 10, 2015), 
paragraph 3 available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/29/27; ‘The idea of a normative gap is a simple one. It 
is a condition that exists when some widely - accepted moral principle has insufficiently binding rules to 
guide and / or impel actors’ behaviour in line with that principle. Put most simply, it is a gap between 
aspiration and firm commitment.’ David Richards and Jillienne Haglund, “Exploring the Consequences of 
the Normative Gap in Legal Protections Addressing Violence Against Women,” In The Legal Protection 
From Violence: Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law, edited by Rashida Manjoo and Jackie 
Jones, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 40. 
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accountability.’897 Applying ‘two separate regimes of responsibility for “private” as 
opposed to “public” acts has an effect on accountability for protection of human 
rights.’898 Carin Benninger-Budel argues that ‘[t]he fact that it is women who are the 
primary victims of violence perpetrated by non-state actors has played a major role in 
the historical refusal to view such violence as a human rights violation.’899 Whilst the 
due diligence standard has allowed for the institutionalisation of the conceptualisation 
of violence against women as a human rights violation, it has done so by defining a 
lesser degree of state responsibility. For those who argue that the standard has ‘helped 
dissolve the public/private divide’, there are also those who ‘question whether the 
distinct methods used in the examination and estimation of international responsibility 
with regard to conduct by state actors and non-state actors has on the other hand 
entrenched this division.’900 Addressing violence against women with a lesser measure 
of accountability can act to reinforce the public/private dichotomy active in 
international human rights law and in standard-setting at the national level. As Amy 
Sennett argues, the flexibility inherent in the due diligence standard – and the lack of 
clarity that this breeds – may actually allow states to ‘escape responsibility’.901 As the 
standard is one of means and not results it allows the state to use claims of due 
diligence as a defensive standard rather than as a standard of responsibility. Rikki 
Holtmaat suggests that even in the context of specific obligations, the concept of due 
diligence ‘seem to suggest that as long as the state argues it has done something this is 
enough, no matter whether the internationally agreed result has been achieved.’902
Menno Kamminga gives a condemning assessment of the use of the due diligence 
standard in the context of violence against women:
Advocates of due diligence as a tool to promote women’s rights should 
perhaps be reminded that they have not invented the concept. The due 
diligence standard has an established meaning in both general international law 
897 Rebecca J Cook, “Accountability in International Law for Violations of Women's Rights by Non-State 
Actors,” Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, (25), (1993): 95. 
898 Carin Benninger-Budel, “Introduction,” In Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women From 
Violence, edited by Carin Benninger-Budel, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 
17. 
899 Benninger-Budel, “Introduction,” 5.
900 Benninger-Budel, “Introduction,” 17.
901 Amy J. Sennett, “Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States of America: Defining Due Diligence?” Harvard 
International Law Journal, 53(2), (Summer 2012): 547. 537 – 547.
902 Rikki Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Dilligence Standard and Article 5(a) 
of the CEDAW Convention,” In Due Dilligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence, edited 
by Carin Benninger-Budel, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 88.
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and domestic law. It is widely perceived as a weak standard, an obligation of 
conduct rather than an obligation of result. Its exercise is subject to available 
resources and to a margin of appreciation. For precisely these reasons, the 
obligation to act with due diligence is a standard that is well liked by 
governments and by companies. When accused of abuses they have learned to 
defend themselves by arguing that they have acted with all due diligence and 
therefore are not accountable.903
In his scathing account of the utilisation of the standard in the human rights discourse, 
Kamminga goes on to argue that ‘reliance on due diligence is both unnecessary and 
counterproductive’ and that a focus on positive obligations with regard women’s rights 
should replace ‘due diligence mania’.904 He is not alone in calling for an emphasis on 
positive obligations over due diligence obligations. What makes this particularly 
challenging is the discourse’s generalised use of the term ‘due diligence’ and its 
conflation with positive obligations. As due diligence has often been used to bolster 
positive obligations there has been some conceptual erosion of the duties incumbent 
on the state with regard its positive obligations. In the context of primary prevention 
of violence against women, this is particularly evident in the conflation of systemic due 
diligence and the positive obligations of the state under Article 2(e)-(f) and 5(a) of the 
CEDAW to modify prejudicial social and cultural patterns and practices. Whilst Rikki 
Holtmaat rightly argues that ‘[b]anashing gender stereotypes […] is one of the main, 
general mechanisms to prevent violence against women’905, this norm has developed 
through joint application of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW (a positive obligation) and the 
due diligence obligation to prevent violence against women, and so their co-
constitutive relationship makes it difficult to distinguish between the two. This is 
problematic when it comes to defining standards inherent in the duty of primary 
prevention, and determining breaches of these standards.
903 Menno T. Kamminga, “Due Diligence Mania: The Misguided Introduction of an Extraneous Concept 
into Human Rights Discourse,” In The Women's Convention Turned 30, edited by Ingrid Westendorp, 
(Cambridge: Intersentia Publishing, 2012), 413. 
904 Kamminga “Due Diligence Mania: The Misguided Introduction of an Extraneous Concept into Human 
Rights Discourse,” 407.
905 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the 
Obligations to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention,” 
64.
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Primary prevention: a positive obligation or a duty of due diligence?
The responsibility of states to prevent violence against women at a primary level, has 
entered the discourse most notably through the application of the due diligence 
standard to specific instances of violence against women. In cases and complaints 
brought before the international and regional human rights bodies, as outlined above, 
applicants have called for the state to be responsible for the wider culture or pattern 
of violence against women that existed beyond, and arguably contributed towards, the 
specific violative act at issue. The Courts and monitoring bodies have increasingly 
spoken to this more general responsibility; in keeping with former Special Rapporteur 
Manjoo’s articulation of a duty of systemic due diligence. In the cases outlined above 
the responsibility of the state at the primary level has regularly been articulated as an 
obligation of due diligence. This has often been applied in conjunction with other 
obligations under CEDAW Article 5(a), or its regional or customary law equivalents. 
The combination of the two owes as much to the sociopolitical significance of the due 
diligence standard, as to its legal value. Due to the struggle in bringing violence against 
women into the international human rights discourse, and the success of the due 
diligence concept in correcting that erasure, advocates have clung to the standard as a 
framework for accountability. As touched on above, as a rallying point, and ‘cause 
célèbre’906, the due diligence standard holds significant sociopolitical and institutional
value within the discourse. However, as the understanding of violence against women 
has grown, and the surrounding norms have evolved, it could be argued that the utility 
and efficacy of the standard as a legal tool has not been sufficiently (re)appraised. 
Whilst its sociopolitical value remains, marking a major victory within transnational 
feminist advocacy, its legal import has arguably dwindled. As positive obligations have 
been strengthened and developed by the evolution of customary law status and the 
codification of legal obligations in binding regional instruments, the broad and flexible 
standard of due diligence has not kept up. Rikki Holtmaat argues that the treaty and 
customary norms and obligations that have evolved over the past decades are often 
‘much more precise and far stretching that the general obligation “to act with due 
906 Kamminga “Due Diligence Mania: The Misguided Introduction of an Extraneous Concept into Human 
Rights Discourse,” 408.
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diligence”.’907 Holtmaat goes on to ask: ‘does this concept offer us enough strongholds 
as to the accountability of states insofar as the prevention of violence against women is 
concerned?’908 Faced with resistance to structural change; the scale of the work 
needed at the sociocultural level; and, the demands of implementation, is a standard of 
responsibility that is so vague and flexible actually effective?909 Whilst the case law 
evidences a developing approach to systemic prevention, as outlined above, this seems 
case-specific and inconsistent; with hesitance still evident in both the regional Courts’ 
decisions, despite the gender jurisprudence of some of their cases. As evident in the 
dissenting opinions of the Talpis case, there remains ambivalence on the European 
Court as to the wider sociocultural duties of the state in its obligation to prevent. 
Similarly, in the Cotton Fields case, the Court declined to make recommendations on 
the duties of the state regarding primary prevention, despite concluding on systemic 
and structural failings at the sociocultural and political levels. The positive obligations of 
the state under CEDAW Article 2(e)-(f) and 5(a), and the arguably customary law 
standards of General Recommendation no. 19, should not be left subject to the 
degree of flexibility and context-specificity inherent in the due diligence standard. In its 
General Recommendation no. 35 the CEDAW Committee further clarified the 
positive obligations under the convention and General Recommendation no. 19:
Article 2 establishes that the overarching obligation of States parties is to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women, including gender-based violence against women. 
This is an obligation of an immediate nature; delays cannot be justified on any 
grounds, including on economic, cultural or religious grounds. General 
recommendation No. 19 indicates that in respect of gender-based violence 
against women this obligation comprises two aspects of State responsibility: for 
such violence resulting from the actions or omissions of (a) the State party or 
its actors, and (b) non-State actors.
907 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the 
Obligations to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention,” 
88.
908 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the 
Obligations to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention,” 
65.
909 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the 
Obligations to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention,” 
65.
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These obligations are of an immediate nature and have defined content, and speak to 
the duties of primary prevention incumbent on the state. It is important that when
applying systemic due diligence, the nature of these obligations – as immediate and 
results-based – aren’t collapsed into a lesser standard of responsibility. Whilst there is 
general consensus that ‘due diligence is not about undermining positive obligations but 
about reinforcing them’910; there are obvious problems with clearly outlining and 
conceptualising the differences and ensuring both are appropriately applied. Legal 
obligations of result must be enforced as such, and the primacy of the due diligence 
standard in holding states responsible for primary prevention runs the ‘danger that 
concrete obligations are replaced with the due diligence obligation.’911 Because the 
standard operated as such a powerful sociopolitical tool within the discourse, framing 
previously established substantive rights in new ways, delineation between the 
standard and primary obligations at hand has become difficult to maintain. There is 
particular risk of this kind of conflation in the application of PPIPR obligations, which,
while interrelated with the due diligence obligation, represent distinct obligations in 
their own right. 
As the term ‘due diligence’ is rarely used it is common to look for language that 
implies the standard’s existence, such as: ‘vigilance’, ‘due care’, ‘all appropriate 
measures’; or, in the context of rights, the evolving standards of ‘respect, protect, 
fulfil’.912 Similarly, PPIPR obligations are sometimes considered ‘indicative of the 
existence’913 of the due diligence standard. However, as outlined by Katja Samuel, it is 
widely considered that PPIPR obligations, including prevention, ‘do not of themselves 
constitute due diligence obligations; rather […] they trigger parallel but separate due 
diligence obligations.’914 Samuel goes on to consider James Crawford’s assessment of 
prevention as a parallel but distinct obligation to due diligence. Crawford, former 
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission for State Responsibility (1998 
– 2001), argues that the characterisation of the obligation to prevent, as outlined in 
Draft Article 23 of the ILA Draft Articles, is distinct from the obligation to act with due 
910 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 16.
911 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the 
Obligations to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention,” 
88.
912 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 24.
913 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 24.
914 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 24.
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diligence, ‘in the ordinary sense’915. In the prior case, whilst ‘the mere failure to prevent 
is not a sufficient condition for responsibility […] it is a necessary one.’916 An obligation 
of prevention is not breached unless the ‘apprehended event occurs’917. However, the 
obligation of due diligence ‘would be breached by a failure to exercise due diligence, 
even if the apprehended result did not (or not yet) occur.’918 Only the obligation to 
prevent was included in Draft Article 23, as a ‘particular obligation of result.’919 As such 
there exists two distinct obligations: one substantive and one procedural; one of result 
and one of means. Whilst this distinction is significant, it doesn’t inherently devalue the 
concept of due diligence: it simply calls for greater clarity in applying due diligence 
alongside other obligations. As a measure of conduct rather than result, due diligence 
should be seen as strengthening the obligation of prevention, and furthering the 
principles of good faith, loyal action, and timely undertaking of positive obligations. Due 
diligence should be ‘about ensuring compliance with the positive obligations that a 
state already has’920; offering a useful measure of conduct. In fact, as it doesn’t rely on a 
breach to assess responsibility, it should be seen as heightening compliance. In this way 
due diligence is vital, offering a tool that should strengthen the compliance of the state
with its duties, rather than ‘subtract from their positive obligations.’921 However, this 
relies on correctly interpreting and implementing both obligations: due diligence as a 
standard of means, concerned with appropriate measures and procedural duties; and 
the obligation to prevent – as outlined in treaty and customary law – as a standard of 
result922, concerned with positive obligations and substantive rights and duties.923
Whilst greater judicial clarity is arguably needed in applying due diligence alongside 
PPIPR obligations, the parallel duty of due diligence shouldn’t be considered as 
undermining the positive obligation to prevent.
915 James Crawford, State Responsibility; The General Part, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 227.
916 Crawford, State Responsibility; The General Part, 227.
917 Crawford, State Responsibility; The General Part, 227.
918 Crawford, State Responsibility; The General Part, 227.
919 Crawford, State Responsibility; The General Part, 228.
920 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 17.
921 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 17.
922 Kamminga “Due Diligence Mania: The Misguided Introduction of an Extraneous Concept into Human 
Rights Discourse,” 411.
923 Samuel, “The Legal Character of Due Diligence: Standards, Obligations or Both?” 10.
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In the case of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW, the positive obligation to challenge 
sociocultural discrimination and prejudicial practices has been strengthened by 
application alongside the systemic due diligence obligation to prevent violence against 
women. Together they reinforce the obligation on states to ‘remove the structural 
causes of violence against women.’924 This can be seen in the case law of the 
CEDAW-OP and regional human rights bodies, as outlined above. However, 
Kamminga argues that the duty to prevent violence against women is best treated as a 
separate positive obligation, with due diligence cast aside completely. He highlights the 
approach of the European Court, which has ‘used the concept of due diligence only 
sparingly’; preferring to ‘rely on the notion of positive obligations.’925 Kamminga argues 
for the ECtHR’s approach in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010), where the Court 
made no reference to due diligence but instead relied on Article 4 to establish a 
positive obligation to prevent trafficking. He argues that ‘[b]y laying down the result 
that must be achieved (effective prevention and investigation) the Court did much 
more for the victims than if it would merely have held that States have to make a due 
diligence effort to achieve this result.’926 However, in the Opuz v. Turkey decision, which 
concretised the state’s obligation to prevent violence against women, including 
domestic violence, the Court relied heavily on due diligence to frame the state’s
(positive) obligation to prevent. Whilst positive obligations represent clearer 
substantive rights and incur stricter responsibility, the application of these rights and 
obligations to contexts of private violence still largely rely on the due diligence 
standard. This is no small caveat, given the majority experience of violence against 
women is at the hands of an intimate partner or family member, and that women 
disproportionately suffer private violence. Due diligence in the context of domestic 
violence, and in the context of primary prevention, works to instrumentalise 
substantive rights. Due diligence in this regard remains a vital ‘juridical bridge’.
However, there does need to be greater clarity on the normative destination arrived at; 
with a focus on further clarification of positive obligations of prevention. As former 
Special Rapporteur Yakin Ertürk suggests, the ‘major potential for expanding the due 
924 Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the 
Obligations to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention,” 
88 – 89.
925 Kamminga “Due Diligence Mania: The Misguided Introduction of an Extraneous Concept into Human 
Rights Discourse,” 410.
926 Kamminga “Due Diligence Mania: The Misguided Introduction of an Extraneous Concept into Human 
Rights Discourse,” 410 – 411.
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diligence standard lies in the full implementation of generalized obligations of 
prevention’.927
Without clearer delineation of obligations at the legal/judicial level and at the 
sociopolitical/discursive level, hard-fought for substantive rights risk being collapsed into 
readings of due diligence as a minimum standard of care and responsibility. In the 
particular context of women’s international human rights law, an area of international 
law in its (relative) infancy, the overreliance on due diligence – as a standard of relative 
and undetermined content – risks setting a low bar or a cap on quickly evolving 
standards such as ‘respect, protect, fulfil’.928 Further work is needed to expand the 
notion of due diligence in the context of the norms and general principles specific to 
international human rights law. This would be furthered by setting the due diligence 
standard for preventing violence against women in a binding international instrument 
that directly addressed violence against women, and clearly outlined substantive rights 
and positive obligations.
The individual and the transformative agenda
Attention also needs to be given to developing the state’s systemic due diligence 
obligations in a way that doesn’t further ‘a discourse of women as victims’929; and in a 
manner that doesn’t seek to profit politically from the individual. The due diligence 
obligation to prevent, and the due diligence obligation to provide reparations, have 
both been used to expand the ‘transformative agenda’930 with regard primary 
prevention and eliminating violence against women. However, critics have argued that 
this approach burdens victims and inappropriately leverages their suffering to achieve 
wider change. As a ‘powerful claims-making tool’ transformative reparations have ‘been 
criticised for sidelining victims […] or for actors appropriating their voices for their 
927 Ertürk, “The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It Entail for Women’s Rights?” 38.
928 Kamminga “Due Diligence Mania: The Misguided Introduction of an Extraneous Concept into Human 
Rights Discourse,” 412; Holtmaat, “Preventing Violence against Women: The Due Diligence Standard 
with Respect to the Obligations to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the 
CEDAW Convention,” 88.
929 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship, “670.
930 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014).
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own political ends.’931 Seeking sociocultural change and gender transformation through 
individual cases risks the manipulation of the individual and the loss of a victim-oriented 
approach. Conversely, it could be seen that the recognition of the victim’s suffering as 
part of a wider context may further strengthen their individual rights-claim and political 
agency.
What is certain though, is that transformation through litigation shouldn’t be the 
principal approach to strengthening norms of state responsibility for primary 
prevention. Due diligence needs to be placed in the context of wider advocacy that 
pushes for greater instrumentalisation and implementation of existing standards.
Whilst further clarity is needed when addressing the state’s positive obligation to 
prevent violence against women, and restraint cautioned with regard kneejerk appeals 
to due diligence (where stricter standards may apply), some of the most significant 
challenges facing the use of the due diligence standard arguably lie outside of itself. The 
contested status of legal rules and norms, and conceptual fragility, at the broader level 
of institutionalising state responsibility for violence against women pose sizeable 
challenges to implementing (systemic) due diligence. 
As a measure of reasonableness that is context specific and shaped by the primary 
rule, the due diligence standard is as effective as the wider legal and normative 
approach to state responsibility for violence against women. There exists two sizeable 
problems in articulating state responsibility for violence against women. The first relates 
to: the legal status and institutionalisation of the norms surrounding the elimination of 
violence against women; and, the lack of a legally binding international instrument 
focused on violence against women. The second relates to: the fragmentation of 
norms; the inconsistent framing of violence against women; and the fragility of the 
feminist conceptualisation of state responsibility for eliminating violence against 
women. Both problems will be explored in some depth below.
931 Luke Moffett, “Reparations in Transitional Justice: Justice or Political Compromise?” Human Rights and 
International Legal Discourse, 17(1), (2017): 70.  
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Due diligence and the normative gap?932
There still exists no internationally binding treaty that deals specifically with violence 
against women. Whilst the Belém do Pará, Maputo, and Istanbul Conventions are 
binding on state parties, no such global instrument exists – representing a universal 
commitment to eliminate violence against women. At the international level the main 
application of the due diligence obligation to prevent violence against women has 
come by way of the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation no. 19; often 
read in conjunction with the DEVAW. The DEVAW is a soft-law declaration, and the 
legal standing of General Recommendations is contested.933 In fact, Rhonda McQuigg’s 
account of General Recommendation no. 19, is that it is ‘in strict legal terms only a 
non-binding interpretation of CEDAW.’934
Although the international application of due diligence is rooted in non-binding 
recommendations and declarations, one of the strengths of the soft-law approach is 
that ‘such declarations may provide a basis for the speedy consolidation of customary 
rules.’935 As Brownlie suggests, non-binding norms can lead to customary law, as they
have ‘decisive catalytic effect’936 on state practice. This has been argued to be the case 
by the CEDAW Committee and former Special Rapporteur Ertürk. In General 
Recommendation no. 35 (2017) the Committee argue that:
932 The following analysis has been shaped by conversations with former Special Rapporteur, Professor 
Rashida Manjoo, and Professor Jackie Jones. In her 2015 report, Special Rapporteur Manjoo discussed 
‘closing the normative gap in international human rights law’. Prior to this, a series of expert meetings 
and consultations with activists, practitioners and academics in the women’s rights sector took place. My 
own participation in this, included a paper delivered at a 2013 panel discussion on ‘International Legal 
Gaps in the Protection of Women from Violence’, and participation in a meeting of European experts 
to ‘discuss whether a new international legal instrument was required, useful, and mandated.’ Details of 
these events and the wider process of consultation can be found in the addendum to the Special 
Rapporteurs 2015 report. United Nations, Addendum to the Human Right Council Thematic report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence, its Causes and Consequences, A/HRC/29/27/Add.5 (June 12, 2015), 
available at http://undocs.org/A/HRC/29/27/Add.5
933 Rashida Manjoo, “Normative Developments on Violence Against Women in the United Nation 
System,” In The Legal Protection From Violence: Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law, edited 
by Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 74.  p 73 – 106, p. 74
934 Ronagh J. A. McQuigg, “Is it time for a UN treaty on violence against women?” The International 
Journal of Human Rights, 22(3), (2018): 309.
935 Heléne Combrinck, “Positive State Duties to Protect Women from Violence: Recent South African 
Developments,” Human Rights Quarterly, 20, (1998): 674. 666 – 690, pp. 674
936 Ian Brownlie, Legal status of natural resources in international law (some aspects) (Volume 162), 
(Boston: Nijhoff, 1979), 261.
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For over 25 years the practice of States parties has endorsed the Committee’s 
interpretation. The opinio juris and State practice suggest that the prohibition of 
gender-based violence against women has evolved into a principle of 
customary international law. General recommendation No. 19 has been a key 
catalyst for this process.937
The 2006 report of the Special Rapporteur found on the same basis that ‘there is a 
rule of customary international law that obliges States to prevent and respond to acts 
of violence against women with due diligence.’938 This approach has been taken up by 
the European and Inter-American Courts, with the latter utilising it in the case of 
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) and others v. United States, to hold the United States 
accountable to its responsibility to prevent violence against women, despite it not 
being a party to any international or regional binding or non-binding instrument 
addressing violence against women. 
Whilst there is some debate as to whether the due diligence standard to prevent 
violence against women does have customary international law status, with Christine 
Chinkin939 and former Special Rapporteur Manjoo940 both arguing that evidence of 
customary law status is inconclusive or incomplete; the more pressing question, with 
regard efficacy of the standard, is whether customary law status is helpful in clarifying 
responsibility and accountability. As Jackie Jones argues ‘[e]ven if one were to agree 
with General Recommendation 35 that violence against women had obtained the 
status of customary international law, there are still major drawbacks for relying solely 
on this status.’941 Whereas treaty law is ‘precise, concise and transferrable’942, making it 
937 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 35
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35, (2017), available from http://undocs.org/ CEDAW/C/GC/35
938 United Nations, The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Yakin Erturk,
E/CN.4/2006/61, (20 January 2006), paragraph 29.
939 Christine Chinkin, “Chapter 4: Sources,” In International Human Rights Law, edited by Daniel 
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh Sivakumaran, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 92 – 3; 
Jackie Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,” In The Legal Protection From Violence: 
Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law, edited by Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 19.  
940 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 68.
941 Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,” 19.
942 Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,” 19.
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an appropriate mechanism to strengthen and consolidate the standard-setting of the 
past three decades, the existence of customary law still leaves open questions about 
the specific content of rules and standards. With regard due diligence this is even 
more pressing as effective interpretation and application of the standard relies on the 
clarity of the primary rule or obligation. As Beth Simmons argues, ‘[t]reaties are the 
clearest statements available about the content of globally sanctioned decent rights 
practices […] Treaties serve notice that governments are accountable [… and] signal a 
seriousness of intent that is difficult to replicate in other ways.’943 Jones further argues 
that ‘one very significant shortcoming is the fact that there is no monitoring body 
attached to a rule of customary international law that could or would monitor 
compliance.’944 As implementation and compliance are widely considered to be 
pressing challenges in the international human rights law approach to violence against 
women, reliance on customary law as a foundation for due diligence obligations seems 
questionable. Interestingly, Jones characterises the normative gap left by the absence of 
a binding instrument as an indication of ‘the failure of the State in its responsibility to 
act with due diligence in addressing widespread and systemic violations of women’s 
and girls’ human rights.’945 The Special Rapporteur noted the same failing in her 2015 
report:
The normative gap under international human rights law raises crucial 
questions about the State responsibility to act with due diligence and the 
responsibility of the State as the ultimate duty bearer to protect women and 
girls from violence, its causes and consequences.946
Without an internationally binding standard, the development of the due diligence 
standard has relied on regional standards that lack universality. Whilst there are 
numerous problems that come from the divergence and fragmentation of norms at 
the regional level, the issue of universality as a core concern of human rights is also at 
play. In light of this an international instrument could serve to concretise the notion of 
943 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 5.
944 Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,” 19.
945 Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,” 11.
946 United Nations, Existing legal standards and practices regarding violence against women in three regional 
human rights systems and activities being undertaken by civil society regarding the normative gap in 
international human rights law: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/29/27 (June 10, 2015), paragraph 63.
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women’s rights as universal and inalienable. As the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, Commissioner Lucy Asuagbor, also argues, a legally binding treaty at 
the individual level could ‘achieve some useful harmony’ otherwise lacking at the 
domestic and international level.947 With specific reference to the development of 
state responsibility, Jeremy Sarkin argues that more needs to be done to make due 
diligence ‘known and accepted’ as a necessary standard, and ‘methodology’,948 and this 
relies on linking this methodology to universal standards and processes of 
accountability:
For a due diligence methodology to take hold, all states must be made to 
comply with a due diligence strategy. That means that such a methodology must 
be obligatory when the states report on human rights matters, such as at 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) or at the various treaty bodies [… therefore] 
there may be a need for a new binding international instrument that specifically 
prohibits violence against women and clearly articulates and delineates due 
diligence standards and processes with which states need to comply.949
To improve compliance ‘a universal process to deal specifically with VAW is needed 
with an oversight mechanism.’950 Stedman further impresses upon the issue of 
compliance with regard the efficacy of due diligence:
the extent to which State obligations are capable of positively impacting the 
status of women’s rights is limited by the ineffective implementation of such 
obligations. Furthermore, the absence of a binding instrument with an 
947 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa, Lucy Asuagbor, argues the case for universal 
standards over regional standards: ‘[I]nternational standards differ from regional standards that 
collectively suffer a lack of implementation at the domestic level. The resultant fragmentation works to 
the disadvantage of victims who may be faced with several but non-inclusive and non-complementary 
avenues of redress. In this instance, a global VAW treaty that prescribes clear and legally binding 
enforcement mechanisms at both the international and domestic levels could achieve some useful 
harmony.' Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa, Response by Commissioner Lucy 
Asuagbor to Dr. Dubravka imonovi on questions on the adequacy of the legal framework on violence against 
women, accessed May 10, 2019, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/SR/Framework/SRWInAfrica.docx 
948 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 35.
949 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 35.
950 Sarkin, “A Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and 
Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World,” 22.
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international mandate to monitor State compliance with due diligence 
obligations related to violence against women hints at a slow progression 
moving forward.951
The call for a binding instrument was taken up by former Special Rapporteur Manjoo
in 2013. The ‘normative gap’ was first highlighted in her 2014 report, with specific 
reference to the need for a legally binding instrument which clearly outlines the 
‘obligations of States to act with due diligence to eliminate violence against women.’952
The issue became the focus of her 2015 thematic report, where she considered: 
‘Closing the gap in international human rights law: lessons from three regional human 
rights systems on legal standards and practices regarding violence against women’953. 
The Special Rapporteur concluded:
Transformative change requires that the words and actions of States reflect an 
acknowledgement that violence against women is a human rights violation, in 
and of itself and, more importantly, it requires a commitment by States to be 
bound by specific legal obligations in the quest to prevent and eliminate such 
violence.954
The current Special Rapporteur Dubravka imonovi has looked to continue the 
conversation on the ‘adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against 
women’955 and has sought the input of women’s civil society groups on the issue. 
Amongst other questions on the ‘adequacy of the international legal framework’, 
Special Rapporteur imonovi asked: ‘Do you consider that there is a need for a 
951 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 
28.
952 United Nations, Violence against women: Twenty years of developments to combat violence against 
women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/26/38 (May 28, 2014), paragraph 68.
953 United Nations, Existing legal standards and practices regarding violence against women in three regional 
human rights systems and activities being undertaken by civil society regarding the normative gap in 
international human rights law: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/29/27 (June 10, 2015).
954 United Nations, Existing legal standards and practices regarding violence against women in three regional 
human rights systems and activities being undertaken by civil society regarding the normative gap in 
international human rights law: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/29/27 (June 10, 2015), paragraph 65.
955 “Adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against women,” United Nations, 




separate legally binding treaty on violence against women with its separate monitoring 
body?’956 The Rapporteur acknowledged the overwhelming response in favour of a 
new instrument: ‘Many civil society organizations […] urged adoption of a new treaty, 
which would be “specifically on violence against women, comprehensive and legally 
binding” and reflect “uniformity, specificity and state accountability”.’957 The report also 
noted that:
[a] significant number of submissions pointed out that the lack of a specific 
global treaty on gender-based violence against women had important symbolic 
value and further indicated that a new treaty could have an important role in 
galvanizing implementation at the State level.958
This picks up on the issue of implementation and accountability. Whilst there might be 
widespread consensus that the norms surrounding violence against women are well 
established, methods of implementation and accountability are weak. The argument of 
a normative gap is based on the ‘gap between aspiration and firm commitment.’959 In 
the context of violence against women the gap ‘is a condition where states have
widely agreed upon some standard of human dignity […] but have failed to institute 
binding rules to hold states accountable to this standard.’960 However, despite the 
acknowledgement of a normative gap and the majority support for a new binding 
international instrument, the Special Rapporteur ‘did not support this view but 
articulated other solutions.’961 In particular, the Special Rapporteur felt that:
956 “Adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against women,” United Nations, 
accessed May 9, 2019,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/AdequacyInternationalLegalFramework.asp
x
957 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences on the adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against women, A/72/134 
(July 19, 2017), paragraph 43 available from http://undocs.org/A/72/134
958 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences on the adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against women, A/72/134 
(July 19, 2017), paragraph 84.
959 Richards and Haglund, “Exploring the Consequences of the Normative Gap in Legal Protections 
Addressing Violence Against Women,” 40.
960 Richards and Haglund, “Exploring the Consequences of the Normative Gap in Legal Protections 
Addressing Violence Against Women,” 40.
961 Rashida Manjoo, “Closing the Normative Gap in International Law on Violence Against Women: 
Developments, Initiatives and Possible Options,” In The Legal Protection From Violence: Normative Gaps in 
International Human Rights Law, edited by Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2018), 209. 199 – 212. 
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the argument of a normative gap on violence against women at the 
international level does not take into account the coverage by the Convention
[CEDAW] of gender-based violence as a form of discrimination against 
women and the recent adoption of general recommendation No. 35 (2017) 
on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation 
No. 19 (1992) on violence against women.962
The above position of the current Special Rapporteur that violence against women is a 
form of discrimination (and therefore covered by a binding international treaty), speaks 
to the wider issues of norm fragmentation and contestation over framing and 
conceptualisation. These issues will picked up shortly, as this contestation is both a 
cause and consequence of the difficulty in applying due diligence to violence against 
women. 
The call for a new legally binding instrument responds to the normative gap at the 
international level, which weakens the implementation of the due diligence standard. 
The gap also responds to the fragmentation of norms at the international and regional 
level (caused largely by the lack of a single international instrument), which makes 
conceptualising and interpreting the due diligence standard consistently problematic. In 
turn, this impacts on the effective application and development of the standard, and 
broader notions of state responsibility.
Fragmentation and framing
In international judicial application (as outlined above) the due diligence standard for 
eliminating violence against women is rooted in four main settings: the CEDAW 
Committee’s General Recommendation no. 19, the DEVAW, the Convention of 
Belém do Pará, and the Istanbul Convention. It has been applied with reference to the 
prevention of violence against women, by the CEDAW Committee, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Inter-American Court and 
Commission of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights. Across 
these bodies a number of jurisprudential approaches have emerged with regard the 
962 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences on the adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against women, A/72/134 
(July 19, 2017), paragraph 87.
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application of due diligence, reflecting the differences in framing across the regional 
conventions and at the international level. Chief amongst these differences is the 
framing of violence against women as gender-discrimination (or not), and the bearing 
of this conceptualisation on the interpretation of the due diligence standard and the 
obligation of prevention, and the two interpreted in parallel.
It has long been recognised that there are two dominant feminist framings of violence 
against women within the international human rights discourse. As touched on in 
Chapter 2, these are: the framing of violence against women as a form of gender 
discrimination; and, the framing of violence against women as torture or a violation of 
the right to life/dignity/bodily integrity. Alice Edwards describes these as ‘pragmatic 
strategies’ borne out of the need to conceptualise violence against women in a way 
that included it ‘within the existing human rights framework’963. With very little political 
will to address violence against women as a criminal issue, let alone conceive of it as a 
human rights abuse, the transnational women’s movement had to ‘use what they had’ 
to bring violence against women under international human rights law. Whilst there 
was initially no understanding (or willingness) to conceive of violence against women 
under the Women’s Convention964, it was the CEDAW Committee who first 
articulated violence against women as a human rights violation. To do this, the 
Committee creatively interpreted the treaty in its General Recommendation no. 19 to 
include violence against women as a form of gender-discrimination. (Some argue this 
created a new norm, and provided the ‘missing link’965 between the convention and 
violence against women, whereas others argue that the ‘link was not “missing,” but 
was simply not sufficiently visible’966 prior to the interpretive recommendation.) The 
963 Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), xi.
964 Belgium proposed violence against women be included under Article 6 with reference to ‘attacks on 
the physical integrity of women’, but this lacked support. Lars Adam Rehof, Guide to the Travaux 
Preparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 91; The objection from Pakistan and the lack of 
broader support meant the proposal was withdrawn. United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on the Status of Women, Twenty-sixth session, Summary record of the 638th meeting held at the 
Palais des Nations, Geneva, E/CN.6/SR.638 (September 17, 1976), paragraph 40, available at 
http://undocs.org/E/CN.6/SR.638
965 Heisoo Shin, “CEDAW and Violence against Women: Providing the ‘Missing Link’,” In The Circle of 
Empowerment: twenty-five years of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
edited by Hanna Beate Schoepp-Schilling and Cees Flinterman. (New York: Feminist Press at the City of 
University of New York, 2007), 229.
966 imonovi, “Global and Regional Standards on Violence against Women: The Evolution and Synergy 
of the CEDAW and Istanbul Conventions,” 601.
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Committee has used the framing of violence against women as discrimination to vastly 
expand norms around state responsibility for preventing violence against women:
By clearly categorizing all forms of violence against women in terms of gender 
discrimination, the CEDAW Committee opened an avenue for mobilizing a 
feminist understanding of due diligence to subvert the public/private divide.967
The linking of ‘a State’s obligation to protect women from violence’ and its ‘obligations 
to eliminate discrimination against women generally’ has been the basis of formulating 
state responsibility for violence against women at the international level.968 In particular 
the obligations of the state under Article 2 ‘to pursue by all appropriate means and 
without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women’ has been 
interpreted by the Committee in General Recommendation no. 19 and General 
Recommendation no. 28 as ‘impos[ing] a due diligence obligation on States parties to 
prevent discrimination by private actors.’969 This is specifically called for within the 
convention under Article 2(e), which obligates states ‘[t]o take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or 
enterprise.’ This is (argued to be) the binding international legal basis of the state’s
obligation to prevent violence against women. Likewise the framing of systemic due 
diligence and the duty of primary prevention is best framed (within binding obligations) 
under Article 2(e)-(f) and Article 5(a) of the Convention and paragraphs 11 and 12 of 
General Recommendation no. 19, which all emphasise the state’s duty to address the 
root causes of violence against women. Whilst these might not be referenced within 
the legal sources of the regional courts’ jurisprudence they have certainly had an 
impact on shaping it. This is most notable in the evolution and cross-fertilisation of 
case law addressing due diligence and primary prevention, as evidenced in A.T. v. 
Hungary, which went on to influence the landmark European (Opuz v. Turkey) and 
Inter-American (Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States) cases. Perhaps most 
importantly, this framing has allowed for the expansion of state responsibility to 
967 García-Del Moral and Dersnah, “A feminist challenge to the gendered politics of the public/private 
divide: on due diligence, domestic violence, and citizenship,” 662.
968 Manjoo, “Normative Developments on Violence Against Women in the United Nation System,” 74.
969 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 28 
on Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, (2010), paragraph 13. available from 
http://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/GC/28.
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include systemic due diligence. The norms of primary prevention – as outlined in 
Chapter 3 – have been furthered by the CEDAW Committee and regional courts by 
applying due diligence within the frame of violence against women as discrimination. 
This includes: 
- tackling root causes such as gender inequality, and the framing of individual 
violations within the wider structural pattern of violence against women: as in 
Maria da Penha where the Commission highlighted the ‘social and historical 
roots and factors that sustain and encourage violence against women’970, and in 
Lenahan where the Commission emphasised that the ‘States’ duty to address 
violence against women also involves measures to prevent and respond to the 
discrimination that perpetuates this problem’971;
- the primacy of substantive equality, and the ‘practical realization of the principle 
of equality’972: as in A.T. and González et al. where the courts highlighted the 
insufficiency of de jure protection in realising a state’s responsibility to prevent;
- the call for gender-specificity and the roll of women’s organisations: as in 
Ortega where the Court called on the state to fund a Women’s Centre ‘where 
educational activities regarding human rights and the rights of women can be 
carried out’973;
- the obligation of gender transformation: as in González et al. where the Court 
stated ‘re-establishment of the same structural context of violence and 
discrimination is not acceptable’974, and X and Y where the Committee linked 
the state’s duties of sociocultural modification with preventing violence against 
women975; and,
- the role of the state as a sociocultural actor in tackling violence against women 
at the structural and systemic level: as in Opuz, Maria de Penha and Lenahan, 
where the Court and Commission criticised the ‘passivity’976 of the state, and 
970 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paragraph 55.
971 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 126.
972 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, paragraph 12.1.2, this was common to Yildirim (deceased) v Austria, 
CEDAW paragraph 12.1.2.
973 Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, paras. 308.22, 308.23
974 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 450.
975 X and Y v Georgia, paragraph 8.7.
976 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 198.
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framed the lack of ‘willingness by the State, as the representative of the society’ 
as acting to ‘create a climate that is conducive to domestic violence’977.
The international and regional jurisprudence that has led to interpretative widening 
and thickening of the due diligence standard – giving a framework of accountability to 
the norm of state responsibility for primary prevention – is arguably rooted in the 
framing of violence against women as discrimination. However, whilst this framing has 
been dominant at the international level, due in large to the growth of the CEDAW 
Committee’s influence through the individual complaints process under the Optional 
Protocol, it has not been without criticism or contention. There are concerns over the 
framing itself, and questions over consistency in applying the frame. Whilst the framing 
of violence against women as discrimination responds to the gender-based nature of 
the violence experienced by women, it could also be seen as limiting the 
conceptualisation and interpretation of violence against women within the discourse, 
such that violence against women is not seen ‘first and foremost as a human rights 
violation in and of itself.’978 Former Special Rapporteur Manjoo has pushed for a new 
binding instrument on violence against women on this basis, arguing that:
CEDAW, whilst having many positive qualities and being an essential piece of 
international legislation preventing discrimination against women, did not 
specifically provide the normative tools for effectively holding States to account 
for their lack of protection of women and girls from violence.979
In an interview with Daniela Nadj, the then Special Rapporteur critiqued the CEDAW 
framing, arguing that the Committee has to twist the Convention to make individual 
complaints of violence against women admissible:
The functioning of the (CEDAW) Committee regarding violence against 
women is to try and fit this pervasive human rights violation under the 
discrimination label, and to then find ways to justify the Committee’s 
977 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, paras. 55, 56; Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States (Merits) 
paragraph 163, citing Maria Da Penha Maia Fernandes v Brazil, paragraph 56
978 Manjoo, “Normative Developments on Violence Against Women in the United Nation System,” 87.
979 Manjoo, “Closing the Normative Gap in International Law on Violence Against Women: 
Developments, Initiatives and Possible Options,” 201.
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jurisdiction by using other provisions in the CEDAW. When it receives a 
complaint, or when it interrogates the state parties reports, it does what I call 
jurisdictional gymnastics to address the issue of violence against women. It has 
to ask questions such as: Is violence against women discrimination? Is the 
violence due to stereotyping? Is it due to family relations?980
By doing this it restricts the accountability and responsibility of the state to instances 
where violence can be evidenced as discriminatory. At a conceptual and discursive 
level it frames acts of violence, torture, and deprivation of liberty, as only being 
violative if they are also discriminatory. In so doing, the framing arguably furthers the 
public/private divide; maintaining that violence that men experience is torture, but 
violence that women experience is discrimination. For this reason the dominance of 
this framing has led feminist lawyers to question the ‘merits of these strategies in the 
long term’ and ‘what these strategic choices actually mean for women – conceptually, 
structurally, and procedurally.’981 Even those in support of the framing of violence 
against women as a form of discrimination – which is the majority of commentators –
still pause to give explanation of the less than obvious legal roots of the international 
human rights law approach to violence against women. As Rhonda McQuigg states: ‘an 
anti-discrimination framework is perhaps not the first discourse which comes to mind 
when considering violence against women, and indeed to approach this issue purely as 
one of discrimination would not capture the essence of the problem.’982
Whilst the framing is limited, it is just that: limited; not wholly deficient. I would argue 
that the discrimination lens does ‘capture the essence of the problem’, but not the 
fullness of the problem. That violence against women is treated as a form of 
discrimination – not just a cause or consequence of discrimination – captures the 
inescapably gendered experience of violence against women. Whilst the discrimination 
frame was borne (at least in part) out of a ‘pragmatic response[…] to gender gaps in 
the law’983, its conceptualisation accurately accounts for the way that violence against 
980 Rashida Manjoo and Daniela Nadj, “‘Bridging the Divide’: An Interview with Professor Rashida 
Manjoo, UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,” Feminist Legal Studies, 23, (2015): 343.
981 Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, xii.
982 McQuigg, “Is it time for a UN treaty on violence against women?” 306.
983 Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law, xii.
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women is experienced984 as specifically and fundamentally gendered by women, and 
the simultaneous psychosocial trauma this inflicts: 
First, discriminatory violence is particularly harmful to its victims, who suffer not 
only the physical and emotional injury of the crime itself but also the added 
psychic injury of knowing they were victimized because of their group identity. 
Second, group-based violence serves a terroristic function, intimidating not only 
the individual who has been attacked but all other members of the same group 
who fear that they could be next. Thus, all women – including those who have 
not been direct victims – pay the price for violence against women in lost 
options, autonomy, and peace of mind. And finally, group-based violence 
serves the broader function of reinforcing the prevailing subordination of the 
targeted group. In this way, violence against women is an instrument of social 
control.985
This has been picked up and applied by the regional Courts in their consideration of 
harm and due diligence.986 Applying a discrimination frame also allows for intersectional 
analysis of violative acts and the state’s responsibility to prevent at a primary level, by 
considering how multiple and multiply-mediated forms of discrimination impact on 
women’s experience of violence, and the role of the state in challenging and mitigating 
those factors:
By accounting for the roots of violence, the obligation easily accommodates an 
analysis of gender violence that is linked to other forms of discrimination. It 
requires attention to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination because 
they are part and parcel of the cause and consequences of gender violence.987
This frame has meant that the application of due diligence has been expanded to 
account for a state’s increased duties and responsibility to prevent violence against 
984 This has been well theorised and articulated by feminist theorists for decades, and has been 
researched and evidenced by trauma specialists. See the work of Catherine MacKinnon, Robin West, 
Mary Becker, Susan Brownmiller.
985 Goldfarb, “Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,” 16.
986 Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, paragraph 124.
987 Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils,” 
309.
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vulnerable and marginalised women. This has been most clearly noted in the Inter-
American cases, where the discrimination frame has led to interpretive thickening of 
the state’s responsibility for the girl-child988, for the maquiladora workers989, for 
indigenous women990, and women who are at increased risk of, and exposure to
violence, such as trans women and women who ‘face discrimination on the basis of 
more than one factor during their lifetime’991, such as race, ethnicity, disability, 
indigeneity, or economic status. 
Whilst the discrimination frame has led to the interpretive expansion of due diligence 
obligations, it is, as touched on above, limited. Its emphasis on discrimination has led to 
significant advances in how primary prevention is conceptualised, with an increased 
focus on the state’s responsibility with regard the wider context and culture of 
discrimination and violence against women, but it has also, arguably, paid insufficient 
attention to the substantive rights and violations that are framed as discriminatory. This 
is not specific to the issue of violence against women, but reflective of the nature of 
the CEDAW as ‘primarily focused on combating discrimination against women, as 
opposed to securing the rights of women in a more substantive manner.’992 However, 
the lack of focus on substantive rights has meant that women’s experience of violence 
has not been consistently interpreted through the engendered application of existing 
human rights provisions, such as the right to bodily integrity, or the prohibition of 
torture.993
988 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 113.
989 Claudia Ivette González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, paragraph 2.
990 Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, paras. 308.22, 308.23.
991 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 113.
992 McQuigg, “Is it time for a UN treaty on violence against women?” 306.
993 Gendered violations of torture – particularly those committed by private actors – are still regularly 
conceptualised as outside the purview of existing ‘gender-neutral’ human rights provisions, such as the 
CAT. The lack of development in engendering existing substantive rights is reflected in academic 
commentary, where the second frame of engendering existing human rights provisions has received far 
less attention than the discrimination frame. The academic mainstay for the frame of violence against 
women as torture remains Rhonda Copelon’s 1994 work: ‘Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic 
Violence as Torture’. Writing in 2018, Rhonda McQuigg (“Is it time for a UN treaty on violence against 
women?”) highlights the two feminist frames of violence against women, and uses Copelon to evidence 
the frame of torture. Likewise, writing in 2018, Jeremy Sarkin (“A Methodology to Ensure that States 
Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and Processes to Significantly Impact Levels of Violence 
Against Women Around the World,”) does the same. That Copelon’s work has stayed the test of time 
is a testament to her scholarship, but it also reflects the dearth of further theorising and analysis of this 
frame. (Copelon, “Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture.”). An example of how 
this manifests in the case law outlined above, is the framing offered by the third party petitioner, 
Interights, in the Opuz case, and the Court’s response to it. Interights argued that State responsibility for 
preventing violence against women should be measured against ‘exemplary diligence’ given ‘the jus 
cogens nature of the right to freedom from torture and the right to life’ (Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 125). 
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There also exists within the discrimination frame a lack of clarity as to the nature of 
the relationship between violence against women and gender discrimination, which has 
impacted upon the application of the due diligence principle and state responsibility for 
preventing violence against women. Is violence against women a form of discrimination, 
or a cause or consequence of discrimination; or all three? Part of this is rooted in 
textual differences across the CEDAW and regional treaties. The CEDAW 
Committee predominantly treats violence against women as a form or manifestation 
of discrimination. (Although it also recognises discrimination as both an underlying 
cause and consequence of violence against women in General Recommendation no. 
19.) Alternatively, Article 6(a) of the Convention of Belém do Pará states: ‘The right of 
every woman to be free from violence includes, among others: The right of women to 
be free from all forms of discrimination.’ David Richards and Jillienne Haglund highlight 
this difference – describing it as an ‘inconsistency due to overlap’994. When considering 
‘whether this is the same thing stated two ways’995, they conclude:
The answer to this appears to us to be “no”, as on one hand CEDAW states 
that some forms of discrimination constitute violence against women, and on 
the other hand, the Inter-American treaty states that all forms of discrimination 
constitute violence against women.996
The Istanbul Convention – similarly to the Belém do Pará – specifically states violence 
against women is a human rights violation in its own right, but also frames it as a form 
and consequence of gender discrimination. However, it diverges from this 
understanding by separating domestic violence out from the discrimination framing (as 
outlined in Chapter 3). This disrupts the jurisprudence of the European Court, and 
diverges from international and regional standards. This has major impacts for the 
This is in keeping with the ILC assessment of due diligence in the Bosnia Genocide case. Whilst the 
ECtHR did take a gendered approach to violence against women in the Opuz case, and spoke to the 
‘gravity of offences’ (paragraph 170), it could have gone farther to outline how an engendered reading 
of torture impacted on the measure of diligence required to prevent violence against women. The 
gendered approach to Article 2 and 3 in Opuz relied on application in conjunction with Article 14. A 
broader reading of violence against women as gendered torture – beyond the framing of discrimination 
– was not evident in the Court’s framing. 
994 Richards and Haglund, “Exploring the Consequences of the Normative Gap in Legal Protections 
Addressing Violence Against Women,” 43.
995 Richards and Haglund, “Exploring the Consequences of the Normative Gap in Legal Protections 
Addressing Violence Against Women,” 43.
996 Richards and Haglund, “Exploring the Consequences of the Normative Gap in Legal Protections 
Addressing Violence Against Women,” 43.
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framing of violence against women, and consequently efforts to apply due diligence –
and importantly systemic due diligence – to instances of domestic violence. As 
outlined above the initial framing of state responsibility for private violence relied on 
Article 2 (e) of the CEDAW – without this gendered analysis the foundations of state 
responsibility for violence against women become less clear. This is particularly true of 
systemic due diligence and primary prevention which relies on a conceptualisation of 
violence as gendered and systemic. Whilst the Convention makes sure of the duty of 
prevention, it also provides a dangerous opening to gender-neutral readings of 
domestic violence. In other regions, and at the international level, this could have a
significant impact on norm conceptualisation. By ‘invisibilising (once again) the 
structural discrimination which permits the violence to flourish in the first place’997, the 
Istanbul Treaty blurs the relationship between violence against women (more broadly) 
and discrimination, and weakens recourse to provisions of systemic due diligence 
which have expanded notions of state responsibility for this pervasive violation. 
Beneath the disjointed overlap of regional and international instruments lies a lack of 
conceptual clarity concerning the relationship between violence against women and 
discrimination. This appears across and within the case law of the regional bodies; with 
some cases displaying a lack of internal clarity of framing, as outlined below. 
In the case of Opuz v. Turkey – widely considered a watershed moment in the ECtHR’s 
gender jurisprudence – the framing of the Court’s findings under Article 14 relied on a 
number of understandings of the relationship between violence and discrimination. 
Given the foundational relationship between the determination of reasonableness and 
the articulation of the primary rule, this lack of conceptual clarity raises questions about 
the Court’s assessment of due diligence. Whilst the Court found that the state had 
failed in its duty to prevent violence against women – applying Articles 2 and 3 in 
conjunction with Article 14 – when it came to describing how the violation was 
gender-based and discriminatory it appears unclear if the Court considered violence 
against women to be discriminatory (as understood under the CEDAW framing) or if 
it was the way the authorities responded to the violence that was discriminatory. The 
Court’s assessment of the state’s responsibility seemed to emphasise the second 
framing over the first, characterising ‘violence against women as a form of 
997 Jones, “The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Council of Europe Convention 
on Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention),” 140.
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discrimination owing to the State’s failure to exercise due diligence’998, and 
pronouncing that ‘the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence 
breaches their right to equal protection’999. In a list of its considerations on the 
relationship between violence against women and discrimination, the Court referred 
to: the CEDAW, Belém do Pará, the DEVAW, the cases before the CEDAW 
Committee and Inter-American bodies, and the framing of HRC resolution 2003/45 
(which articulates violence against women as a consequence of discrimination). Whilst 
the Court noted the framing of violence against women as a form, cause, and 
consequence of discrimination, it seemed most hesitant on pronouncing on violence 
against women as a form of discrimination (the framing of the CEDAW): only 
suggesting that ‘the violence suffered by the applicant and her mother may be 
regarded as gender-based violence which is a form of discrimination against 
women’1000. This is particularly puzzling given its judgement on the state’s 
discriminatory response to the violence Nahide suffered seemed to rely heavily on 
evidence provided by the petitioners that the abuse she suffered was gender-based 
and discriminatory. Despite this, the Court much more readily emphasised the nature 
of the state’s response and judicial passivity as discriminatory. The ECtHR’s 
consideration of international and regional gender-jurisprudence in this case was 
welcomed, and showed the Court’s willingness to apply a gendered framing of 
violence against women. However, the listing of overlapping frames – without 
grounding its own conceptualisation – seems to evidence a lack of clarity as to the 
Court’s gender analysis and interpretation of violence against women as discrimination. 
As the framing of the international and regional cases overlap, and the Court ultimately 
found violations under Article 14, there appears to be a lack of critical concern for the 
specific frame the Court used to determine a breach of discrimination. This said, the
Court’s decision could have been based on cumulative framing: finding a breach of 
Article 14 based on a combination of the subtly different frames of the CEDAW and 
Inter-American case law and treaties. 
Similar conceptual blurring and cumulative framing is evident in the Inter-American 
cases, where the frame of violence against women as discrimination seems more 
readily to hinge on the state’s response as discriminatory, rather than characterisation of 
998 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 190.
999 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 191.
1000 Opuz v. Turkey, paragraph 200.
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the violence itself as gender-based: ‘a state’s failure to act with due diligence to protect 
women from violence constitutes a form of discrimination, and denies women their 
right to equality before the law.’1001 Whilst the state’s passivity is discriminatory, the 
framing of systemic due diligence relies on recognition that violence against women –
as a structural phenomenon – is itself gendered and discriminatory. There seems to be a 
degree of conflation concerning discrimination as it relates to the primary rule (the 
framing of violence against women as gender-based) and discrimination as it relates to 
the application of the due diligence standard (the general principle that due diligence 
should be applied in good faith and in a non-discriminatory manner). In the Lenahan 
case the Court rightly considers the frame of discrimination, but does little to separate 
discrimination as framing the primary rule from discrimination in relation to due 
diligence. Instead the Court describes a ‘strong link’ between the three ideas:
In the same vein, the international and regional systems have pronounced on 
the strong link between discrimination, violence and due diligence, emphasizing 
that a State’s failure to act with due diligence to protect women from violence 
constitutes a form of discrimination, and denies women their right to equality 
before the law. These principles have also been applied to hold States 
responsible for failures to protect women from domestic violence acts 
perpetrated by private actors. Domestic violence, for its part, has been 
recognized at the international level as a human rights violation and one of the 
most pervasive forms of discrimination, affecting women of all ages, ethnicities, 
races and social classes.1002
Repeatedly the regional Courts combine their judgments on the failure to act with due 
diligence in a non-discriminatory manner, and the failure to respond to violence against 
women (itself a form of discrimination). Both of these norms are at issue, and are to 
some degree related, but conceptual clarity is needed. The application of due diligence 
relies on clear appreciation and conceptualisation of the primary rule, and the 
application of systemic due diligence, specifically, relies on clearly conceiving of violence 
against women as gendered and discriminatory. 
1001 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 111.
1002 Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, paragraph 111.
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Analysis of the international and regional bodies’ gender jurisprudence seems similarly 
blurry with some commentators lumping together ‘violence and discrimination against 
women’ without making it clear if this frames two distinct violations; if the two relate; 
or, if they co-constitutively frame one violative act. For instance, in Brooke Stedman’s 
analysis of the international and regional bodies’ application of the due diligence 
standard, she repeatedly touches on a number of frames of violence against women as 
discriminatory (including Belém do Pará and General Recommendation no 19), before 
assimilating those ideas into broad analysis of ‘violence and discrimination’. In describing 
the European Court’s jurisprudence concerning due diligence and violence against 
women, she says ‘the ECtHR formally recognised State responsibility to prevent 
violence and discrimination against women in two landmark cases, Opuz v. Turkey and 
Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria.’1003 This is true if Stedman is presenting ‘violence and 
discrimination’ as separate violations, but does not accurately account for the gender-
jurisprudence of the Court. Historically the Court was reluctant to apply a gendered 
lens to violence against women, refusing to make findings on the basis of Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination). The ‘conspicuous’ absence of a discrimination frame 
was out of keeping with international standards and heavily criticised, as outlined 
above. This changed with the Opuz verdict, where the Court for the first time held 
that domestic violence was gender-based and discriminatory. However, the Court’s 
application of Article 14 has been inconsistent. In Bevacqua and S v. Bulgaria the Court 
refused to find on Article 14 but did pronounce on Article 8 (right to family life). In 
Opuz the court found on Article 14 but not on Article 8. In Civek v. Turkey the Court 
reverted to a gender-neutral reading and refused to find on Article 14. A month later 
in M.G. v. Turkey it found on Article 14 and reaffirmed its judgement in Opuz. Both 
Opuz v. Turkey and Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria are domestic violence cases where the 
Court expanded the responsibility of the state under the due diligence principle, but, 
significantly, the Court did not make findings under Article 14 in Bevacqua, and failed 
to apply gendered analysis to the case. 
Whilst the discrimination frame is essential to readings of the state’s systemic due 
diligence obligation to prevent violence against women, the blurring, or blurriness, of 
the framing, has led to increased calls for violence against women to be dually framed 
1003 Stedman, “The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights Through a Legal Lens,” 
13.
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as a human rights violation in and of itself and a form of discrimination. This approach 
has been taken up by the Istanbul Convention – despite its divergent (and internally 
inconsistent) approach to domestic violence – and has long been the approach of 
third party interveners and petitioners in the regional cases.1004
The fragmented and overlapping framing across the international and regional bodies –
particularly with relation to violence against women as gender-based and 
discriminatory – furthers the call for a new legally binding document. As well as the 
lack of bite (with the absence of a hard law provision), the lack of conceptual clarity 
(with no single, unified and codified approach), means that the application of the due 
diligence standard is complicated and inconsistent. As such, one single binding 
instrument that cements the gendered and discriminatory nature of violence against 
women, including domestic violence, and establishes violence against women as a 
human rights violation, is essential to actualising the feminist conceptualisation of state
responsibility for preventing violence against women. This framing is especially needed 
for the development of systemic due diligence, which relies on the clarification of 
primary rules; particularly those outlining primary prevention. 
Clarification of norms and obligations is especially needed given the risk of calling for 
greater state action. Given the state remains a prolific perpetrator of human rights 
violations against women1005, Benninger-Budel asks: ‘[i]s a state that functions according 
1004 In the Lenahan case, for instance, the CUNY International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic 
amicus brief focused on violence against women as a form of gender discrimination and a form of 
torture: Brief for the International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic City University of New York as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Jessica Ruth Gonzales in her individual capacity and on behalf of 
her deceased daughters, Katheryn, Rebecca, And Leslie Gonzales v United States Of America, Case No. 
12.626 Petition No. P-1490-05, retrieved from  
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/10.20.08%20IWHR%20Gonzales%20amicus%20brief%20FI
NAL%2010-20-2008.pdf
1005 ‘Examples abound of sexual violence committed by State actors, both as individuals acting in official 
or semi-official capacities, and through group or collective actions. Sexual violence committed by the 
military, both against members of the military and against civilians, is all too common. Tragic accounts of 
the widespread and systematic use of rape in war starkly highlight this point. In other cases, the State 
turns a blind eye toward abuses carried out by paramilitary forces as a way to deflect culpability. 
Outside of military settings, women and girls, particularly racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, 
are subjected to sexual assault, rape, brutal strip-searches, beatings, and even shootings and killings by 
law enforcement and other state officials. As but one example, the United Nations Committee Against 
Torture has noted with alarm reports of women being subjected to sexual violence in police stations in 
Guatemala. State agents explicitly advocate or frequently condone violence against sex workers, migrant 
women, and trans people.’ Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its 
Power and its Perils,” 312.
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to patriarchal principles in any position to protect women from violence?’1006 As Julie 
Goldscheid and Debra Liebowitz suggest, in invoking the due diligence standard we 
must be cautious to ‘parse its powers and its perils’1007. At a symbolic and material 
level, recourse to the state as a ‘protector of women’s rights’ is beset with challenges –
as outlined in chapter 1 – and these require attention when calling for the state to 
take increased responsibility and accountability. As Brown cautions, the call for state 
protection creates and perpetuates the ‘legal and thereby ontologising … construction 
of … female powerlessness’1008. Much like the critique of the Men and Boys’ Network, 
the engagement of the state risks further diminishing the citizenship of women, by 
characterising them as weak, in need of protection, and consequently making their lives 
and bodies open to further regulation.1009 Acting at a global level, reinforcing this 
standard of protection within customary or treaty law, risks the universalization of this 
‘ontologising construction of female powerlessness’, and the concomitant endorsement
of male power and force. At the state level, the implications of these international 
standards are the material expansion of criminalisation and regulation of women’s lives, 
bodies and homes. This is particularly true when seeking to expand the powers of the 
state in the context of criminal interventions, such as the push for mandatory arrests 
and no-drop prosecutions as an obligation of due diligence protection. Given that ‘[f]or 
many, the State, particularly as embodied by the criminal justice system, is a 
perpetrator of violence rather than a protector against violence’1010, calls for increased 
intervention must seek to redress (rather than further) the state’s troubling 
relationship with marginalised women, such as migrant workers, trans women, and 
racial and ethnic minority women. Advocating for due diligence must be part of a 
broader ‘normative challenge to [the] human rights discourse’1011, going beyond the 
‘the familiar liberal, rights-based model’1012, and applying a holistic conceptualisation of 
women’s rights. A new treaty must mark an advance of radical, engendered notions of 
state responsibility. As such, the potential for the ‘de-politicisation, professionalisation, 
1006 Benninger-Budel, “Introduction,” 16.
1007 Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils,” 
301.
1008 Wendy Brown, “Finding the Man in the State,” Feminist Studies, 18(1), (Spring 1992): 9.
1009 Jones, “The Importance of International Law and Institutions,” 9.
1010 Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils,” 
313.
1011 Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism, (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005), 
136.
1012 Bourke-Martignoni, “The history and development of the due diligence standard in international law 
and its role in the protection of women against violence,” 59.
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and standardisation of the anti-domestic violence movement’1013 through ‘partnership’
with the state should be a concern. Any effort to move towards a new instrument 
should therefore be led by the transnational women’s movement and uphold a 
gendered and holistic conceptualisation of violence against women along with feminist 
principles of state responsibility for prevention. Again it is worth noting – as touched 
on in chapter 1 – that engagement with international human rights law is premised on 
the independence afforded women’s groups from the state at this level1014; and the 
ability this gives for feminists to negotiate the gendered implications of state 
responsibility beyond the confines of their national context. This discursive opportunity 
remains a vital avenue for solidarity, community and empowerment across women’s 
groups, and for overcoming systemic oppressions at the state level.
Conclusions
As discussed, there remain questions as to the efficacy of the due diligence standard, 
with consistent application affected by internal and external challenges. The flexibility 
and lack of clarity about the standard’s substantive content leaves it open to be used 
defensively by states. This requires clearer articulation and application of primary rules 
and substantive rights, and interpretation of the positive obligations that flow from 
them. The differing frames of violence against women, and the fragmentation of legal 
norms across the regional conventions, add further challenge to concretising due 
diligence obligations. These problems are largely resolved by the introduction of a new 
binding instrument. This binding instrument must uphold the norms of primary 
prevention and the feminist conceptualisation of state responsibility, as outlined in 
Chapter 3, and as evidenced in the evolving regional case law and visionary 
theorisation of the UN Special Rapporteur. This is particularly the case given the risks 
and complexities of calling for greater involvement of the state – a hegemonic, 
patriarchal actor – in women’s lives. 
As outlined above, the due diligence standard has acted as a powerful legal tool for 
strengthening accountability and expanding interpretation of substantive obligations of 
1013 Goldscheid and Liebowitz, “Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils,” 
313.
1014 Jude Howell, “Gender, civil society and the state in China,” In Gender, Politics and the State, Vicky 
Randall and Georgina Waylen, eds., (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 178.
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primary prevention. It has also acted as a central sociopolitical framework for 
establishing violence against women, and domestic violence in particular, as a human 
rights violation. These legal and jurisprudential developments form part of, and are 
rooted in, a feminist theory of state responsibility; and build on the conceptual 
developments at the paradigmatic level outlined in the previous chapter. Combined 
they form an approach to violence against women that is distinct from criminal, civil or 
public health understandings of violence against women, and raise up norms that are 
unique to the human rights approach to eliminating violence against women. Whilst 
the due diligence standard continues to act as an effective tool for accountability, its 
sociopolitical and legal significance are capped without development of a new binding 
instrument concretising norms and rules of primary prevention. Where once the due 
diligence standard was a rallying-point for activists, it is now left floundering in the 
normative gap, with a significant number of scholars1015, including former Special 
Rapporteur Manjoo, calling for the international human rights law approach to catch-
up. Due diligence must be part of the next evolutionary leap of the human rights law 
approach to violence against women, serving not only to help close the ‘normative 
gap’ but also to bring further normative challenge, as part of the feminist reimagining of 
state responsibility within international human rights law.
1015 See: Manjoo and Jones, eds., The Legal Protection From Violence: Normative Gaps in International 
Human Rights Law; McQuigg, “Is it time for a UN treaty on violence against women?”; Sarkin, “A 
Methodology to Ensure that States Adequately Apply Due Diligence Standards and Processes to 
Significantly Impact Levels of Violence Against Women Around the World.”; Edwards, Violence Against 
Women Under International Human Rights Law.
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A Feminist Theory of State Responsibility for Violence Against Women: 
Conclusion.
The transnational women’s movement has led the international human rights law 
approach to violence against women since its origins. As such, this approach is rooted 
in (radical) feminist theory, methodology and epistemology. Whilst seemingly centred 
on the liberal machinery of the institutional international legal order, the approach is 
one that looks radically at the gendered and politicised nature of the state, society, and 
the problem of violence against women, and engages with the law on that basis; 
confronting patriarchy where it manifests in the law, and in practice and appropriation 
of the law. It operates through a liberationist lens, seeking not only to achieve ‘equality 
with men’, but rather to free women from oppression, violence and subjugation. Its 
understanding of gender is deeply political, intersectional, and radical, and forefronts 
positionality, community, and empowerment, as they relate to questions about 
paradigm, policy, and praxis. It blurs boundaries between theory and practice and 
constantly calls into focus the experience, wisdom, and expertise of women and 
women’s organisations; and, likewise, calls into question, those approaches that lack 
this experiential grounding and wisdom.
The feminist approach to violence against women, as evidenced in the emerging 
international human rights response of the past decades, casts a large shadow on the 
state. Beyond its historical, legal significance as the primary subject of international law, 
the feminist approach to violence against women places a high degree of culpability, 
responsibility and accountability on the state due to its operation as a hegemonic 
cultural and sociopolitical actor. Engagement with the due diligence standard is 
premised on this understanding: that violence against women is a macrosystemic 
phenomenon that demands the state be responsible for its actions (and inactions) at 
this level. It frames violence against women in such a way that rejects the idiosyncratic, 
individualised, privatised, and overly pathologised accounts of violence against women. 
It calls into question the fraternal social contract and creates a deeply politicised 
discursive space within international law, and international society, in which, and from 
which, women can renegotiate their identities and claims as citizens. In this way it 
undermines past renderings of international law as ‘public’ and women (and violence 
against women) as constitutively ‘private’. It recognises the role of the state in the most 
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intimate spaces of women’s lives, and the existence of women at the most public and 
global setting. 
From this discursive space the transnational women’s movement has been able to 
institutionalise and operationalise particular substantive norms, developed from ‘asking 
the woman question’ both of international law and violence against women. The 
conceptualisation of violence against women as: rooted in patriarchy; gendered and 
discriminatory; and, operating at an individual and societal level in a systemic manner; 
has formed the bedrock of standard-setting, good policy, and praxis developments at 
the international and state levels. The increased acceptance of the feminist 
understanding and characterisation of violence against women has led to a focus on 
primary prevention which aims to tackle ‘upstream’ or ‘root’ causes. The norms 
inherent in this development – gender mainstreaming, gender specificity, 
transformative equality, intersectionality, and empowerment – frame the work of 
leading women’s organisations, and mark a fuller approach to human rights more 
broadly: one that emphasises the holism, indivisibility, and inalienability of women’s 
human rights. This approach to the primary prevention of violence against women, 
seeks to see women, and their experience of violence against women, fully, politically, 
and ‘prophetically’ – calling out and validating the reality of women’s experience, 
throwing off the hegemonic consciousness of the day, and seeing instead ‘what might 
be’. 
As evidenced in the case study on the Men and Boys’ Network, this approach to 
primary prevention is incompatible with welfarist, paternalistic/fraternalistic, gender-
neutralised, and depoliticised engagement with violence against women. It is an 
approach that is epistemologically and methodologically dependent on the leadership 
and vision of women. As such, the rapid advance of the Men and Boys’ Network 
shows the fragility of these seemingly broadly-held norms. This is most evident in the 
depoliticisation and gender-neutralisation of the framing of domestic violence at the 
regional, European level, and at the domestic level, as evidenced by the Welsh 
approach. This fragility is borne of the normative gap at the international level. Whilst 
there arguably exists a rule of customary law that requires of states to pursue the 
elimination of violence against women, there remains no binding international 
conventional law that concretises and outlines specifically the duties of the state; and 
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makes accountable the responsibility of the state. This creates both symbolic and 
normative problems, and operates as a bar to implementing the hard-fought normative 
gains of the transnational women’s movement. The due diligence standard has served 
as a juridical bridge for bringing ‘private’ acts of violence against women into the 
purview of international law, and as a broader sociopolitical tool for actualising the 
feminist theory of state responsibility – particularly with regard primary prevention and 
systemic due diligence. However, as previously summarised, this standard is weak, and 
its reign as ‘cause célèbre’ is tired. The discourse has since advanced more robust 
norms and accounts of positive rights with relation to preventing violence against 
women; and the duty of states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights extends
beyond the limited framing of due diligence offered by the DEVAW and General 
Recommendation no. 19. The norms of primary prevention outlined in Chapter 3, and 
the progressive jurisprudence of the regional courts outlined in Chapter 4, need to be 
further concretised both to maintain the institutional and discursive gains of the past 
three decades, and to provide a more robust platform for further advancement and 
development. 
The absence of political will, however, and the advent of alternative actors contributing 
to the discourse, should raise concerns for those looking to utilise the international 
human rights law approach to violence against women, to further advance a case for 
state responsibility for violence against women. In response the transnational women’s 
movement must continue to fight for leadership of the international human rights law 
approach to violence against women, and to defend the discursive space they have 
created from, and for, the lived experience of women, and the futures they collectively 
envision. I believe a new international treaty is instrumental to that future. 
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